


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Wrocław
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REVIEW

Papieski Wydział Teologiczny we Wrocławiu
Pontifical Faculty of Theology in Wrocław



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FOREWORD

Wrocławski PRZEGLĄD Teologiczny
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“Primarily, the proclamation of the Gospel”

„Przede wszystkim głoszenie Ewangelii”

The Synod of Bishops for the Amazon was held in the Vatican from October 6 to 26, 2019. In his concluding speech following the vote on the final document, Pope Francis emphasized that four dimensions – cultural, ecological, social, and pastoral – had to be considered to make what the Synod had given the Church understandable. I believe that the theological-doctrinal dimension is the fifth element that must be assumed due to its very nature. Although the Holy Father did not explicitly mention it, his statement that post-synodal exhortation should be promulgated by the end of the year assumes this dimension. It is the solemn teaching of the Bishop of Rome that is binding for the whole Church. Under the Code of Canon Law (can. 343), the post-synodal provisions are merely advisory to the Pope. Therefore, it should be recognized that the provisions of the Synod are only “the input to the debate” and have no legal force.

Pope Francis also noted that the most crucial thing is to focus on the evangelization. Proclaiming the Gospel requires tremendous creativity. Therefore, I mentioned above the theological-doctrinal dimension of not so much the post-synodal provisions as the exhortation to be proclaimed. In this context, academic theology has a prominent role to play. It is from the academic discussion that conclusions are born and, in a sense, mark paths of fidelity to the Gospel and its proclamation to the contemporary man.

The community of the Pontifical Faculty of Theology in Wrocław has been undertaking this assignment for over fifty years. In February last year, we celebrated the golden anniversary of the Decree of the Congregation for Catholic Education recognising the Academic School of Theology in Wrocław as a continuation of the pre-war Faculty of Catholic Theology at the University of Wrocław. In the same year, our journal celebrated its silver jubilee. We are continually striving to raise our scientific standards, as evidenced by the constant presence of the “Wrocław Theological Review” on the List of Scored Journals

published by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. The journal was also on the List announced on July 3, 2019, gaining 20 points. We owe this state of art primarily to the resilient activity of our scientific community. The result is the issue that we are now giving to the Readers.

It contains articles by our scientists as well as by researchers from Poland and abroad. Remarkably, we have placed two works authored by the former and present dignitaries of the Holy See first. These articles set forth ways of understanding theology as a science. The adoption of this paradigm results in undertaking a theological consideration on selected biblical issues, which can be found in the first part of this issue. Since the Bible is the soul of theology, it is natural to initiate a reflection on contemporary issues of fundamental and dogmatic theology, which is included in the second section. The work of pastoral theology and even canonical law and history of the Church are the practical application of the issues raised by the doctrine of the Church. We also do not lack reflection on philosophical issues. Theology practised in the academic dimension is also based on discussions with other researchers; therefore, as usual, we publish a section with reviews of domestic and foreign books.

We are pleased to present to our Readers the next issue of "Wrocław Theological Review" in English. It was enabled by the fact that our editorial team had won the competition in two projects held by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. We hope that in this way our periodical will blossom out not only in Poland but also abroad.

Fr. Sławomir Stasiak
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Theology as a Science¹

Teologia jako nauka

ABSTRACT: The vantage point of the article is to show the formation process of the concept and objective of Christian theology from the historic perspective. The concept of theology itself stems from its function within the Church – it is the acceptance and execution of the Revelation. Theology is the task of the Church as a whole, as it leads to getting to know God and the ultimate objective of man. Through the establishment of the relation between reason and faith, theology becomes for one a place of searching for answers to fundamental questions concerning the reason for one's existence. As theology has its sources in the self-revelation of God in His Word, getting to know God is complete on the personal plane in the love for Him. Theology is not a science in the full extent of the concept, as it is executed by reason, and through this, it participates in the cognition of all reality. Today it seems to be a proposition of a fundamental anthropological science, in light of the distribution of specialities of special sciences at universities, as it deals with fundamental questions. On the other hand, theology has in its core the spreading of the Gospel, and this remains its task as a science in the university realm.

(summary prepared by fr. Jacek Froniewski)

KEYWORDS: theology as a science, theological cognition, theology and lay sciences, faith and reason, theology at the university

ABSTRAKT: Punktem wyjścia artykułu jest ukazanie kształtowania się pojęcia i celu chrześcijańskiej teologii w perspektywie historycznej. Natomiast sama treść teologii zdaniem autora wynika z jej funkcji w Kościele – to przyswojenie i realizacja Objawienia. W takim sensie teologia jest zadaniem Kościoła jako całości, gdyż wiedzie do poznania Boga i ostatecznego celu człowieka. Poprzez ustanowienie związku pomiędzy rozumem a wiarą teologia staje się dla człowieka miejscem poszukiwania odpowiedzi na fundamentalne pytanie o sens istnienia. Ponieważ teologia ma swoje źródło

¹ The article is based on the text of the speech delivered during the International Scientific Conference on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Pontifical Faculty of Theology in post-war Poland “Theology in the world of science,” which was held at the Pontifical Faculty of Theology in Wrocław on 22–23 June, 2018.

w samoobjawieniu się Boga w Jego Słowie, poznanie Boga dopełnia się na płaszczyźnie osobowej w miłości do Niego. Pomimo całej swojej specyfiki poznawczej teologia jest w pełni nauką, gdyż realizuje się za pomocą rozumu, przez co uczestniczy w poznaniu całej rzeczywistości. Więcej jeszcze, w takim kontekście teologia dzisiaj wydaje się propozycją fundamentalnej nauki antropologicznej wobec rozdrobnienia specjalności nauk szczegółowych na uniwersytetach, gdyż zajmuje się podstawowymi pytaniami o byt i naturę istoty ludzkiej. Z drugiej strony teologia ma w swojej istocie głoszenie Ewangelii i to pozostaje jej zadaniem jako nauki w świecie uniwersyteckim – miejscu wymiany poglądów, gdzie wnosi istotne kwestie egzystencjalne ważne dla każdego.

(streszczenie przygotował ks. Jacek Froniewski)

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: teologia jako nauka, poznanie teologiczne, teologia a nauki świeckie, wiara a rozum, teologia na uniwersytecie

The concept and the objective of Christian theology

The usage of the term “theology” to refer to the scientific collection, presentation and analysis of the entire reality of the world and man from the perspective of the revelation emerged in the Western World in the 12th century (Gilbert van Poitiers, Petrus Abaelard). The Christian doctrine (*doctrina christiana, sacra scriptura, divina pagina, sacra eruditio*) was until that time frequently seen as the opposition to “theology,” this being a collective term for the false teachings of heathens about God.

In contrast, Christian teachings about God and Christ are the “true” theological philosophy (Augustine, *Civ* 8,1). Augustine describes a threefold mode of usage of the term (*Civ* 6): First as a mythical theology of writers, second – as a political theology (e.g. also as a state ideology) and third – as philosophical teachings about God. This lecture on God under the intense impact of the philosophically substantiated myth (Plato, *Polit* 379 a) forms for Aristotle, as the *Theologia*, one of the three philosophical sciences after mathematics and physics: “Without a doubt, if there would be something divine somewhere, then it would have such nature and have as its objective the most noble of sciences, the most noble form of the being” (*Metaph* E 1026a). Thus, theology is the “first philosophy” and first metaphysics. It poses the question on the universal reasons and principles of being. This metaphysically-philosophical science of God is significant for Christian theology as well, as the *theologia naturalis*.

The reception of “theology” as a professional term took place against the backdrop of an intense transformation of meanings of both components of this term. “Theos” now becomes, in opposition to the predicative usage in Greek and Roman mythology, a designation for the God from the Biblical Revelation,

in itself person and subject. “Theos” thus becomes the name of that personal reality that approaches the world as the Creator (Gen 1,1) and Originator, as well as Carrier of holy history (Ex 3,14), and which reveals itself in the New Testament as the Father, Son and the Spirit (Gal 4,4-6; Matthew 28, 19 and elsewhere). The discussion of God, hence, takes place by way of an explication of the *logos* of God (John 1,14), whereby this God that would submit itself to this thinking is expressed in themselves in the WORD and in the Spirit (Clement of Alexandria, *Strom* 1,12; 66,1; 13;57,6; Origen, *Cels* 6,18; *Comm in lo* 1,24; 2,34).

In the works of Athanasius, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa, one finds an important differentiation between *theologia* (= the science of *theos*, the Father as the origin of Godliness and His union with the Son and the Spirit, meaning, teachings on the immanent Trinity) and *oikonomia* (= the science of the incarnation of the Word and the sending of the Spirit, meaning, a focus on the economic Trinity, the self-discovery of God in the history of salvation). In the works of Eusebius of Caesarea, “church theology” describes the true Christian science of God, differently to paganism and to any heretic concepts (*Praep* 55,1,1-4). In the sixth century, *Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite* differentiates between mythical, symbolic theology that provides an internal connection to God and the demonstrative-argumentative theology (*Myst3; Ep* 9). The more effective and existential type of theology rather remains within the will and love of its frame of time (theologia cordis), while theology not aimed intellectually any more puts its focus on the discovery of knowledge (theologia intellectualis). This also corresponds to the question of scholastics as to whether theology is rather theoretically-speculative (according to theologians more strongly oriented on the Aristotelian ideal of knowledge, w. g. Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, conf. S.th. I q. 1., a.4), or, within the sense of the Augustine and Franciscan tradition, that it must rather be a practical science “anziskanischen” (Duns Scotus; Bonaventura, *Prooem* in IV 9,3: “ut boni fiamus”).

Theology as a function of the Church

The material determination of “theology” stems from the reflection about its necessity as a function of the Church. The sending of the Church to preach the Gospel to people of all times (Mt 28,19) includes the order to provide the Revelation in a relevant linguistic and witness form so that it could also be accepted by people into their faiths, with their given mental, psychological and cultural conditions. As an attempt at a theoretical inclination and implementation of the revelation, it materially belongs to the universal teachings of the Church.

Both as a simple reflection on faith, as well as within its scientific-theoretical and scientific-organisational institutionalisation at higher education facilities, theology encompasses:

- a) *Historic theology*, with the task of a hermeneutic and historical analysis of the actual purpose of the expression of God in the relevant sources of faith (scripture, tradition, the life and teachings of the Church);
- b) *Theoretical or speculative theology*, with the task to encompass faith in its entirety reasonably, and to bring it to fruitful dialogue with the natural experience of reality of man, as it is reflected in philosophy, but also, in particular, in historical, social and natural sciences;
- c) *Practical theology*, with the objective of reflecting on the individual and social shape of Christian life in the Church and the church itself with respect to society.

Thus, theology does not originate from folly of reason that ventures far too far into divine secrets, and would like to remain on a solid base of available and material knowledge instead of the leap of faith that should be attempted. Theology is also not founded in the private interests of the individual researchers. Theology is a task of the Church as a whole. Its forum is the public space of spiritual and cultural life.

The First Vatican Council founded the service of reason to provide faith while protecting the secretive form of faith, and described the relationship of the positive, philosophical, theoretical and practical aspect of theology:

If, however,

- the reason illuminated by faith (*ratio fide illustrata*) would research with fire, piety and sincerity, with God's Mercy, it would arrive at intelligent insight (*intelligentia mysteriorum*), in fact, quite a fruitful one both from
- the analogy (*analogia*) to that which it recognises naturally, as well as from the relationship of mysteries, among them (*nexus mysteriorum inter se*) and
- with the ultimate objective of man (*finis hominis ultimus*) (DH 3016; 4192).

According to the Second Vatican Council, one can describe the objective of studies in theology in its individual disciplines and in relation to issues of philosophy and natural sciences in contact with the ecumenical questions and the knowledge of the history of religion so:

that younger theologians create Catholic knowledge with precision from the divine revelation, they immerse themselves deeply in it, they make it fruitful for their spiritual life and preach, interpret and defend it in their future priestly service (OT 16).

Theology as the place of the self-understanding of man in the light of God

If it would want to do justice to its task, then theology may not limit itself to simply preaching of faith or just explaining the teachings of the church. This would suggest not in the least the threat of fundamentalism in the interpretation of scripture, which makes no hermeneutic differentiation between the content of what is spoken and its world perspective, or, alongside, the threat of a fruitful, purely positivist reference to the Revelation or to the teachings of the Church. As Faith, however, is not a purely affective attunement of the soul (according to the statement: "Everyone must respond to the question of religion with themselves alone in private"), but because faith describes a personal relation with God who reveals Himself in Word and in Act of His historic revelation as the omnipresent leading idea of the human experience of reality and search for truth, man is unconditionally referred back to reason. Through it, they react adequately to the entirety of their world experience.

A determination of the relationship between reason and faith assumes a precise material statement of the both mutually referring terms. The fundamental relationship of reality and human knowledge may not be described by the fact that reason and sanity only constitute a system of empty rules, through which amorphous content of sensual perception is formed to be some kind of complete image. And the other way around, faith cannot be defined against the backdrop of a quantitative understanding of knowledge, as an amendment or limitation of knowledge acquired from the experience of the world with reference to any subjectively constructed world beyond. Reason is rather given in its transcendental fulfilment that encompasses subjects, introducing the unit of consciousness into sensual experiences in the first place, by virtue of reality itself. In this regard, the question arises about the absolute reason for reality, *the reason of the existence of an individual as a person*. The inevitable fact of life in suffering, in love and in death are key moments of the spiritual existence of man in the world. In their spiritual self-fulfilment, one experiences themselves as reliant on the transcendental origin and the objective of all: God, as the *Whereupon* of self-fulfilment. Hence, the self-experience of man as a creature of reason includes the role of being a "listener" for any possible consolation and claim of God to them in the transmission of any human word. Only upon meeting the *Whereupon* of human spirit as revealing itself in history, does the ability of self-transcendence become complete (*potentia oboedientialis*). *This mode of realisation of reason and freedom opened up by the WORD and carried on by the SPIRIT is called, in the theological sense, "faith."* It is not a heterogeneous

addition to knowledge, but the determination of the transcendental realisation of reason by the Light from the “subject of knowledge” itself (*lumen fidei*).

The origin of theology in the historic meeting with God

On the level of advanced reflection, this original reasonability of faith is called “theology.” The Christian faith clearly does not begin with a general experience of the Holy, but as the self-proclamation of God as a Person in His Words that He speaks to us. The God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the Father of Jesus Christ, does not in any culturally substantiated way, constitute a personification of cosmic powers, as in polytheistic myths and in religions that perceive the divine impersonally. It also is not any variety of a game of philosophic theism that would believe that the absolute is the highest spirit.

Faith is, rather, the reaction to an initiative from the realm of the divine, when and how God would reveal Himself in His absolutely holy name – *ubi et quando visum est Deo*. God is holy because He turns out to be unavailable. However, in the revelation of His name, He also commences a relationship with us so that we can refer to Him and become a community with the holy God. God is holy and He sanctifies us. He is God and He deifies us, when we recognise Him in His WORD (*logos*) and love Him in His Spirit (*spiritus divinus*). “And this is life eternal, that they might know Thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent.” (John 17, 3). To recognise God in the faith infused by the Holy Spirit and in theological reflection is not the material permeation and embracing of a subject of knowledge, but a mutual permeation of two spiritual subjects, namely, the endless Spirit of God and the limited Spirit of man, “but then shall I know even as also I am known.” (1 Corinthians 13, 12).

Theological knowledge is completed in the love for God, above all, and to one’s next as to oneself. Considering this appeal by God, we are also made aware of our own unavailability. If He speaks to me, “You,” there rises in me the ontological reason for my human existence, this is the substantiality, the indivisibility and the immortality of my soul, the meaning of my metaphysical “I.” “For God made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living. For He created all things that they might be: and He made the nations of the Earth for health.” (Wisdom 1, 13). We find ourselves reflexively as a person due to the divine call to existence and a life from God and onto Him: “Man (...) is the only creature on Earth which God willed for Himself.” (GS 24).

Moses sees in the desert the mysterious form of the burning thorn bush that does not burn all the way – an image for the unavailable power of the holy mystery. God Himself calls him from the burning thorn bush by name, but Moses does not react with horror and with a reflex to flee, but clearly, without pride and any sort of feeling of low self-esteem, presents himself: “Here am I.” (Exodus 3, 4). On this holy soil of revelation, God tells him His name, making Himself identifiable and addressable Himself as the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Jesus says at the climax of his self-revelation of the triune God that this God of promise is not a God of the dead, but of the living (Matthew 22, 32). God is the father for Israel and the Church “I am that I am” – always and everywhere.

Hence, it is not the people of God that present the holy personified as their God. It is rather God who freely answers to the needs and complaints of an enslaved people, and addresses them actively. Their question to Moses is fully legitimate: “What is His name?” And Moses tells the people not of his mystical experiences that may not really be of general interest, but he fulfils his task and provides them with the information. “I AM hath sent me unto you” (Exodus 3, 14).

Here one sees the unique fusion of the predicate of divinity with the self-revelation of God as a person in relation to the people of His union. In terms of the history of religion, it remains unprecedented and may also not be derived from the concepts of divinity or absolute and one. To summarise the entire self-revelation of the holy God as mercy and life for everyone who is faithful, one may quote a word from the First Epistle of Peter:

Hope to the end for the grace that is to be brought unto you at the revelation of Jesus Christ; (...) But as He which hath called you is holy, so be ye holy in all manner of conversation. Because it is written, Be ye holy; for I am holy. (Leviticus 19, 2) (1 Peter 1, 16).

Knowledge of God is effected as the succession of Christ and the equalisation with the crucified and resurrected Lord due to the share in the life of the holy God. The life of Christ in God is the fruit and the effect of the self-revelation of God to man, through which the faithful, by Christ, become sons and daughters of God, and by infusion of the Holy Spirit into our hearts, become friends of God.

Our knowledge of truth and the completion of man in the participation in the divinity and rule of God, based on the self-revelation of God, has decisive consequences for our human image. How do we see ourselves in this world in relation to God?

In *Gaudium et spes*, the Council says:

Man judges rightly that by his intellect he surpasses the material universe, for he shares in the light of the divine mind. By relentlessly employing his talents through the ages, he has indeed made progress in the practical sciences and in technology and the liberal arts. In our times, he has won superlative victories, especially in his probing of the material world and in subjecting it to himself. Still he has always searched for more penetrating truths, and finds them. For his intelligence is not confined to observable data alone, but can with genuine certitude attain to reality itself as knowable, though in consequence of sin that certitude is partly obscured and weakened. The intellectual nature of the human person is perfected by wisdom and needs to be, for wisdom gently attracts the mind of man to a quest and a love for what is true and good. Steeped in wisdom, man passes through visible realities to those which are unseen (GS 15).

Theology as a specific medium of self-understanding of man about their own soul and their position in the world, in light of the revelation

For a methodically precise differentiation between the knowledge of the existence of God from the world in the natural execution of reason and the personal-dialogue appearance of reason due to meeting with God in faith, there arises an internal relation between the knowledge of God and the human world and human self-knowledge. Theological reason thus does not only serve the system-immanent interpretation of the knowledge of faith of the Church, but, at the same time, the mutual exchange between the basic orientation in the world achieved in faith and the entirety of knowledge of philosophy and the empirical sciences relevant for the question of human existence.

The scientific claim of faith thus opposes neither the internal spirit of faith nor the objective and method of science. There follows thus, that:

- a) theology, founded in the objective and subjective faith in the revealed truth in the articles of faith (the principle of unity in theology), is specifically different from the natural theology of philosophy, as well as from the formal and real sciences;
- b) as theology, however, rises thanks to reason, and thus shares in the universal reach of reason towards the entirety of reality in its natural, societal, historical and transcendental reality (and to the extent that theological reason, just as reason in general, is informed by reality), it is eminently a science.

Problems with respect to theology and profane sciences

In the 19th century, the Church took a stand against two deficient definitions of relation of faith and reason:

- a) against *fideism* (Bautain) and *traditionalism* (Bonald, Bonnetty, Lamennais). In order to avoid claims against the reasonability of faith (in empiricism, rationalism, criticism), the representatives of these directions traced all religious and moral knowledge of man back to some original revelation, and these are, in the authoritative and positivist sense, predetermined by that possibility of reasonable analysis and transfer (conf. DH 2751–56; 2776–2780; 2811–2813; 2841–2844);
- b) on the other hand, theological *rationalism* (in various variants) also required a critical approach. Even if it did not always and in every respect reduce truths of faith to truths of reason; however, it obfuscated the various origins and the various principles (*lumen naturale, lumen fidei*) that are the basis for natural and supernatural truth. The analogous structure of theological knowledge must have been proven in this regard. Thus, God, as its content and its principle, can never be encompassed by human reason or be in any way made available. In its incomprehensibility, He rather remains the divine secret to which man refers to in a personal act. For this reason, theological reason is, at its very core, dialogical and personal and not dispositive and subjective (conf. the condemnations of the theses of J. Frohschammer: DH 2850–54).

The determination of the relationship of faith and reason in their mutual relation, at the same time, with a differentiation, was also the topic of the dogmatic constitution *Dei Filius* about the Catholic faith, of the First Council of Vatican (DH 3000–3045).

The determination of the relationship of “faith and knowledge” experienced a further expansion in the Second Vatican Council. *Dei Verbum* understands Revelation not as the provision of information on supernatural truths, but rather as the personal message of God through Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit in the medium of the world and history. While separate, faith and reason do not remain in a fixed relationship with each other, but refer to each other dynamically (conf. DV 2–6; GS 15).

The rising natural sciences were, since their “formation” in the 19th century, always flanked and contaminated by a purely immanentist and materialistic world image. Only the material, the visible, the measurable was valid. Truth was not the knowledge of being any more with all its material and spiritual revelations, but it was limited to what was technically possible and reproducible.

The reduction of knowledge to inductive experience structures hid the rather deductive “achievements” of theology and philosophy. Its merit is not found in the improvement of quality of individual results, but in the deeper reflection on the permanent question about the existence of all that exists and its relation to God. Progress in philosophy and theology can certainly also be measured quantitatively in its historical and exegetic dimensions – if we only consider the critical text editions. At its speculative core, however, there is only one qualitative progress that must always be re-adapted individually.

Theology as a fundamental anthropological science

In opposition to the ever increasing fragmentation of individual professional fields at higher education facilities and academies, the frequently microscopic differentiation of which, as well as their independence, theology seems to be a “fundamental science” that deals with the basic coordinates of being, of thinking and of human nature in his conditioning of the reliance on transcendence.

The rationality of faith in the revelation of Jesus Christus allows any person who is not faithful, but who searches for truth and whose existence in the world is a question to them, to seek answers. First, non-believers may see that theology contains a multitude of historic details and cultural knowledge and creative will and contains philosophical reflection characteristic for the development of human spiritual history that the removal of theology from university life would lead to a significant reduction of the entirety of knowledge. The university is nothing else than the entirety of knowledge. Theology is assigned in the university arrangement in the entirety of human knowledge, at the same time remaining at its core, because it confronts man with the reason and sense of his entire existence.

Second, man, as a being provided with reason, has always asked himself about his origins, his objectives and his purpose. The experience of one’s dependence on factors that are not bound by his own fantasy and the readiness to create, the question about his own humanity is also the question about the existence of God. In the course of the history of the spirit and of theology, great thinkers have always shown off complex systems that were carried by the question about god and the relevant consequences for man. In their density and the general validity, they belong to that scope of knowledge that must rightly claim a place within the university.

Theology – for preaching

“The Church is concerned with proclaiming the gospel to all those, within the University, to whom it is still unknown and who are ready to receive it in freedom.” In this way, the Congregation for Catholic Education, the Pontifical Council for the Laity and the Pontifical Council for Culture had provided in the text *The Presence of the Church in the University and in University Culture* 1994 (conf. VAS 118, 9) had stated one aspect significant for theology: Theology is also the preaching of the word of God in the world. The University means in its specific level – scientific exchange, and it is a meeting place of people. Theology may not be taught without value and neutrally. Always under the protection of its own method and the requirements of time, theology may experience an increase in challenges due to the contact with other fields of knowledge, for instance, historic sciences, linguistic sciences, philosophy as well as natural sciences. The indicated sciences frequently put new questions to scientific theology that is encouraged, by university exchange, to new research.

The order to preach of those who teach and their employees must be carried by knowledge that the contents of theology always come with an existential meaning. Countless young people are provided, through the presence of theology at universities and higher education facilities, with the possibility of confronting themselves with the material questions of their existence, and, if they are not students of theology, to meet the Church, the faith in the triune God, the incarnation and the deification of man. True science, however, has its ultimate objective not in technology, but in wisdom.

In terms of the virtue of *sapientia*, the Scripture says in the Book of Wisdom, 6,16-19:

For she goeth about seeking such as are worthy of her, and she sheweth herself to them cheerfully in the ways, and meeteth them with all providence.

For the beginning of her is the most true desire of discipline, And the care of discipline is love.

And love is the keeping of her laws: and the keeping of her laws is the firm foundation of incorruption. And incorruption bringeth near to God.

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Theology in the World of Science¹

Teologia w świecie nauki

ABSTRACT: Culture and modern society are posing new challenges to academic institutions (primarily in Europe). Therefore, the Church has started once again to re-establish its own universities to promote dialogue between faith and reason. In the academic world, student autonomy has begun to increase, and more and more, emphasis is placed on self-teaching using multimedia technologies. This has led to innovative activities in the teaching process and in the teaching system, forcing the transformation of universities, who are questioned about their role to play in the world. There must exist a dialogue between theology and exact sciences, which John Paul II described in *Sapientia Christiana*, *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* and *Fides et Ratio*. Two reflections come to the fore: the first is about the mutual benefits that science and theology can obtain in intellectual dialogue in a university context. Consequently, theology plays an indispensable role in the search for the unity of knowledge, which is why it is obliged to a responsible university presence. The second describes the importance of reaching an integrated view, which oscillates between scientific and religious-theological reading of the world. *Veritatis gaudium* of Pope Francis shows the prospects for the development of Church studies. New social and cultural dynamics force us to extend the purpose of studies, so that the Gospel not only reaches each person individually, but all cultures in their entirety.

KEYWORDS: university, theology, John Paul II, Pope Francis, *Sapientia christiana*, *Fides et ratio*, *Veritatis gaudium*

ABSTRAKT: Kultura i współczesne społeczeństwo rzucają nowe wyzwania instytucjom akademickim (przede wszystkim w Europie). Dlatego Kościół zaczął na nowo zakładać własne uniwersytety, aby promować dialog pomiędzy wiarą i rozumem. W świecie akademickim zaczęła wzrastać autonomia studenta, coraz większy nacisk kładzie się na autodydaktykę przy użyciu technologii multimedialnych. Doprowadziło to do działań

¹ The article is based on the text of the speech delivered during the International Scientific Conference on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Pontifical Faculty of Theology in post-war Poland “Theology in the world of science,” which was held at the Pontifical Faculty of Theology in Wrocław on 22–23 June, 2018.

innowacyjnych w procesie dydaktycznym i w systemie nauczania, wymuszając przemiany uniwersytetów, którym stawia się pytanie dotyczące ich roli do odegrania w świecie. Pomiędzy teologią a naukami ścisłymi musi istnieć dialog, którego prowadzenie opisał Jan Paweł II w *Sapientia Christiana, Ex Corde Ecclesiae* i *Fides et Ratio*. Dwie refleksje wysuwają się na czoło: pierwsza to wzajemne korzyści, które nauka i teologia mogą uzyskać w dialogu intelektualnym w kontekście uniwersyteckim. W konsekwencji teologia odgrywa niezwykłą rolę w poszukiwaniu jedności wiedzy i dlatego to jej przypada pełna odpowiedzialność obecność w uniwersytecie. Druga mówi o wadze dochodzenia do zintegrowanego spojrzenia, które oscyluje pomiędzy lekturą naukową i lekturą religijno-teologiczną świata. *Veritatis gaudium* Papieża Franciszka ukazuje perspektywy rozwoju studiów kościelnych. Nowe dynamiki społeczne i kulturowe zmuszają do rozszerzenia celowości studiów, ażeby Ewangelia nie tylko osiągała każdej osoby indywidualnie, lecz wszystkie kultury w ich całości.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: uniwersytet, teologia, Jan Paweł II, Papież Franciszek, *Sapientia christiana*, *Fides et ratio*, *Veritatis gaudium*

This text serves as an opportunity to reflect on the important task that theology carries out in the world of science. First of all, I would like to draw attention to the new challenges that today's culture and society pose to academic systems (especially in Europe); secondly, I will refer to the dialogue between theology and the sciences, and finally, I will focus on the development of ecclesiastical studies in the light of the recent Apostolic Constitution *Veritatis gaudium* of Pope Francis.

The challenges in the current context of academic studies

I would like to start with a provocative quotation that suggests how current discussions touch the nature and destiny of the university itself. The American futurologist, Peter Drucker, in 1997, wrote: "Thirty years from now, university campuses will become relics. Universities should not survive."² Twenty years have passed and we do not know if in the future we will go towards the outcome hypothesized by Drucker, but we all see that the debate on the change of the university and on its survival is widely open everywhere.

The institution of university, as it was established in the Middle Ages,³ declined during humanism and above all in the following centuries. After

² Text quoted by W.Z. Hiersch, L.E. Weber, *Challenges Facing Higher Education at the Millennium*, Phoenix, AZ 1999 (the page is not indicated).

³ The university was founded in the 11th century as *universitas scholarium* in Bologna, or *universitas magistrorum* in Paris; only later will we talk about *universitas studiorum*. In the course of history, on the university – from its origins to the present day – developments

the period of the Enlightenment, with the emergence of individual modern states and the spread of a critical mentality towards the Church, the university environment, born from the heart of the Church, is taken out of it, and thus the reform started by Wilhem von Humbolt (1767–1835), also with its merits, represents the laicization of the medieval model of university.⁴

In the cultural situation of more recent centuries, as happened in Europe and elsewhere, the Church has begun to establish its own universities to promote dialogue between faith and reason and to train men and women who are Christianly and professionally qualified. In this new phase, Catholic universities are more distinguished, as they refer to the civil laws of the various countries in which they are established, by ecclesiastical faculties that are particularly concerned with Christian revelation and the disciplines connected with it, and who are more intimately connected with the evangelizing mission of the Church. The ecclesiastical faculties, like this one, are erected or approved by the Holy See and confer academic degrees by authority of it, based on the specific canonical legislation that has been specified over time with provisions issued several times over the last century, up to the Apostolic Constitution *Veritatis gaudium*, recently published by Pope Francis.

In many cases, ecclesiastical faculties are institutionally located within Catholic universities, as required by the Apostolic Constitution *Ex corde Ecclesiae*, or within state universities, governed by specific agreements or conventions.⁵

and tensions produced by culture and society are reflected. The Church has always had an interest in promoting the presence of Christian thought within the culture; in the first centuries, with the famous *Didaskaleion* of Alexandria, where an attempt was made to teach the various profane disciplines in the light of the Gospel, the works of the apologists and of the Fathers of the Church, there was concern to defend the Christian faith against errors, but also to express it in the culture of the time. Along these lines, the first higher-level educational institutions were born in the following centuries, such as the monastic schools and cathedral schools, which organized courses in different arts and disciplines with great authority, orienting them to theology and putting them in dialogue with one another in the light of reason and of faith. The university as *Studium Generale*, i.e. as a place open to all and as a corporation of teachers and students, was built in the 12th and 13th centuries. In the *universitas magistrorum et scholarium*, the community of teachers and students who come together freely is animated by the common desire for knowledge, research and contemplation of the truth, the beauty, the good, of God: all expressed in close connection between them.

⁴ Cf. C.H. Haskins, *The Rise of University*, New York 1923; H. Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, London 1964 (ed. 1, 1895); *The Encyclopedia of Higher Education*, B.R. Clark, G. Neave (eds.), Oxford 1992; John Paul II, *Sapientia Christiana*, [in:] *EV* 6 (1977–1979), pp. 1330–1527; idem, *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, [in:] *EV* 12 (1990), pp. 414–492.

⁵ Ecclesiastical legislation urges theological Faculties to have contact, collaboration and dialogue with other centers of science and culture, both to respond to problems arising

But what are the *challenges* that universities face today? Undoubtedly, over the past few years, the highly emphasized reference to the *knowledge society* has been successful. This, like the other similar definitions of 'information society' and 'learning society,' intends to indicate a society characterized by two paradigms: the growth of knowledge and the corresponding applications in the organization of social life and the change in the ways of memorization and transfer of knowledge. Information technology, the creation of telematic networks, the integration of languages and other technological developments are causing the breaking of space and time constraints, destined to grow in different sectors of social and cultural life. The consequences on research and teaching systems and on universities are particularly incisive and cause profound changes, above all for the possibility of acquiring information and knowledge, and of establishing interactions and exchanges.

First of all, the autonomy of the student is destined to grow with the emphasis of self-learning through the use of multimedia and/or at a distance learning technologies in place of the traditional education in the relationship with the teacher. Moreover, there are also many conceptual and methodological implications produced by the passage from knowledge centered for centuries on the word and on the book and from a teaching based on the direct relationship with the teacher, to a communication connected with the integration of different languages and with a 'dematerialization' of relationships.

The new questions and the new opportunities that emerge exercise increasing pressure and cause process and system innovations, inevitably involving the university, which feels challenged about the role to be played in this context. Some specialists in the sector have analyzed the changes and try to trace the future evolution.⁶

Contrary to what P. Drucker states, in the knowledge society, the task of institutions that develop and transfer knowledge is destined to consolidate and grow. In particular, universities, as a place where the processes of production and transmission of the entire range of knowledge coexist, are destined to play an essential and indispensable role. The traditional core of the university institution is, therefore, in harmony with the needs of today and the future, while it is more complicated to understand how it will be able to carry out its functions in a society in continuous transformation.

from scientific and social progress and to seek solutions to human problems, inspired by the Revelation.

⁶ Cf. A. Ruberti, *L'università tra memoria e futuro*, [in:] *Perché l'università. Riflessioni sull'etica del sapere*, I. Ceccarini-P.G. Palla (ed.), Città di Castello 2007, pp. 217–226.

We may sense that we will move towards a more highly diversified system, in which there will be – as today – predominantly research institutions and – more than today – mainly educational institutions. In a process that will be long, an arrangement will be formed in which those institutions that will be able to reconfirm their genetic heritage and establish intense cooperation relations with the other institutions will be consolidated as universities.

In the genetic heritage, there arise: knowledge as the result of a meeting between experience and imagination in a community of teachers and students; the unitary coexistence of scientific and humanistic knowledge; the commitment to overcome the separation of cultures and disciplinary fragmentation. These tasks must be articulated within the university institution in a structural and functional way, allowing the development of programs and activities both at the research level and at the level of education in the various academic cycles.

For the future of the university, the prospect of strengthening the international horizon and of encouraging the commitment to build a common space of higher studies remains a strategic one, which, however, must avoid the danger of homogeneity and uniformity. In this common space, a balance must be guaranteed between the unity of values and the academic tradition and the diversity of cultures, languages and social contexts, as well as the typical nature of the university as a real physical space for meeting and communicating, open to virtual interaction and cooperation.

Another aspect that I would like to highlight refers to the change regarding the design of *university courses* and *university curricula*.⁷

At the European level, in recent years this topic refers to two aspects. The first is the redefinition of the *input*, or rather of the access elements (the alternative ways of accessing university courses with greater differentiation of age, experience, socio-economic status, cultural background) and the redefinition of the *output* (the interest has moved towards the skills required and defined by the social and professional context of reference). The second aspect concerns a greater openness and flexibility of the course structure to favour students' progress through modular options and the credit system.

In this context, we are reflecting on the subject of the academic *curriculum*, drawing, above all, from the language of the school system. Experts argue that the curriculum should provide learning not only of the “inferior” order (such as knowledge and skills), but also of the “superior” order (intelligence, responsibility, open-mindedness, constructive spirit, independence of judgment, reflexivity etc.).

⁷ Cf. C. Zaggia, *L'università delle competenze. Progettazione e valutazione dei corsi di laurea nel processo di Bologna*, Milan 2008.

And they refer to this second order of education with the term *morphogenesis*; this consists in the acquisition of abstract, mental and lasting habits, defined as *deutero learning*, that is, a type of intellectual disposition that characterizes the personality of the student in his abilities and constructive spirit. In order for university curricula to encourage the training of “competent persons,” it is hypothesized that, above all, this second level of higher education should aim at some fundamental objectives, such as: systematically involving students in the design, provision and revision of the curriculum; customize study paths; make teachings modular; orientate by educating, educate by evaluating; situate knowledge through internships, field research and project work; use information and communication technologies.

The dialogue between theology and the sciences

At the heart of the emerging challenges that the university must face today is the topic of dialogue between theology and the sciences. This is a very relevant topic on which the ecclesiastical teaching has repeatedly expressed itself. Finding ourselves in the homeland of Saint John Paul II, as a special tribute to the memory of this great Pontiff who published in 1979, the Apostolic Constitution *Sapientia christiana* on the Pontifical Ecclesiastical Universities and Faculties; in 1990, the Apostolic Constitution *Ex corde Ecclesiae* on Catholic Universities; and in 1998, the Encyclical letter *Fides et ratio*; I would like to propose some considerations concerning, indeed, the relationship between theology and scientific thought, drawing precisely from the thinking of Pope Wojtyła.⁸

The request to go back to studying the story of Galileo “in the loyal recognition of the wrongs, whichever part they come from,” formulated in 1979 in a speech to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences on the occasion of the centenary of the birth of Albert Einstein, perhaps constitutes the most striking aspect of this concern.⁹ With this and other interventions, through a sincere and continuous attention to the scientific environment, he has shown in the first place the *attitude* to be taken towards scientific research: loyal to its acquired results, open to grasp its potential also for the philosophical and theological reflection, critical and precise towards its ideological seductions. There are many studies

⁸ Cf. G. Tanzella-Nitti, *Passione per la verità e responsabilità del sapere. Un’idea di Università nel magistero di Giovanni Paolo II*, Casale Monferrato 1998.

⁹ Cf. *Allocuzione alla Pontificia Accademia delle Scienze*, Rome, 10 November 1979, *Insegnamenti* of John Paul II, 2 (1979/2), pp. 1115–1120.

done on these papal interventions; but here I would like to emphasize the need for this relationship to *pass through* the university and the interdisciplinary dialogue within it.

In the discourses addressed to universities, one of the poles of discussion is represented by theology. Faith or the Church are involved in this commitment to study and reflection, but in a reflected way, often in a historical framework. In an intellectual debate, science, philosophy and theology can be treated in a similar way: they constitute different ways of approach and knowledge of the single reality and can dialogue with each other both on an epistemological and an anthropological level. Theology is not identified with faith, although the latter is evidently necessary to exercise it.¹⁰ Philosophy and theology are also sciences in the analogical sense. The vision coming from each of these disciplines is not exhaustive and needs the others to arrive at a non-reductive interpretation of the universe we live in.

St. John Paul II was aware of the fact that there are many who, throughout history, have wished to interpret the relationship between theology and the sciences in terms of conflict, and how this mentality has not completely disappeared even in the current era. His look at the past is attentive to the serene recognition of the facts, but he is not willing to rush concessions towards those critical positions which, more than with reason, should be united with ideologies. But the Polish Pontiff's gaze was turned rather to the future. What seems to have had a special importance for him were the social, but also educational and scientific problems that humanity had to face in the new millennium, in front of which science and religion had to be on the same side. This was for him the decisive thrust that had to motivate his collaboration, pushing both to seek the correct epistemological attitude, but also the confrontation on the anthropological terrain.

Among his recurrent ideas, I would like to point out at least two: first, the reciprocal advantages that science and theology can draw from dialogue conducted with intellectual rigor and in a university context; consequently, theology has an indispensable role in the search for the unity of knowledge and therefore it has a responsible presence within the university. Secondly, the importance of reaching an integrated vision between scientific reading and religious-theological reading of the world: ignoring each other would be not only intellectually incorrect, but also harmful to humanity as a whole. The document that deals with these matters more profoundly and in depth is the

¹⁰ Cf. Discourse *Ai docenti di Teologia della Pontificia Università di Salamanca*, 1 November 1982, *Insegnamenti* of John Paul II, 5 (1982/3), pp. 1049–1055, no. 5.

Letter to the Director of the Vatican Observatory, desired and expressly wanted by the Pope.¹¹

For too long, theology and sciences have been held at a distance, says John Paul II in this letter: now is the time to begin to understand each other. Just as the Church needs the university, theology also needs science. If the Word of God may, as such, not need it, as an *incarnate* word it cannot fail to dialogue with the various aspects of human rationality, all equally necessary for this word to be better understood and expressed. This is ultimately the task of theology towards the Revelation and faith. The vital exchange that theology has traditionally implemented over time with philosophy and other humanistic disciplines, today must also be carried out with scientific thought.

John Paul II courageously compared the use made in the past by the Christian faith with many insights from Aristotelian philosophy and science, with the role that contemporary science could play in favouring the expression and better understanding of some truths contained in the Revelation. The language of contemporary science, as it was that of medieval culture, or even of the archaic culture in which the first pages of Sacred Scripture were forged, could, therefore, be useful, properly understood and evaluated, to talk about the mystery of the world and of man.

For these reasons, Pope Wojtyła hoped for the presence of theologians who are also competent in scientific subjects, to avoid the double error of using science with ingenuously apologetic ends or ignoring – often for fear of its consequences – its cultural and philosophical scope, thus taking refuge in a dangerous isolation. Today it is also thanks to the vision of the world offered by the natural sciences that a believer can understand the scope of what it means to be “a creature in front of a Creator;” or what the truth of Christ as the head of creation means, the mandate to reconcile all things with him through the Father in the Spirit; or grasp all the wealth of information and processes associated with the mystery of life and its reproduction. It is a scope and an opening of horizons that only a couple of centuries ago seemed inconceivable.

It should, therefore, be read within this new cultural horizon, what John Paul II wrote in *Fides et ratio*:

¹¹ The circumstances, apparently unusual, of the *Letter* are those of the publication of the Proceedings of a Conference held at the Vatican Observatory from 21 to 26 September 1987, on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of Newton’s *Principia Mathematica Philosophiae Naturalis* (1687), which will give rise to a series of Interviews subsequently hosted by the Vatican Observatory.

The Revelation, with its contents, will never be able to humiliate reason in its discoveries and in its legitimate autonomy; for its part, however, reason must never lose the ability to question and question itself, in the awareness of not being able to stand up to absolute and exclusive value (no. 79).

Einstein's well-known statement that science without religion is lame, but religion without science is blind, does not lose its validity. On the need for a dialogue between theology and the sciences in the university context, John Paul II returned to an important passage in the Apostolic Constitution on Catholic universities.¹² With the progress of scientific development and with the globalization of culture and life on the planet, religion and sciences are coming and will inevitably come into contact and, for this reason, around them there must be an interdisciplinary research commitment on an academic and scientific level.

If the interdisciplinary relationship between science and humanism should be favoured already in principle because it allows a better service to man and his integral truth, with greater reason it must be sought when the disciplines in question are the natural sciences and theology, the influence of which was such as to forge, in the case of the former, the dominant rationality of our time, in the case of the latter, the moral conscience of the peoples.

In the places rich in history and academic and cultural institutions, dialogue and collaboration always existed, and in the face of today's challenges, they are even more desirable. There are many points in common between theologians and the scholars of other sciences: they work with the same tools of knowledge production; they dedicate themselves to hermeneutical work; participate in the construction of a network of meanings and values, etc. All of this constitutes the basis of a serious scientific dialogue aimed at the common good, namely: responding to problems emerging from cultural progress and seeking, in the light of the Revelation, solutions to human problems.

¹² "Theology plays a particularly important role in the search for a synthesis of knowledge, as well as in the dialogue between faith and reason. It also brings a contribution to all the other disciplines in their search for meaning, not only helping them to examine how their respective discoveries will affect people and society, but also providing a perspective and orientation that are not contained in the methodologies. In turn, the interaction with these other disciplines and their discoveries enriches theology, offering a better understanding of today's world and making theological research more adherent to the present needs" (John Paul II, Apostolic Constitution *Ex corde Ecclesiae*, no. 19).

The orientations of the Apostolic Constitution *Veritatis gaudium*

A particularly incisive contribution to developing dialogue between ecclesiastical studies, above all theology, and other sciences, comes from the recent Apostolic Constitution *Veritatis gaudium* of Pope Francis, in which he wanted to emphasize the great need to give a new impulse to the scientific research conducted in ecclesiastical universities and faculties. Already John Paul II, in *Sapientia christiana*, introduced the theme of research as a “fundamental duty” for academic institutions, called to put themselves in constant “contact with reality itself (...) to communicate the doctrine to the men of their time in the variety of cultures.”¹³ But in our age, marked by the multicultural and multi-ethnic condition, new social and cultural dynamics impose a widening of these aims of study so that the Gospel reaches not only every person, but also to the cultures as a whole. In this sense, ecclesiastical studies cannot be limited to transferring knowledge, skills, experiences to the men and women of our time, but they must acquire the urgent task of developing intellectual tools capable of presenting themselves as paradigms of action and thought, useful to the announcement in a world marked by ethical-religious pluralism.

This requires not only a profound theological awareness, but, as well, the ability to conceive, design and implement systems of representation of the Christian religion that are able to enter deeply into different cultural systems. All this calls for an increase in the quality of scientific research and a progressive advancement of the level of theological studies and related sciences.

One of the criteria that Pope Francis indicates to renew the architecture and methodical dynamics of the curricula proposed by the ecclesiastical study system, in their theological origin and in dialogue with the various scientific disciplines, is the vital and intellectual principle of the unity of knowledge in the distinction and in respect of its multiple, related and converging expressions¹⁴. In this sense, the Constitution says, the rediscovery of the principle of interdisciplinarity is certainly positive and promising: not so much in its “weak” form of simple multidisciplinary, as an approach that favors a better understanding from more points of view than a object of study; but rather in its “strong” form of *transdisciplinarity*, as the placement and fermentation of knowledge within the space of Light and Life offered by Wisdom that emanates from the Revelation of God.

¹³ John Paul II, Apostolic Constitution *Sapientia Christiana*, Proemium III.

¹⁴ Cf. Pope Francis, Apostolic Constitution *Veritatis gaudium*, Proemium 4c.

Therefore, the profile of ecclesiastical studies, as outlined in the Proemium of the Constitution, today must be more detailed so that it can be offered and spent in the areopagus of cultures, in the concert of academic institutions and in the knowledge market, through a more careful disciplinary and pedagogical articulation. In this sense, it will be necessary to apply more and more the vital and intellectual principle of the unity of knowledge in the distinction of its multiple and related expressions.¹⁵ What does this mean for the dialogue between theology and other sciences?

The *unity of knowledge*, which is increasingly invoked as an antidote to the current fragmentation, is not assimilable with the concept of the unity of science, of a purely functional character and tending to a re-composition of knowledge from the outside, but it envisages the unification of knowledge from the inside. Indeed, it is a matter of offering a plurality of knowledge through the system of studies, corresponding to the multiform richness of the real in the light disclosed by the event of the Revelation, which is, at the same time, harmonically and dynamically gathered in the unity of its transcendent source and of its historical and metahistorical intentionality. This theological and anthropological, existential and epistemic principle, has an extraordinary value and can exhibit great efficacy both within the system of studies (in its cohesion and flexibility, as well as in organicity and dynamism) and also in relation to the fragmented and often disintegrated today's panorama of university studies and the pluralism of cultural beliefs and options.

The principle of the unity of knowledge must find its intelligent articulation and its corresponding application at different levels of university life.

First of all, at the *academic environment* level. Some specialists today claim that the university fails in its tasks if men and women come out of its classrooms and instead of contributing to the common good, they use the benefits obtained with the contribution of the whole society for purely selfish purposes.¹⁶ The irreplaceable role of the university lies in being *Alma Mater*, a mother who nourishes and raises. The Latin etymology *aló*, alimentary, is the root of *alma* and pupil (*alunno*), which assimilates with personal study the nourishment it receives from professors to grow intellectually. Obviously, the level of university studies cannot be lowered to suit everyone indiscriminately; on the contrary, it must be demanding and vitally capable of raising and contributing to the

¹⁵ Cf. P. Coda, "Learning outcomes" e unità dei saperi, [in:] *Seminarium*, Anno LI, no. 1 (2011), pp. 85–97.

¹⁶ Cf. M. Peláez, *Università e bene comune*, [in:] *Perché l'università. Riflessioni sull'etica del sapere*, I. Ceccarini-P. Palla (ed.), Città di Castello 2007, pp. 71–77.

growth of the ecclesial and civil community, as well as the common aspirations of each one. Therefore, the university must establish a special type of bond both between the people who compose it (*universitas magistrorum et scholarium*), and between the various disciplines of human knowledge (*universitas studiorum*). In such perspective, university teaching requires active and dynamic relationships between professors and students who are able to integrate the intellectual aspects of study and scientific research with human aspects. The academic environment must be a place of gathering and at the same time an open place, a convivial place and at the same time a universal place, where the multiple and differentiated relationships that are experienced in it have the stamp of commitment and application, freedom, creativity and the joy of growth.

But the principle of the unity of knowledge must be articulated above all at the level of the *specific task* of the academic institution. Experts in cognitive processes argue that any university reform must have thought reform as a vital goal; it would allow the full use of intelligence and the coordination of cultures and separate knowledge. Interdisciplinarity is insufficient to remedy superspecialization. It is, therefore, a matter of starting a non-programmatic but paradigmatic reform that concerns our ability to organize knowledge to overcome the fragmentation of the disciplines, replacing a thought that connects to a thought that only distinguishes. The ability to connect and unite requires that the unilinear causality is replaced by a multireferential causality, that the logical rigour is completed with the dialogical one, capable of connecting antagonistic notions in a complementary way. Theology and ecclesiastical studies, in this sense, have an added value compared to others: the unique epistemic principle is the intelligence of the Revelation which, ultimately, is Christ himself, *mediator simul et plenitudo totius revelationis* (*Dei Verbum*, 2) and which closely links the system of studies to the evangelizing mission of the Church. From this unitary principle derives the indispensable and immense task of the university: *to teach wisdom*, which means to acquire that gaze of truth and freedom on God, on man and on the world, which is “one” being “multiple” in its expressions, just as how manifold are the expressions of the life of the person, of the human community and of the cosmos.¹⁷

The unity of knowledge must also characterize the *method* of research, teaching and study. The Apostolic Constitution *Veritatis gaudium* reiterates

¹⁷ Benedict XVI emphasized that only the light of faith in God, and his Revelation in Christ, helps man to pass from a simply scientific knowledge to a “sapiential” knowledge; it allows us to discover the intrinsic unity that links the different branches of knowledge. If this is true for all the sciences, it is essential and connatural for the different articulations of theological knowledge and related sciences.

what *Sapientia christiana* already affirmed, namely, the need to pay attention to the “right desire for a university life open to greater participation,” to the need not to neglect “the great evolution that has taken place in the pedagogical methods and didactics” and “the desire for greater collaboration in the entire university world.”¹⁸ These traits are the answer to the crisis of the university, due to the profound split between a classical conception of science and knowledge – the university as a place for the common search for truth – and the flat functionalism of science, basically practiced and transmitted in universities. The university cannot be reduced to a mere vocational school bent to the harsh efficiency criteria of modern industrial society, but it must recover the aspect of community that has always characterized it, proposing it as a place for the community development of a particular culture in which scientific research and theory, but also the formation and education of people, are harmoniously combined.

In conclusion, I hope that the tasks and challenges of theological faculties will be faced with courage and foresight.

The great environmental, scientific and technological transformations that shape in an ever-new way the surface of the planet, our way of living and communicating, as well as the progressive social transformations of people, the interaction between the ethnic groups and traditions caused by the growing migratory phenomenon, are all factors that do not alter the characteristics of the authentic “university spirit,” but rather represent all the realities that must enter the “universitas” with that very spirit, the only one that can guarantee the dignity of the person, the love for their integral truth, the serene confrontation of knowledge and cultures achieved with intellectual rigour, but always with respect for all and in peace.

Theology, which investigates the problems and questions of man from the point of view of the Gospel message, can offer to various areas of scientific knowledge, an illuminating contribution.

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Medieval Glossary of Biblical Symbols – Pseudo-Garnier's of Langres *Allegoriae in universam Sacram Scripturam*¹

Średniowieczny glosariusz symboli biblijnych
Allegoriae in universam Sacram Scripturam Pseudo-Garniera z Langres

ABSTRACT: In the article, we will present the life and works of Garnier of Langres, and show the specificity of the *Allegoriae in universam Sacram Scripturam* and the problems associated with the attribution of the work and the manuscript tradition. It will also reveal the inadequacy of the text published in *Patrologia Latina* and the need for a critical edition.

KEYWORDS: Bible, medieval interpretation, Garnier of Langres, allegory, biblical hermeneutics

ABSTRAKT: Artykuł prezentuje życie i twórczość Garniera z Langres, wykazuje specyfikę *Allegoriae in universam Sacram Scripturam* oraz problemy związane z atrybucją dzieła i tradycją przekazu rękopiśmiennego. Wskazuje na nieadekwatność wydania w *Patrologia Latina* i potrzebę edycji krytycznej.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: Biblia, interpretacja średniowieczna, Garnier z Langres, alegoria, hermeneutyka biblijna

¹ The article was based on a lecture given during the VI Congress of Polish Medievalists (20–22 September 2018, Wrocław).

Introduction

A few years ago,² we began working on a little-known text included in Migne's collection, the *Patrologia Latina* among the works of Rabanus Maurus (d. 856) entitled *Allegoriae in universam Sacram Scripturam*. It is a glossary containing the symbolic explanations of biblical motifs based on patristic and medieval works. Initially, we intended to translate it into Polish. However, it soon turned out that not only the attribution of the work is incorrect, but the text included in the *Patrologia Latina* also leaves a lot to be desired. Upon acquiring digital reproductions of the most important manuscripts of the work, we undertook the difficult task of its critical edition within the framework of a grant which we had received in 2018 in the Universalia National Program for the Development of Humanities. In the present article we are going to present the initial, partial results of our research.

Initially, we are going to outline the life and work of Garnier of Langres (d. after 1225). Furthermore, we will show the specificity of *Allegoriae in universam Sacram Scripturam*, as well as problems connected with the attribution of the work and the tradition of manuscript writing. We will point out the inadequacy of the publication in the *Patrologia Latina*, as well as the need for a critical edition. In subsequent parts of the article, we will present a hermeneutic introduction to the glossary, followed by its critical compilation, along with a Polish translation.

The life and work of Garnier of Langres

Garnier of Langres was born in mid-XII century, in Rochefort-sur-Brévon, into a noble family. At a very young age, he entered the Longuay (Longum Vadum) Cistercian Abbey in the Langres diocese. The abbey abandoned the Rule of St. Augustine in 1150 and accepted the rule from Cîteau. Soon, Garnier became the prior of the Clairvaux Abbey, and in 1180, the abbot in Auberive. Six years later, he was called back to Clairvaux to take on the post of abbot there. At that time, he received a letter from Richard the Lionheart (d. 1199), in which he asked him to preach a new crusade, following in the footsteps of his predecessor Bernard of Clairvaux (d. 1153), in order to provide military support

² The research is a joint work of the author of the article and Dominika Budzanowska D.Sc. The project of a critical edition and the Polish translation of the studied text received a grant from the Universalia National Program for the Development of Humanities in 2018.

for the Crusaders from the Holy Land. In 1193, Garnier was consecrated as bishop in order to become the ordinary of the Langres diocese. Six years later, he resigned from his post of bishop due to problems connected with administering the diocese and left as a simple monk for the abbey in Clairvaux. He died several years – after 1225.

Garnier put together 40 sermons.³ However, it seems that he was not a talented preacher, since according to J.C. Didier, “they have neither the anointing nor the charm.”⁴ He frequently quoted classicist authors. From among the Fathers of the Church, he especially favored Ambrose (d. 397), Jerome (d. 420), Augustine (d. 430) (his metaphors of Christ as a doctor), Boethius (d. 524) and Bede (d. 735). From time to time, he also quoted John Scotus Eriugena (d. 877) and he was one of the first authors influenced by Joachim of Fiore (d. 1202), especially his thoughts on symbolism. Apart from two letters, Garnier also wrote a polemical treatise against the Cathars, *Tractatus contra amaurianos*,⁵ which contains an interpretation of a Tetragrammaton by Joachim of Fiore.

The specificity of *Allegoriae in universam Sacram Scripturam*

Allegoriae in universam Sacram Scripturam is the most comprehensive medieval dictionary of biblical symbols. It reflects the symbolic *universum* in accordance with the medieval tradition of the four senses of the Holy Scripture. This means, that the author does not limit his perspective only to symbols intended by the inspired writer (as is the case with contemporary biblical scholars), but also takes into account symbols created by the readers based on the literary motifs of the biblical text. These symbolic interpretations come from the earlier texts of the Fathers of the Church and other medieval authors.

The work attributed to Garnier of Langres begins with a hermeneutic introduction, explaining the differences between the literal, allegorical, moral and anagogical senses. Then, the terminology is arranged in an alphabetical order of literary motifs. Each entry contains four elements:

a) presentation of a literary motif, usually with the aid of a single word,

³ *Sermones de tempore et de sanctis*, [in:] *Patrologia Latina* (further: PL), 205, pp. 159–828.

⁴ *Ils n'ont pas la moindre onction, ni le moindre charme*; J.-C. Didier, *Garnier de Rochefort. Sa vie et son oeuvre. État des questions*, „Collectanea ordinis cisterciensium reformatorum” 17 (1955), p. 154.

⁵ *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medioevalis* (further: CCCM), 232, P. Lucentini (ed.), Turnhout 2010.

- b) symbolic meaning attributed to said motif,
- c) the biblical quotation which was used to form the symbolic interpretation is preceded by the name of the book of the Bible or a general hint as to where the quotation comes from,
- d) a brief explanation of the interpretation, focusing on its spiritual significance.

Most of the literary motifs have more than one interpretation. Some of them, e.g. water (*aqua*) contain as many as 21. Sometimes the same literary motif is interpreted in a different way depending on the biblical context.

Prior to the XII century, two glossaries were prepared in a similar way, namely, the *Formulae spiritalis intelligentiae*⁶ by Eucherius of Lyon (d. 450) from the first half of the V century, and the *Clavis*,⁷ wrongly attributed to Melito of Sardis (d. 180), an anonymous work created between the VII and IX centuries.⁸ Eucherius had some influence on the *Clavis*, but neither of these works is reflected in the *Allegoriae* attributed to Garnier of Langres. Neither of the glossaries is arranged in an alphabetical order, the entries are grouped according to association (e.g. things above ground, animals, body parts etc.).

Attribution of *Allegoriae in universam Sacram Scripturam*

Studies on the attribution of the glossary boast a rich history. *Editio princeps* by Gregorius Colvenerius (d. 1649), a professor at the University of Douai, was published in 1626, among the works of Rabanus Maurus.⁹ The attribution has no grounds in any manuscript and was probably based on the fact that numerous symbolic interpretations of the glossary come from the works of Rabanus. Colvenerius's text was printed with the same attribution in Migne's *Patrologia Latina* series.¹⁰

⁶ Eucherius of Lyon, *Formulae spiritalis intelligentiae; Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* (further: CSEL) 31/1, pp. 3–62. Eucherius's edition in PL 50, pp. 727–772, contains latter interpolations from the works of Bede. On the subject of the exegesis of Eucherius see also: T. Skibiński, *L'interpretazione della Scrittura in Eucherio di Lione*, Roma 1995.

⁷ J.-P. Laurant, *Symbolisme et Ecriture, Le cardinal Pitra et la „Clef” de Meliton de Sardes*, Paris 1988 (publication of the manuscript from Clairmont).

⁸ *Terminus post quem* is the beginning of the VII century, the times of Gregory the Great (d. 604), who had great influence on the *Clavis*. *Terminus a quo* is the beginning of the IX century, since Theodulf of Orléans (d. 821) and Rabanus Maurus (d. 856) use the *Clavis* in their commentaries.

⁹ G. Colvenerius, *Hrabani Mauri opera quae reperi potuerunt omnia in sex tomos distincta*, Köln 1626, vol. 5, pp. 749–823.

¹⁰ PL 112, pp. 849–1088.

Until studies conducted by André Wilmart¹¹ in the second decade of the XX century, the attribution was widely accepted. The only exception was based on manuscript 13411 from the Bibliothèque Nationale de France. This proposed attributing the work to Adam Scotus (Adam of Prémontré, Adam of Dryburgh, d. 1212). However, it seems that there is a lack of compelling evidence to support it.

Wilmart brings to light several arguments against the alleged authorship of Rabanus Maurus. At least three of them are worth mentioning:

- a) all the *Allegoriae* manuscripts, under the term *bysus* contain a quotation from Hildebert, the bishop of Mans, stating his name. Hildebert of Lavardin became the bishop of Mans in 1097, then the archbishop of Tours in 1125 and died somewhere between 1133 and 1134, more than 300 years after the death of Rabanus Maurus;
- b) as far as the fourth sense of the Holy Scripture, Rabanus Maurus (after Cassian and Bede), uses the term *anagoge* in his writings, while in the *Allegoriae*, the term *anagogia* always appears;
- c) quotations from Psalms in the works of Rabanus Maurus come from the Gallican Psalter, while in the *Allegoriae*, verses of Psalms were taken from the Roman Psalter.

Attributing *Allegoriae* to Garnier of Langres is based mainly on the evidence from manuscripts 392 and 32 from the library in Clairvaux (presently in Troyes). Both these manuscripts contain, at the end of the text, information provided by Abbot Conrad about donations made by Garnier of Langres for the abbey, as well as about the fact, how the conventual community shall express its gratitude, with the exact date of 1216. Then, there is a XIII-century appendix, apparently from the same time: *Hunc etiam librum dedit dominus Garnerius quondam lingonensis episcopus* ("This book was also given by Lord Garnier, in the past bishop of Langres"). At the end of the last page of manuscript 392, there is an inscription of the abbey librarian, also from the XIII century: *Angelus domini Garnerii quondam lingonensi episcopi* (The angel of Lord Garnier, in the past bishop of Langres). The text containing the title of the work, *Angelus*, based on the first word of the glossary, seems to indicate authorship. However, it may also be the result of the provenance of the manuscript. Most likely it was a gift to the abbey from Garnier at the end of his life, when he no longer held the post of bishop.

¹¹ A. Wilmart, *Les allégories sur l'Écriture attribuées à Hraban Maur*, „Revue bénédictine” 32 (1920), pp. 47–56.

It must be noted, that both manuscripts 392 and 32 contain the later form of text indicating numerous interpolations, as will be seen in the latter part of our article. That is why, even if we assume Garnier's authorship, it will be connected with the extended and edited form of the text (δ), and not the original (β). In our opinion, the original form of the text was anonymously composed in the XII century. Most likely it took place prior to 1125, since the above-mentioned Bishop Hildebert is presented as *episcopus cenomanensis* (of Mans), and not as the bishop of Tours, a town that is more important as far as a bishopric is concerned.

The manuscript tradition of *Allegoriae*

Allegoriae is represented by over 55 manuscripts stored in various libraries all across Europe. Most of them (18) are found in France, however it is worth mentioning, that the next ranked country as far as the amount of preserved manuscripts is Poland, with six of them – three in the Jagiellonian Library in Krakow and three in the University Library in Wroclaw. Six manuscripts date back to the end of the XII or the beginning of the XIII century, eight to the first decades of the XIII century, fourteen to the XIII century, three to the end of the XIII century. All the remaining ones are from the XIV and XV centuries.

Based on internal criticism, we have discovered three stages of the creation of the text. The first, composed of manuscripts belonging to the β family, represents the shortest form of text. It was created before the end of the XII century, most likely – as has already been mentioned – between 1100 and 1125. It contains an introduction of hermeneutic character and only a few extensions outside the original intent of bestowing a symbolic significance upon literary biblical motifs. This version of the text has attained great prominence and is represented by numerous latter manuscripts spread all around Europe and the British Isles.

We have also found three manuscripts containing an extended form of the text – the γ family. The interpolations are mainly based on adding new, symbolic interpretations and some extensions containing definitions and differentiations. The introduction was preserved, however several stylistic corrections had been made. Manuscripts from this family are found in France and in Italy. Such form of the text probably appeared in the second half of the XII century or at the beginning of the XIII century (before 1216).

Finally, the δ family represents the most developed form of the text. Here, we will find numerous interpolations containing new symbolic interpretations, definitions and differentiations. This version has been edited based on γ , however

the introduction was omitted. These kind of manuscripts are found in many locations, starting with Portugal and ending with Poland, where we can find four copies.

The story of the creation of *Allegoriae* leads us to formulate a hypothesis about the existence of an original form of the text – the α form – that could be called *schedarium Garnieri*. Most likely, this was not a volume, but a collection of cards containing individual interpretations collected from literary sources. It can also not be excluded that the *schedarium* was expanded by introducing new cards (α_1 i α_2) containing interpretations that were interpolated into the original text during the latter stages of edition (γ i δ). Unfortunately, this is only a hypothesis, since manuscript evidence as to the existence of the *schedarium Garnieri* has not been found.

As of present date, we have been able to locate digital facsimiles of 27 manuscripts and one printed version, which can be classified according to the following *stemma codicum*.

β family (short form of the text):

Troyes, Médiathèque du Grand Troyes, 868 (XII century) (only entries starting with the letter A)

Paris, Sorbonne, P588 (XII century)

Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 13411 (XII century)

Troyes, Médiathèque du Grand Troyes, 539 (XIII century)

Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 589 (XIII century)

Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 599 (XIII century)

Oxford, Laudianum, Misc. 504 (XIII century)

Oxford, Wood, Empt. 16 (XIII century)

Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 634 (XIII century)

Assisi, 249 (XIII century) (entries starting with A–B, influences of the γ family)

Olomouc, Státní Vedecké knihovna, M.I.274 (1300–1350)

Praha, Národní knihovna České republiky, VIII.B.27 (1442–1443)

Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, I.F.97 (1400–1450)

Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, I.F.265 (1464)

Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 112 (based on an unidentified manuscript).

γ family intermediate (form of the text, containing interpolations):

Troyes, Médiathèque du Grand Troyes, 1697 (XIII century)

Troyes, Médiathèque du Grand Troyes, 1704 (XIII century) (entries in a shortened version)

Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica, Borgh., 148 (XIV century).

δ family (extended text form with numerous interpolations):

Troyes, Médiathèque du Grand Troyes, 32 (prior to 1216)

Troyes, Médiathèque du Grand Troyes, 392 (prior to 1216)

Dijon, Bibliothèque municipale, 0087 (1201–1225)

Lisboa, Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, Cód. Alcobacenses, 410 (1257)

Oxford, Merton coll. 200 (beginning of the XIV century)

Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, BJ1467 (1443)

Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, BJ1471 (XV century)

Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, I.F.99 (1474).

Inadequacy of the *Patrologia Latina* edition and the need for a critical edition

The most popular and widespread edition of the *Allegoriae* is Migne's *Patrologia Latina* based on Colvenerius's edition. Both of the contemporary translations, into Italian by Pier Giorgio di Domenico¹² and into English by Priscilla Throop,¹³ have been completed based on this edition.

The manuscript used by Colvenerius is part of the β family and contains the proper form of the text. Nevertheless, Migne's edition is far from perfect. Firstly, it seems that Colvenerius's manuscript was heavily damaged, contained numerous gaps and illegible fragments, all of which has been marked in the edition. Secondly, the scribe utilized abbreviations, which the editor wrongly deciphered. Some abbreviations are frequently confused, e.g. *quod* instead of *quia*, *Psalmo* instead of *Psalmis*, *Canticis* instead of *Cantico*. Thirdly, the editor was an expert in classical Latin and from time to time, especially when the text was difficult to read, he did a lot of guesswork with the aim of reconstructing the probable original form. Moreover, the Colvenerius edition contains interpolations, unconfirmed by any manuscript and far removed in style from the original version of the text.

All of this leads us to the conclusion that, the text of the *Allegoriae* from *Patrologia Latina* should be replaced with a new critical edition based on evidence from manuscripts.

¹² Rabano Mauro (pseudo), *Allegorie sulla Scrittura*, transl. P.G. di Domenico, Citta' del Vaticano 2002.

¹³ Anonymous, *Allegories in All Holy Scripture*, transl. P. Throop, Charlotte, Vermont 2009.

Remarks concerning the preparation of the critical edition

In the critical edition of *Allegoriae* which we have prepared, we take into account the available manuscripts from the XII century and the best manuscripts belonging to the β family from the XIII century. In situations when different versions of the text are represented by important manuscripts, we also check β manuscripts from the XIV-XV centuries, as well as evidence from the γ and δ families. Due to the significance of the *Patrologia Latina* edition, we also include its variations in the critical apparatus, although we have not yet accessed the manuscript which served its publication.

Apart from the critical apparatus, we also study sources of *Allegoriae*. Some interpretations are definitely based on the *Morals on the Book of Job* by Gregory the Great (d. 604) or commentaries to various Books of the Bible by Bede the Venerable or Rabanus Maurus. We have also come across influences of Augustine and Ambrose. Similarities to Eucherius, Fulgentius (d. 533), Primasius of Hadrumetum (died c. 560), Cassiodorus (d. 585), Ambrose Aupert (d. 784), or Paschasius Radbertus (d. 865) seem rather accidental and are a result of the common spiritual tradition of the interpretation of the Bible.

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The Significance of Suffering in Biblical Anthropology – Based on Cultures of the Middle East: *Res sacra miser* – a Suffering Man is Sacrosanct

Znaczenie cierpienia w antropologii biblijnej
na tle kultur Bliskiego Wschodu.
Res sacra miser – człowiek cierpiący rzeczą świętą

ABSTRACT: The basis for the biblical answer to the question of why man suffers is found in the ancient civilizations. In the civilization of Egypt, suffering was associated with the violation of the principles of Maat. In Mesopotamia there existed two sources of suffering, one was the wrong decisions of human beings, and the other was the work of demons. In the Greek civilization, in mythology, the source of suffering may be the rebellion of man. In philosophy, one tries to rationalize suffering and lead a person to such a state where he would experience as little of it in life as possible. Inspired authors know suffering, which is recorded in the nature of the living world, and man, through the gift of reason, should prudently avoid it. Most often, however, these authors see the source of suffering in sin. In the history of theology, there has also appeared the question about the possibility of the suffering of God. Under the influence of the Greek philosophical ideas of controlling passions and accepting the attitude of *apatheia*, the possibility of God experiencing suffering was rejected. God was pushed into the sphere that is only driven by love to a limited degree, and yet God is love. It went unnoticed that there are two ambivalent sources of suffering, one is born of evil, and the other is the highest bond of love. Those who love are most fully united in suffering, therefore, God was open to this narrative when His Son suffered and is also open when man suffers.

KEY WORDS: suffering, suffering in the Bible, expiation, test of faith, pedagogy of suffering, suffering of God

ABSTRAKT: Tłem dla biblijnej odpowiedzi na pytanie, dlaczego człowiek cierpi, pozostają dawne cywilizacje. W cywilizacji Egiptu cierpienie wiązano z naruszeniem zasad, które uświęcone przez tradycję porządkowały życie osobiste i społeczne. W Mezopotamii za źródła cierpienia uznawano błędne decyzje człowieka i działania demonów. W cywilizacji Grecji mamy dwa nurty – mitologiczny i filozoficzny. Autorzy natchnieni natomiast znają cierpienie, które jest zapisane w naturze, a którego rozumny człowiek powinien unikać. Najczęściej jednak widzą źródło cierpienia w grzechu. W tym kontekście pojawiła się trudność z wyjaśnieniem cierpienia człowieka sprawiedliwego. Jedną z odpowiedzi odnajdujemy w idei próby wiary, inną w myśli, że cierpienie ma charakter wychowawczy, gdyż oczyszcza i pozwala otworzyć się na innych. W historii teologii pojawiło się również pytanie o to, czy cierpi Bóg. Pod wpływem greckiej filozofii panowania nad namiętnościami i postawy *apathei* odrzucono tę możliwość. Jednak w ten sposób zepchnięto Stwórcę do strefy, w której ogranicza się kierowanie miłością, a przecież Bóg jest miłością. Nie zauważono, że są dwa ambiwalentne źródła cierpienia – jedno rodzi się ze zła, a drugie jest szczytem miłości. Najpełniej osoby kochające łączą się w cierpieniu, a więc Bóg był otwarty na tę relację, gdy cierpiał Jego Syn, i jest otwarty, gdy cierpi człowiek.

SŁOWA KLUCZE: cierpienie, cierpienie w Biblii, ekspiacja, próba wiary, pedagogia cierpienia, cierpienie Boga

At some point in his life man poses the questions: Why do I suffer? Why do my loved ones suffer? Where does suffering come from in the first place? Let us respond to these questions drawing on the wisdom of ancient civilizations since they too experienced the feeling of joy and happiness, but they also partook in pain, the feeling of misfortune and suffering. How did previous generations deal with the existence of suffering? The answer to this question can shed light upon the dilemmas which contemporary man faces at the present as he also tries to cope with the suffering that is part of his life.

A fruitful life means not only an able mind and body, success in life, the feeling of satisfaction, but also the conscious acceptance and dealing with suffering that one encounters. There is nothing closer to man than suffering – not even love. Only a few take their own life out of love, yet throngs of people have died experiencing suffering. It may be said, that man may just as well be referred to as both *homo sapiens* and *homo patiens*.¹ Perhaps there is a dependence between love and suffering? Perhaps the fullest love can only be expressed in suffering? Perhaps he who has not suffered in life, has also not experienced that which is most beautiful, complete unity in love?

¹ Cf. M. Filipiak, *Biblia jako tekst religijny i kulturowy* (Bible as a Religious and Cultural Text), Lublin 1993, p. 43.

Egyptians in the face of suffering

The Egyptian civilization arose at the shores of the Nile River and was shaped by its relatively regular floods. Similarly, the Egyptian social consciousness was formed based on the possibility of harnessing the potential of water, which the Nile provided. Happiness and prosperity were based on social harmony because it guaranteed the proper harnessing of the river floods. This harmony, the divine principles of the functioning of social relations were deified in the figure of the goddess Maat. Therefore, the source of suffering is a life in opposition to Maat – to divine harmony.

How should divine harmony be part of a man's private life? It is necessary to keep the body and the spirit as able as possible because only then does a man remain useful to his loved ones and society as a whole. Health is also the basis for building our happiness. And how do we keep in good health? We must maintain a healthy lifestyle! This means maintaining the balance between insufficiency and overabundance (neither asceticism nor promiscuity is good); all of the evil that a fool encounters, comes from the overindulgence of his belly and penis. An ideal life is one of moderation, based on optimizing one's needs, while a condition of maintaining health is a balance between the components of man: *ka* – responsible for physical needs, *ba* – responsible for desires and passions, and *akh* – responsible for higher aspirations and ambitions. On the other hand, the heart should be a place where compromise is achieved.²

Egyptians developed medicine because according to them it led to harmony. If a man was ill, it was up to the physician to restore balance (both physical and spiritual) in the organism. There is a preserved document in which the head Egyptian physician Uzahor-Resenet expresses his gratitude to the ruler of Persia for his care over a school of physicians:

His Majesty King Darius, who reigned in Elam on all countries and on all Egypt, has sent me to Sais in Egypt. He has instructed me to reorganize the houses of the life that had fallen into decadence.³ I have done as His Majesty has instructed me: I have filled them with students from noble families – there were no sons of the poor among them. I left them in the care of the wise men (...). His Majesty has instructed me to furnish them as best as possible so that they would

² Cf. W. Bator, *Religia starożytnego Egiptu* (The Religion of Ancient Egypt), Krakow 2004, p. 305.

³ In houses of life adepts were educated in various disciplines, which also included medicine. Cf. S. Pernigotti, *Kapłan* (Priest), transl. M. Witkowski, [in:] *Człowiek Egiptu* (Man of Egypt), S. Donadoni (ed.), Warsaw 2000, p. 178.

be able to learn and work. I have provided them with all that is necessary, all tools, in accordance with rules from previous times. His Majesty has commanded thus because he knew the benefits of this art, which is aimed at keeping alive all those who suffer.⁴

In the social dimension, the pharaoh was responsible for the presence of Maat – it was he who implemented order with his laws, which if they were not upheld could lead to chaos in interpersonal relations, and as a consequence to the suffering of many men. Each person, as best as he could, should also implement Maat, in order to overcome suffering in the social space, that is why the owner of a tomb boasts: “I have fed the hungry, clothed the naked, aided the castaway.”⁵

The Egyptians considered the surrounding reality as good and as a source of joy, that is why they considered a brief life as one of the most severe forms of punishment resulting in suffering. An even greater punishment was to be negatively judged by Osiris due to not maintaining the principles of Maat and to be sentenced to the darkest regions in the land of the dead to remain there forever.⁶

Mesopotamia – two sources of suffering

The inhabitants of Mesopotamia sought the answer to the question where does man come from. One of these was that the gods created people since work was too difficult for them, thus man was given the gift of reason, in order to carry out the work of gods.⁷ Therefore, the hardships and suffering connected with work were part of human nature since that was the will of the gods. Suffering also has its source in the existence of evil. And where did evil in the world come from, which brought with it pain and suffering?

⁴ Cf. J. Thorwald, *Dawna medycyna. Jej tajemnice i potęga. Egipt, Babilonia, Indie, Chiny, Meksyk, Peru* (Ancient Medicine. Its mysteries and its power. Egypt, Babylonian, India, China, Mexico, Peru), Wrocław 1990, p. 30.

⁵ Cf. S. Morenz, *Bóg i człowiek w starożytnym Egipcie* (God and Man in Ancient Egypt), transl. M. Szczudłowski, Warsaw 1972, p. 117.

⁶ Cf. W. Bator, Cierpienie (Suffering) [entry], [in:] *Religia Encyklopedia PWN* (Religion. PWN Encyclopedia), vol. 3, Warsaw 2001, p. 13.

⁷ Cf. K. Łyczkowska, K. Szarzyńska, *Mitologia Mezopotamii* (The Mythology of Mesopotamia), Warsaw 1986, p. 69.

This question which filled the minds of the inhabitants of Mesopotamia found its mythical explanation in the beginnings of the world. Initially, there was only Zurvan. Everything was in him and he was everything. Endless time and infinite space were in him and they were one, indistinguishable, identical. There were no features distinguishing the elements of being, while good and evil had not yet emerged out of unity. Then an idea entered Zurvan's head, a desire, to no longer be one, but to multiply and become two. He desired a son. He offered sacrifices and pondered what this offspring should be like: filled with all that is good, all splendor, happiness, and wisdom. And out of this prayerful thought, he conceived a Son of Light – Ormuzd. As he struggled thus, thinking, his joy was interrupted with doubts, which arose from the division of his being: he thought of characteristics in opposition to the previous ones, meaning darkness, anger and misfortune. This thought and this doubt gave rise to a second, unwanted son. And thus he conceived the Lord of Darkness – Ahriman.⁸

In this way, disharmony appeared in the world, which is a source of suffering. The world is filled with good and evil spirits and these have influence upon the people. As a consequence, the inhabitants of Mesopotamia limited the root of suffering to two sources: one was due to the wrong and bad decisions of man, the other was independent of man – the perpetrators of this suffering were demons. If a man was beset by physical suffering, then its cause had to be diagnosed. The diagnostician (*barû*) occupied himself with figuring out the causes of an illness (a diagnosis textbook was available). As soon as the diagnosis was made, treatment had to ensue. It was the task of a physician (*asû*) to treat illnesses with herbal mixtures, ointments, poultices, massages, and the isolation of the ailing. When the illness had spiritual roots, its causes were sought out outside of man, in the world of evil spirits. Finding the cure for this kind of an illness was the domain of an exorcist (*āšipu*), who treated the ill, using words, spells and amulets.⁹

A certain court official claimed that he came to Assur because: "I am ill. I do not even go to the marketplace. If I had gone there I would have died along the way (...) Let the king send me an exorcist and a physician."¹⁰ The *shurpu* was a known ritual, referring to the ritual of burning magical objects, to which both the illness and curses by which the believer was afflicted were transferred. During this ceremony, the suffering man requested to be free of "automatic

⁸ Cf. M. Składankowa, *Bohaterowie bogowie i demony dawnego Iranu* (The Heroes, Gods, and Demons of Ancient Iran), Warsaw 1984, p. 13.

⁹ Cf. I.L. Finkel, *Zarys historii medycyny starożytnej Mezopotamii* (An Overview of the History of Ancient Mesopotamia), Poznan 1997, p. 16 ff.

¹⁰ Cf. J. Thorwald, *Dawna medycyna. Jej tajemnice i potęga...*, op. cit., p. 131.

sins” meaning those that were done unconsciously, in order to in this way, be liberated of misfortune or the black magic that harassed him.¹¹

The civilization of Mesopotamia gave rise a trend of religious and philosophical thought which was created by Zarathustra. The foundation of his thought was the dualism of good and evil which begins in the divine dimension where there is a constant struggle between Ashura Mazda the god of good and Angra Mainju the god of evil. This fight spills out onto the human dimension, and within each of us, there is a struggle between good and evil. The final victory belongs to the good, but along the way, there is much suffering, caused by resistance of the forces of evil.¹²

The end of the world and death were treated as liberation from the necessity of suffering and changes, as a passing into the state of eternal happiness.¹³

Greece – searching for the sense of suffering

Generations of philosophers have struggled with the questions concerning the sense of suffering. Aristotle distinguished between suffering connected with death, meaning suffering in the face of “a loss-causing evil” and all other forms of suffering referring to a lesser evil.¹⁴ Suffering connected with death should be conquered by the virtue of courage, while in all the remaining cases, by the virtue of patience.¹⁵

According to Aristotle, man should control his feelings (*pathos*), among which he included, in the broad sense: “desire, anger, fear, bravery, envy, joy, love, hatred, longing, jealousy, mercy – and, in general, all that is accompanied by pleasure or distress.”¹⁶ As far as feelings are concerned, Aristotle postulated moderation: “ethical courage concerns the experience of passions and acting, in which overabundance is a mistake, while shortage – an object of reprimand, while the mean is an object of praise, something appropriate.”¹⁷ Among passions, there are those which are inherently evil, meaning joy at the misfortune

¹¹ Cf. G. Ravasi, *Hiob. Dramat Boga i człowieka* (Job. The Drama of God and Man), part 2, transl. K. Stopa, Krakow 2005, p. 383.

¹² Cf. I.J.S. Taraporewala, *The Religion of Zarathushtra*, Teheran 1980, pp. 23–30.

¹³ Cf. M. Składankowa, *Bohaterowie bogowie i demony dawnego Iranu*, op. cit., p. 28.

¹⁴ See: Aristotle, *Etyka nikomachejska* (Nicomachean Ethics), Warsaw 2012, III.

¹⁵ Cf. M. Czachorowski, Suffering [entry], [in:] *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii* (The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy), vol. 2, Lublin 2001, p. 190.

¹⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *Etyka nikomachejska*, op. cit., 1105d.

¹⁷ Cf. ibidem, 1106b.

of others, envy, hatred, and others requiring to be overcome and in those cases, the rule of the golden mean does not apply.¹⁸

The Stoics suggested that happiness is achieved by living in accordance with Nature, meaning the law of reason. Reason allows us to recognize virtues, which we should follow and passions, which should be limited. The four principal virtues lead to happiness: sensibility, courage, moderation and justice. Those who do not follow these virtues are susceptible to experiencing suffering. Passions, which should be controlled, may also be a source of suffering. A wise man limits and even eliminates passions: pleasures (*hedone*), sorrows (*lype*), desires, (*epithymia*) and fears (*fobos*). In this way, we achieve a state of apathy (*apatheia*),¹⁹ in which we minimalize experiences associated with suffering.

Seneca states that: “It is of utmost importance to be able to in a joyful mood, deal with displeasures. Accept all that happens to you as if you had really wanted it to happen to you. And in truth, you should want to, if you truly understand that all things happen according to God’s will.” Seneca encouraged one to be distant from joy and suffering, explaining:

It is the most important thing – to reach with our thoughts above things dependent on fate and to remember that we are human to know about happiness that it is brief, and about misfortune that no one is misfortunate unless he considers himself to be so. That is the most important thing – to be prepared for death.²⁰

Therefore, the nature of things must be understood and if they are unavoidable they must be accepted peacefully, so if death is part of human nature we must accept this fact and be prepared for final departure at every moment of our lives. We try to avoid suffering, but if it should come, we endure it patiently.

For Epicurus and his students, the most important goal in life was to attain happiness, which they connected with achieving long-lasting pleasure encompassing the entire life. Since happiness most often means the lack of

¹⁸ Cf. M. Czachorowski, Apathy [entry], [in:] *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii* (The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy), vol. 1, Lublin 2000, p. 287.

¹⁹ This term means insensitivity, understood as a lack of passions in different shades in each school of philosophy. The Stoics understood it as a radical elimination of passions (affects) thought to be the evil of the soul, which causes it to be miserable. The Cynics, on the other hand, see apathy as a sort of indifference in the face of all things, which people value. The Megarian Stilpo views apathy as the ability to not feel needs. Pirron understands apathy in the most radical way: it means utter insensitivity. Cf. G. Reale, *Historia filozofii starożytnej* (The History of Ancient Philosophy), vol. 5, Lublin 2005, p. 28.

²⁰ Cf. F. Copleston, *Historia filozofii* (The History of Philosophy), vol. 1, Warsaw 2004, pp. 358–363.

pain, then it is attained by steering clear of suffering. The road to happiness leads through a wise, honest and just life. Epicurus claimed “a noble man enjoys perfect harmony of spirit, while an evil man lives in constant anxiety.” Then it is necessary to get rid of all fears, which are the source of suffering as well as desires, which multiply our needs and also become a root of suffering. On this path, we are aided by three virtues: simplicity, moderation and temperance. In extreme cases, our needs must be limited to a minimum, meaning food, drink and rest. At the same time, our food should be simple, while drink unrefined.

The Epicureans paid attention to health since it was a fundamental condition for not experiencing suffering. Another thing man needs for happiness is to be in a community with other people, therefore he needs friends. That is why Epicureans claimed “friendship is the greatest of all goods which wisdom provides us with to ensure happiness throughout our lives.” Epicurus was a supporter of a peaceful family existence far removed from the hustle and bustle of the world.²¹ A wise man should then live in hiding, surrounded by faithful friends, limiting his needs to a bare minimum.²² In this way, man achieves a state of serene calmness (*ataraxia*) and is happy. However, such a lifestyle did not guarantee a complete removal of suffering, hence Epicurus reproachfully states: “If God wants to abolish suffering and cannot, then he is not omnipotent. If he can, but does not want to, then he is wicked. And if he wants to and can then why does suffering exist and He does not abolish it?”²³ The attitude of *hybris* was some kind of a response to this problem. It meant self-exaltation above the gods, which brought misfortune to people.²⁴ However, the accusation against God that He is responsible for suffering in the world, repeats itself throughout history.

While philosophy strove to defeat suffering as a form of evil, in Greek mythology, the deities experienced suffering and were also its source for others. The Greeks created a myth about Prometheus who had a great influence on the European way of thinking, all the way to contemporary times. In this myth, Prometheus steals fire from Mt. Olympus, which he would later gifts to humanity. As punishment, he is chained to a rock on the Caucasus where a hungry

²¹ Cf. J. Jundziłł, *Wzorce i modele wychowania w rodzinie rzymskiej* (The Patterns and Models of Upbringing in a Roman Family), Bydgoszcz 2001, p. 28. The rabbi Shemaiah encouraged his students to lead a peaceful life advising them: “Love work, hate lordship, and seek no intimacy with the ruling powers” (Pirke Awot 1,10).

²² Cf. J.-J. Duhot, *Szczęście u Greków* (Happiness According to the Greeks), [in:] *Encyklopedia religii świata* (Encyclopedia of the Religions of the World), vol. 2: *Zagadnienia problemowe* (Key Issues), Warsaw 2002, p. 1788.

²³ Cf. F. Copleston, *Historia filozofii*, vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 369–373.

²⁴ Cf. W. Bator, *Cierpienie* [entry], op. cit., p. 13.

vulture constantly pecks out his liver, which then grows back, therefore he is subject to unending suffering.²⁵

In the European way of thinking this myth is still alive and well, although it has been transferred to the image of God from the Bible. Man is often shown as the one who steals truth about the laws of Nature from God, for which he is subject to suffering. This contradiction between divine wisdom (principles of the functioning of the world) and the theft of this knowledge from God, is a burden for European civilization. It is as if the civilization is a result of stealing divine laws! The time has come to change our way of thinking: civilization is a gift from God resulting from His first blessing: “be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it” (Gen. 1:28), meaning, utilize your mind to discover God’s laws rooted in Nature and use them to overcome suffering, and make life more pleasant.

In subsequent parts of the myth we can read that Prometheus’s brother, Epimetheus married Pandora who was sent by Zeus, and opened a box, where all the evils and miseries which afflict humanity were trapped, meaning: old age, hard work, illnesses, madness, vices, and passions.²⁶ In this part of the myth, we discover the profound truth, that the limitation of man is part of his development. Man must accept this limitation of the development of civilization, but on the other hand, those who transcend the mind, open themselves onto the next stage of cognition, which is the path of faith. From this perspective, a ‘redeemed’ man sees his own life and the life of the entire human community as eternal and then he transcends the limitations of suffering creating a civilization that in turn transcends mortality.

The Biblical response to experiencing suffering

Suffering as part of nature

In the world created by God, suffering is part of its nature. There are storms, hurricanes, cyclones, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis, and many other forces of Nature that are a source of suffering. What should be the attitude of

²⁵ Cf. V. Zamarovský, *Bogowie i herosi mitologii greckiej i rzymskiej* (The Gods and Heroes of Greek Mythology), Warsaw 2003, p. 389 ff.

²⁶ Cf. W. Markowska, *Mity Greków i Rzymian* (The Myths of Greeks and Romans), Warsaw 2002, p. 109 ff.

man in the face of natural threats? Man was created in the image and likeness of God, so he possesses the gift of reason, which should lead him to shape life and the surrounding world in such a way so as to be as little susceptible to suffering as possible.²⁷ The mandate received from God “Subdue the Earth” (Gen. 1:28) is just such a calling. The scholar Sirach encourages us: “Love your soul and comfort your heart, and drive care far from you” (Sir. 30:24).

However, it is impossible for man to completely avoid the threats present in the surrounding world, that is why he turns in prayers towards the Divine Providence, to protect him from suffering. Man should ask for the gift of reason, to appropriately shape Nature, to not damage it, let it become a source of his happiness and not a cause of suffering.

Suffering as a result of sin

One of the first responses about the sense of suffering is provided by biblical tradition in the very first chapters of the Book of Genesis. From the biblical text, we find out that God planted “the tree of knowledge of good and evil” (*ra'*, Gen. 2:9), and then forbade access to it under the penalty of death (Gen. 2:17). This text puts the responsibility for breaking this law solely upon the shoulders of man. God created both the perpetrator of the temptation (serpent), as well as the object of desire (the forbidden fruit); therefore, he is somehow responsible for the evil present in the world (Gen. 6:5, *ra'*).²⁸

The possibility of choosing evil is part of the world condition so that man in recognizing good in the shadow of evil could shape his will and improve in recreating God's image in himself. Therefore, forming the image of God in man is a process in which man has God and his will as role models, but in a mirror, there is a reflection of His counterpart – evil. Every time man rejects God's design and gives into evil, sin appears, which distorts God's design in man, in the same way, that good is distorted in the reflection in the shape of

²⁷ This is how J.J. Rousseau commented the earthquake in Lisbon in 1755 with his *Letter on Providence*: “It was not Nature's way to crowd together twenty thousand houses with six or seven stories each. If all the inhabitants of the city had been dispersed more equally, the damage would have been much less, maybe nil.” Cf. J.J. Rousseau, *List do Woltera o Opatrzności* (Letter to Voltaire on Providence), [in:] idem, *Umowa społeczna* (Social Contract), Warsaw 1966, p. 522 ff.

²⁸ Cf. A. Tronina, *Księga Hioba* (The Book of Job), Nowy Komentarz Biblijny (New Biblical Commentary), vol. 15, Częstochowa 2013, p. 570 ff.

its counterpart. As a consequence, sin gives rise to suffering, because disorder, disharmony and chaos enter the world (Gen 3:14-19).

The story of the relationship between Cain and Abel shows how sin destroys the foundations of love that should exist between brothers. Each man can discover himself in the relationship between Cain and Abel since we are all brothers because God is our Father. Cain, who is unable to bear the imbalance that is natural for mankind, chooses a path of jealousy, envy and hatred, and these parts of human nature are the cause of all conflicts and wars among people.²⁹

Yet, the appalling question still remains, where do jealousy, envy and hatred in man come from, if he was created in the image and likeness of God? Is the distortion of this image of God so great, that it causes the evil elements of human nature to surface in man? Or perhaps man as a free being has in his nature the possibility to activate these elements and at the moment of the original sin, they were put in motion and penetrated human nature? If it is possible to imagine a man without jealousy, envy and hatred then this means, that these are not the constructive components of human nature, but rather are the effect of negative use of human freedom, which is part of human nature.

Therefore, God in creating man granted him freedom; every time man in his choices takes the side of evil, this freedom is a source of suffering. In sinning, I can hurt myself or other people. In instilling suffering through sin, I deserve to be punished, which is recalled by the scholar Sirach: Do no evil, so shall no evil overtake you. Depart from wrong and it shall turn aside from you” (Sir. 7:1). Therefore, suffering can be a compensation for harm done to another man. A man should then attempt himself to compensate for the evil committed so that he could benefit from God’s mercy.

After righting the wrongs caused by sin, it is time for penance and a prayer filled with requests for the forgiveness of sins. An illustration of the connection between sin and suffering is the story of David. His love of Bathsheba becomes a source of David’s sin – he condemns her husband Uriah the Hittite to certain death. The prophet Nathan makes David aware of his sin, for which there must be just punishment. It comes in the form of illness of the child from David’s relationship with Bathsheba, which ultimately results in the child’s death. Despite the fact that David took up penance (2Sam. 12:16), God still demanded that he suffer due to the child’s death, to repent for his sin. The substitute sacrifice remains in the background, an innocent child takes the sin of the father upon himself – this is the figure of the innocent Christ suffering for the sins of men.

²⁹ Por. E. Haag, *Sens cierpienia w Starym Testamencie* (The Sense of Suffering in the Old Testament), “Communio” 50 (1989), no. 2, p. 5.

David then assumed that his sin had already been forgiven, therefore after the death of the child, he abandoned his fasting and returned to everyday life, however, God once again reminded him of the sin and the necessity for penance, through the rebellion of David's son Absalom. David humbly accepts his son's rebellion, even allows himself to be cursed and harmed by Shimei, counting on God's mercy in exchange. David then said: "Perhaps the Lord will see my affliction and repay me with good for the cursing I receive today" (2Sam. 16:12).³⁰ David changes himself from a rebellious ruler he becomes humble and open to God's mercy. He experiences this mercy and Absalom's rebellion is put down, while Bathsheba's son Salomon ascends to the throne.

In establishing a covenant with Noah, God, after the flood exhibited affirmation for the creation contaminated with sin (Gen. 9:8-17), for which a salvation plan is in place but still the sun continues to rise in the same way on the evil and the good, while the rain falls upon the righteous and the unrighteous (Mat 5:45).³¹

It must be remembered that biblical thought refers to all signs of life, including signs of evil, misfortune, and suffering, to God as the first cause of all that happens and all actions. God can grant health but also strike with illness, give children or not. Evil is not an exception in the entire reality created and dependent on God as the Creator.³² The evil caused by man can, therefore, return to him in the form of punishment that manifests itself as suffering. When the Hebrews fled Egypt, God intervened on their behalf, besieging the Egyptians with plagues. Certainly, these plagues were a form of suffering for the Egyptians, but in the background, we have the earlier exploitation of the Hebrews. In context we hear God's message directed to man in which he proclaims:

if you will listen carefully to the voice of the Lord your God, and do what is right in His eyes and pay attention to His commands, and keep all His statutes, then I will not bring on you any of the disasters I inflicted on the Egyptians. For I am the Lord who heals you (Ex. 15:26).

³⁰ Cf. S. Potocki, *Problem cierpienia w historycznych tradycjach Starego Testamentu* (The Aspect of Suffering in Historical Traditions of the Old Testament), [in:] *Męka Jezusa Chrystusa* (The Passion of Jesus Christ), F. Gryglewicz (ed.), Lublin 1986, p. 29.

³¹ Cf. E. Haag, *Sens cierpienia w Starym Testamencie*, op. cit., p. 14.

³² Cf. M. Filipiak, *Aksjologiczne treści antropologii biblijnej* (The Axiological Content of Biblical Anthropology), Lublin 1991, p. 110.

God desires good and desires to heal all human wounds, but man in choosing evil and stubbornly persisting in it seems to be demanding divine intervention, to put an end to all these afflictions by just punishment. The prophet Amos reminds Israel on behalf of God:

I beset all your cities with cleanness of teeth and all your towns with lack of bread, yet you did not return to me. I also withheld the rain from you, I laid waste among you, yet you did not return to me (Am. 4:6-7).

A context for God's intervention and the punishment sent down from above was the great social injustice that was prevalent in the Hebrew community at that time. God, through suffering, invited people to change their lives and reject all evil.

Suffering as a test of faith

However, in life, we also encounter situations where misfortune befalls the righteous, while happiness comes to the impious. Job of Uz, a man who was respected and wealthy, suddenly, as a result of subsequent catastrophes loses his children, servants, house, fortune – basically everything.³³ As if that was not enough, he himself is afflicted with leprosy. Moreover, his friends in trying to console him, accuse him of leading a sinful life. Therefore, on top of physical pain, he experiences spiritual suffering through not being understood even by his friends. Job finds no fault within himself and regretfully calls to God: “Why do the wicked live on, growing old and increasing in power? They see their children established around them, their offspring before their eyes” (Job 21:7-8).³⁴ Finally, we learn that Job was subject to a test of faith and thanks to his faithfulness was given further blessings from God. In this trial, Job learns humility in the face of God, who directs the fate of all reality, in which suffering also plays a part.³⁵ Job regains his home and household, animals and properties, his wife, children, beautiful daughters and, in addition, long life.

³³ The tragic figure of Job may come from the tradition of Persian dualism of the struggle between good and evil where man is the arena, however, now the inspired author must find a solution for the suffering of Job in a monotheistic reality, where God is responsible for all reality in which man experiences suffering. As a consequence, the evil spirit assumes the role of a servant, who tests Job.

³⁴ Cf. G. Ravasi, *Hiob. Dramat Boga i człowieka*, part 2, op. cit., pp. 267–280.

³⁵ Cf. J.W. Bremer, *Hiob wobec sprawiedliwego i miłosiernego Boga* (Job in the Face of a Just God), Krakow 2017, pp. 113–120; John Paul II, Apostolic Letter *Salvifici Doloris*, Rome 1984, p. 11.

Jesus invites us to be just as faithful in overcoming the offers of the devil of easy prosperity, supernatural power and unlimited authority (Mk. 1:12-13; Mat. 4:1-11; Luk. 4:1-13) and demands that we ask in the prayer of *Our Father* for the grace of not succumbing to temptation and the ability to withstand the test of our faith (Mt. 6:9-13, Luk. 11:2-4).³⁶ Even the first people were subject to a test. The inspired author narrows down this trial to the prohibition of consuming the fruit from the tree of “knowledge of good and evil” (Gen. 2:8). This test was unsuccessful for man, since the fruit was picked and eaten, and this resulted in unfortunate consequences in the relationship between the first people with their Father, the Creator.

What was this test? Man in the symbol of the tree of knowledge of good and evil had all his competencies drawn out as God’s child. He was to carry out his calling “to subdue the Earth,” in compliance with God’s will (Gen. 1:28), but man’s response to God was: I shall do so, according to my own will, and he proclaimed himself equal to God, meaning he committed the sin of pride. A consequence of this decision was suffering, which since that time has been part of human nature.³⁷ Man was removed from the place where he experienced God’s tender care, where life was to end not with death, but with passing on to eternity. In a new existentialist situation, man must deal with the shortcomings of his nature, which due to sin, is subject to suffering, along with the closing of the perspective of eternal life.

The idea of a test comes back in the Book of Genesis, where we read: “And it came to pass after these things, that God did tempt Abraham, and said unto him, Abraham: and he said, Behold, here I am. And He said, Take now your son, your only son Isaac, whom you love, and go to the land of Moriah; and offer him there for a burnt offering upon one of the mountains which I will tell you of” (Gen. 22:1-2). After he makes the decision to offer his only son in sacrifice, a decision marked by great suffering, Abraham heard the words of an angel sent by God: “By Myself I have sworn, declares the Lord, that because you have done this and have not withheld your only son, I will surely bless you” (Gen. 22:15-16). Let us hope for the strength of Abraham and the resilience of Job when we are faced with our own test of faith!

³⁶ Cf. R. Maritain, *Notatki na temat „Ojciec nasz”* (Notes on the Subject of „Our Father”), Krakow 2000, pp. 73–80.

³⁷ Cf. S. Potocki, *Problem cierpienia w historycznych tradycjach...*, op. cit., p. 20.

The pedagogical aspect of suffering

Suffering may also carry with it a pedagogical aspect: “For the Lord disciplines the one He loves, as does a father a son in whom he delights” (Prov. 3:12). The author of the Book of Revelation thinks likewise, explaining to the community of the Church in Laodicea: “Those I love, I rebuke and discipline” (Rev. 3:19a). God disciplined his people during the journey through the desert towards the Promised Land, which the Deuteronomist reminds us of:

Remember that these forty years the Lord your God led you all the way in the wilderness, so that He might humble you and test you in order to know what was in your heart, whether or not you would keep His commandments. He humbled you, and in your hunger, He gave you manna to eat, which neither you nor your fathers had known, so that you might understand that man does not live on bread alone, but on every word that comes from the mouth of the Lord (...). So know in your heart that just as a man disciplines his son, so the Lord your God disciplines you (Deut. 8:2-5).

In another historical context, during the Seleucid domination over Judea, we hear the reflection of an inspired historian: “the calamities that happened, not as being for the destruction, but for the correction of our nation” (2Macc. 6:12). Paul speaks in a similar way during the persecutions of the Church:

Not only that, but we also rejoice in our sufferings, because we know that suffering produces perseverance – perseverance, character; and character, hope. And hope does not disappoint us, because God has poured out His love into our hearts through the Holy Spirit, whom He has given us (Rom. 5:3-5).

In suffering, there is a particular calling for virtue, which man must develop. This means a virtue of resilience, in face of that which afflicts and hurts us. In doing this, man instills hope within himself, which maintains in him the conviction that he will not be overcome by suffering, his dignity and his sense of living will not be taken away. And it is this very sense that manifests itself along with God’s love, which is the greatest gift of the Holy Spirit.³⁸

Seneca (d. 65 A.D.), a Stoic scholar, notes: “Therefore, God hardens, reviews, and exercises those whom He tests and loves: those whom He seems to indulge and spare, He is keeping out of condition to meet their coming misfortunes”

³⁸ John Paul II, Apostolic Letter *Salvifici Doloris*, op. cit., p. 23.

(Thoughts 4:7)³⁹. Ascending the rungs of reason, Seneca noticed that man becomes better at suffering and becomes richer in his humanity because he is prepared to accept the challenges that Fate puts in front of him. In addition, as is suggested by Władysław Tatarkiewicz in analyzing the feeling of love, moments experienced as suffering may be the happiest moments of our life. In his treatise *O szczęściu* (On Happiness), he writes that in love that is joyful, we experience:

the feeling of wanting, since we are separated from the person we love, anxiety since we are far away from them, sadness since we must part with them, boredom since we must stay in the company of others, and often a sensation of insatiability when we are together. In their absence, the world becomes, as Żeromski says “empty, barren, deaf, dull, full of darkness and boredom.” Yet, this period in our lives filled with these sensations – longing, anxiety, sadness, boredom, insatiability – we often experience as the happiest time of our life.

Later, the philosopher asks why is it that negative feelings are seen as happy moments? This happens because these sensations are associated with the “consciousness that we have something in life which is worth being anxious about,”⁴⁰ because the opposite of suffering is not happiness, but a feeling of pleasure.⁴¹ Happiness, on the other hand, is the experiencing of joy from something we possess. That is why acquiring this possession, even in suffering, is a positive experience that leads to happiness. Therefore, there is an aspect of suffering that is part of happiness and not its opposite! When does this occur? When suffering is combined with love; without it, suffering acquires negative characteristics and becomes an experience of evil. “Love is the fullest response to a question on the sense of suffering. A response provided by God in the Crucifixion of Jesus Christ.”⁴²

Previously, this form of experiencing suffering was proposed by God to the prophets so that they would be the prediction of the experience of suffering by His Son. Jeremiah brings to God the complaint of the Righteous (Jer. 11:18-23;

³⁹ Cf. Seneca, *Mysli* (Thoughts), Warsaw 1995, p. 41.

⁴⁰ Cf. W. Tatarkiewicz, *O szczęściu* (On Happiness), Warsaw 1990, p. 97 ff.

⁴¹ „The angel of pleasure wants to teach us to enjoy various things. He wants us to taste life in its fullest. Experiencing pleasures – as we can see through mystical theology, which is recalled by St. Augustine – is an integral element of spiritual life. Ultimately the goal of our life is to delight in God in everlasting life.” Cf. A. Grün, *Posłańcy nieba. O aniołach, dzięki którym życie nabiera lekkości* (Messengers of Heaven. On Angels Thanks to Whom Life Acquires a Sense of Lightness), transl. K. Markiewicz, Poznań 2016, p. 15 ff.

⁴² Cf. John Paul II, Apostolic Letter *Salvifici Doloris*, op. cit., p. 13.

12:1-6; 15:10-21; 17:12-18, 18:18-23; 20:7-18), while God orders him to take part in the suffering, to be together with this just man in experiencing suffering.⁴³ Jeremiah finds the sense of his own suffering in experiencing the presence of God in this suffering. Suffering which transforms into the experience of happiness only becomes possible when man sees its sense and undertakes it in the name of love. Jesus, in proposing this path to happiness, expressed in His blessings, refers to these two dimensions, inviting us to undertake the challenge of suffering in life. The horizontal sense of suffering can be found in the feeling of being a just man. The vertical sense is the reward that awaits us in heaven, and, in the connection filled with love towards Christ. Therefore, not every form of suffering changes into an experience of happiness, but sometimes:

Blessed are those who are persecuted because of righteousness, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are you when people insult you, persecute you, and falsely say all kinds of evil against you because of Me. Rejoice and be glad, because great is your reward in heaven; for in the same way they persecuted the prophets before you (Mat. 5:10-11).

Just as parents discipline their child out of love, forming his personality in order for him to be able to put into effect future plans, so too God raises us through difficult experiences, so that man may meet the requirements of relations within a community and reach the destination of his journey, meaning eternity. A child, when he is motivated to acquire knowledge, perform daily duties, often experiences this as something negative, but when he attains a goal, he feels fulfilled by the fact that the time devoted to it resulted in new opportunities.

In the same way, moments of suffering in life, which are put in front of us by God, seem difficult to bear, but when we overcome them, we may see the pedagogical presence of the Lord, as we have become less arrogant towards other people, we respect them more, and understand that their shortcomings require from us patience and more often than not, forgiveness. The author of the Letter to the Hebrews makes us aware that God punishes us “for our good, so that we may share in His holiness. No discipline seems enjoyable at the time, but painful. Later on, however, it yields a peaceful harvest of righteousness to those who have been trained by it” (Heb. 12:10b-11).

⁴³ Cf. E. Haag, *Sens cierpienia w Starym Testamencie*, op. cit., p. 8 ff.

Suffering in the service of Divine Providence

Suffering might also be the result of an act of Divine Providence. God cares over the fate of people and the world (Ps. 146:7-9; Isa. 44:24-28; Wis. 6:8; 12:13) and in a special way defends those who are persecuted. In a symbolic way those who are the most discriminated against are mentioned, the poor, the widows, the orphans. The prophet Isiah proclaims: "Woe to those who enact unjust statutes and issue oppressive decrees, to deprive the poor of fair treatment and withhold justice from the oppressed of My people, to make widows their prey and orphans their plunder" (Isa. 10:1-2). If we are those who harm, we must take into account the fact that God will defend those who are harmed and then we may experience suffering. Let us not forget, that a prayer for the discriminated reaches the ears of God and calls on Divine Providence to defend their rights (Ps 69:70).

The prayer of the Hebrews in Egypt was answered by God and the process of their exodus from Egypt was put into motion as was promised by the Lord. Unfortunately, their path was blocked by the Egyptians and that is why these oppressors were besieged by misfortune in the shape of plagues (Ex. 9:1-10:29).⁴⁴ God, therefore, in defending the discriminated can send us a sign in the form of suffering to encourage us to change our evil ways. Then we do not rebel against the actions of Divine Providence, but we change our way and beg for God's mercy. Let the humility of the prodigal son be an encouragement for us on our path towards the Merciful Father! (Luk. 15:11-32).

God may also invite us to be part of a project in which He desires to convert and change another person and He needs us in this project, which may be connected with the necessity to give up on our own dreams and plans, and in turn, we may experience it as a certain form of suffering! Let us remember that in the mysterious plan of God, which led to the creation of man, there was an aspect of free will, which means that he was granted freedom since only a free being is able to love God, but also to reject this love. Man affirms divine love and answers to it – thus God becomes 'richer' through man's love. Even if man rejects divine love, in this rejection, God's greatness is also revealed since he allowed man to act in this way. This can be translated into interpersonal relations. The greatness of man reveals itself in his love towards another man, but even discarded love that causes pain is better than a situation in which man has never experienced love! Paradoxically, rejected love and even hatred is better

⁴⁴ Cf. M. Filipiak, *Biblia o człowieku. Zarys antropologii biblijnej Starego Testamentu* (Bible on Man: An Overview of the Biblical Anthropology of the Old Testament), Lublin 1979, p. 179.

than indifference. Indifference shuts man off from all relations with another man, while hatred which is overcome may be a turning point in building even more beautiful bonds since they were enriched by the experienced suffering on the path to change!

Expiatory significance of suffering from the perspective of eternal life

The Old Testament scholar struggles with yet another question: what is the sense of the death of a young, good person? The Book of Wisdom answers thus: "He pleased God, and was beloved, and living among sinners, he was translated. He was taken away, lest wickedness should alter his understanding, or deceit beguile his soul. For the bewitching of vanity obscures good things, and the wandering of concupiscence overturns the innocent mind" (Wis. 4:10-12).

It seems that the scholar dealing with the death of a just man opens up onto the hope of eternal life.⁴⁵ The righteous is taken away from a sinful world and preserved for a new life.

Similar hope is experienced by the praying Psalmist when he tells God: "You have taken account of my wanderings. Put my tears in Your bottle, are they not in Your book?" (Ps 56:9; cf. Isa. 25:8). The Psalmist entrusts his misfortune to God, but there will come a day when God rewards him for the tears in the book!

On the other hand, the prophet Deutero-Isiah in the grand vision of the Servant of Yahweh sees the value of suffering, especially of sinners:

Surely He took on our infirmities and carried our sorrows, yet we considered Him stricken by God, struck down and afflicted. But He was pierced for our transgressions. He was crushed for our iniquities. The punishment that brought us peace was upon Him, and by His stripes we are healed (Isa. 53: 4-5).⁴⁶

The image of man who, in experiencing suffering, completely trusts God, is depicted in the prayer contained in Ps. 22. Here, is a suffering man, who goes through suffering alone and experiences total rejection and contempt by all people, but yet he still carries inside him hope for divine intervention. He does

⁴⁵ Cf. B. Poniży, *Księga Mądrości. Od egzegezy do teologii* (The Book of Wisdom: From Exegesis to Theology), Poznan 2000, p. 198.

⁴⁶ Cf. J. Paściak, *Izajasz wieszczem Chrystusa* (Isiah as the Prophet of Christ), Katowice 1987, pp. 100-142.

not completely understand his suffering, but he does not lose his connection with God, moreover, he trusts that his salvation will become a sign inviting all people to come to God, who is their Father. On the Cross, Jesus prays with these words of longing for the Father: “My God! My God!,” and although this cry ends with a question “why have You forsaken me?,” these are words of potential elevation above the feeling of loneliness – these are words, which in themselves, as the words of a prayer, contain a positive answer.⁴⁷

The love between the Son and the Father does not stop, it reaches its pinnacle, complete unity. The Father leads the Son through death, receiving the Spirit and once again giving Him to the Son so that the Christ could be resurrected and unite with the Father. The Holy Trinity is filled with love, which is fully expressed by the experience of the suffering of Christ.

Therefore, the Old Testament struggles with the sense of suffering were only fully completed by the death of Jesus who, in suffering, gave up His life for our sake, in order to grant us eternal life.⁴⁸ As His agony approaches, Christ consoles His disciples:

You will grieve, but your grief will turn to joy. A woman has pain in childbirth because her time has come; but when she brings forth her child, she forgets her anguish because of her joy that a child has been born into the world. So also you have sorrow now, but I will see you again and your hearts will rejoice, and no one will take away your joy (Jn. 16:21-22).

The introduction of man into the realm of eternal life is the goal of Christ’s path of suffering, however, its motif is explained by Christ during the nightly theological dispute with Nicodemus: “For God so loved the world that He gave His one and only Son” (Jn. 3:16). Human suffering only then acquires sense, when the perspective of life does not end in temporality, but possesses an eternal dimension, and also when we suffer due to our love of another person, in which we discover the image of God. These two vectors are necessary to bestow sense upon human fate as far as the suffering he experiences. Is one of these vectors enough to provide sense to human suffering? No! Because when we try to attain eternal life without love we may find “the gates to heaven closed,” which

⁴⁷ Cf. S. Mędała, *Stary Testament a męka Chrystusa* (Old Testament and the Passion of Christ), [in:] *Męka Jezusa Chrystusa* (The Passion of Jesus Christ), J. Gryglewicz (ed.), Lublin 1986, p. 40 ff.

⁴⁸ We can only fully understand the actions of Divine Providence if we open ourselves to eternal life. Cf. B. Pylak, *Boża Opatrzność a zło w świecie* (Divine Providence and Evil in the World), Lublin 1960, p. 25 ff.

without love would become its direct opposite. When we desire to find sense only in horizontal love to another human being without opening ourselves onto eternal life, then the death of a loved one renders our life senseless. Only in the perspective of eternity filled with love do we fully comprehend Christ's calling "Do, not be afraid of those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul" (Mat. 10:28). A man who loves is prepared to die because his love does not die, it is eternal, it has overcome death on the Cross, and its presence allows us to not fear the death of those we love!

A Christian strives to live in such a way, as to not bring suffering upon himself or others, he may also ask Divine Providence to protect him from suffering, but, at the same time, remembers the words of the Master: "If anyone wants to come after Me, he must deny himself and take up his cross and follow Me" (Mk. 8:34). Therefore, for a Christian, suffering may also be a call to follow Christ:

For if anyone endures the pain of unjust suffering because he is conscious of God, this is to be commended. How is it to your credit if you are beaten for doing wrong and you endure it? But if you suffer for doing good and you endure it, this is commendable before God. For to this, you were called, because Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example that you should follow in His footsteps (1Pt. 2:19-21).⁴⁹

Suffering as a calling means we participate in Christ's suffering, in His gift of salvation. Paul explains to the community in Rome that:

For all who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God. For you did not receive a spirit of slavery that returns you to fear, but you received the Spirit of sonship, by whom we cry, "Abba! Father!" The Spirit Himself testifies with our spirit that we are God's children. And if we are children, then we are heirs: heirs of God and co-heirs with Christ – if indeed we suffer with Him, so that we may also be glorified with Him (Rom. 8:14-17).⁵⁰

All those who suffer are invited to "suffer in Christ" (1Pt. 4:13). This was the path to which Our Lady had already been invited by the words of Simeon, who prophesizes saying that: "a sword will pierce your soul" (Luk. 2:35). The

⁴⁹ Cf. M.I. Alves, *Sens cierpienia w Nowym Testamencie* (The Sense of Suffering in the New Testament), "Communio" 50 (1989), no. 2, p. 23 ff.

⁵⁰ Cf. *ibidem*, p. 24.

prophecy comes true in the image of the Virgin Mary standing under the Cross upon which Christ is dying.⁵¹

A Christian does not even fear death since he knows that he will enjoy eternal life. Starting with the very early Christians all the way to contemporary times, the fullest expression of love between man – God’s child and Father – the Creator, is readiness to sacrifice our life on behalf of this love and die a martyr’s death! There are more and more generations of those who love the Father and are ready to endure pain and suffering to come together as much as possible with God, who is love (1Jn. 4:8-16). The author of the Book of Revelation in a vision of the New Jerusalem – the Holy City – sees a multitude of the saved, for whom God “will wipe away every tear from their eyes, and there will be no more death or mourning or crying or pain, for the former things have passed away” (Rev. 21:4).⁵² In experiencing suffering, Job did not yet have the perspective of eternal life, so he demanded compensation from God here on Earth. At that time, the *Sheol* was a place where one awaited to be saved by God. Job, however, has such deep faith that he believes that even if he had died, God will not keep him in the land of the dead, because He is just (Job 19:25-27).

Does contemporary man possess such deep faith as the one exhibited by Job? Losing our path towards God in suffering ends in an existentialist rebellion against the world and God – but it is in suffering “he becomes a completely new person. He discovers a new dimension, as it were, of his entire life and vocation. This discovery is a particular confirmation of the spiritual greatness which in man transcends the body in a way that is completely beyond compare.”⁵³

Suffering of God?

On the pages of the Bible, God appears as a Father who cares for his children who were created in His image and likeness. However, how should the children understand their likeness to the Father if “No one has ever seen God” (Jn. 1:18). Through the act of embodiment of the Son, God gave us His image, since He is the image of an invisible God (Col. 1:15). Jesus, the Son of God, ensures the doubting Philip that he who sees the Son also sees the Father (Jn. 14:9).

⁵¹ Cf. M. Guzewicz, *Postawy wobec cierpienia w Biblii. Od Abrahama do Maryi* (Attitudes in Face of Suffering in the Bible. From Abraham to the Virgin Mary), Poznan 2005, pp. 39–42.

⁵² Cf. G. Ravasi, *Biblia jest dla ciebie. Mały kurs teologii biblijnej* (The Bible Is for You. A Short Course of Biblical Theology), Poznan 2011, p. 34 ff.

⁵³ Cf. John Paul II, Apostolic Letter *Salvifici Doloris*, op. cit., p. 26.

In Christ, we find the image of God, who is love (1Jn. 4:16). We learn this love and we desire as good children should, to carry out the Father's will. This will was revealed in the Word of God, which we contemplate and implement in our relations with other people because in them we find the image of our common Father. In contemplating the love of the Father, we open ourselves to the truth, that this love is so great, that in it, the Father was ready to send his own Son to suffer to deliver us from evil, grant us fullness of life, and restore this bond of love between the children and the Father! We have lost this bond when we left the house of God (Paradise) and we said: we do not want to live under Your care, in accordance with Your will, we want to live on our own! Did the Father suffer due to our departure?

In philosophical reflection, we bestow upon God such attributes as perfection, infinity, immovability, immutability, non-susceptibility to wounds. Denial of the possibility of God's suffering – that is a temptation that immediately comes to us, especially since the beginning of the III century, Hippolytus and Tertullian had to speak out against the Patripassians, who accepted “the passion” of the Father. Patripassianism was a form of modalism: according to it, since the Word is another name for the Father, then it was the Father who was embodied and suffered.⁵⁴ The fear of falling into heresy made us immobilize God and deny the fundamental truth that “God is love” (Jn. 4:16)! Suffering is, after all, the greatest bond of love; when we suffer along with our loved one, we are bonded so closely with their pain, that our bodies simultaneously feel the suffering, while our souls achieve a pinnacle of unity, to such a degree that we are willing to die for those we love! Only a person who loves joins in the suffering of a loved one! In all other cases we stop at sympathy – a form of empathy that motivates us to help a suffering person – however, our body does not experience physical pain until we display love for the suffering person.

Such an image of joint suffering is provided by Our Lady standing under the Cross as she participates in the pain of her Son. Should God then only be able to experience sympathy? Could God look with indifference upon his Son's suffering? Could God not love us enough to experience our suffering, the

⁵⁴ The Patripassians were a religious community of Unitarians from the II century, which was established by the students of Praxeas, Noetus, and Sabellius. Inspired by the views of Modalists, they taught that the Father was self-conceived in the womb of the Virgin Mary, became Jesus Christ, suffered on the Cross and died. Cf. H. Masson, *Słownik herezji w Kościele katolickim* (A Dictionary of Heresies in the Catholic Church), transl. B. Sęk, Katowice 1993, p. 235; F. Varillon, *Cierpienie Boga* (The Suffering of God), [in:] *Sens choroby, sens śmierci, sens życia* (The Sense of an Illness, the Sense of Death, the Sense of Life), H. Bortnowska (ed.), Krakow 1984, p. 403.

greatest bond of love with each and every person? It was the embodiment of the Son of God that opened God up to the relation of love, in which, in the human body of Jesus, God can fully experience unity with man and show him love through the experience of the highest form of love, which is unity in suffering.

In this image of experienced suffering there is a reflexive form – not only do I suffer along with my loved ones, but I also allow them to participate in my suffering. When my body is weak and requires support, I in my weakness depend on the love of those who love me, allowing them to care for me and participate in my suffering. In the same way, I open myself up to God’s care and His love in my suffering, I allow God to love me in my physical or spiritual imperfection. Unfortunately, very often man suffers feeling rebellious: why has this befallen me? And the fruit of this rebellion is an accusation directed at God, that He is unjust because He created a world in which suffering exists. Only if there exists an open reflexive relation of love towards God, can God enter into the life of a suffering person, more often than not, by calling upon those who would love the person who suffers. Do not reject God’s love in suffering, nor the love of those called by Him to care for us. Do not refuse God, if He invites us onto the path of relieving other people’s suffering, especially if we are invited to participate in the suffering by calling us to love the person who is experiencing pain, misfortune and loneliness.

We are all called to undertake the hardship of supporting those who suffer. Recalling the words of Jesus, the Evangelist Matthew noted:

Come, you who are blessed by My Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. For I was hungry and you gave Me something to eat, I was thirsty and you gave Me something to drink, I was a stranger and you took Me in, I was naked and you clothed Me, I was sick and you looked after Me, I was in prison and you visited Me (Mat 25:34-36).

In response to the righteous who would ask Him when did they do all of this for Him, the Son of Man shall say: “Truly I tell you, whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers of Mine, you did for Me” (Mat. 25:40).

In another image, we receive a lesson of opening ourselves onto the selfless love, onto the suffering of a harmed man. On his way to Jerusalem, a man was beaten and needed help (Luk. 10:30-37). God sends a priest this way, who serves Him in a temple, unfortunately, he passes by in utter indifference not answering his calling. God then calls upon a Levite, who is a lesser servant in the temple, but he too passes without providing aid. For both of them, ritual rules constituted an obstacle in opening themselves to the calling of God to

participate in the suffering of man, which is also experienced by God since his image is in that very man! Finally, a Samaritan is invited onto the path, he stops and comprehends his calling – not only does he help this unfortunate soul, but his care goes further to establish a personal bond with the one who suffers. If we assume that a beaten Jew was lying along the road to Jerusalem, while the Samaritan was a soldier going to the Cyprus fortress, then the clarity of overcoming human barriers and opening up onto love even of your enemies becomes a living illustration of the Jew-Samaritan relationship, since at that time those two communities had nothing but contempt for each other. However, the suffering of one released the most beautiful of feelings in the other and led to the giving of love, despite social and cultural barriers. “A man (...) cannot discover himself in full, other than by the selfless giving of oneself.”⁵⁵

Early Christianity named the belief that God can suffer and take part in Christ’s passion – “Theopaschism.” The Fathers of the Church intuitively felt that God has the ability to suffer! Of course, God suffers differently – He accepts suffering voluntarily, at His own initiative, out of love, not as forced upon Him from the outside or as a result of ontological deficiencies.

The reason that the truth contained in the views of the supporters of Theopaschism was forgotten, was Greek philosophy with its idea of *apatheia*. The mentality of the Greek elites did not allow for the presence of suffering in the divine world of happiness. Greek philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Neoplatonism) was in direct opposition to the universal in ancient times mythological notions of suffering and changing deities. That is why the Fathers of the Church developed a paradox formula of “the Impassible who suffered for us.” God, who is impassible in His nature, suffered in the embodiment of His Son, in His human nature. This was especially emphasized by the theologians of Antioch. The Alexandrian ones, on the other hand, explained that divine nature assimilates the suffering of Christ in His human nature.⁵⁶

The boldest of early-Christian writers in depicting God suffering out of love was Origen. In his profound ponderation of the testimony provided by biblical texts, he wrote: “In his love, God suffers (*sympaschei*), He is not impassible.”⁵⁷ In pondering the suffering of the Son of God, he adds:

⁵⁵ Cf. The Second Vatican Council, *Konstytucja duszpasterska o Kościele w świecie współczesnym* “*Gaudium et spes*” (The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World *Gaudium et spes*), Vatican, 1965, p. 24.

⁵⁶ Cf. W. Hryniewicz, *Pascha Chrystusa w dziejach człowieka i wszechświata* (The Passover of Christ in the History of Man and the Universe), vol. 3: *Zarys chrześcijańskiej teologii paschalnej* (An Overview of Christian Paschal Theology), Lublin 1991, p. 268.

⁵⁷ Cf. *Selecta in Ezech.* 16. PG 13,812.

What is the suffering that He suffered for us? It is the suffering of love (*caritas est passio*). Does the Father Himself, God of the Universe, full of long-lasting compassion and mercy (Ps 102:18) not suffer in some way? Or do you not know that in His concern for human affairs (*quando humana dispensat*), He bears human suffering (*passionem patitur humanam*)? God takes upon Himself your misfortunes, as the Son of God takes on our sufferings. The Father Himself is not impassible (*Ipse Pater non est impassibilis*). He suffers with the suffering of love (*patitur aliquid caritatis*) and becomes such as He cannot be due to the greatness of His nature; for us, He bears human suffering (*humanas sustinet passiones*).⁵⁸

God's suffering is suffering which comes from His love, which can experience pain together with man.⁵⁹ He participates in the suffering of man and suffers because of him. Origen speaks of the passion of the Son suffered for us, but goes on even further, indicating the mysterious suffering of the Father. He notices the profoundness of this paradox: on one hand, impassibility (*apatheia*), on the other, His passibility (*pathos*) in the entire process of the Economy of Salvation.⁶⁰ Indeed, if there exists a mutual connection between loving Divine Persons, it is impossible for one to suffer and the other to remain indifferent.⁶¹

The Son of God does indeed pass through death, and in that sense, Jesus feels loneliness upon the Cross, but the hope for the return of the Spirit which is leaving Him, overcomes the sensation of loneliness. The suffering of loneliness releases a feeling of an even greater joy of meeting along with the deified human nature of Christ. It is also the joy expressed by the Father at the fact of healing the relations of love between Father the Creator and His child – the created man. Man was invited to partake in the joint journey along with the Father, towards his home, while Christ and His Gospel became the guide. He was our brother in whom love was expressed to its fullest, since He loved us so much that He was prepared to sacrifice His life for us, even then, when we were sinners rebelling against Him and our Father. What then is following Christ to the Father? A way of rebuilding relations of love? The suffering of separation

⁵⁸ Cf. *In Ezech. hom.* 6.6. PG 13,714-715.

⁵⁹ The expression *ho pathon Theos* comes from St. Gregory of Nazianzus who, in using it, expressed his thoughts on undergoing passion by a Being, who naturally does not experience suffering. Cf. Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 17 (PG 35, 980); Or. 38 (PG 36, 325).

⁶⁰ Cf. W. Hryniewicz, *Pascha Chrystusa...*, op. cit., p. 270.

⁶¹ Cf. W. Hryniewicz, *Bóg cierpiący? Rozważania nad chrześcijańskim pojęciem Boga* (Suffering God? Thoughts on the Subject of the Christian Concept of God), "Collectanea Theologica" 51 (1981), no. 2, p. 5.

is overcome, every time man builds relations of love with the Father, expressing them in his relationship with another man, made in the image of the Father.

Conclusion

The XX century has been called the era of reinforced concrete, glass, plastic, atom and electronics. Here are the great works which provided an impulse for humanity to subdue the Earth in such a way as to contain less poverty, rejection, exclusion, and suffering. However, the very same century brought about two world wars and much human suffering! This century also led to an unprecedented development of cities, but at the same time, to the greatest destruction of the natural environment. Man, thanks to using the gift of reason reduced suffering in many domains of life, where progress in medicine and electronics played a particular role, but on the other hand, the very same man experiences even more suffering brought about by the degraded environment. It is time for building a new man, who not only uses his mind to overcome suffering, but ascends to a higher level of cognition, which is the path of faith – because only upon this path does man discover the perspective of eternal life, which allows him to overcome the suffering of passing, ageing, experiencing illnesses and premature death.⁶²

Man cannot simply stop at these two stages of cognition, on knowledge and faith; he must move forward to the next stage, which is the path of love! Only a man who loves is able to discover the true sense of suffering because he lives for the person he loves and is willing to suffer for them. In this way, man attains the highest level of familiarity with another man when out of love he suffers along with him! A man who does not love, can only sympathize with another man, can help him, can relieve his suffering, but not suffer along with him! Suffering together is the pinnacle of the relation of love, where the pain of one person is the pain of another, where both the spiritual and the physical pain of the suffering person whom we love is experienced. He who has never loved, cannot come to understand the Cross, where divine love has manifested itself most fully in suffering. Therefore, suffering is present in the world to release love, to transform the entire human civilization into a “civilization of love.”⁶³

⁶² John Paul II devoted an encyclical to the complementary nature of reason and faith. Cf. *Fides et ratio*, Rome 1998.

⁶³ Cf. John Paul II, Apostolic Letter *Salvifici Doloris*, Rome 1984, p. 30.

The reflection of the Church on suffering has been dominated by influences from Greek philosophy, where the concepts of *apatheia* and *antraxia* leading to the control over one's feelings were transferred into theology. In this theological trend, an image that emerged is one of an impassive God, removed from suffering, ultimately sensually indifferent to the experience of suffering.⁶⁴ The assumed axiom, that suffering in its fullness is a result of evil, shut off the possibility of theological reflection upon the image of God the Father as "suffering along" with His Son, in His Passion, and, as a consequence, upon the image of God "suffering along" with man. It was not again made possible until we became aware that there are two sources of suffering and they are ambivalent – one truly can be attributed to evil, the other is a pinnacle of the bond of love. The one that is a result of evil must be overcome! The one that is the utmost form of love must be experienced! For nothing bonds one man with another, more than suffering together with the one we love. This is the greatest expression of interpersonal relations.

Is such a relationship impossible between God and man? Did not our theological reflection, based on philosophy, "forbid" God from loving man, all the way until experiencing suffering? Let us remember that the opposite of love is indifference.⁶⁵ God cannot remain indifferent to the experience of suffering, He desires to take part in it because He loves us! Let us allow God "to suffer along" with our fate.

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⁶⁴ We should also take into account the views of the Fathers of the Church who allowed for the "co-suffering" of the Father in the Passion of Christ, but ultimately the threat of heresy brought about the domination of a view depicting God as an impassive and transcendent, who is more of a king and a judge than a loving Father. Cf. W. Hryniewicz, *Pascha Chrystusa...*, op. cit., p. 268 ff.

⁶⁵ The desire to not commit to love was well known to the ancients; they included it separately among the seven cardinal sins, referring to it as *acedia* – the indifference of the heart. Cf. J. Pieper, *O miłości* (On Love), Warsaw 1983, p. 55.

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The Second and Third Jesus' Passion and Resurrection Announcements According to St Luke

Druga i trzecia zapowiedź Męki i Zmartwychwstania Jezusa
w ujęciu Łukasowym

ABSTRACT: The article discusses issues related to the exegetical and theological significance of Jesus' second and third Passion and Resurrection announcements in St Luke's Gospel. Due to the shorter form of the second foretelling, it seems necessary to examine both the origin and authenticity of the logion. With the use of the historical-critical method in the analysis of the tradition and editing of the second announcement of the Passion of Christ and the commentary on its individual expressions and texts to other Evangelists, the author intends to discover its meaning and importance (Lk 9:43b-45). In the case of the third announcement of Lk 18:31-34, by applying the historical-critical method, the author will seek answers to questions related to the origin and authenticity of the examined fragment. Finally, the exegesis of some expressions and words will help us to understand more deeply the meaning of the third announcement.

KEYWORDS: betrayed, Passion, announcement, Son of Man, Gentiles, hand over, Jerusalem, three days, Resurrection

ABSTRAKT: Artykuł omawia problematykę związaną ze znaczeniem egzegetyczno-teologicznym drugiej i trzeciej zapowiedzi Męki i Zmartwychwstania Jezusa w Ewangelii św. Łukasza. Ze względu na krótszą formę drugiej zapowiedzi konieczne wydaje się zbadanie tak pochodzenia, jak i autentyczności logionu. Stosując metodę historyczno-krytyczną w analizie tradycji i redakcji drugiej zapowiedzi Męki Pańskiej Łk 9,43b-45 oraz komentarza do poszczególnych jej wyrażen, a także porównania do innych ewangelistów, postaram się odkryć jej sens i znaczenie. W przypadku trzeciej zapowiedzi Łk 18, 31-34, poprzez zastosowanie metody historyczno-krytycznej, poszukam odpowiedzi na pytania związane z pochodzeniem i autentycznością badanego

fragmentu. W końcu egzegeza niektórych wyrażen i słów pomoże nam głębiej zrozumieć znaczenie i trzeciej zapowiedzi.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: wydany, Męka, zapowiedź, Syn Człowieczy, poganie, będzie wydany, Jerozolima, trzy dni, Zmartwychwstanie

Jesus' second Passion and Resurrection announcement according to St Luke

Text and translation

^{43b} Πάντων δὲ θαυμαζόντων ἐπὶ πᾶσιν οἷς ἐποίει εἶπεν πρὸς τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ· ⁴⁴ θέσθε ὑμεῖς εἰς τὰ ὄρα ὑμῶν τοὺς λόγους τούτους· ὁ γὰρ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μέλλει παραδίδοσθαι εἰς χεῖρας ἀνθρώπων· ⁴⁵ οἱ δὲ ἠγνόουν τὸ ῥῆμα τοῦτο καὶ ἦν παρακεκαλυμμένον ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἵνα μὴ αἴσθωνται αὐτό, καὶ ἐφοβοῦντο ἐρωτῆσαι αὐτὸν περὶ τοῦ ῥήματος τούτου

^{43b} While everyone was marveling at all that Jesus did, he said to His disciples: ⁴⁴ Listen carefully to what I am about to tell you: The Son of Man is going to be delivered into the hands of men.” ⁴⁵ But they did not understand what this meant. It was hidden from them, so that they did not grasp it, and they were afraid to ask him about it.¹

The context of the pericope

The second Passion announcement (Lk 9:43b-45), like the first one (Lk 9:21-22), belongs to the last sequence (cf. 9:1-50) of the first part of the Gospel (*Jesus' activity in Galilee*: Lk 4:14-9:50).

The immediate context of the second announcement is created by verses 37-50. Its limits are determined primarily by the indications of time and place (v. 37: “The next day, as they were descending the mountain...” and v. 51: “When the days for His being taken up had arrived...”). There are four scenes: the first one

¹ Greek text: *The Greek New Testament* (28th Revised Edition), K. and B. Aland, C.M. Martini, B.M. Metzger, J. Karavidopoulos (eds.), Stuttgart 2012; Polish text: *Biblia Tysiąclecia – Pismo Święte Starego i Nowego Testamentu* (The Bible of the Millennium – Sacred Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments,) 5th Edition, Pallotinum, 2014.

shows the healing of the possessed epileptic (vs. 9:37-43a), the next one is the second Passion announcement (vs. 9:43-b45),² the third one revolves around the question: "Which of them was the greatest?" (vs. 9:46-49), while the last one is built on the words: "The one who is not with me is against me" (vs. 9:49-50).

In the first scene, St Luke describes Jesus' gesture of power towards a young man possessed by an unclean spirit. After the event of Jesus' transfiguration (Lk 9:28-36), St Luke again draws attention to the vast crowd, including the disciples. The Evangelist immediately speaks of a man from the crowd who asks Jesus to heal his only son who is being tormented by an evil spirit. He knowledgeably enumerates (v. 39) the symptoms of illness (screams, convulsions, foam at the mouth, the others), but only briefly mentions the unsuccessful attempt of the disciples to heal (v. 40). Then, before healing the possessed, Jesus Himself intervenes and attacks the disbelief of the deceitful generation. The description is focused on Jesus' healing activity. In the end, we have only a statement of healing, confirmed by the return of the son to his father (cf. Lk 7:15), and the whole narration ceases with a description of the people's feelings: bewilderment and astonishment (v. 43a).

St Luke begins the second scene (v. 43b) with a mention of the admiration from the crowd. In the atmosphere of superficial enthusiasm of the people, Jesus speaks for the second time of the mystery of His Passion. The announcement is supposed to correct this enthusiastic attitude. The words explaining and anticipating future are addressed to the disciples, and refer to the delivery of the Son of Man into the hands of man (vs. 43b-44).

The disciples' response to Jesus' words indicates a total lack of understanding. Unfortunately, they are not yet prepared to adopt and accept the prediction of events to come, are full of fear, and do not dare to ask a single question (v. 45).

In the following part, St Luke presents two scenes that are a set of two loggias (vs. 46-48; 49-50) that provide essential guidelines for the new behaviour that the disciples of Jesus should receive. The two guidelines for the conduct of the disciples, immediately following the announcement of the Passion in 9:43b-45,

² According to Schürmann, the relationship between the two scenes is so close that the announcement in v. 44 is connected with the scene of Transfiguration, just as the first announcement in v. 22 was connected with the confession of Peter; cf. also: *Il Vangelo di Luca I: Testo greco e traduzione, Commento ai capp. 1, 1-9, 50*, Brescia 1983, pp. 883-884. Other authors do not confirm this position, cf. e.g.: J. Ernst, *Il Vangelo secondo Luca, I-II*, Brescia 1985, pp. 421-424; J.A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX. Introduction, Translation, and Notes*, New York-London-Toronto-Sydney-Auckland 1981, p. 812; H.I. Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke. A Commentary on the Greek Text*, Exeter-Grand Rapids 1978, pp. 392-393.

are closely related to it. The construction is analogous to that of the first announcement with the subsequent call to follow Jesus on the Way of the Cross.³

A discussion arose among students about “who is the greatest of them.” Jesus knows their most profound heart movements, although they have not yet been expressed (vs. 46-47). In responding to their problem, He uses a symbol: He takes the child and puts it next to Him. That is how Jesus shows that before God, true greatness is given to the least, which is a lesson in humility for the disciples (v. 48).

The second logion presents Jesus’ answer to John’s question about the disciples’ attitude toward a foreign exorcist (v. 49). The answer, formulated in quite general terms, prompts Jesus to give His disciples a warning: the power to cast out demons is not linked to any group.

Literary structure

The second announcement, similarly to the first one, follows the two-part scheme. There are two parts, antithetic to each other in terms of structure and content.

The subject in the first part is Jesus. This part contains only one sentence (vs. 43b-44), where we meet a construction typical of St Luke (*genetivus absolutus* πάντων δὲ θαυμάζόντων),⁴ due to which the idea expressed at the beginning of the pericope (admiration) is subject to what happens. In the next part, a two-part scheme in the direct words of Jesus (v. 44): imperative and declaration can be discovered.

The second part contains three sentences that are coordinated with each other and concern the disciples. The first two are parallel and emphasise the mystery of Jesus’ words. The third one states that the disciples were afraid to ask Jesus questions on this subject.

We therefore have the following structural formula: A + B, where B = (b₁ + b₂) + b₃.

A While everyone was marvelling at all that Jesus was doing, He said to His disciples: “Let these words sink down into your ears, for the Son of Man is about to be betrayed into the hands of men.”

b₁ But they did not understand this statement;

b₂ It was veiled from them so that they could not comprehend it,

b₃ and they were afraid to ask Him about it...

³ Cf. H. Schürmann, *Il Vangelo di Luca...*, op. cit., p. 894.

⁴ Cf. J.A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX...*, op. cit., p. 813.

The origin of the logion

St Luke's editing of the so-called second announcement of the Passion which Jesus presents to the disciples (Lk 9:43b-45) turns out to be significantly different from the corresponding foretelling in Mt 17:22-23 and Mk 9:30-32. As in the case of the first foretelling, it is necessary to use a historical-critical method to analyse this passage. It is justified by the form of the second announcement, which in St Luke's editing is shorter than that of St Matthew and St Mark. Before dealing with this issue, however, it will be worthwhile to synoptically list the text so that the shared and individual parts of each Evangelist are distinguished.

Synoptic comparison

When juxtaposing the text of St Luke with St Mark's and St Matthew's ones, the attention should be drawn to common elements, and then distinctive ones. Compliances reveal whether there is any literary dependence, while differences allow for determining which text should be considered the source of the others.

Lk 9:43b-45

^{43b} Πάντων δὲ θαυμαζόντων ἐπὶ πᾶσιν οἷς ἐποίησε

εἶπεν πρὸς τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ· ⁴⁴θέσθε ὑμεῖς εἰς τὰ ὄψα ὑμῶν τοὺς λόγους τούτους· ὁ γὰρ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μέλλει παραδίδοσθαι εἰς χεῖρας ἀνθρώπων.

⁴⁵ οἱ δὲ ἠγνόουν τὸ ῥῆμα τοῦτο καὶ ἦν παρακεκαλυμμένοι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἵνα μὴ αἰσθῶνται αὐτό, καὶ ἐφοβοῦντο ἐρωτῆσαι αὐτὸν περὶ τοῦ ῥήματος τούτου.

Mk 9:30-32

³⁰ Κάκειθεν ἐξελθόντες παρεπορεύοντο διὰ τῆς Γαλιλαίας, καὶ οὐκ ἤθελεν ἵνα τις γνοῖ·

³¹ ἐδίδασκεν γὰρ τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς ὅτι

ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου παραδίδοται εἰς χεῖρας ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀποκτενοῦσιν αὐτόν, καὶ ἀποκτανθεὶς μετὰ τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἀναστήσεται. ³² οἱ δὲ ἠγνόουν τὸ ῥῆμα, καὶ ἐφοβοῦντο αὐτὸν ἐπερωτῆσαι.

Mt 17:22-23

²² Συστρεφομένων δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ Γαλιλαίᾳ

εἶπεν αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς·

μέλλει ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου παραδίδοσθαι εἰς χεῖρας ἀνθρώπων,

²³ καὶ ἀποκτενοῦσιν αὐτόν, καὶ τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἐγερθήσεται. καὶ ἐλυπήθησαν σφόδρα.

Compliances

1. All three Evangelists (Lk 9:43b; Mk 9:30-31; Mt 17:22) use the title *the Son of Man*, and His fate is spoken of in terms of surrender into the hands of men.
2. Lk 9:43b and Mt 17,22 – but Mk 9,30 not – have a common beginning, which constitutes a clear separation from the previous pericope; besides, both texts have the structure of the genitive absolute with the inserted contrasting conjunction δέ, the principal verb εἶπεν and the omission of the conjunctival ὅτι.
3. St Luke, like Mk 9:30-31, in contrast to Mt 17,22, omits the subject of the main verb Ἰησοῦς.
4. Both St Luke and St Mark indicate the addressees of Jesus' words, i.e. the disciples (cf. Lk 9:43b; Mk 9:30-31; Mt 17:22).
5. In Lk 9:44, the Third Evangelist, like St Matthew, uses μέλλει παραδίδοσθαι, instead of the present tense: παραδίδονται seen in Mk 9:31b.

Differences

1. Within the narrative framework that introduces the words of Jesus, St Luke does not mention the detail of St Mark 9:31: ἐδίδασκεν γάρ.
2. Lk 9:43 alone omits any mention of the presence of Jesus and His disciples in Galilee (cf. Mk 9:30-31; Mt 17:22).
3. When comparing St Luke's editing with that of the other two Evangelists, it is easy to see that he adds an encouraging sentence: θέσθε ὑμεῖς εἰς τὰ ὦτα ὑμῶν τοὺς λόγους τούτους.
4. St Luke does not mention the death and resurrection of Jesus.
5. While working on the second announcement, Lk 9:45 presents a specific extension to the material of Mk 9:32 and Mt 17:23, namely, he emphasises the misunderstanding and ignorance of the disciples regarding the words spoken by Jesus. St Luke does not take up the detail of St Matthew 17:23: καὶ ἐλυπήθησαν σφόδρα, which indicates the clear disciples' understanding of what Jesus said to them.

The study of tradition and editing

The synoptic comparison of St Luke 9:43b-45 with the corresponding texts of Mk 9:30-32 and Mt 17:22-23 shows that St Luke's second prediction of Passion is different from that of St Matthew and St Mark.

At this point, however, the author will address another issue: the reason for the St Luke's shortening of the announcement. The search conducted by exegetes on this matter has not led to a single unanimous interpretation. According to some scholars, it was St Luke who prepared the material for St Mark, but others consider St Luke's editing of the second announcement to be the oldest text. As part of the study of tradition and editing, the author attempts at identifying the most convincing arguments for both positions, thereby trying to find a satisfactory solution.

As can be seen from the synopsis of the texts of the second preview, the construction of the *genivus absolutus* (9:43b) that begins the pericope is St Luke's own text. With this formulation, the Third Evangelist first presents the environment or psychological context in which he places Jesus's words. He summarises the effects of the entire activity of Jesus and constitutes a clear separation from the previous scene.⁵

St Luke also removes the remark Mk 9:30 about Jesus, who was walking around Galilee. Exegetes explain this omission differently, e.g. by stating that the lack of clues is due to St Luke's negligible interest in geographical data. Meanwhile, it should be noted that many geographical details are scattered throughout the third Gospel. In part beginning at 9:51, we hear a recurring refrain about going to Jerusalem (cf. Lk 9:51; 13:22; 17:11; 19:28). In addition, there are many other geographical references (cf. Lk 1:5,26,39,65; 2:42,51; 3:1-2; 18:35; 19:1,29,37; 23:51; 24:13, and others.). It follows that the position indicating St Luke's alleged absence of interest in this sphere should be assessed with great caution and can only be considered legitimate if considered in the light of the literary and doctrinal plan of his work.⁶

Verse 44 reveals another difference between the text of St Luke and the editing of Mark and Matthew: the extension of Jesus' direct words and the omission of any mention of the death and resurrection of Jesus. Many exegetes regard the first part of v. 44 (44a) as a Semitic sentence with its roots in Exodus 17:14, and its presence is to be justified by the transfer of the narrative detail of Mk 9:31: ἐδίδασκει γὰρ τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ⁷ to direct speech. In the second part (v. 44b) – “The Son of Man will be delivered into the hands of

⁵ The inclusion in the form of genitive at the beginning of the pericopy is quite a common stylistic phenomenon in St Luke, cf. e.g.: Luke 3:15; 4:40,42; 7:24; 8:4; 9:57; 11:29; 19:11; 20:45; 21:5; 22:47; 24:36.

⁶ Cf. G. Gamba, *Senso e significato funzionale di Luca 9,43b-45*, [in:] *Il messianismo: Atti della XVIII settimana biblica*, Brescia 1966, pp. 237–238.

⁷ The origin of this sentence is not very clear. Commentators note that w. 44a is Semitism, but they do not indicate any precise references to LXX. A similar construction can be found

men” – Jeremias⁸ sees the play of words as an example of *mashal* – a mysterious expression in which there is a rhetorical contrast between the “Son of Man” and the “people.” It is also noted that both the present tense “is delivered” (Mk 9:31; 14:21 par. 41 par.; Mt 26:27) as well as the form “will be delivered” (St Matthew 17:22; St Luke 9:44b) recall the recreation of the future simple tense (*futurum proximum*) based on the archetype created by the Aramaic participium. Thus, this formulation goes back to the Aramaic tradition.¹⁰ “The sentence of Semitic origin concerning *traditio* of the Son of Man in v. 44b suggests that the phrase about the Son of Man was transmitted at a very early stage in the context of the themes of rejection.”¹¹

In the section devoted to the students in the second foretelling (v. 45), St Luke quotes the text in an extended form compared to the texts of St Mark and St Matthew. That proves that the Evangelist is interested in emphasising the misunderstanding and ignorance of the disciples. Such a formulation is probably the result of St Luke’s certain modifications to the Evangelists’ shared tradition, with the possible influence of his sources.¹²

Authenticity of the second announcement

The study of tradition and editing led us to discover some data that might help to assess the authenticity of the second announcement. Above all, its short form gives us a guarantee of genuineness due to the lack of precise details of the Passion present in the third foretelling (Lk 18:31-34). The fact that there is no reference to the Resurrection day is also an indication of this. Moreover, the presence of Semitic elements and the character of *Mashal*¹³ are, according to Jeremias, certain proofs of the defence of the statement authenticity.¹⁴

in Lk 1:66; 21:14; Acts 5,4; cf. G. Gamba, *Senso e significato funzionale di Luca 9:43b-45*, op. cit., footnote 23, pp. 238–239; H.I. Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke...*, op. cit., p. 393.

⁸ J. Jeremias, *La Passione*, [in:] *Teologia del Nuovo Testamento*, vol. 1, Brescia 1972, p. 321.

⁹ Cf. J.A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I–IX...*, op. cit., p. 814; D.L. Bock, *Luke 1,1-9,50*, vol. 1, Grand Rapids 1994, p. 888.

¹⁰ Cf. J. Jeremias, *La Passione*, op. cit., p. 321.

¹¹ H.F. Bayer, *Jesus’ Predictions of Vindication and Resurrection*, Tübingen 1986, p. 193.

¹² Cf. ibidem, pp. 193–194.

¹³ Next to this *mashal* we can find other similar *meshalim*, such as: Lk 22:22; Mk 14:21 par.; Mk 9:12; Lk 17:25; Lk 24:7.

¹⁴ Cf. P. Benoit, M.E. Boismard, *Synopse des quatre Evangiles en français avec parallèles des Apocryphes et des Pères*, 1: *Textes*, 2: *Commentaire*, Paris 1972, § 172; J. Jeremias, *La Passione*, op. cit., pp. 321–322.

Comment

Using the expression Πάντων δὲ θαυμαζόντων (v. 43b) St Luke describes the attitude of amazement at the things done by Jesus during His public ministry in Galilee (the phrase: ἐπὶ πάσιν οἷς ἐποίει). Thus, both sentences express the superficial enthusiasm of the people who do not cross the vestibule of faith with their feelings, even though they are confronted with the works of Jesus.

It is not the first time that St Luke has mentioned astonishment and admiration. These attitudes permeate his entire Gospel. Using the verb θαυμάζω, he describes the reaction of the heroes, which can result from the content of a vital saying (1:65; 2:18,33; 4:22; 7:9; 20:26) or the response to Jesus' actions (8:25; 11:14; 24:12,41). St Luke avoids speaking of indeterminate and blind surprise. The perception of faith is always present in this attitude.¹⁵

St Luke's *Summarium* of the effects on the surrounding people does not refer only to the healing of the boy but includes all Jesus' activities, as indicated by the use of πᾶσιν in connection with ἐποίει. Therefore, the Evangelist using the synthesis of the attitudes of the crowd aims only to highlight uniqueness and extraordinariness of Jesus' achievements before the eyes of his contemporaries.

The revelation of the mystery of the Passion is again made in respect of the disciples themselves (cf. 9:21-22). This announcement will have no other purpose than to correct the thinking of the crowd that, instead of drawing attention to the fate of Jesus, remains only on the level of astonishment.

Jesus invites the disciples to listen to "these words" in the Hebrew language¹⁶ in v. 44. As regards the interpretation of the v. 44, the scholars remain divided according to the meaning to be attributed to the expression τοὺς λόγους τούτους and the conjunction γὰρ. For some understand and give meaning to this expression in the Semitic sense: *these things, these events*, thus linking them to the miraculous events that took place shortly before, and attribute causal meaning to the conjunction: *because, since*.¹⁷ Most commentators¹⁸ prefer to understand the expression in the Greek sense: *these words*, thereby referring

¹⁵ Cf. H. Schürmann, *Il Vangelo di Luca*, op. cit., p. 754.

¹⁶ Cf. H.I. Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke...*, op. cit., p. 393.

¹⁷ Cf. M.-J. Lagrange, *Evangile selon Saint Luc*, op. cit., Paris 1927, p. 279.

¹⁸ Cf. D.L. Bock, *Luke 1,1-9,50*, op. cit., p. 888; J.M. Creed, *The Gospel According to St. Luke. The Greek Text with Introduction, Notes, and Indices*, London 1930, p. 137; A. Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to St. Luke*, Edinburgh 1928, p. 256; H.I. Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke...*, op. cit., p. 393; J. Nolland, *Luke* (World Biblical Commentary 35A, 35B, 35C), Dallas 1993, p. 513; J.A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX...*, op. cit., p. 813.

it to the next Jesus' words, where the conjunction γάρ takes on an egzegetic meaning (= *it means*). In our context, the phrase τοὺς λόγους τούτους means rather *these words*, that is, the Passion announcement.¹⁹

The "Son of Man" will be "handed over" to the people. According to Nolland, the text of Dn 7:25 is the closest parallelism to the idea of "handing over." There the saints of God Most High will be given into the hands of the last king imagined by the fourth vision of the beast (Dn 7:1-14). That would be a specific reference to suffering instead of vengeance of the Son of Man. On the other hand, there is no proper basis for establishing a connection between Dn 7 and the suffering of the Son of Man, and for referring to historical Jesus. However, the problem of identifying the Son of Man with the saints of God Most High in Dn 7:25 remains.²⁰

The word play: "Son of Man – hands of men" drastically emphasises the notion of παραδίδοσθαι. In his reconstruction of the original form of the foretelling, Jeremias, who considers the second prophecy to be the oldest of all, stressed the importance of the verb παραδιδοναι – *hand over*.

When in LXX God is the subject of this verb, it almost always has a negative resonance, signifying a catastrophe, destruction ordered by God to the detriment of an individual, a city, or people. The corresponding Aramaic verb is *mesar*. The above suggests a connection with Iz 53, since the verb appears three times in the translation of LXX and three times in the Targum, though not precisely in the same places.²¹

In the New Testament, παραδίδωμι in the active or passive voice often has a negative connotation related to putting before a tribunal or at the mercy of death. Synoptics present Jesus Christ forty-four times as a sacrifice to a judge or death. The verb παραδίδωμι often appears in the descriptions of the Passion. When it appears in the active voice, the subject is given. This verb is used to refer to the betrayal of Judas (Lk 2:3-6), the handing over of Jesus to Pilate by the Sanhedrin (Mk 15:1; Lk 22:66), and the giving of Jesus to the people or soldiers (Lk 23:25).²² When the verb is passive, the subject is always the "Son of Man," but it lacks the object verb. It is about *passivum theologicum*, which

¹⁹ The phrase *tou.j lo.gouj tou,touj* can also refer to the "things" that Jesus does. In our context, it rather means "these words," i.e. the Passion announcement; cf. J.A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I–IX...*, op. cit., p. 813; H.I. Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke...*, op. cit., p. 393.

²⁰ Cf. J. Nolland, *Luke*, op. cit., 35B, pp. 513–514.

²¹ Cf. B. Lindars, *Credi tu nel Figlio dell'Uomo*, Torino 1987, p. 115.

²² Cf. F. Büchsel, διδωμι, [in:] *TDNT* II, pp. 169–171.

suggests that it has nothing to do with some blind fate, but it concerns the mystery of God's plan. It was God who "gave" His only Son (cf. Acts 2:23).

In the next verse (v. 45), the misunderstanding of Jesus' disciples is directly indicated. The following Hebrew expression in the passive voice – παρακεκαλυμμένον ἀπο²³ – signifies the action of God, who deliberately concealed from their eyes the mystery of the necessity of suffering so that – ἵνα – they did not understand it. "The blindness of the loved ones is also predicted in God's plan. It is intended to emphasise that Jesus said His 'yes' on the cross alone and without any human support."²⁴ Only for the time being does the mystery of the Passion remain hidden (by God and in accordance with His plan) since Jesus' salvific work is not yet fully completed. It will be accomplished through the death and resurrection of Christ. And only after that will the disciples understand the words spoken now (cf. 24,7n).

The third Passion and Resurrection announcement according to St Luke's

Text and translation

³¹Παραλαβὼν δὲ τοὺς δώδεκα εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτούς· ἰδοὺ ἀναβαίνομεν εἰς Ἱερουσαλήμ, καὶ τελεσθήσεται πάντα τὰ γεγραμμένα διὰ τῶν προφητῶν τῷ υἱῷ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· ³²παραδοθήσεται γὰρ τοῖς ἔθνεσιν καὶ ἐμπαιχθήσεται καὶ ὑβρισθήσεται καὶ ἐμπτυσθήσεται ³³καὶ μαστιγώσαντες ἀποκτενοῦσιν αὐτόν, καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας τῆς τρίτης ἀναστήσεται. ³⁴καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐδὲν τούτων συνῆκαν καὶ ἦν τὸ ῥῆμα τοῦτο κεκρυμμένον ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ οὐκ ἐγίνωσκον τὰ λεγόμενα.

³¹Then Jesus took the Twelve aside and said to them, "Look, we are going up to Jerusalem, and everything the prophets have written about the Son of Man will be fulfilled. ³²He will be delivered over to the Gentiles and will be mocked and insulted and spit upon. ³³They will flog Him and kill Him, and on the third day He will rise again." ³⁴But the disciples did not understand any of these

²³ Cf. H.I. Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke...*, op. cit., p. 394.

²⁴ J. Ernst, *Il vangelo secondo Luca*, op. cit., pp. 425–426.

things. The meaning was hidden from them, and they did not comprehend what He was saying.²⁵

Background

The third announcement is within the so-called *Jesus' Journey to Jerusalem* (Lk 9:51-19:28). This large narrative unit includes three smaller literary units, which are each time marked with a reference to the "journey" of Jesus (9:51-13:21; 13:22-17:10; 17:11-19:28). The last one provides a broad context for the fragment in question.

Within its framework, two sequences are distinguished: Lk 17:11-18:30 and Lk 18:31-19:28 with their own scenes. The first one has seven such scenes: ten lepers (17:11-19), the coming of the Kingdom of God (17:20-21), the Day of the Son of Man (17:22-37), the parable of the Judge who has no fear of God (18:1-8), the parable of the Pharisee and the Tax Collector (19:9-14), receiving the Kingdom of God as little child (18:15-17), and the renunciation of wealth to enter the Kingdom (18,18-30).

The second sequence contains, among other scenes (the blind man healed at Jericho: 18:31-34; Zacchaeus: 19:1-10; the parable of the ten minas: 19:11-28), an interesting text.

The verses 18-30 provide a direct context for the third announcement. This is supported, firstly, by the presence of characters of the scenes immediately preceding the fragment under discussion and, secondly, by the subject discussed in it.

In the vs. 8-23, as mentioned earlier, one finds a scene with a rich young man asks Jesus what actions bring eternal life. Jesus' first response shows the way of the commandments, but when this statement does not satisfy the interlocutor, Jesus advises him to break away from all his possessions. The rich man's reaction is eloquent: he becomes sad. Having earthly possessions prevents him from conversion and repentance.

The issue of wealth will be addressed in two subsequent scenes: 18:24-27 and 18:28-30. In the first one, the hero is the crowd listening to Jesus' harsh words about riches. In the next scene with Peter (Lk 18:28-30), Jesus promises the reward of eternal life to those who have given up everything for the sake of God's Kingdom.

²⁵ Greek text after: *The Greek New Testament*, op. cit.; *Biblia Tysiąclecia* (The Bible of the Millennium), op. cit.

The author's text is placed at the end of the last scene. The heroes are only Jesus and the Twelve, to whom the mystery of the Passion and Resurrection is revealed.

Literary structure

The third announcement is also divided into two parts. The first (v. 31) concerns the disciples taken aside by Jesus, who reveals the mystery of the Passion to them.

The second part consists of three sentences. The first part (v. 32) is written in the passive voice and describes the action of Gentiles in relation to Jesus and the action of God who gives His Son. St Luke expresses this idea primarily with the verb *παραδοθήσεται* (cf. 9,44).²⁶ The construction of the second sentence (v. 33) is in the active voice. St Luke speaks there generally of killing (instead of "crucifixion"), which probably better reflect the original words of the logion.²⁷ This fragment (v. 34) ends with a remark like the one expressed in the second announcement (9:43b-45), i.e. information about the misunderstanding and fear of the disciples.

Hence the scheme is similar to the previous ones: A + B, where B = b₁ + b₂ + b₃.

A Then Jesus took the Twelve aside and said to them, "Look, we are going up to Jerusalem, and everything the prophets have written about the Son of Man will be fulfilled.

b₁ He will be delivered over to the Gentiles and will be mocked and insulted and spit upon.

b₂ They will flog Him and kill Him, and on the third day He will rise again."

b₃ But the disciples did not understand any of these things. The meaning was hidden from them, and they did not comprehend what He was saying.

The origin of the logion

The very study of the literary context and structure has shown that the third announcement is the longest among the announcements of the Passion (cf. Lk 9:21-22 par.; 9:43b-45 par.). It is therefore worth looking at this text

²⁶ Cf. H.I. Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke...*, op. cit., p. 690.

²⁷ Cf. J. Ernst, *Il Vangelo secondo Luca*, op. cit., p. 716.

and juxtaposing it synoptically with its counterparts in the Gospels of Mark and Matthew.

Synoptic comparison

Lk 18,31-34	Mk 10,32-34	Mt 20,17-19
<p>³¹Παραλαβὼν δὲ τοὺς δώδεκα εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτούς· ἰδοὺ ἀναβαίνομεν εἰς Ἱερουσαλήμ, καὶ τελεσθήσεται πάντα τὰ γεγραμμένα διὰ τῶν προφητῶν τῷ υἱῷ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· 32 παραδοθήσεται γὰρ τοῖς ἔθνεσιν καὶ ἐμπαυχθήσεται καὶ ὕβρισθήσεται καὶ ἐμπυσθήσεται ³³ καὶ μαστιγώσαντες ἀποκτενοῦσιν αὐτόν, καὶ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ τρίτῃ ἀναστήσεται. ³⁴ καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐδὲν τούτων συνήκαν καὶ ἦν τὸ ῥῆμα τοῦτο κεκρυμμένον ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ οὐκ ἐγίνωσκον τὰ λεγόμενα.</p>	<p>³²Ἦσαν δὲ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ ἀναβαίοντες εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα, καὶ ἦν προάγων αὐτοὺς ὁ Ἰησοῦς, καὶ ἔθαμβοῦντο, οἱ δὲ ἀκολουθοῦντες ἐφοβοῦντο.</p> <p>καὶ παραλαβὼν πάλιν τοὺς δώδεκα ἤρξατο αὐτοῖς λέγειν τὰ μέλλοντα αὐτῷ συμβαίνειν ³³ ὅτι ἰδοὺ ἀναβαίνομεν εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα, καὶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου παραδοθήσεται τοῖς ἀρχιερεῦσιν καὶ τοῖς γραμματεῦσιν, καὶ κατακρινοῦσιν αὐτὸν θανάτῳ καὶ παραδώσουσιν αὐτὸν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ³⁴ καὶ ἐμπαίξουσιν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐμπύσουσιν αὐτὸν καὶ μαστιγώσουσιν αὐτὸν καὶ ἀποκτενοῦσιν, καὶ μετὰ τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἀναστήσεται</p>	<p>¹⁷Καὶ ἀναβαίνων ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα</p> <p>¹⁷ παρέλαβεν τοὺς δώδεκα [μαθητὰς] κατ' ἰδίαν καὶ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· ¹⁸ ἰδοὺ ἀναβαίνομεν εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα, καὶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου παραδοθήσεται τοῖς ἀρχιερεῦσιν καὶ γραμματεῦσιν, καὶ κατακρινοῦσιν αὐτὸν θανάτῳ ¹⁹ καὶ παραδώσουσιν αὐτὸν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν εἰς τὸ ἐμπαῖξαι καὶ μαστιγῶσαι καὶ σταυρῶσαι, καὶ τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἐγερθήσεται.</p>

St Luke follows Mark's third foretelling (Mk 10:32-34). Therefore, without wishing to go into the detailed analysis of the compatibility and differences present in the synopsis of the text, the authors will underline the most significant

changes that the Third Evangelist made to Mark's text. They can be grouped as follows:

- a) the Third Evangelist omits to mention Jesus and His journey to Jerusalem, as well as the introductory elements of the disciples' fear (cf. 18:31);
- b) in v. 32 there is a typical St Luke's reference to the fulfilment of what was written by the prophets;
- c) St Luke omits the mention of *traditio* of the Son of Man in the hands of the Jews, while speaks of handing over of the Son of Man in the hands of the Gentiles (cf. Lk 18:32; Mk 10:33);
- d) the comment that closes the scene of the third announcement, regarding the misunderstanding on the part of the disciples, is St Luke's own text (cf. Lk 18:34; Mk 10:34).

The study of tradition and editing

The pericope Lk 18:31-34 on the Passion and Resurrection of Jesus is part of a large section of the Gospel: the journey to Jerusalem. The first two announcements (Lk 9:21-22; 9:43b-45) appeared in the critical Chapter nine as preparation for the section 9,51-19,27(28), which is a great "inclusion" containing St Luke's own material. The third announcement, due to its summarizing character, is placed at the end of this section. For this reason, the Gospel of Luke is separated from the two previous ones, especially if compared with the versions of St Mark and St Matthew. The text itself has been stylistically corrected. The editorial corrections made by St Luke in St Mark's source text concern both the introduction and later verses.

St Luke left out the introduction of Mk 10:32. The part about going to Jerusalem might be superfluous after what was said earlier. As far as language is concerned, Lk 18:3 was taken directly from St Mark's source, and St Luke made editorial corrections:

- a) εἶπεν πρὸς is St Luke's own text;
- b) St Luke also omits τὰ μέλλοντα αὐτῷ συμβαίνειν, as he probably considers πάντα τὰ γεγραμμένα as equivalent to this expression;²⁸
- c) St Luke uses the Hebrew transliteration of the name Jerusalem: Ἰερουσαλήμ, while Mk 10:32,33 and Mt 20:17,18 contain a Hellenistic form: Ἱεροσόλυμα, but without changing the meaning;²⁹

²⁸ Cf. H.I. Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke...*, op. cit., p. 690.

²⁹ Cf. H.F. Bayer, *Jesus' Predictions of Vindication and Resurrection*, op. cit., footnote 73, p. 194.

d) the idea of the fulfilment of the Scriptures is characteristic of St Luke. This motif may come from a separate tradition of foretelling and is St Luke's own theme (cf. 24:25,27,32,46; Acts 2:22-36; 3:12-26).³⁰

In the case of v. 32 St Luke holds to St Mark's forms and vocabulary, however, he changes the subject of the act of giving the Son of Man – the Gentiles, not the chief priests and scribes (cf. Mk 10:33). St Luke takes the passive form *παραδοθήσεται* from Mk 10:33b and adds to it the implied subject of the active form of the same verb (which he omits) from Mark 10:33c. Thus, he removes the reference to high priests and scribes. This fact is not confirmed in the first announcement (Mk 8:31; cf. Lk 9:22), which speaks of the elders, high priests and scribes; in the second foretelling, it is mentioned that the Son of Man will be delivered into the hands of men. According to Fitzmyer, *ἄνθρωποι* from Mk 9:31 become in Mk 10:33 the chief priests and scribes who then give the Son of Man to the Gentiles.³¹ St Luke also adds two verbs to the list of activities of the Gentiles: *ἐμπαυχθήσεται* καὶ *ὕβρισθήσεται*.

In v. 33, St Luke brings Mark's first verb down to the form of *participium* and inserts "after three days" instead of "the third day." A similar situation occurs in Lk 9:22, where scholars point to the possibility that St Luke and St Matthew know a tradition different than St Mark's. St Luke also changes the expression "to resurrect." Although he changed Mark's *ἀνίστημι* na *ἐγείρω* in Lk 9:22, there he retains Mark's form.

Marek does not introduce any equivalent of Lk v. 34 This verse belongs to St Luke's reformulation of v. 9:45, which has its roots in Mk 9:32.³²

The origin of the third announcement

As to the authenticity of the third statement, scholars' opinions are divided: some maintain that the foretelling has many elements in common with the description of the Passion, and therefore it must be considered *vaticinio ex eventu*; others defend the authenticity and historicity of the logion.

According to Jeremias, when compared to the two previous ones (Lk 9:21-22; 9:43b-45) the third announcement might have been subject to some *ex eventu* retouching. At the same time, however, it should not escape that attention that Lk 18:31-34 par. does not contain any element that could not be expected in

³⁰ Cf. H.I. Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke...*, op. cit., pp. 689–690.

³¹ Cf. J.A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke X–XXIV. Introduction, Translation, and Notes*, New York–London–Toronto–Sydney–Auckland 1985, p. 1209.

³² Cf. J. Nolland, *Luke*, op. cit., 35B, p. 896.

the process of condemning Jesus to death in the light of the law and customs of the time, which should prevent from declaring unambiguously that an *ex eventu* announcement is considered. On the other hand, as Jeremias goes on to say, when the predictions of the Passion are compared with each other, a secondary tendency to use and match concrete elements related to the real course of events is observed in them.³³ This position is shared by Bayer, who was examining parallelisms and differences between the third Passion announcement (Mk 10:32-34) and the description of the Passion in St Mark, and came to the following conclusions:

- a) there are differences in vocabulary suggesting that the used forms and words refer to pre-Mark traditions such as ἀνίστημί, ἀποκτείνω;
- b) the third prediction of the Passion refers to the Son of Man, while there is no such reference in the description of the Passion, and a mention of Resurrection follows the themes of rejection and death. The author concludes that the description of the Passion is based on Mk 10:33nn.³⁴

Summing up the reflections on the origin of the third foretelling, it can be concluded that, despite the presence of elements close to the description of the Passion and the thematic links with the second foretelling, Lk 18:31-34 presents what the disciples remembered about the third foretelling of the Jesus' Passion and Resurrection, which immediately preceded the events of the Passover.³⁵

Comment

The third Passion announcement is addressed to the Twelve. Using the verb παραλαβῶν (cf. 9:10.28; 11:26; 17:34-35), St Luke speaks of taking the Twelve aside. In classical Greek it often means “to take a wife, a companion” or “to adopt a son.” It particularly concerns the disciples who accompanied Jesus on the way to Jerusalem. Jesus takes them aside to reveal to them the mystery of His Passion.

In v. 31 the attention is drawn to the significance of Jesus' journey. Jerusalem is now explicitly defined as the place where salvation is realized. St Luke emphasises the importance of Jerusalem more than other synoptics. X. Léon-Dufour describes St Luke's Gospel as “a story focused on Jerusalem” and thus illustrates this feature of the third Gospel: “The artistry of the description is manifested

³³ Cf. J. Jeremias, *παῖς θεοῦ*, [in:] *TDNT IX*, pp. 428–429.

³⁴ Cf. H.F. Bayer, *Jesus' Predictions of Vindication and Resurrection*, op. cit., pp. 171–174.

³⁵ Cf. *ibidem*, p. 216.

above all in the way in which the whole Gospel is focused on Jerusalem. (...) It begins (1:5) and ends in Jerusalem (24:52n).³⁶ Jerusalem is the foretold place of Jesus' Passion (Lk 9:31; 13:33; 18:31). He goes there with His disciples (Lk 9:51-19:27). From the very beginning, His journey is marked by the cross, and it is precisely the meaning of His suffering that is expressed in the concept of the journey, as confirmed by the mentions of the Passion (cf. 12:50; 13:31-33; 17:25-20). The holy city becomes the setting for the Passion, death (Lk 22:1-23:56) and Resurrection of Jesus (Lk 24:1-53). St Luke uses the form "Ἱερουσαλήμ," which is the "holy name," to describe the city. It marks the holy city as the place where God's plan, messianic revelation and paschal mystery are realized.³⁷

As in the two previous announcements, the title of the Son of Man appears once again (cf. Lk 9:21-22; 9:43b-45). This title can be read both in relation to τὰ γεγραμμένα, and τελεσθήσεται. Many commentators prefer the traditional interpretation, where the title "Son of Man" is used in relation to τὰ γεγραμμένα³⁸ "Everything" refers to the way in which St Luke thinks not only of the Passion of Jesus, but also of a series of events connected with His glory after the Resurrection (cf. Lk 24:26; 9:31:51).

It now appears that the language of expression concerning the necessity of fulfilling what was said in Lk 9:22 was based on the Scriptures. The passive voice may indicate both the realization of what the Scriptures prophetically proclaim as well as the conclusion of Jesus' journey in Passion, and His glory. Among the synoptics, only St Luke uses the verb τελέω, in the sense of fulfilment (Lk 12:50; 22:37; Acts 13:29) and only from time to time, as here, in the sense of the fulfilment of the prophecies of the Old Testament.

In this case, however, St Luke does not specify which words of the Scriptures Jesus means. According to Jeremias, the numerous general references to Scripture in all three synoptics, such as Luke 9:12; 14:21; 14:49; 18:31; 13:33; 17:25; 24:7.25.44-46, are, in the opinion of Jeremias, primarily allusions to Is 52.³⁹ "The words of Is 53 about the suffering of the Servant of God and the prophetic vision about the Son of Man received in the power of God (Dn 7) now come to their natural end, all this will be fulfilled by God Himself (*passivum theologicum*)."⁴⁰ Jesus is likely to interpret His fate in the light of this kind of

³⁶ Cf. X. Léon-Dufour, *Il vangelo secondo Luca*, [in:] A. George, P. Grelot, *Introduzione al Nuovo Testamento. 2: L'annuncio del Vangelo*, Brescia 1980, p. 111.

³⁷ Cf. C.G. Bottini, *Introduzione all'opera di Luca. Aspetti teologici*, Jerusalem 1992, p. 57.

³⁸ Cf. J.A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke X-XXIV*, op. cit., p. 1209; A. Plummer, *A critical and exegetical commentary on the Gospel According to St. Luke*, op. cit., p. 428.

³⁹ Cf. J. Jeremias, *παῖς θεοῦ*, op. cit., pp. 410-412.

⁴⁰ Cf. J. Ernst, *Il Vangelo secondo Luca*, op. cit., p. 715.

prophecy. Thus, everything that awaits Him is not determined by blind fate from the very beginning, but is tellingly included in God's plan.

In vs. 32-33 as mentioned above, one finds again the form "will be published," which can also be an allusion to Is 53,3 (par. 9:44). Moreover, the passive form "will be released" naturally refers to the fact that all the participants, Jews and Gentiles, are only actors who had to act according to a plan prior to their free decision.⁴¹ Jesus, therefore, no longer has "power over Himself"; He is obedient to the mysterious plan which God has planned and carried out to the end. At this point, Luke specifies the addressees of His own "betrayal" – the Gentiles. Their participation in the handing over of Jesus is crucial to St Luke and is a scandalous act.

Further on, the details of the Gentiles' actions towards Jesus are mentioned. Above all, the differences between Luke's description of the Passion (which does not mention spitting and scourging or the trial before the Jewish tribunal) and the content of the third announcement ought to be noted. Unlike the description of the Passion, which spares the Romans, the fragment in question tends to strongly emphasise the participation of the Gentiles in Christ's sufferings. The fault of the Jews is that they gave up Jesus and renounced Him, thus giving rise to His Passion (cf. Acts 3:13).

Once again, St Luke's version of the announcement (cf. Lk 9:22) gives information about the resurrection of the Son of Man "on the third day."

The concluding comment (v. 34) is St Luke's own text (cf. 9:45). The disciples are astonished when they juxtapose what they have seen before (especially Jesus' miraculous work) with what they hear. Their behaviour clearly shows the reaction to the close relationship between the Messianic declaration (9:18-20) and the necessity of suffering. When facing the mystery of Christ's Passion, the heart closes and cannot accept what is proclaimed to it. Only later, in the episode of Emmaus (24:27, 44-45), will the disciples find an explanation of Jesus' words concerning his Passion and Resurrection.

Conclusion

The literary analysis of the second announcement, after establishing the context and formulation of Lk 9,43b-45, attempted to indicate the origin of the logion. The synoptic comparison with the Gospels of St Mark and St Matthew allows for considering Lk 9,43b-45 as an abbreviation and formulation based

⁴¹ Cf. *ibidem*, p. 716.

on St Mark's source, with the possibility that St Luke also drew on his own sources. In the part devoted to the authenticity of the second foretelling of the Passion, arguments are presented which make us consider the fragment to be historical and authentic.

In the part devoted to literary analysis and the third context of the announcement, the author has concluded that the announcement under discussion is significantly shifted in comparison with the parallel texts of St Mark and St Matthew. A study of the literary formulation of the third announcement also revealed that the text differs from those found in Mk 10:32-34; and Mt 20:17-19.

Then, to discover the origin of the logion, the author referred to a synoptic comparison and a study of tradition and editing. It helped to recognise the compliances and differences between the relevant texts, as well as the traditional and St Luke's editorial elements. Then, the attempt was made to defend the authenticity and historicity of the evangelical statement by presenting various arguments in favour of that thesis.

Finally, using an exegetical study of some words in the text, the author tried to explore their meaning and theological content. For the Evangelist Luke, Jesus is the Messiah as long as He suffers, dies and resurrects on the third day. He is the One whom the Father sends to realise and fulfil the eternal plan of salvation directed by God to man. Christ is somehow connected with this divine plan because the Scriptures in which God announced and revealed it must be accomplished. Jesus wants to consciously realise this mysterious plan, which will result in suffering, death and resurrection of the Son of Man.

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God in the World of ‘Liquid Modernity’: Zygmunt Bauman on Religion. Presentation and Criticism

Bóg w świecie „płynnej nowoczesności”.
Zygmunt Bauman wobec religii. Prezentacja i krytyka

ABSTRACT: In this article, the author reviews the expressed thoughts of Z. Bauman in the context of Christian motifs present in the texts of left-wing intellectuals. In this analysis of selected motifs of Bauman’s work, the author first makes a short introduction, presenting the philosopher. Next, he shows Bauman’s hermeneutics of Christianity. Finally, the author presents an assessment of Bauman’s views in the form of apologia. Left-leaning intellectuals are critical of Christianity in their theses. Bauman, an agnostic, evaluates Christianity with a cool eye. He is concerned about evangelical radicalism and attachment to the truth. Therefore, he postulates that believers should open themselves to the world and give up their own confessional identity and start building a broad human coalition.

KEY WORDS: religion, revelation, transcendence, Christianity, left, Bauman

ABSTRAKT: W prezentowanym artykule autor, poszukując wątków chrześcijańskich obecnych w tekstach lewicowych intelektualistów, sięga do myśli Zygmunta Baumana. Podejmując analizę wybranych motywów jego twórczości, przyjmuje następującą sekwencję kroków. Najpierw dokonuje krótkiego wprowadzenia, prezentując myśl filozofa. Następnie ukazuje jego hermeneutykę religii i chrześcijaństwa. Na koniec zaś przedstawia ocenę poglądów Baumana, która przybiera postać apologii. Lewicowy intelektualista w swoich pracach krytycznie zajmuje się chrześcijaństwem. Bauman jako agnostyk chłodnym okiem ocenia chrześcijaństwo. Niepokoi go ewangeliczny radykalizm oraz przywiązanie do prawdy. Dlatego postuluje, by wierzący otworzyli się na świat i zrezygnowali z własnej konfesyjnej tożsamości i zaczęli budować szeroką ludzką koalicję.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: religia, objawienie, transcendencja, chrześcijaństwo, lewica, Bauman

Introduction

Religion's present situation, as remarked by I. Bokwa, may be successfully described as ambiguous. On one hand, Enlightenment assurances proclaiming the disappearance of religion seem to be losing their validity, and religion itself continues to exist and is nowhere near being removed to the prehistory of its dependent humanity while, on the other hand, the outlines of reality defined as religion are subjected to a far-reaching process of blurring and dilution.¹

Habermas, a classic of left-wing thinker, in his text *To Believe and to Know*, notes that 'post-secular society' isn't actually entirely secularised and that the role of religion today, even though limited in comparison to older times, remains significant.²

While observing the dynamic process of the return of spirituality, often adopting a non-confessional form³ and defined as 'spilling of the *sacrum*,⁴ we notice a simultaneous interest in Christianity among the representatives of the intellectual left, pertaining to neo-Marxist milieus (mostly the heirs of the Frankfurt School).⁵ Their notorious return to religion is described as a 'theological turn'⁶ by religion critics. It is strongly noticeable when it comes

¹ I. Bokwa, *Teologia w warunkach nowoczesności i ponowoczesności*, Sandomierz 2010, pp. 304–305.

² See: J. Habermas, *Przyszłość natury ludzkiej. Czy zmierzamy do eugeniki liberalnej?*, transl. M. Łukasiewicz, Warsaw 2003, pp. 103–115. The evoked text appeared also in the monthly "Znak" (568) 2002.

³ See: J. Mariański, *Religia w społeczeństwie ponowoczesnym. Studium socjologiczne*, Warsaw 2010, pp. 195–242.

⁴ See: H. Seweryniak, *Teologia fundamentalna*, vol. 1, Warsaw 2010, pp. 98–100.

⁵ See: P. Artemiuk, *Deus otiosus, czyli lewicowa hermeneutyka chrześcijaństwa*, "Studia teologiczne Białystok–Drohiczyń–Łomża" (32) 2014, pp. 107–138. The introduction to the present article is a slightly modified version of the introduction of this previously written article.

⁶ Similarly, postmodernism in its criticism and innovative ideas entered the religious sphere and made theology react. J. Życiński (d. 2011) believed that in postmodernism's case, we witness a 'deep transformation in the current that in its initial stage of development rejected both Christian tradition and Enlightenment philosophy, declaring the end of metaphysics on the verge of the postmodern era, this radically new stage of cultural development' (in: *Bóg postmodernistów. Wielkie pytania filozofii we współczesnej krytyce moderny*, Lublin 2001, p. 9). Don't these statements, however, sound overly optimistic? What return of religion are we talking about? Can we really talk about a turn in the perception of the question of faith? J. Sochoń (born in 1953) remarks that 'the postmodern culture, even though frequently declaring an atheist attitude, [as a matter of fact] reveal specific regret after the loss of God, [which is why] it still remains within the sacral radiation' (in: *Religia*

to philosophers as significant as A. Badiou (b. 1937),⁷ S. Žižek (b. 1949),⁸ or G. Agamben (b. 1942),⁹ who refers to Saint Paul's thought. But also, among such thinkers as P. Sloterdijk (b. 1947),¹⁰ T. Eagleton (b. 1943),¹¹ and Z. Bauman (d. 2017), who draw their own vision of the Christian religion.

If liberal intellectuals turn towards Christianity, it's worthwhile to examine their interest, evaluate the hermeneutics of the faith they practice, and ask about the image of God they propose and the role they assign to the Christian Revelation. It's also interesting to analyse whether their interpretation of Christianity outgrows the severe criticism and reaches to the core of it or solely remains a deconstruction of biblical motifs present in the culture. Theology, they claim, is too serious of a matter to be left to theologians, and

(...) religion – as left-wing philosopher A. Bielik-Robson underlines – is more than only an archaic assembly of dogmas – (...) it is also metaphysical speculation. (...) this speculation may concern not only the living God, present and providential, to whom we raise our intense prayers, but also, and in modern times, most of all, an 'absent God,' a 'withdrawn God,' or even 'a God who died.' *Deus absconditus*, better still – *deus otiosus*, as this formula contains the ambivalence that interests us here: a suggestive vision of God as simultaneously absent,

w projekcie postmodernistycznym, Lublin 2012, p. 14). Nevertheless, one should say that postmodern thinkers are simply unable to escape religious questions as the culture is so strongly infused with the spirit of Christianity, that ultimately, with every step, they stumble over something religious. This is why we need to adopt a critical attitude towards postmodernism and inscribe it within the context of Christianity.

⁷ A. Badiou, *Święty Paweł. Ustanowienie uniwersalizmu*, transl. J. Kutyla, P. Mościcki, Krakow 2007.

⁸ S. Žižek, *Kukła i karzeł. Perwersyjny rdzeń chrześcijaństwa*, transl. M. Kropiwnicki, Bydgoszcz 2006; idem, *O wierze*, transl. B. Baran, Warsaw 2008; idem, *Kruchy absolut, czyli dlaczego warto walczyć o chrześcijańskie dziedzictwo*, transl. M. Kropiwnicki, Warsaw 2009.

⁹ G. Agamben, *Czas, który zostaje. Komentarz do Listu do Rzymian*, transl. S. Królak, Warsaw 2009; idem, *Piłat i Jezus*, transl. M. Surma-Gawłowska, A. Zawadzki, Krakow 2017.

¹⁰ P. Sloterdijk, *O ulepszeniu dobrej nowiny. Piąta „ewangelia” Nietzschego. Mowa wygłoszona w Weimarze, 25 sierpnia 2000 r., z okazji setnej rocznicy śmierci Fryderyka Nietzschego*, transl. T. Słowiński, Wrocław 2010; idem, *Gorliwość Boga. W walce trzech monoteizmów*, transl. B. Baran, Warsaw 2013; idem, *Musisz życie swe odmieścić. O antropotechnice*, transl. J. Janiszewski, Warsaw 2014; idem, *W cieniu góry Synaj. Przypis o źródłach i przemianach całkowitego członkostwa*, transl. B. Baran, Warsaw 2014.

¹¹ T. Eagleton, *Święty terror*, transl. J. Konieczny, Krakow 2008; idem, *Rozum, wiara i rewolucja. Refleksja nad debatą o Bogu*, transl. W. Usakiewicz, Krakow 2010; idem, *Kultura a śmierć Boga*, transl. B. Baran, Warsaw 2014.

but also unwanted, pushed away in weightlessness, concealed in the slumber chamber. This is a typical God of the modern era, which, in Jonas' perspective thrives on the element of the 'unconditional immanence': traces, phantoms of a God from a distant past.¹²

While investigating the Christian threads in the texts of left-wing intellectuals, I'll reach for Bauman's thought.¹³ I will take up the analysis of selected motives present in his work in the following sequence: first, I'll proceed to a short introduction presenting Bauman's philosophy; second, I'll trace his hermeneutics of religion that by default assumes Christianity; and finally, I'll present my assessment of the Polish sociologist's ideas, which will resemble an apologetic.

Bauman's idea of 'liquid modernity'

Z. Bauman¹⁴ is an internationally known sociologist, philosopher, theoretician of postmodernity, essayist, and one of the most influential observers of the changes taking place in contemporary societies, as well as a thinker with a clearly left-wing sensibility. According to D. Smith, he is among the most remarkable and most influential commentators on the human condition¹⁵ while his books and essays are of capital significance for comprehending the nature of the world we live in.¹⁶ Though remaining a sociologist, the thinker didn't allow his ideas to be locked up only in the academic formula: his writings'

¹² A. Bielik-Robson, *Deus otiosus: ślad, widmo, karzeł*, [in:] *Deus otiosus. Nowoczesność w perspektywie postsekularnej*, A. Bielik-Robson, M.A. Sosnowski (eds.), Warsaw 2013, pp. 7–8. *Deus otiosus*, meaning 'a passive God,' is a formula applied in religiology to define God the Creator, distant and not interfering with the affairs of the world, whom is not worshiped, but only evoked in dramatic circumstances. The concept of a passive deity has its place in deism. In turn, Saint Thomas, followed by Martin Luther, introduced the notion of *Deus absconditus* to describe the mystery of God's concealment and His distance; see: M. Eliade, *Traktat o historii religii*, Warsaw 2010, pp. 63–67.

¹³ In one of my previous texts, I took up analysis of the thought of P. Sloterdijk and T. Eagleton, see: footnote 6.

¹⁴ "Znak" (752) 2018 was entirely dedicated to Bauman and his philosophy.

¹⁵ D. Smith, *Zygmunt Bauman: Prophet of Postmodernity*, Cambridge 1999, p. 3.

¹⁶ Z. Bauman, K. Tester, *Conversations with Zygmunt Bauman*, Cambridge 2001 (*O pożytkach z wątpliwości. Rozmowy z Zygmuntem Baumanem*, transl. E. Krasieńska, Warsaw 2003, p. 10).

'literariness' (...) let him, unlike probably anybody else, follow the marks of the transforming society, capture human experiences, fears, anxieties and new ways of thinking. Out of necessity, it must be a personal voice, filled with metaphors, resembling a literary narration rather than a traditional model of scientific treatise.¹⁷

The most characteristic notion that knits and infiltrates Bauman's thought is the concept of liquid modernity.¹⁸ This representative idea puts him in the range of theoreticians and creators of postmodernism. Let's inquire then as to the meaning of this constitutive term.

Today's world, as sociologists highlight (i.e., U. Beck), has stopped being postmodern and has become fluid, ephemeral, liquid. We are then confronted, in a way, with a second modernity.

The term 'postmodernity,' as explicated by Bauman himself, was faulted from the first moment; it smelled of provisory solution and suggested erroneous ideas about reality. It was a temporary 'fill-the-gap' term: while expressing growing conviction that the dawning new world is unlike the one we used to know and we were able to talk about, knowing what to expect of it, and that the language we inherited from sociological ancestors, is quite unfit to describe what is happening; the term didn't reveal much about the properties of the new world, and even less about its own logic and about what drives it and recreates it; so in the end, even the term itself wasn't quite helpful in the understanding of the new world (...). Even though I used the term 'postmodernity,' for lack of a better one, my conscience is clear, in a sense that from the very first moment I defined it as modernity minus illusions (in the sense of delusions about the perfect order waiting at the end of the road, free of contingency, fortuity and ambiguity; transparent, predictable, and administrated by reason; about the inevitably approaching end of fortuity, contingency and ambiguity...). From the beginning, I was searching for a better term, better in the sense of more positive and not implying the necessity of resigning, in the *Jetztzeit* analysis, of the quite useful, and in my opinion, indispensable term of "modernity"; what helped me to coin the new term was the metaphor of liquid, a substance that is stochastically undetermined, subjected to even weak surface or cutting strengths, thus incapable of keeping its shape. This image allows to realise the nature of

¹⁷ P. Tacik, *Socjologia Zygmunta Baumana*, Warsaw 2012, p. 7.

¹⁸ See: *Zrozumieć nowoczesność. Księga jubileuszowa Zygmunta Baumana*, A. Chrzanowski, W. Godzic, A. Zeidler-Janiszewska (eds.), Łódź 2010.

our weird “world *ohne Eigenschaft*,” if we borrow the term from Robert Musil; speaking more precisely, without permanently assigned properties, indicating (implicitly, determining) identity in the time...¹⁹

In the already classic text, entitled *Liquid Modernity*, this is how the sociologist defines the term:

(...) there are reasons to consider ‘fluidity’ or ‘liquidity’ as fitting metaphors when we wish to grasp the nature of the present, in many ways novel, phase in the history of modernity. I readily agree that such a proposition may give pause to anyone at home in the ‘modernity discourse’ and familiar with the vocabulary commonly used to narrate modern history. Was not modernity a process of ‘liquefaction’ from the start? Was not ‘melting the solids’ its major pastime and prime accomplishment all along? In other words, has modernity not been ‘fluid’ since its inception?²⁰

Bauman notes that already the *Communist Manifesto*, a harbinger of modernity, stressed that all that’s permanent should be liquified; excessively static, coagulated society needs to be diluted and reality should be released from the ‘yoke’ of its own history. This may be done

only by melting the solids (that is, by definition, dissolving whatever persists over time and is negligent of its passage or immune to its flow). That intention called in turn for the ‘profaning of the sacred’: for disavowing and dethroning the past, and first and foremost ‘tradition’ – to wit, the sediment and residue of the past in the present; it thereby called for the smashing of the protective armour forged of the beliefs and loyalties which allowed the solids to resist the ‘liquefaction.’²¹

At the outset, the liquidising power of modernity hit stagnating institutions, political constellations, and social settings, aiming at breaking old forms. They were, however, rapidly substituted by new ones, which despite being enhanced, were equally rigid and inflexible as the old ones. People, released from the old

¹⁹ Z. Bauman, R. Kubicki, A. Zeidler-Janiszewska, *Życie w kontekstach. Rozmowy o tym, co za nami i o tym, co przed nami*, Warsaw 2009, pp. 109–110.

²⁰ Z. Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*, Cambridge 2000 (*Płynna nowoczesność*, transl. T. Kunz, Krakow 2000, p. 7). Quotes by Zygmunt Bauman are from original English sources, unless marked otherwise – translator’s note.

²¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 7–8.

cages, were promptly pushed into new cubbyholes, and every eliminated form was replaced by a new one. Effectively, in Bauman's view, this 'liquidising power' shifted from the 'system' to 'society,' from the 'politics' to 'life-policies,' generally speaking, from the 'macro' to the 'micro-level' of social cohabitation.²² Thus, today, we are dealing with

an individualised, privatised version of modernity, with the burden of pattern-weaving and the responsibility for failure falling primarily on the individual's shoulders. It is the patterns of dependency and interaction whose turn to be liquefied has now come. They are now malleable to an extent unexperienced by, and unimaginable for, past generations; but like all fluids, they do not keep their shape for long. Shaping them is easier than keeping them in shape. Solids are cast once and for all. Keeping fluids in shape requires a lot of attention, constant vigilance and perpetual effort – and even then the success of the effort is anything but a foregone conclusion.²³

The Polish sociologist notes that 'liquid modernity' influences deeply the conditions of human life.

The remoteness and unreachability of systemic structure, coupled with the unstructured, fluid state of the immediate setting of life-policies change that condition in a radical way and call for a rethinking of old concepts that used to frame its narratives.²⁴

Liquid Life

Having multiple meanings, modernity may be described in various categories. For Bauman, however, the notion of 'liquidity' is especially significant, and provides him with a perspective to analyse reality.²⁵ In such a constellation, human existence also appears as liquid, which implies that 'it cannot keep its shape or

²² Ibidem, p. 14.

²³ Ibidem, pp. 14–15.

²⁴ Ibidem, p. 15. These notions are: emancipation, individual, time/space, work and community.

²⁵ See: idem, *Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty*, Cambridge 2006 (*Płynne czasy. Życie w epoce niepewności*, transl. M. Żakowski, Warsaw 2007); idem, *44 Letters from the Liquid Modern World*, Cambridge 2010 (*44 listy ze świata płynnej nowoczesności*, transl. T. Kunz, Krakow 2011); idem, *Culture in a Liquid Modern World*, Cambridge 2011 (*Kultura w płynnej nowoczesności*, Warsaw 2011).

stay on course for long,²⁶ but is filled with uncertainty, constant anxiety and fear. 'Liquid life' is characterised by a dictate of an 'expiration date,' a whole line of 'new beginnings,' 'new openings,' the incessant drive to modernise as the 'life in the liquid modern society cannot stand still.'²⁷ In such a world,

the greatest chances of winning belong to the people who circulate close to the top of the global power pyramid, to whom space matters little and distance is not a bother; people at home in many places but in no one place in particular. They are as light, sprightly and volatile as the increasingly global and exterritorial trade and finances that assisted at their birth and sustain their nomadic existence.²⁸

People living in the society of liquid modernity more often than not constitute a 'spiritual lumpenproletariat.' This controversial notion used by Bauman has its genealogy. It was first used by Josif Brodski (then recalled by Andrzej Stasiuk²⁹), to characterise people who,

materially affluent yet spiritually impoverished and famished contemporaries, tired like the residents of Calvino's Eutropia of everything they have enjoyed thus far (yoga, Buddhism, Zen, contemplation, Mao), and so beginning to dig (with the help of state-of-the-art technology, of course) into the mysteries of Sufism, kabbala, or Sunnism, to beef up their flagging desire to desire.³⁰

Contemporarily, people infected by the virus of 'spiritual lumpenproletariat,' stresses Bauman, live only for the sake of living, as what matters for them is the present only. The world is no longer their home nor property, that's why they see no evil in blatantly exploiting its resources; flattened

into the perpetual present and filled to the brim with survival-and-gratification concerns (it is gratification to survive, the purpose of survival being more gratification), leaves no room for worries about anything other than what can be, at least in principle, consumed and relished on the spot, here and now.³¹

²⁶ Idem, *Liquid Life*, Cambridge 2005 (*Płynne życie*, transl. T. Kunz, Krakow 2007, p. 5).

²⁷ See: ibidem, pp. 6–8.

²⁸ Ibidem, p. 9.

²⁹ A. Stasiuk, *Duchowy lumpenproletariat, Rewolucja, czyli zagłada*, [in:] idem, *Tekturowy samolot*, Wołowiec 2000.

³⁰ Z. Bauman, *Liquid Life*, op. cit., p. 14.

³¹ Ibidem, pp. 14–15.

In such a reality, devoid of thinking about eternity, there is room for infinity.

The present may be stretched beyond any limit and accommodates as much as once was hoped to be experienced only in the fullness of time (...). Thanks to the hoped-to infinity of mundane experiences yet to come, eternity may not be missed; its loss may not even be noticed.³²

'The trick is to compress eternity so that it may fit, whole, into the timespan of an individual life.'³³ If eternity was effectively eliminated, is there still room for religion in the world of liquid modernity? What's Bauman's outlook on this reality?

Religion – an attempt at a definition

The very notion of religion, in particular Christianity, is slightly troublesome for the Polish thinker, as we tend to comprehend it until we're required to define it.³⁴ Modern times condemned religion to banishment, for the modern scientific mind couldn't deal with it. Nevertheless,

The postmodern mind, naturally milder than its predecessor and more aware of the weaknesses of human knowledge, took down the stigma of infamy, granting it [religion] a permanent stay permit. The postmodern mind conceded to the fact that definitions conceal as much as they reveal and that they cripple and obfuscate the reality they are supposed to straighten and explicate. The postmodern mind accepts that more often than not, human experience and sensations break out of the cages in which we would want to enclose them, that there are things impossible to talk about, and therefore one should not talk about them, and that what is impossible to say is as much an intrinsic part of human existence as the verbal web in which we try (in vain as it turns out, but nevertheless no less persistently) to catch them. (...) The postmodern mind is too modest to forbid and too weak to condemn to banishment, so few are the chances to remedy the excesses of frisky modern ambitions.³⁵

³² Ibidem, p. 15.

³³ Ibidem. See: idem, *Society Under Siege*, Cambridge 2002 (*Spoleczeństwo w stanie obłączenia*, transl. J. Margański, Warsaw 2006, pp. 208–278); idem, *Consuming Life*, Cambridge 2007 (*Konsumowanie życia*, transl. M. Wyrwas-Wisniewska, Krakow 2009).

³⁴ See: Z. Bauman, S. Obirek, *O Bogu i człowieku rozmowy*, Krakow 2013, pp. 5–57.

³⁵ Z. Bauman, *Postmodernity and its Discontents*, New York 1997 (*Ponowoczesność jako źródło cierpień*, Warsaw 2000, pp. 277–278). Translated from Polish by S. Barnett.

Bauman remarks that the postmodern reflection on religion is not accompanied by a perspective of 'locking the world up in a cage of rigid categories and clear divisions.'³⁶ While seeking an understanding of religion and religiousness, we need to argue less about the correct definition and more to find out

how up till now the social mechanism was able to operate, pointing out what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought, the practices that we accept, rest. Perhaps in the case of religion, more than in all other cases, because religiosity is, after all, nothing else but the intuition of the limits to what we, humans, being humans, may do and comprehend.³⁷

Bauman believes that a correct reading of social mechanisms shaping religion will provide us with a sufficient explanation of its core nature. He begins his own analysis with the criticism of the definition of religion by Leszek Kołakowski.

Dreadful fear, stemming from a feeling of insufficiency that in his [the Polish philosopher] opinion makes us look for help in religion, was a result of life tasks that exceeded the skills and efficiency of available tools for those who are supposed to complete them: it is in this dissonance between goal and means that the sense of insufficiency is embedded.³⁸

But together with the appearance of modernity

the organisation of daily life revolves around concerns that seldom, if ever, include worry about the ultimate limit of things. These worries, problems 'of no practical meaning' (tasks that one can do nothing about) were taken off the agenda of regular individuals (non-philosophers, non-poets). Modern revolution constructed the life agenda in such a way that little or no time was left to attend to such worries, and one may also say that it consisted of plugging one's ears to the homilies of redemption and salvation and closing one's eyes to pictures of posthumous bliss or doom.³⁹

³⁶ Ibidem, pp. 282–283. Translated from Polish by S. Barnett.

³⁷ Ibidem, p. 283.

³⁸ Ibidem, p. 284. Translated from Polish by S. Barnett.

³⁹ Ibidem, pp. 290–291. Adapted from the original by S. Barnett.

'Problems' during that time were defined as everyday tasks, ready to be instantly solved. Bauman claims that for the generation that witnessed the

collapse of the old (...) it was clear that there would be as much (and no more) sense and order in the world as its human inhabitants managed to insert into it; and that the ordering work on the top must be replicated by the work at the bottom – each individual having to shape and direct his or her own life, which otherwise would remain shapeless and bereft of purpose. Modern life strategy was not a matter of choice, wise or foolish, but a rational adjustment to totally new life conditions never visited before. In this process of rational adjustment, there was little use for religion.⁴⁰

Does postmodernity add anything to that vision of a world without religion? Certainly, postmodern people, affected by ontological insecurity, are condemned to incessantly choose. That's the reason why they need advice. This variant of insecurity, however, doesn't entail demand for eschatological visions characteristic of religion.

Men and women haunted by the uncertainty of postmodern style do not need preachers telling them about the weakness of man and insufficiency of human resources. They need guides who will convince them that they can do everything needed for a prosperous life, and will brief them about how to do it; who will reassure them, proving that every problem has a solution and that these clients/patients are able to do anything as long as they listen to their advice and heartily apply it.⁴¹

Are they bereft, however, of any spiritual desires or inner quests? They certainly aren't, but in Bauman's opinion, these inner struggles mean simple human activities in which what matters most is the technical aspect, aiming at gaining indispensable skills required for mastering due technology.⁴² The sociologist calls this process 'sensation gathering,' a search for 'peak experiences.'

'The whole experience' of revelation, ecstasy, breaking the boundaries of the self and total transcendence, once the privilege of the selected 'aristocracy of culture' – saints, hermits, mystics, ascetic monks, *tsadiks* and dervishes – and

⁴⁰ Ibidem, pp. 293–294.

⁴¹ Ibidem, pp. 307–308. Translated from Polish by S. Barnett.

⁴² Ibidem, p. 313.

coming either as an unsolicited miracle, in no obvious fashion related to what the receiver of grace has done to earn it, or as an act of grace rewarding the life of self-immolation and denial – has been put by the postmodern culture in every individual's reach, recast as a realistic target and plausible prospect of each individual self-training, and relocated at the product of life devoted to the art of consumer self-indulgence. What distinguishes the postmodern strategy of peak experience from one promoted by religion is that, far from celebrating the assumed human insufficiency and weakness, it appeals to the full development of human inner psychological and bodily resources and presumes infinite human potency.⁴³

Contemporary religion – between fundamentalism and agnosticism

Bauman completes the landscape of postmodern forms of religion with a specific shape, 'in which appears today a human lack of self-reliance and the futility of dreams about submitting destiny to man's control.'⁴⁴ This form is fundamentalism or integralism. This is an essentially contemporary and postmodern phenomenon. Religious fundamentalism

fully absorbed, assimilated and drew into its service 'rationalising' reforms and technical inventions of modernity; it did not reject them *en bloc*, but tries instead to find delight in them without paying the high price that others seem to have agreed to, considering it to be inevitable or not unreasonable. This price that fundamentalism promises to remit is the agony of choice and its consequences on an individual, the dread of perpetual uncertainty as to the correctness of the choice or the possibility of the omittance of a better one...⁴⁵

Thus, the reality of religion, towards which the sociologist remains agnostic,⁴⁶ is constantly intriguing.⁴⁷ Bauman avoids, however, making clear, personal

⁴³ Ibidem, pp. 310–311.

⁴⁴ Ibidem, pp. 314–315. Translated from Polish by S. Barnett.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, p. 315. Translated from Polish by S. Barnett.

⁴⁶ 'Is it true, Bauman confesses in his dialogue with Obirek, that our paths to agnosticism are different? They probably are, as the religions and Churches, whose "discomforts we felt," but about whom we however thought "that we could change them from the inside" were also different'; Z. Bauman, S. Obirek, *O Bogu i człowieku rozmowy*, op. cit., pp. 5–6.

⁴⁷ As testified by the dialogue with S. Obirek evoked earlier.

confessions⁴⁸ and he evaluates this dimension of human activity with the eye of a scientist, demanding that confessional communities and Churches adopt pluralism, according to the spirit of his own philosophy, to abandon their attachment to the truth and quit their monotheism, as a result then, to deny their confessional identity in the name of undefined religious *polis*, which leads to weakening and finally to the disappearance of institutional structures of individual communities.⁴⁹

J. Tokarska-Bakir considers that 'Bauman practised theological reflection, but one where God had no right to appear.'⁵⁰ In the translator's opinion, it's clearly noticeable in his *Postmodern Ethics*. Even though the sociologist gives no univocal ethical prescription in this work, nor has he some 'other patented mean for moral security and clear conscious,'⁵¹ he undertakes reflection on ethics. In his opinion, 'the great issues of ethics – such as human rights, social justice, balance between peaceful cooperation and personal self-assertion, synchronisation of individual conduct and collective welfare – have lost nothing of their topicality.'⁵² We only need to, argues Bauman, deal with them in a new way. As everything

⁴⁸ A perfect example is Bauman's text *W co wierzą niewierzący (a są tacy?)*, published in the volume of *Co nas łączy? Dialog z niewierzącymi*, S. Obirek (ed.), Krakow 2002, pp. 102–109. 'Interrogated, the sociologist is not saying whether he believes/doesn't believe or what is his personal relation to God, he only states that, escaping into own analysis and referring to elaborated notions and schemes, "liquid modernity" isn't an era of unbelievers. The only thing is, that instead of one and immutable faith, people immersed in "liquid modernity" believe in many things at once. At the same time, they don't expect others to believe in what they do, once and for good, nor do they see a reason to swear lifelong faithfulness to one of the beliefs... It's hard for them to give uncritical trust to their own faith, as it played tricks on them many times before; why would they think that it would behave better from now on?'; *ibidem*, p. 105.

⁴⁹ Z. Bauman, S. Obirek, *O Bogu i człowieku rozmowy*, op. cit., pp. 6–10; "God of the times of liquid modernity, stresses Bauman, is composed and promoted not by institutions, but 'from below' (...)" ; *idem*, *This is Not a Diary*, Cambridge 2012 (*To nie jest dziennik*, transl. M. Zawadzka, Krakow 2012, pp. 110–111); see: Z. Bauman, *Strangers at Our Door*, Cambridge 2016 (*Obcy u naszych bram*, transl. W. Mincer, Warsaw 2016); *idem*, *Retrotopia*, Cambridge 2017 (*Retrotopia. Jak rządzi nami przeszłość*, transl. K. Lebek, Warsaw 2018).

⁵⁰ *Anioł historii boi się o przyszłość. Dyskusja z udziałem: Dariusza Brzezińskiego, Macieja Gduli, Tomasza Majewskiego, Joanny Tokarskiej-Bakir*, "Znak" 752 (2018), p. 34.

⁵¹ Z. Bauman, *Postmodern Ethics*, Cambridge 1993 (*Etyka ponowoczesna*, transl. J. Bauman, J. Tokarska-Bakir, Warsaw 2012, p. 345). Translated from Polish by S. Barnett.

⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 9.

changed, however, with the gradual loosening of the grip of tradition (...) and the growing plurality of mutually autonomous contexts in which the life of the rising number of men and women came to be conducted; in other words, with the casting of these men and women in the position of *individuals*, endowed with identities not-yet-given, or given but sketchy – and, thus, facing the need for “constructing” them, and *making choices in the process*.⁵³

While taking up reflection on ethical issues, Bauman solely describes the transformation of morality from modern and postmodern perspectives. He makes, however, the reservation that

no code of ethics will be revealed in the end (...) of the reflection, nor hope preserved either that a code like that will ever exist. The kind of understanding of the moral condition that the postmodern perspective allows for will not make the life of a moral man *easier*. One can at most dream that it will make it *more moral*.⁵⁴

What kind of morality, however, is in question? What appears in Bauman’s analysis?

First, the sociologist states that moral questions cannot be solved today with reasoning.

Morality is not safe in the hands of reason, though this is exactly what spokesmen of reason promise. (...) Reason is about making correct decisions, while moral responsibility precedes all thinking about decisions as it does not, and cannot care about the logic that would allow approval of an action as correct.⁵⁵

Second, the moral conscience in the postmodern world is feeble. According to Bauman, it ‘commands obedience without proof that the command should be obeyed; conscience can neither convince nor coerce. Conscience wields no weapons recognised by the modern world as an insignia of authority.’⁵⁶

Third, the only thing remaining and simply ‘existing’ is moral responsibility. Bauman calls it the most personal, inalienable of human freedoms, and the most precious of human rights. What is its essence, though? The sociologist

⁵³ Ibidem, p. 10.

⁵⁴ Ibidem, p. 26. Translated from Polish by S. Barnett.

⁵⁵ Ibidem, p. 384.

⁵⁶ Ibidem, p. 386.

describes it in a poetic manner, without, however, pointing at the fundament of responsibility nor, even less so, at its source.

Moral responsibility is the most personal and inalienable of human possessions, and the most precious of human rights. It cannot be taken away, shared, ceded, pawned, or deposited for safe-keeping. Moral responsibility is unconditional and infinite, and it manifests itself in the constant anguish of not manifesting itself enough. Moral responsibility does not look for reassurance for its rights to be or for excuses for its rights not to be. It is there before any reassurance or proof and after any excuse or absolution.⁵⁷

Criticism

Bauman regards religion, Christianity in particular, with a visible distance. His analyses are impregnated with criticism. The sociologist reveals, however, that his agnosticism impacts his perception of religion. He assesses Christianity with a chilled sociologist's eye, avoiding personal confessions. He looks down on it, valuing his own agnosticism. Without doubt, what influenced this perception of religion was his life experience, particularly his fascination and involvement in communism, followed by his turn towards postmodernism, as well as his academic masters.

Bauman's approach to religion and faith is conditioned both by Enlightenment clichés and postmodern rhetoric. The philosopher believes that a man is able to manage on his own, living alone, without God. The Polish sociologist rejects the conviction of human self-deficiency, present in the thought of Kola-kowski. He entirely disagrees with his concept of religion while being unable to present his own. He flees definitions and covers up in the descriptions of manifestations of religion.

At analysing contemporary Christianity, Bauman postulates for its greater openness to the world and adopting a pluralistic paradigm. He considers the present form of religion to be overly closed and characterised by a strong potential of fanaticism. In the sociologist's opinion, this also concerns Christianity. Bauman identifies fidelity to religious principles and care for commandments with fanaticism. In his view, evangelical fanaticism indicates fundamentalism that ought to be fought. Absolute truth, postmodernists claim, doesn't exist. That's why Christians shouldn't insist on their convictions. People of the Church

⁵⁷ Ibidem, p. 388.

should be permeated with cultural identity and diversity. In the name of pluralism, Christians are to get rid of their own identity, which is confessional and restrictive. Their communities, if oriented towards the other, must abandon attachment to monotheism and turn rather towards the Antiquity model of religious *polis*, decisively more corresponding to the modern structure of societies.

Bauman's outlook on Christianity is very simplified. While analysing his statements, one can have the impression that the sociologist proclaims its dusk, indicates it as ill-fitting for today's world. He postulates that evangelical radicalism be rejected, but he mistakes it for fanaticism. He wishes for the dilution of religion, spilling it over into our pluralistic world. He attempts to convince that the era of monotheism is long gone; that today, polytheism is much more attractive, especially the one from the times of ancient Greece. Bauman, keeping his distance towards Christianity, promotes an agnostic attitude towards religion. Chilled and distanced.

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Reflections from Romano Guardini on Being “Lost in Chaos”

Refleksje Romano Guardiniego o byciu „zagubionym w chaosie”

ABSTRACT: The text was written as a contribution to the celebration of the 92nd birthday of Joseph Ratzinger, who considered Romano Guardini to be one of the intellectual heroes of his youth. The author of the article discusses Guardini’s monograph published in 1933, entitled *Das Gute, das Gewissen und die Sammlung*. Among the enemies of moral life, Guardini included Immanuel Kant and his concept of absolute autonomy of conscience, Friedrich Nietzsche, according to whom Christianity is a form of slave morality, and Bolshevism (today we would call it Marxism). As was diagnosed by Guardini, those who want to make an effort to evaluate a moral act feel “lost in chaos.” Conscience is susceptible to three types of error: the search for easy solutions; the exaggeration of duties; the adoption of false interpretations resulting from following conscious or unconscious desires. In Guardini’s opinion, conscience is the living voice of God’s holiness in man. The moral law is not the law of the human ‘I,’ and Kant’s thesis is both philosophically and theologically incorrect. God gives grace of a pure conscience to man praying for the fulfilment of His will, while the sacrament of Confirmation gives man gifts of the Holy Spirit. The last part of Guardini’s work focuses on the importance of prayer and concentration, as well as the supervision of the senses.

(summary prepared by Sławomir Zatwardnicki)

KEYWORDS: Romano Guardini, Joseph Ratzinger, conscience, moral life, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, Bolshevism, Marxism, conscience and spiritual life

ABSTRAKT: Tekst powstał jako wkład w obchody 92. urodzin Josepha Ratzingera, który uważał Romano Guardiniego za jednego z intelektualnych bohaterów swojej młodości. Autorka artykułu omawia monografię Guardiniego wydaną w 1933 roku, zatytułowaną *Das Gute, das Gewissen und die Sammlung*. Do wrogów moralnego życia Guardini zaliczył Immanuela Kanta i jego pojęcie absolutnej autonomii sumienia, Friedricha Nietzschego, według którego chrześcijaństwo jest formą niewolniczej moralności, oraz bolszewizm (dziś nazwalibyśmy go marksizmem). Zgodnie z diagnozą

Guardiniego osoby chcące podjąć wysiłek oceny aktu moralnego czują się „zagubione w chaosie”. Sumienie jest bowiem podatne na błędy trojakiemu rodzaju: szukania łatwych rozwiązań; wyolbrzymiania obowiązków; przyjęcia fałszywych interpretacji wynikłych z podążania za świadomymi czy nieświadomymi pragnieniami. W opinii Guardiniego sumienie jest żywym głosem świętości Boga w człowieku. Prawo moralne nie jest prawem ludzkiego „ja”, a teza Kanta jest błędna zarówno filozoficznie, jak i teologicznie. Bóg człowiekowi modłącemu się o spełnienie Jego woli daje łaskę czystego sumienia, z kolei sakrament bierzmowania obdarowuje człowieka darami Ducha Świętego. Ostatnia część pracy Guardiniego koncentruje się na znaczeniu modlitwy i skupienia, a także nadzorowania zmysłów.

(streszczenie przygotował Sławomir Zatwardnicki)

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: Romano Guardini, Joseph Ratzinger, sumienie, życie moralne, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, bolszewizm, marksizm, sumienie a życie duchowe

In 1933, Romano Guardini published a small monograph consisting of three lectures around the subject of conscience. It was originally titled *Das Gute, das Gewissen und die Sammlung* – the good, conscience and inner composure. It was recently republished in Italian under the more simple title *La coscienza*.¹

As a contribution to the celebration of Joseph Ratzinger's 92nd birthday who described Guardini as one of the intellectual heroes of his youth, I have summarised the contents of *La coscienza*, including some translations of the most significant paragraphs.

Guardini begins his book by saying that he hopes to offer some aid to the Christian conscience in the struggle around the foundations of moral life, especially as the spiritual situation in Germany conditions this struggle. He asks rhetorically: “fight: but who are our enemies?”²

The first name on his list of enemies of the moral life is Immanuel Kant. He attributes the notion of the absolute autonomy of conscience to Kant. Friedrich Nietzsche comes second since, according to him, Christianity is a form of slave morality that excludes believers from greatness. The third is Bolshevism or what we would now more commonly call Marxism. Bolshevism “suffocates the living spirit, and destroys the free personality in the collective and the process of history, thereby diminishing it to a mere organ for the realization of super-individual needs.”³ Although other enemies, he noted, could be named, these were his top three. In short, Kantians, Nietzscheans and Marxists are the foes of a moral life!

¹ R. Guardini, *La coscienza*, Brescia 2009.

² Ibidem, p. 5.

³ Ibidem.

Regarding the spiritual situation in Germany, he states:

We live in a devastated age. The things of the spirit and the things of salvation no longer have their own seat. Everything is thrown on the road...

We have forgotten that what the spirit reflects is a very demanding nobility and that understanding it is only possible under certain conditions. [We have forgotten] that the different interests of the spiritual world from time to time cast a different way of speaking and listening; they require a different interior space, in which this speaking and listening can take place.

We live in a time, in which the degradation of the honor that belongs to the spirit has become a common practice, which no longer impresses in a particular way. To notice it, it is enough to take a careful look at public education, with its conferences, discussions, magazines and with its newspapers; it is enough to observe the bad habits followed in dealing with spiritual things, the language used in this.⁴

Guardini goes on to speak of “moral disorientation.” He suggests that “in the judgement of many, the moral act does not compensate for the serious effort it requires,” while others, who would be ready for such an effort, do not know where to start. They feel “lost in chaos.”⁵

Our conscience, he argues, is not a “mechanical instrument, a magnetic needle that puts itself in place, but something alive, and everything that is living is prone to error.”⁶ While our conscience is our supreme compass, it can nonetheless lose its compass. He suggests that this can happen in three ways:

[First], the conscience can become superficial, reckless, obtuse. Consciousness makes life more burdensome. It makes life richer in content, more dignified, but this also means heavier. As a consequence we have a tendency to seek the easy ways and free ourselves from the burdens. There is an internal operation that aims to cushion the need for conscience. It is not always a conscious desire; it may be that the sphere of the subconscious acts. This can happen in a thousand ways: by doing so, for example, that the gaze is distracted by the unpleasant lines of what we are dealing with; that the most important point remains veiled;

⁴ Ibidem, pp. 8–9.

⁵ Ibidem, p. 21.

⁶ Ibidem, p. 29.

that the situation with its fatiguing unicity and unrepeatability is flattened on a more comfortable general scheme. At other times the warning of conscience is silenced and reassured, saying that in the end it is not a matter of what is 'so bad.' Points of view aimed at challenging this judgement are emphasized. We refer to what others do; one looks for one's own judgment, there is a remission of responsibility with reference to the traditional bad habit, which 'was always like that'; to the environment that 'is also of good will' to 'good common sense' and the like, and so the moral requirement, which always has something hard in itself, is weakened.

[Second], consciousness may also be refined excessively. A person may see duties where there are none; to feel responsibilities which do not exist; to exaggerate obligations beyond the limits of what is right and possible. (And this is especially so for the person predisposed to sociality, who is in danger of overburdening his conscience). Consciousness can therefore be subject to real diseases. The pure and clear duty which, however difficult, always raises upwards, can turn into an obsession. The command of consciousness must be perceived in freedom. But when the conscience has suffered damage, this freedom disappears and from the need that it poses derives a real slavery: the anguished conscience, the scruple. Within the human person the secret instinct to torment oneself is deeply rooted, and in certain temperaments this instinct works with particular force. If it is not cured with prudent care it can degenerate into melancholy.

Thirdly, consciousness can also be altered in its contents. Our knowledge is not a mirror which simply reproduces what is in front of it. We do not view a situation the way that a camera photographs an object. In our view we are present ourselves. We ourselves, with our temperament, with our desires, with our secret and overt motives, are already contained in the gaze, which we direct on things: thus, by looking at them, we shape them. We do not take them as they are in themselves, but as we wish they were, that is, to find a welcoming environment for our desires and our feelings. We would like to see the confirmation of what we are in the situation. We would like to see from it what we bring into ourselves as an aspiration. So we interpret the situation according to our conscious and unconscious desires. The latter especially exert a strong influence. Modern psychology has demonstrated how profound is the influence of the unconscious will upon the acts of perception.⁷

⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 28–32.

Not only is the conscience not a mirror or a camera, not a magnetic needle or any other kind of mechanical instrument, Guardini goes to argue that it is not a “law that hangs somewhere,” “not a simple idea,” “not a concept in the air,” but rather “the living voice of God’s holiness in us.”⁸ That means that as soon as we start to engage with our conscience, we “strike a religious ground.” The Old Testament describes it as “walking in the sight of God” or “walking in the presence of God.” In this context, Guardini explains:

God is not a concept, an idea, a feeling, a sociological need. God is real and absolute reality. And in the consciousness of those who approach him sincerely, he will not fail to bear witness to himself. God will make sure that in his sight the sincere conscience acquires the freedom to see without blindness and to decide rightly. To those who pray: Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven, God will give the grace of a clear conscience.⁹

Although three enemies are listed at the beginning of the book, the weight of the argumentation is against the Kantian enemy. Guardini spends several paragraphs firing canons into the idea that a person who looks to God for knowledge of what is right and moral is a slave to others and fails the autonomy test. God, he asserts, “surrounds us, envelopes us, penetrates us.”¹⁰ He is “present in our intimacy.” He “speaks within us.” He “speaks from the inside with the raising of the conscience, from the outside with the disposition of things.”¹¹ “The word of the one is clarified by the word of the other.” “Man is regenerated, from God the Father, in Christ, by the work of the Holy Spirit, to participate in the divine life.”¹² Therefore the moral law is not a law of my ‘I.’

Guardini describes the Kantian belief that the moral law is a law of my ‘I’ as “an inner optical illusion” and “an incorrect thesis,” both philosophically and theologically.¹³ God, he declares, is not an ‘other.’ Instead, “religious relationship with God is determined precisely by that unique phenomenon that does not repeat elsewhere.”¹⁴ The fact is that “the more deeply I abandon myself to Him,

⁸ Ibidem, pp. 32–33.

⁹ Ibidem, p. 35.

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 36.

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 37.

¹² Ibidem, p. 38.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 39.

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 40.

the more fully I allow Him to penetrate me, the greater the force the Creator asserts in me, the more I become myself.”¹⁵

Having dealt with Kant’s optical illusion, Guardini then deepens his theological analysis by suggesting that people often forget that there is a sacrament of the Christian conscience called Confirmation that comes with some seven gifts. He also endorses the prayer of Blessed John Henry Newman for clarity of conscience against ears that are deaf to the voice of God and eyes that are blind to the signs of God.

In the final section that focuses upon the importance of prayer and recollection, as well as the concept of “custody of senses,” Guardini states:

Let not all that beats at the door of the senses and attention enter; that we know how to distinguish between good and evil, between what is noble and what is ignoble, between what has value and what is worth nothing, between what brings awareness and order and what creates only confusion and drags us into the base.¹⁶

Moreover, Guardini suggests that we need to prevent newspapers pouring “all that jumble of political junk, of intellectual trifles, of dark and sensational news, of truth and falsehood, of beauty and vulgarity, of gossip and other things” into our interior lives.¹⁷ We need to learn to take from newspapers only the critical information that directly concerns us and not to waste our time on the rest of the data which is presented to us. We need to find pleasure “in engaging the fight against the precarious barbarity that surrounds us,” so that we are not the “laughing stock of the cultural chaos that surrounds us” but are, on the contrary, “free masters of ourselves.”¹⁸

For Guardini it is axiomatic that the human person must be attentive to their conscience, but the conscience can be erroneous for the three reasons he gave. For those “lost in chaos,” his message was: forget Kant, forget Nietzsche and do not degrade yourself with Marxist ideologies. Pray for the grace to hear the voice of God in the depths of one’s soul.

Such reflections by Guardini can be found echoed by Joseph Ratzinger in his *Values in a Time of Upheaval*. In this collection of essays, Ratzinger concluded:

¹⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁶ Ibidem, p. 56.

¹⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 57.

It is indisputable that one must always follow a clear verdict of conscience, or at least that one may not act against such a verdict. But is quite a different matter to assume that the verdict of conscience (or what one takes to be such a verdict) is always correct, ie infallible – for if that were so, it would mean there is no truth, at least in matters of morality and religion, which are the foundations of our very existence.¹⁹

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¹⁹ J. Ratzinger, *Values in a Time of Upheaval*, San Francisco 2006, p. 76.

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Radical Orthodoxy as *Suspended Middle*¹

Radykalna ortodoksja jako *suspended middle*

ABSTRACT: The article addresses the central ideas of radical orthodoxy. It has been emphasised that the criticism of modern paradigms and rethinking of the Christian tradition connect with the radical return to orthodoxy. The main ideas behind the movement are presented in the form of a juxtaposition of affirmations of orthodox beliefs together with the dangerous consequences of their abandonment. The results of the departure from the concept of participation, which is central to radical orthodoxy, are shown with pointing to the heritage of John Duns Scotus that opens space for the misunderstood autonomy of creatures and the dangerous concept of *natura pura*. Reference was also made to the legacy of Henri de Lubac, which the supporters of the movement interpret most thoroughly and which they want to develop. The author of *Surnaturel* is also interested in the understanding of humanism and the relationship between theology and philosophy. Suspended middle, a term used by Hans Urs von Balthasar, which later became the title of John Milbank's book on de Lubac, seems to be the best self-characteristics of the movement. At the end of the article, the author puts forward a thesis that the authors' call for radical orthodoxy towards post-conciliar Catholic theology can be compared to the contribution of the Second Council of Constantinople to Christology. In both cases, it is a matter of emphasising unity and rejecting all harmful 'Nestorian' duality.

KEY WORDS: radical orthodoxy, John Milbank, rationalism and fideism, secularism, participatory metaphysics, Scotist rupture, *natura pura*, Henri de Lubac, relations between theology and philosophy, *suspended middle*

¹ Results of research carried out within the project "Radykalna ortodoksja (Radical Orthodoxy) w teologii. Część I. Teologia jako nauka" (Radical Orthodoxy in theology. Part I. Theology as science) (grant no. 03/2018/C) financed from the grant for maintaining research potential/purposeful grant for conducting scientific research or development works for young scientists and participants of doctoral studies awarded by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education in 2018.

ABSTRAKT: W artykule podjęto się zaprezentowania centralnych idei radykalnej ortodoksji. Podkreślono, że radykalny powrót do ortodoksji jest związany z krytyką nowożytnych paradygmatów, a także z przemyśleniem samej tradycji chrześcijańskiej. Główne idee ruchu przedstawiono w formie zestawienia afirmacji ortodoksyjnych przekonań z niebezpiecznymi konsekwencjami ich porzucenia. Ukazano skutki odejścia od centralnej dla radykalnej ortodoksji koncepcji partycypacji, wskazując na dziedzictwo Jana Dunska Szkota otwierające przestrzeń dla źle rozumianej autonomii stworzeń oraz niebezpiecznej koncepcji *natura pura*. Odniesiono się także do spuścizny Henriego de Lubaca, którą zwolennicy ruchu odczytują w najbardziej radykalny sposób i którą chcą rozwijać. W zagadnieniu interesującym autora *Surmaturel* kryje się także problem pojmowania humanizmu oraz relacji między teologią a filozofią. *Suspended middle*, określenie użyte przez Hansa Ursa von Balthasara, które stało się następnie tytułem książki Johna Milbanka poświęconej de Lubacowi, wydaje się najlepszą autocharakterystyką ruchu. W zakończeniu artykułu autor stawia tezę, że wezwanie kierowane przez autorów spod znaku radykalnej ortodoksji w stronę posoborowej teologii katolickiej wolno porównać do wkładu II Soboru w Konstantynopolu w chrystologię. W obu przypadkach chodzi o akcent na jedność i odrzucenie wszelkich szkodliwych dualizmów „nestoriańskich”.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: radykalna ortodoksja, John Milbank, racjonalizm i fideizm, sekularyzm, metafizyka partycypacji, skotystyczne zerwanie, *natura pura*, Henri de Lubac, relacje teologii z filozofią, *suspended middle*

Introduction

The beginnings of radical orthodoxy (hereinafter referred to as RO) date back to the early 1990s. The following names are mentioned among the movement's inaugurators: John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward.² Undoubtedly, the first of them should be regarded as the *spiritus movens* of this large-scale project, which has already gained so much influence in the Anglo-World that even critics cannot ignore its significance.³ Today, under the banner of the movement initiated by Anglican thinkers, there are also

² I consciously use the term 'movement', even though the inaugurators refrain from calling RO 'school' or 'movement' and instead they propose to speak of 'theological sensibility' or 'spirit' – cf. J.K.A. Smith, *Introducing Radical Orthodoxy. Mapping a Post-secular Theology*, Grand Rapids 2004, p. 70.

³ *Radical Orthodoxy: a conversation*, R. Shortt (ed.), (hereinafter: ROR-C), [in:] *The Radical Orthodoxy Reader* (hereinafter: ROR), J. Milbank, S. Oliver (eds.), New York 2009, p. 28; J.J. Milbank, *The grandeur of reason and the perversity of rationalism: Radical Orthodoxy's first decade* (hereinafter: ROR-A), [in:] ROR, p. 367; J. Milbank, S. Oliver, Z. Lehmann Imfeld, P. Hampson, *Interview and Conversation with John Milbank and Simon Oliver. Radical Orthodoxy and Christian psychology I – theological underpinnings* (further: ROCP), "Edification. The Transdisciplinary Journal of Christian Psychology" 6 (2012), z. 1, p. 61.

Protestants and Catholics, with those who converted to the Catholic Church under the influence of RO among them.⁴

Milbank's provocative and widely discussed publication *Theology and Social Theory*, published in 1993, is considered a foundation for the movement.⁵ The author questions the idea that theology modelled on other disciplines having their research areas would move only in its proper narrow area of competence. Theology is rather a matter of the way of looking at literally everything through the prism of revelation. Social sciences, on the other hand, turn out to be adopting theological, or rather antitheological, assumptions.⁶ In turn, the year 1999, in which the collective work entitled *Radical Orthodoxy. A New Theology*⁷ was published, is regarded as the contractual date inaugurating the movement. In this collection of essays, one can find the kind of intellectual sensibility that will become characteristic of RO.⁸

Although RO as "international influence also increases at a rapid rate,"⁹ in Poland, this movement seems to have been going almost unnoticed so far. There are single references to John Milbank,¹⁰ and the phenomenon has been

⁴ Cf. T. Rowland, *Catholic Theology* (hereinafter: CT), London–Oxford–New York–New Delhi–Sydney 2017, p. 125.

⁵ I'm using the second edition: J. Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory. Beyond Secular Reason*, Oxford 2006 (further: TST).

⁶ Cf. S. Oliver, *Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: from participation to late modernity* (hereinafter: ROR-I), [in:] ROR, p. 3; idem, *Krótki kurs radykalnej ortodoksji* (A short course in radical orthodoxy), transl. K. Kleczka, "Znak" 7–8 (2010), pp. 21–43; ROR-C, p. 30.

⁷ I use the second edition: *Radical Orthodoxy. A New Theology* (hereinafter: RONT), J. Milbank, C. Pickstock, G. Ward (eds.), London–New York 2002.

⁸ CT, p. 125.

⁹ ROR-A, p. 367.

¹⁰ Cf. e.g.: A. Persidok, *Paradoks w teologii według Henri de Lubaca* (Paradox in Theology by Henri de Lubac), "Warszawskie Studia Teologiczne" 2 (2015), pp. 100–117; J. Guzyński, *Między teorią prywatyną a teorią zła radykalnego. Johna Milbanka krytyka pozytywnej ontologii zła* (Between the theory of initiation and the theory of radical evil. John Milbank's criticism of the positive ontology of evil), "Ethos" 1 (2019), pp. 103–121; P. Mazanka, R. Tomanek, *Refleksje o „Radykalnej ortodoksji” Johna Milbanka. Sprawozdanie z konferencji „Belief and metaphysics”, 15–18 September 2006, Spain, Granada* (Reflections on John Milbank's "Radical Orthodoxy". Report of the conference "Belief and Metaphysics"), "Studia Philosophiae Christianae" 2 (2007), pp. 226–233 (the same repeated in: P. Mazanka, *Refleksje o „radykalnej ortodoksji” Johna Milbanka* [Reflections on John Milbank's radical orthodoxy], "Sosnowiec Theological Studies" 8 [2007], pp. 361–367); M. Suskiewicz, *Recenzja książki: J. Milbank, Beyond Secular Order* (Book Review: J. Milbank, Beyond Secular Order), "Przegląd Tomistyczny" 20 (2014), pp. 294–303.

sacrificed in “Znak” magazine.¹¹ However, in strictly scientific publications, it is difficult to find articles presenting the main RO ideas.¹² Some references are likely to be found in monographs; I only came across such references in Robert J. Woźniak’s book.¹³ In this article, I would like to make up for this lack by presenting the basic features of RO approach and indicating the issues requiring further research. The interest in RO concept may turn out to be creative for Polish theology, especially since the representatives of the movement enter into a discussion, sometimes critical, with Catholic theologians.

Many publications under the RO label forced the limited scope of the research. Assuming that the works of the movement creator and leader will be the most representative, I use them first of all, which, due to the scale of the issues raised by the movement, still required a further narrowing of the spectrum. On the other hand, Simon Oliver, a professor at the University of Durham associated with RO, shows a talent for clear promotion of basic ideas of RO and he became a compass for me, enabling me to break through the dense, full of incredibly erudite references, hermetic style of Milbank. The *Radical Orthodoxy Reader*¹⁴ also provides general orientation. Also, the interviews, which both professors gave, allow for catching the issues crucial for RO¹⁵. From the extensive material, I finally choose those issues which both reflect the character of RO thinking and are a good starting point for further research conducted by a Catholic theologian.

It should be remembered that whenever I present interpretations of source texts by such thinkers as John Duns Scotus, Thomas of Aquinas, and Henri de Lubac, they come from supporters of the movement. In the article, I abandon

¹¹ Cf. numbers: (2010) no. 7–8, (2010) no. 9 and (2011) no. 11. The first of these numbers indicates other publications that I have not been granted access yet: S. Duda, *Między Chrystusem a Antychrystem, czyli radykalny ortodoks chrześcijański spotyka lewicę* (Between Christ and Antichrist, or radical Christian Orthodoxy meets the Left) (the text was published in “Krytyka polityczna”); ibidem, *Logos pojednania* (Logos of reconciliation), [in:] *Chrześcijaństwo przed nami* (Christianity before us), J. Makowski, J. Salamon (eds.), Krakow 2008.

¹² See: Bibliografia Nauk Teologicznych (Bibliography of Theological Sciences) FIDES, <http://biblio.fides.org.pl> [access: 15.09.2019].

¹³ R.J. Woźniak, *Przyszłość, teologia, społeczeństwo* (Future, theology, society), Krakow 2007 (in particular pp. 149–152).

¹⁴ ROR; J.K.A. Smith, *Introducing Radical Orthodoxy...*, op. cit. is also an in-depth introduction.

¹⁵ It is also worth recommending the slightly more popular RO recordings from the *Theologians in Conversation* series published by the University of Nottingham and St. Johns Timeline, available on YouTube.

critical assessment of RO's reading of philosophical and theological legacy, but it is worth adding that historians of ideas put forward severe reservations about the way of reading and interpreting the sources made by writers under the aegis of RO.¹⁶

Catholic orthodoxy and heresy of modernity

The common denominator of the authors under the RO sign "is a return to thinking from the depths of Christian traditions and concepts," which in turn becomes "an instrumentarium of entering a creative and inconspicuous dialogue with contemporaneity."¹⁷ According to the movement originators, it remains faithful to the Christian tradition, with emphasis on the patristic period and the Middle Ages. RO intends to reaffirm Christianity, which has been gradually losing its importance since the Middle Ages. In this sense, the term 'orthodox' would also mean "crossing confessional boundaries" so as not to be distorted by Protestant biblicism on the one hand and post-Tridentine Catholicism on the other. Moreover, its radicalism appears in the postulated need to rethink tradition in search of its weak points, which throughout history paved the way for the collapse of the Christian tradition.¹⁸ If only Christian orthodoxy can bring a solution to contemporary problems, then today's condition can become an opportunity to rethink the Christian faith.¹⁹

Catholic orthodoxy recovery

RO cannot be pigeonholed either in liberal theology or in the conservative camp. Liberal theology is criticized for using philosophical categories developed from the assumption that philosophy has its own autonomy and, regardless of faith,

¹⁶ There is no shortage of publications critical of proposals of RO. To name but a few: *Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy. Postmodern Theology, Rhetoric and Truth*, W.J. Hankey, D. Hedley (eds.), Aldershot 2005; *The Poverty of Radical Orthodoxy*, L. Isherwood, M. Zlomislic (eds.), Eugene 2012; D.P. Horan, *Postmodernity and Univocity. A Critical Account of Radical Orthodoxy*, Minneapolis 2014; R. Cross, *Where Angels Fear to Tread. Duns Scotus and Radical Orthodoxy*, "Antonianum" 1 (2001), pp. 7–41.

¹⁷ R.J. Woźniak, *Radykalna ortodoksja: próba opisu* (Radical orthodoxy: an attempt at description), "Znak" 7–8 (2010), p. 16.

¹⁸ Cf. J. Milbank, G. Ward, C. Pickstock, *Introduction. Suspending the material: the turn of radical orthodoxy* (hereinafter: RO-I), [in:] RONT, p. 2.

¹⁹ ROR-I, p. 24.

can speak of any being, including God. However, since philosophical reason knows God only to a certain extent, the theological discourse, reserving for itself a deeper understanding of God as Creator and Redeemer, should take over from the philosophical discourse. The problem with the methodology is the use of philosophical categories, and the right to their legitimacy and adequacy evaluation is lost at the same time.²⁰ If the philosophy is to determine, as does it the neo-orthodox with Barth at the forefront, what it means to be or to know, then it will inevitably also specify how we can know Christ. If theology does not redefine the understanding of being and knowledge, then God's radical otherness will have to be expressed in finite human categories, which is an idolatrous reduction.²¹

By giving methodological priority or even exclusivity to the fullness of revelation in Christ, neo-orthodoxy uses in its reflection only the categories of proper theologies. In this way, however, he renounces the mission of influencing the philosophical notions of being, knowledge or action. In a sense, Barth was in favour of a modern understanding of philosophy, in opposition to which he could too hastily recognize that natural reason does not say anything significant about God. What matters is faith itself, as soon as God reveals God.²² Barth's assumption that Post-Kant philosophy that frees theology to be genuinely theological is, therefore, a danger: "The inner truth of his theology is that by allowing legitimacy to a methodologically atheist philosophy, he finishes by construing God on the model, ironically, of man without God."²³

Along with a misunderstanding of the role of liturgical mediation, Barth also abandons the ancient theory of analogy and participation, which is still operative and makes it possible to transcend the division between reason and faith and thus invalidate both pure rational foundations for faith and fideism.²⁴ Ultimately, Protestant neo-orthodoxy focused only on biblical and ecclesial discourse reduced Christian thought to a fideistic ghetto.²⁵

²⁰ Por. RO-I, p. 4; J. Milbank, *Knowledge. The theological critique of philosophy in Hamann and Jacobi* (hereinafter: RO-K), [in:] RONT, p. 21.

²¹ RO-K, pp. 21–22.

²² Ibidem, p. 21.

²³ Ibidem, p. 22.

²⁴ ROR-A, pp. 370, 372; cf. A. Skowronek, *Niedokończona symfonia*, [in:] *Leksykon wielkich teologów XX/XXI wieku* (Unfinished symphony, [in:] Lexicon of great theologians of the 20th/21st century), vol. 1, J. Majewski, J. Makowski (eds.), Warsaw 2003, p. 23.

²⁵ ROR-C, p. 38.

Against rationalism and fideism

RO wants to look from a different perspective, consistent with the medieval understanding of the relationship between cognition and faith. Revelation is not seen in it as a “bolt from the blue,” because even if it entails a specific illumination of the mind, frequently connected with the external events of salvation history, it is still in continuity with the process of ordinary reasoning, which is in fact never separated from any form of illumination. All human knowledge is a synthesis of external and internal light, and Revelation is an intensification of human reasoning.²⁶

(...) in the Church Fathers or the early scholastics, both faith and reason are included within the more generic framework of participation in the mind of God: to reason truly one must be already illumined by God, while revelation itself is but a higher measure of such illumination, conjoined intrinsically and inseparably with a created event which symbolically discloses that transcendent reality, to which all created events to a lesser degree also point.²⁷

The idea of participation enables Milbank the rejection of choice between fideism on the one hand and foundationalism of reason on the other. Both human reason and faith participate in the Divine mind so that the continuity between them ought to be recognised. In this sense, reason always needs faith, and faith goes hand in hand with the use of reason.²⁸ Since both the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation found themselves in danger of departing from the traditionally Catholic point of view,²⁹ Milbank has an undisguised affection for the Protestant thinkers among the “radical pietists.” Johann Georg Hamann and Franz Heinrich Jacobi, who are in question, discover in the RO creator’s opinion a more traditional Catholic thought than not only Protestantism but also post-Tridentine Catholicism.³⁰

²⁶ ROR-C, p. 39. Unfortunately, the later theology following Suárez, having lost the framework of participation, recognised positive data in Revelation, additional in a way to human knowledge. In such manner, however, both the possibility of ungodly reason and the arbitrariness of Revelation were acknowledged – cf. RO-I, p. 5; J. Montag, *The False Legacy of Suárez*, [in:] RONT, pp. 49–58; G. O’Collins, *Revelation. Towards a Christian Interpretation of God’s Self-revelation in Jesus Christ*, Oxford 2016, p. 4.

²⁷ RO-K, p. 24.

²⁸ ROCP, p. 60.

²⁹ ROR-C, p. 39.

³⁰ RO-K, p. 25.

The search for “theological difference”

The main representatives of RO would like to recover the ontology and philosophy corresponding to Christian doctrine. Without it, theology is under threat of uncritical acceptance of philosophical or cultural knowledge burdened with secularism. Although RO has much in common with Barthian neo-orthodoxy, what differs it from Karl Barth is that it considers various forms of mediation, rejected by a Calvinist theologian focused solely on exegesis. RO as anti-liberal radical orthodoxy wants to be more mediating but less accommodating than neo-orthodoxy. It is assumed here that theology should also talk about something else and seek what can be called a theological difference in everything.³¹

As long as theology does not carry a coherent vision of the whole world, it begins to speak only of the Church and then expresses itself in what Scottish theologian and philosopher Donald MacKinnon called “ecclesial fundamentalism.” Without a Christian way of reading history and acting in society, Christian faith remains unconvincing, and spirituality reduced to religious beliefs and practices corresponds to a secular perception of nature and society. Perhaps a secular phenomenon should be even seen in today’s forms of pietism.³²

While liberal theologians value the spheres glorified in the era of post-Enlightenment secularism (language, knowledge, body, sexuality, aesthetics, personality, visibility, politics), and conservatives treat them with disregard, RO sees the historical roots of celebrating these finite realities in participatory philosophy and incarnation theology.³³ Without reference to transcendence the spheres do not work well and are heading for collapse, because “only transcendence, which ‘suspends’ these things in the sense of interrupting them, ‘suspends’ them also in the other sense of upholding their relative worth over-against void.”³⁴ Conversely, the rejection of secularism is concurrently a revision of too little “Platonic” Christianity, which until now has not sufficiently appreciated the participatory and mediating sphere on the way towards God. Therefore, RO wants to regain the world by placing within the theological framework (including trinitological, Christological, ecclesiological and Eucharistic) the perspective of those spheres in which secularism has been most strongly marked.³⁵

³¹ Ibidem, p. 23; RO-I, p. 2.

³² Cf. ROR-C, pp. 29–30; T.G. Connor, *The Kenotic Trajectory of the Church in Donald MacKinnon’s Theology. From Galilee to Jerusalem to Galilee*, London 2011, p. 91.

³³ An example of the creative dialogue between Christology and contemporary culture is Graham Ward’s work entitled *Christ and Culture* (Oxford 2005); RO-I, p. 4.

³⁴ RO-I, p. 3. Cf. J.K.A. Smith, *Introducing Radical Orthodoxy...*, op. cit., p. 99.

³⁵ RO-I, pp. 1, 3.

Demythologisation of secularism

Milbank questions the thesis that is taken for granted today that secularism was built in a neutral territory after it had been cleared of its previous religious vision. He rejects the myth that secularism was merely a desacralisation and argues that it had to be invented as an idea, replacing the abandoned theological vision. In this way secularism, which tried to exclude God from social life, became a theology in disguise, a distortion of orthodox theology, that is to say: Christian heresy.³⁶

The supporters of RO believe that the origins of secularism can be traced back to the late Middle Ages. It was then that, along with the abandonment of the concept of analogy and participation, a change in the doctrine of God was brought about, which in consequence paved the space for autonomously understood creation.³⁷

The allegedly autonomous ‘nature’ to which modern secularism refers is a post-Christian phenomenon, incomprehensible outside the theological framework. Modernity also remains an heir to the late medieval nominalist-voluntary theology and quasi-Augustinianism of the 17th century. The Modern Era adopted the ontology that forms the basis for the political ontology and should be questioned from the point of view of Christian tradition. Furthermore, since secularism is rooted in *a theological shift*, it is only from a theological perspective that both secularism and modern philosophy can be evaluated.³⁸ Therefore, in Milbank’s opinion: “only theology overcomes metaphysics.”³⁹

All this does not mean that the author of *Theology and Social Theory* has a negative attitude towards secular reason. If secular discourse is a distortion of orthodox vision, then Catholic Christianity can take over and lead to the fulfilment of all partial truths. Professor at the University of Nottingham goes even further in his statements: it is the deformations of secularism that can become an opportunity to express certain aspects of orthodoxy.⁴⁰ It is, therefore, challenging to accuse RO of nostalgic tendencies. Thus, the return

³⁶ Cf. *ibidem*, pp. 3–6; ROR-I, p. 6; TST, XIV, pp. 3, 9; J. Milbank, *Beyond Secular Order. The representation of Being and the Representation of the People* (further: BSO), Oxford 2013, p. 5.

³⁷ ROR-I, pp. 12, 21, 24; ROR-C, p. 28.

³⁸ Cf. BSO, pp. 1, 3, 6, 28; ROR-I, p. 24; cf. M.A. Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity*, Chicago 2008, pp. 19–43.

³⁹ Cf. ROR-I, p. 24; J. Milbank, *The Word Made Strange. Theology, Language, Culture* (further: WMS), Oxford 1997, chapter 2.

⁴⁰ TST, XIV, p. 3; ROR-C, p. 28.

of RO to its roots is at the same time, an attempt to interpret modernity from the theological perspective.

It is about the recovery of modernity, which is impossible without a profound transformation based on the restoration of transcendence.⁴¹ RO aims to develop a systematic vision that enables criticism of modern culture, politics, art, science, and philosophy. This theological project can succeed thanks to the simultaneous self-awareness of the superficiality of secularism.⁴² “Modernity (...) in order to have what it thinks it wants, it would have to recover the theological, because only a theological vision is capable of revealing the finite reality and thus liberate from nihilism.”⁴³

The metaphysics of participation and a Scotist rupture

The central framework for RO is the concept of participation, which was developed by Plato and worked through by Christianity. Its adoption safeguards the integrity of the finite reality and the rejection of the idea of participation must necessarily lead to the adoption of a vision of a territory independent of God. Milbank and Pickstock, the authors of the book *Truth in Aquinas*, see a Neoplatonic participatory ontology at the heart of the whole theology of Aquinas, who is the most crucial Medieval theologian for RO. In the RO environment, on the other hand, the view about the significant change introduced by John Duns Scotus to the Angelic Doctor is repeated like a mantra. The legacy of the Subtle Doctor was to become the source of a theological course towards the misunderstood autonomy of beings and a dangerous concept of *natura pura*. For the RO supporters, the Scotsman becomes a “black hero” because of the triple change he caused: in the understanding of the relationship between God and creation, in the model of interpreting causality, and in the way of understanding knowledge.⁴⁴ Below I will discuss the first two breakups as the most fraught with consequences for theology. Having read this criticism, one should keep in mind Milbank’s view that the theological change was the foundation of modern theory and practice.

⁴¹ Cf. R.J. Woźniak, *Radykalna ortodoksja...*, op. cit., p. 17.

⁴² RO-I, pp. 1–2.

⁴³ Ibidem, p. 4.

⁴⁴ Cf. ROR-I, pp. 3, 18, 21; ROR-C, pp. 29, 33, 39–40; ROCP, p. 61; J. Milbank, *The Suspended Middle. Henri de Lubac and the Renewed Split in Modern Catholic Theology* (hereinafter: SM), Grand Rapids–Cambridge 2014, p. 85.

From participation to autonomy

Participation (in Greek *μέθεξις*,⁴⁵ in Latin: *participatio*) was applied by the Greek philosopher to describe the relationship between the reality of becoming (changeability) and the reality of real being represented by unchangeable ideas. The first one participates in the other as if it “borrows” existence from the forms. Thereby there is only one source of existence (and thus also of truth, goodness and beauty), and this non-dualistic perspective excludes any autonomy of the world of continuous becoming, that is, of variable beings.⁴⁶ It is not something independent, when taken in isolation from the source it turns out to be nothing; it can be said to be suspended over the nihil.⁴⁷

The concept of participation is an essential component of the theory of analogy in Thomas Aquinas’ concept. Angelic Doctor saw in God the *ipsum esse*, a pure being in which the essence and the existence converge into one. The created beings (*esse commune*), composed of the essence and existence, for which the essence is not identical with the existence (they might not be, but they do exist), is present only analogously, in relation to God. Initially, “a being” is concluded only concerning God (for God is a being), and the existence of creation is possible only by the grace given by the Creator for participating in His being. It means that there is no independent existence of creation if it is neither the second “next to” God focus of being or existence nor “beyond” God.⁴⁸

Christian theology significantly changed the Greek philosopher’s thoughts. The existence of finite beings is seen as a gift of grace from the Creator, and the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* is understood not as a unique initial act but as continuous creation since creation exists only by the continuous donation

⁴⁵ It is obvious that Plato used various terms to describe participation – cf. ROR-I, p. 18; Z.J. Zdybicka, *Partycypacja bytu. Próba wyjaśnienia relacji między światem a Bogiem* (Participation in Being. Attempt to explain the relationship between the world and God), Lublin 2017, pp. 25–26.

⁴⁶ ROR-I, pp. 17–18; ROCP, p. 61; cf. J.K.A. Smith, *Introducing Radical Orthodoxy...*, op. cit., p. 63; Z.J. Zdybicka, op. cit., pp. 25–27, 40 and 28: “The participating world to the participated world has a relationship to each other like a non-being to being.”

⁴⁷ Cf. J. Zdybicka, *Partycypacja* (Participation), [in:] *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii* (Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy), vol. 8, A. Maryniarczyk et al. (ed.), Lublin 2007, p. 31. However, the author acknowledges that Plato’s theory “points to the distance between the world of ideas and the world of the matter, introduces duality between these spheres of reality” (ibidem); ROCP, p. 61.

⁴⁸ ROR-I, pp. 17, 21–22; cf. E. Gilson, *Historia filozofii chrześcijańskiej w wiekach średnich* (History of Christian philosophy in the Middle Ages), transl. S. Zalewski, Warsaw 1987, p. 335.

of their being by God. Creation is real, but not autonomous – it is not given, but it is a gift. It is like an arriving gift of self-subsistent God.⁴⁹ “Since we are created, we are received, even as ourselves, before ourselves.”⁵⁰ Participation in God’s substantiality is therefore considered “inappropriate” for creation; participation is not specific to Him, as if the creation itself had the right to exist.⁵¹ “Creatures, for Aquinas, beneath the level of patterns of granted relative necessity and subsistence, are radically accidental. But not thereby, of course, accidents of the divine substance; instead they subsist by participation in this substance.”⁵²

Participation makes it possible to dismiss the risk of perceiving areas free from God, and by denying independence to all areas, it leaves the integrity relevant to created things; it is only by referring to God that their worldliness is safeguarded. The assumption that there are such disciplines that are to be located outside God necessarily leads to nihilism. Nihilism is the last word of the *ratio pura* (*pure reason*). Therefore, RO representatives consider every discipline in a theological framework, if it is not to be founded outside of God, means on nothing. Without reference to eternal stability, everything remains in the immanent scheme (*mathesis*), meaning accepting one of the two variants. The first option is to regard the stream of phenomena as transcendent and established on nothing, and then the world structure remains an illusion resulting from emptiness. The view can also be taken that what appears to man is real, only that it does not exceed itself, and thus the intricacies of created things are removed.⁵³

From analogy to univocity of being

For Aquinas, only God is a being, and created beings exist analogically through participation in the being of God. Angelic Doctor consistently recognized that metaphysics as a science of being must be referred to the higher science available through Revelation; the science of the ultimate cause of being must be God’s own self-knowledge.⁵⁴ However, Duns Scotus considered that an abstract notion of being could include both the Creator and creation, thus taking the ontological difference between them into account. The accepted

⁴⁹ ROR-I, p. 18; ROCP, pp. 61–62.

⁵⁰ TST, XVII.

⁵¹ ROR-I, p. 18.

⁵² J. Milbank, C. Pickstock, *Truth in Aquinas*, London 2001, p. 30; cf. ROR-I, p. 17.

⁵³ RO-I, p. 3; RO-K, pp. 25–26; ROR-I, pp. 18–19; TST, XVII.

⁵⁴ ROR-I, p. 21; WMS, pp. 44–47; BSO, p. 25.

univocity of being abolishes the qualitative distance between the infinite and finite in favour of the quantitative. In this way, paradoxically, God begins to appear as infinitely distant (He is separated from the creatures by the limitless sea of sameness), which at the same time leads to His marginalization and the affirmation of the secular space.⁵⁵

Consequently, such a God can only remain an object of faith separated from reason. Thus, the previous position of incorporating both faith and reason into the horizon of participation in the mind of God is abandoned. *Doctor Subtilis*, thus juxtaposing reason and faith/revelation, becomes guilty of separating philosophy from theology. The univocity accepted by the Franciscan enables the formation of a metaphysics that subordinates being to thinking (being from the real becomes the possible one) and leads to the emergence of an ontology as a science about a being as an object of knowledge independent of any reference to the Absolute. In the long term, this will entail an ontology that is autonomous and prior to theology, culminating in the position of Francisco Suárez in the seventeenth century. The Scotist separation between the concepts of being and God lays the foundations for a reflection on nature as an autonomous and recognizable reality without reference to God.⁵⁶

From unilateral exchange to mutual interaction

The Middle Ages saw divine causality interpreted as 'flowing in' (Latin *in-fluentia*) all levels of the cause hierarchy. Thus, the highest cause operated universally and led to – in reaction to its influence – also the activity of lower causes. In this paradoxical model, due to the unilateral gift going from top to bottom, there was neither reciprocation nor rivalry between acting synergistically but at other ontological levels divine and finite causes.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Cf. WMS, pp. 44–45; ROR-I, pp. 22–23; ROR-C, p. 33; BSO, pp. 30, 50; J.K.A. Smith, *Introducing Radical Orthodoxy...*, op. cit., p. 99; P. Jaroszyński, *Metafizyka czy ontologia? Problem Boga a spór o rozumienie filozofii w kontekście alternatywy metafizyka czy ontologia* (Metaphysics or ontology? The problem of God and the dispute about understanding philosophy in the context of alternative metaphysics or ontology), [in:] *Metafizyka. Część II. Zarys teorii bytu* (Metaphysics. Part II. Outline of the theory of existence), S. Janeczek, A. Starościc (eds.), Lublin 2017, p. 91.

⁵⁶ ROR-I, pp. 23–24; ROR-C, p. 29; WMS, pp. 40–41; BSO, p. 30; ROCP, p. 61; cf. R.I. Woźniak, *Radykalna ortodoksja...*, op. cit., p. 19; P. Jaroszyński, *Metafizyka czy ontologia?...*, op. cit., p. 95: "Metaphysics was somehow absorbed by ontology."

⁵⁷ SM, pp. 95–97; BSO, pp. 28, 42, 44–47.

The Scotist rupture involves a change in the understanding of the operation of causes. Now the higher cause somehow descends to a lower level, hence putting it on a par with finite causes. In this way, causes that differ only quantitatively, not qualitatively, from one ontological level will have to be added, which means that they will also compete. Besides, Subtle Doctor's *concursum* model invalidates the one-sided exchange by adopting a vision of a contract between the highest and lowest causes – now each of them having its own sphere of action enters into a kind of reciprocal interaction within a zero-sum game.⁵⁸

Scheda of the *natura pura* doctrine and the legacy of de Lubac

The connection with *nouvelle théologie* resounds in many publications on RO, but Milbank explicitly referred to Henri de Lubac – whom he considered to be one of the two (next to Sergei Bulgakov) great theologians of the 20th century – in his book *Suspended Middle*. He puts forward a thesis, which is in line with historians of philosophy and theology and against neo-scholastic interpretations, that the opinion of a Catholic theologian should be read most radically and that as such it finds his roots in the legacy of Thomas Aquinas. For the rest of his life, even after *Humani Generis*, the Jesuit maintained or even radicalised his earlier stand. In any case, the secular theologian does not confirm any possible interpretations of de Lubac's withdrawal from his earlier positions in reaction to the encyclical written by Pius XII.⁵⁹

The most important components of de Lubac's thought include understanding the human spirit as a gift internally combined with grace and seeing grace as free while rejecting the concept of *natura pura*, because "a gift can be a gift without contrast to gift."⁶⁰ However, the meaning of *Surnaturel*⁶¹ remains important for RO also because of the conclusions that result from the issue worked out by its author. Incorrect interpretation of supernaturalness is the reason for the emergence of modern philosophy and secularism.⁶² The crucial

⁵⁸ SM, pp. 98–100; BSO, pp. 28, 45–48; ROR-C, pp. 33–34; cf. S. Oliver, *Philosophy, God and Motion*, London–New York 2006.

⁵⁹ SM, IX, XIII, pp. 9–10, 53, 94, 109; ROR-A, p. 368.

⁶⁰ SM, p. 94.

⁶¹ Cf. H. de Lubac, *Surnaturel. Études historiques*, Paris 1946.

⁶² SM, p. 11; M. Wójtowicz, *Odwaga myślenia* (Courage of Thinking), [in:] *Leksykon wielkich teologów XX/XXI wieku*, op. cit., p. 176.

question raised by de Lubac also hides a problem of understanding humanism⁶³ and the relationship between theology and philosophy.

The human spirit as a gift instead of *natura pura*

Thomas of Aquinas never spoke about *natura pura*, but he emphasised the ontological orientation of human nature towards spiritual fulfilment. Only Cardinal Cajetan proposed the suggestion of nature defined by purely natural terms. His solution was to protect the disinterestedness of grace that arouses the desire for supernaturalness in man. De Lubac, however, questioned the neo-scholastic reading of Thomas's works, under which the thought of Aquinas would constitute a breakthrough in the confirmation of secularism.⁶⁴

In discussing the paradoxical relationship between grace and nature, de Lubac holds onto the *suspended middle*, rejecting the vision of autonomous nature and external grace. Grace that does not lift nature above itself has to be regarded as something emptily extrinsic, which does not open nature for participation in the Divine nature. Man's vocation to be divinized means that nature justly demands what it can come only as a gift from God.⁶⁵

De Lubac opposed the thesis of the Pope, who in *Humani Generis* recalled the concept of *natura pura* as the guarantor of free grace, as it does not belong to human nature.⁶⁶ The Jesuit believed that such an approach to grace placed it on the same intra-worldly ontological level as nature (analogically to the acceptance of the univocity of being between God and creation). The above gave rise to the following questions: would pure nature receive grace from its own will or consent, or as something contrary to its freedom or even forcing it? In the first case, we would have to do with Pelagius', as well as Baius and Jansenius' mistakes, and in the other one – Luther and Calvin's ones. In both, grace would lose its gratuitousness.⁶⁷

The natural desire for the supernatural is not in itself grace, because in such case it would be difficult to find anything in human nature that would urge it

⁶³ Cf. H. de Lubac, *Dramat humanizmu ateistycznego* (The drama of atheistic humanism), transl. A. Ziernicki, Krakow 2005.

⁶⁴ SM, pp. 17–18, 20–21, 88–89.

⁶⁵ SM, XII, pp. 5–6, 11, 22–23, 39–40, 44.

⁶⁶ Cf. Pius XII, Encyklika *Humani generis* (Encyclical *Humani generis*), [in:] *Breviarium fidei. Wybór doktrynalnych wypowiedzi Kościoła* (*Breviarium fidei*. Selection of doctrinal statements of the Church), I. Bokwa (ed.), Poznań 2007, p. 406 (no. 1074).

⁶⁷ SM, pp. 47, 50–51.

towards *visio beatifica*. On the other hand, grace would not be a gift if *natura pura* demanded the beatific vision, i.e. if the natural desire for supernaturalness remained part of nature. Thus, desire is a kind of non-existent plane between two and three dimensions in geometry – it must be both nature and grace. De Lubac recognizes that the natural desire for supernaturalness is the gift of the anticipation of gift.⁶⁸

When synthesizing Gilson's ontological difference between God and creation with *Surnaturel* doctrine, de Lubac rejected the thesis that a gift must be contrasted with a non-gift. The created human spirit is not so much the recipient of the gift as it is a gift itself. Thereby, the Jesuit inaugurated a new discourse on the human spirit which, according to the RO leader, can be more satisfying than the one juxtaposing nature and supernaturalness.⁶⁹ "Since there is no preceding recipient, the spirit is a gift to a gift and the gift of giving oneself to oneself, which is the only way consciously to live being a gift and so to be spirit."⁷⁰

Just as creation, grace does not assume anything before it. The divinization does not have to be contrasted with *natura pura*. De Lubac argued with the opponents that the assumption of pure nature – would undermine the gratuitousness of grace. Furthermore, the innate tendency toward a blessed vision is still the divine gift in man. On the one hand, God enables and responds freely to the divinization of man, on the other, grace is created, and the divinizing transfiguration is the work of the human will. The gift of divinization is such a transgression of creation that it embraces it to the maximum extent that in the blessed vision the whole human being becomes the reception of divine light, and there is no longer a "natural" reception.⁷¹

Christian humanism, not secular one

For the French thinker, well understood Christianity is humanism, while secular humanism is the antithesis of the Gospel.⁷²

This, for de Lubac, was (and is) the danger of pure humanism without reference beyond humanity. On the other hand, this danger was ironically fostered by

⁶⁸ Ibidem, pp. 37, 43–45.

⁶⁹ Ibidem, pp. 48, 52.

⁷⁰ Ibidem, p. 48.

⁷¹ Ibidem, pp. 51–51, 97–98.

⁷² Ibidem, p. 10.

the illusory piety of a religion without humanity produced by the neoscholastic understanding of grace.⁷³

The advocate of Christian humanism could not be further away from the tendency to emphasise only the ecclesiastical message of faith detached from the cultural roots.⁷⁴ He maintained that if supernaturalness could one be separated from nature, one should choose one of the two ways of its unification:

either the supernaturalness will descend into the interior of nature to raise and transform it, to make it supernatural, or the nature will absorb and retain the supernaturalness, to lower it, to naturalise it, and then the nature will in no case be “complete” and the supernaturality will be spoiled.⁷⁵

These words explain why “natural” humanism must not be allowed. A similar approach characterises the RO supporters: it is recognized that apart from God, no humanism is possible (unless it is sinister), while the theological discourse inevitably entails a kind of humanism, because it shows how the divinization by grace affects humanity.⁷⁶ Milbank believes that Christian theology should be not so much political theology but rather politicised metaphysics or metaphysical politics. Christianity appears to be the creator of RO not only “the most religious of religions,” but also the most human of specifically human processes; hence its rejection must open “post-human” perspectives.⁷⁷

For even though it is true that Christianity secularised law, politics, language, science and artistic representation, it did not initially do so in the name of and autonomous secular space – this eventual upshot was only the result of the inauthentic doctrine of *natura pura*. Instead, this secularization much more implied a negative qualification of any stable claims to capture the sacred, and at the same time a relativisation of the Durkheimian sacred/profane boundary (...) with a consequent sacralisation of all nature as Creation and all culture as divinisable because human. In this way Christianity exalts and extends the

⁷³ Ibidem, p. 22.

⁷⁴ Ibidem, p. 10.

⁷⁵ H. de Lubac, *Najnowsze paradoksy* (The latest paradoxes), transl. K. Dybeł, A. Ziernicki, Krakow 2012, p. 143.

⁷⁶ ROR-C, p. 45.

⁷⁷ BSO, p. 15; cf. Paweł VI, *Populorum progressio*, 44; P.M. Candler jr, *Logika chrześcijańskiego humanizmu* (The logic of Christian humanism), transl. U. Jachimczak, “Znak” 7–8 (2010), p. 57.

religious (...) precisely by making it more coincide with the human – which is also thereby elevated.⁷⁸

Christian humanism should become an alternative to both the Reformation and modernity, which appeared as a poisoned fruit of earlier theological errors and consistently resulting ontological ones. Therefore, a change in the philosophical and theological perspective, not only in the ecclesial but also a political dimension, can restore the Christian heritage of the West and its influence on humanity.⁷⁹

Philosophy not autonomous, but in relation to theology

The legacy of de Lubac is manifested in RO by the concept of the interconnection of theology and philosophy. Milbank claims that the author of *Surnaturel* proposed a kind of “non-ontology” – a discourse that was neither philosophical metaphysics nor speculative dogmatics. This type of reflection, resulting directly from the recognition of *suspended middle* between nature and grace, at the same time, crossed out the autonomy of philosophy and theology and bound one with the other.⁸⁰ It resembled Augustinian Christian philosophy or Thomistic sacred doctrine.

Research indicates that before 1300 there was no evident duality between the theological and philosophical reason. Even the more profound distinction between philosophy (and rationally practised theology) and *sacra doctrina* introduced by Thomas Aquinas does not necessarily entail the later invention of autonomous philosophy. It was Angelic Doctor who made a more apparent distinction between philosophy and theology so as to unite them.⁸¹

Rational theology and revealed theology are not, then, for Aquinas, even from a human perspective, simplistically discrete ‘stages’, but rather always imply each other in different degrees and with different intensities along a continuum of coming-to-know within historical time. But from a divine point of view it is Aquinas’s central doctrine of divine simplicity (...) which ensures that the

⁷⁸ BSO, p. 15.

⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 18; ROR-C, p. 45.

⁸⁰ SM, pp. 3–5, 12–13, 34, 52; TST, XXIII–XXV.

⁸¹ BSO, pp. 23, 25, 27. Milbank previously believed that Aquinas had in some way allowed for secular autonomy; cf. TST 407; J.K.A. Smith, *Introducing Radical Orthodoxy...*, op. cit., p. 120.

two theologies are only aspects of a single divine knowing. For God creator and revealer is one: his emanation of created being and his call to creation and humanity to return to him are a single same eternal unchanging action.⁸²

For Aquinas, as it turns out, “philosophy is not straightforwardly foundational, and neither is theology straightforwardly superior.”⁸³ The autonomy of philosophy is established in a gradual process in which John Duns Scotus, Francisco Suárez and Domingo Báñez play key roles. Ultimately, a philosophy that has never existed before, regardless of religion or theology, is becoming an independent field abstracted from existential orientation and the question of the beatific vision, thus, paradoxically, ceasing to be theologically neutral.⁸⁴

According to the diagnosis conducted by the RO leader, a philosophy began as secularizing immanentism, and theology, if it wants to consider the love of God and creation as a manifestation of this love again, must completely evacuate metaphysics.⁸⁵ Thus, theology, in a way, redeems its guilt since its assumptions lie at the origin of the autonomous philosophy:

So the paradox is that the theoretically secularising gesture, which permitted the arrival of a pure, autonomous philosophy, was entirely a theological gesture, and even one which sought to conserve the transcendence of God and the priority of the supernatural, by mistakenly insisting on the sheer ‘naturalness’ and self-sufficiency of human beings without grace, as a backdrop of augmenting grace’s sheer gratuity.⁸⁶

It becomes understandable why Milbank refers to Hamann and Jacobi, who have developed a theological criticism of philosophy based on reason independent of faith, without succumbing to, what the author of the essay on the theological criticism of philosophy assesses, confusion of faith and reason. Paradoxically, it was precisely the focus on knowledge by faith alone associated with the Lutheran heritage that caused them to leave less autonomy to reason than the Fathers of the Church were ready to give it. The Anglican theologian convinces that only such a strong emphasis on faith can prevent the deviation introduced by John Duns Scotus. It enables discussion with philosophy and even implies some issue, which without the theology would have been incomprehensible or

⁸² Ibidem, pp. 25–26; cf. J. Milbank, C. Pickstock, *Truth in Aquinas*, op. cit., pp. 19–59.

⁸³ BSO, p. 26.

⁸⁴ Ibidem, pp. 19, 27.

⁸⁵ WMS, p. 50.

⁸⁶ BSO, p. 28.

even impossible to notice. It also makes it possible to diagnose the origins of modern thought.⁸⁷

Conclusion: radical orthodoxy as *suspended middle*

In conclusion, it is worth noting that the radical return to orthodoxy turns out to be inseparably connected with the criticism of modern paradigms, as well as with the rethinking the tradition. Leaning towards the past is accompanied by a symmetrical interest in shaping the future. That, in turn, requires a diagnosis of the present, while evaluation – Milbank’s contribution *et consortes* cannot be underestimated – is made from a theological perspective. That is why the above presentation of the main ideas of RO has taken one form rather than the other: in the first two paragraphs the affirmation of traditional concepts was immediately juxtaposed with the dangerous consequences of its abandonment⁸⁸; in the third paragraph the reverse order was proposed – de Lubac’s legacy becomes a remedy for a disease inherited along with the doctrine of *pure nature*. It seems that the form adopted in the following paragraphs speaks no less than the content of the referred views.

RO creators believe that only the idea of participation protects the integrity of the created reality. The departure from it put the Western thought on the track leading to the acceptance of the notion of *natura pura*. The new approach of Jan Duns Scotus compared to the previous one in fact resulted from the change in the theological perspective that, philosophically speaking, the univocity of being is only one of the possible interpretations of the difference between God and other beings. As Milbank stresses, the affirmation of univocity is at the same time “a decision against a middle in being between identity and difference.” In fact, it is more a matter of existential orientation than a conclusion drawn from argumentation. “For it is in part the result of and undergrounded decision that there can be no ‘middle’ in meaning between identity and difference.”⁸⁹ The supporters of RO practice reflection within the framework of metaxological perspective that “is at once the mediating, the analogical and the participatory.”⁹⁰

⁸⁷ RO-K, pp. 22–25, 31–32.

⁸⁸ Cf. J.K.A. Smith, *Introducing Radical Orthodoxy...*, op. cit., p. 90: „RO’s histories tend to be narratives of (qualified) rupture and discontinuity rather than tales of continuity and progress.”

⁸⁹ BSO, pp. 50–51.

⁹⁰ Cf. ibidem, p. 52, footnote 78; W. Desmond, *Being and the Between. Political Theory in the American Academy*, New York 1995.

In RO publications resound a strong link with *nouvelle théologie*, and de Lubac's contribution is a point of reference for drawing the most far-reaching conclusions. Hans Urs von Balthasar characterized the author of *Surnaturel* as a thinker occupying a *suspended middle* area: "De Lubac soon realized that his position moved into a suspended middle in which he could not practice any philosophy without its transcendence into theology, but also any theology without its essential inner structure of philosophy."⁹¹ In his book on Karl Barth's theology, the Basel scholar combined Lubac's position on supernaturalness with the analogy of being (*analogia entis*) interpreted by Erich Przywara and Gustav Siewerth to reject both liberal theology and Barth's advocacy of Revelation against nature. It is precisely these two rejections that imply the *suspended middle*, which neither belongs to natural theology nor doctrine, although at the same time it encompasses both.⁹²

Thus, we indirectly obtain the auto-characteristics of RO, which perceives the whole reality and the role of theology from the inside of the suspended middle. As Milbank admits, "our discourse is always situated in a kind of in-between realm, which was where de Lubac and von Balthasar often sought to operate."⁹³ The position of RO is an attempt to take over and further develop de Lubac's legacy interpreted in the most radical way possible, and it is this statement that may be a key to interpreting the views of the supporters of the movement.

The discourse initiated by de Lubac faces this 'middle,' which remains 'suspended' between nature and grace, and therefore does not belong to philosophy or theology. Philosophy needs a transcendent supplement in the form of theology but in the same way theology demands (inaccessible) foundations of philosophy, which appears to be an unsolvable aporia. RO, like Balthasar and de Lubac, questions the separation of faith and reason by returning to the patristic conviction that one needs God's illumination to reason truly, since just as there is no nature without grace, so there is no *ratio pura*. Trying to bridge the gap between Athens and Jerusalem, RO is more Catholic than Protestant.⁹⁴

According to Milbank, all de Lubac's theology goes hand in hand with the Christological foundation that underlies it (in which the leader of RO

⁹¹ H.U. von Balthasar, *The Theology of Henri De Lubac*, San Francisco 1991, p. 15.

⁹² SM, pp. 36–37; cf. CT, pp. 118–119; *The Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or the Wisdom of God?*, T.J. White (ed.), Grand Rapids 2011; C. Szczęsny, *Pośrednicząca rola bytu w poznaniu Boga u Gustawa Siewertha* (Intermediate role of being in knowing God with Gustav Siewerth), Lublin 1986.

⁹³ ROR-C, p. 45.

⁹⁴ Ibidem, p. 43; SM, pp. 12, 44, 52.

sees a complete convergence with Joseph Ratzinger's theology).⁹⁵ What is more, Aaron Riches, a Catholic theologian under the banner of RO, derives de Lubac's views from Christology. At the same time, he proposes an interesting comparison that may help in demonstrating the necessity of staying in this *suspended middle*, and at the same time in indicating the direction of reading the meaning of the phrase used:

For de Lubac, the Christological paradox entails that the Church's doctrine will be constituted by 'a comprehensive assembly of opposing aspects', and that these 'opposing aspects' are raised to signify the full depth of the mystery of truth in direct relation to the degree that 'they are mutually supported like flying buttresses (*arc-boutant*), each one braced against the other in the most extreme degrees of tension.'⁹⁶

The structure of the mysteries of faith is compared to a system of mutually dependent buttresses used in sacred architecture. In this picture, the paradoxical character of the doctrine consisting of seemingly contradictory but in fact, mutually supportive aspects, which would result from Christology, is revealed. The Chalcedonian phrase of the unity-without-confusion used by the editor of *Communio* magazine to characterize Balthasar's position⁹⁷ can instead be referred to how RO practises discourse. In Milbank's opinion, the Swiss theologian, although he seems to be also involved in this *suspended middle*, compromises de Lubac's position and goes beyond it both towards Barth (e.g. when he speaks about the self-authentic Divine revelation) and Karl Rahner (too much space granting *natura pura*).⁹⁸

If the Chalcedonian definition of 451 maintains that the Divine and human natures are united "unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably"

⁹⁵ ROR-A, p. 372.

⁹⁶ Cited after: CT, p. 109.

⁹⁷ Cf. A.J. Walker, *Love Alone: Hans Urs von Balthasar as a Master of Theological Renewal*, "Communio: International Catholic Review" 3 (2005), p. 537: "Precisely because of his radical Christocentrism, then, Balthasar is, before anything else, a theologian of the so-called «Catholic 'and'»: of the unity-without-confusion of the «from above» and the «from below»; of grace and of nature; of philosophy and of theology; of the radical following of Christ and of passionate love for the world; of tradition and of the development of doctrine." See also: CT, p. 120.

⁹⁸ SM, p. 74; ROR-A, p. 371. It is also possible to point to other dimensions of *suspended middle*. For example, the ecclesial position of de Lubac as both radical and conservative will be set between a conservative antimodern reaction and a liberal theological *aggiornamento* (SM, p. 8).

(ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαίρετως, ἀχωρίστως)⁹⁹ in one person of Christ, RO wants to emphasise this unity. It is no coincidence that Riches in his book *Ecce homo. On the Divine Unity of Christ* combines de Lubac's natural desire for supernaturalness with the Christology of Cyril of Alexandria and Maximus the Confessor. He does so in the spirit of 'Nestorian' trends in Catholic Christology, calling for a more Cyrillic reading of Chalcedon.¹⁰⁰

Therefore, I propose the thesis that the Second Council of Constantinople contributed to Christology is analogous to what RO calls contemporary theology. The Council of 553 presented the interpretation of Chalcedon in the spirit of the Cyrillic focus on the unity of Christ, thereby claiming that the number of natures in the Incarnate is rather a matter of theoretical division of what in His concrete existence is not divisible.¹⁰¹ Similarly, RO can be an impulse for Catholic theology and calls for a reflection on whether the otherwise legitimate distinctions (nature-grace; philosophy-theology; autonomy of temporal reality-the Church) have been read from the 'Nestorian' perspective. Consequently, it should be added that the views of the representatives of the movement cannot

⁹⁹ Sobór Chalcedoński, *Decyzja Soboru* (Chalcedonian Council, Decision of the Council), [in:] *Breviarium fidei. Wybór doktrynalnych wypowiedzi Kościoła* (Breviarium fidei. Selection of doctrinal statements of the Church), elaborated by S. Głowa, I. Bieda, Poznań 1998, VI.1 (no. 8). On the meaning of four adverbs in the definition of Chalcedon – cf. S. Zatwardnicki, *Chalcedońska formuła „bez zmieszania i bez rozdzielania” w świetle dokumentów Międzynarodowej Komisji Teologicznej* (The Chalcedonian formula 'without mixing or separating' in the light of the documents of the International Theological Commission), Wrocław 2017, pp. 46–50.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. A. Riches, *Ecce homo. On the Divine Unity of Christ*, Grand Rapids, Michigan 2016, pp. 14–16; BSO, pp. 78–79, footnote 139.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Sobór konstantynopolitański II (II Council of Constantinople), *Anatematyzmy przeciwko „Trzem rozdziałom”* (Anathematisms against “Three Chapters”), anathematism VII, [in:] *Dokumenty Soborów Powszechnych. Tekst grecki, łaciński, polski*, t. 1: *Nicea I, Konstantynopol I, Efez, Chalcedon, Konstantynopol II, Konstantynopol III, Nicea II (325–787)* [Documents of the General Councils. Greek, Latin, Polish texts, vol. 1: Nice I, Constantinople I, Ephesus, Chalcedon, Constantinople II, Constantinople III, Nice II (325–787)], composition and elaboration: A. Baron, H. Pietras, Krakow 2007, p. 293; B. Sesboüé, J. Wolinski, *Bóg zbawienia. Tradycja, reguła i Symbole wiary. Ekonomia zbawienia. Rozwój dogmatów trynitarnych i chrystologicznych* (God of salvation. Tradition, rule and symbols of faith. The economy of salvation. Development of Trinitarian and Christological dogmas), B. Sesboüé (ed.), Polish sci. ed. T. Dzidek, transl. P. Rak, Krakow 1999, pp. 372, 375; L. Perrone, *Wpływ dogmatu Chalcedońskiego na refleksję teologiczną między IV a V soborem ekumenicznym* (The influence of the Chalcedonian dogma on the theological reflection between the Fourth and Fifth Ecumenical Councils), [in:] *Historia teologii*, 1: *Epoka patrystyczna* (History of theology, 1: The patristic era), A. di Bernardino, B. Studer (eds.), transl. M. Gołębiowski et al. Krakow 2010, p. 581, footnote 1.

be accused of ‘mono-physical’ deviations, and that it is precisely the unity that secures the truth of the created world, human nature, and reason.¹⁰²

If one were to stick to the adopted convention of epithetisation, ‘miaphysite’ inclinations in RO might be observed. In Christology, they were marked by a preference to speak not so much of the unity of the Person as of the one nature of Christ resulting from the unification “without mixing and without separating human and divine natures.”¹⁰³ RO would also emphasise the broadly understood “complex unity” wherever others are tempted to emphasise differentiation. Remaining orthodox is always a radically tricky task – this is also what radical orthodoxy indirectly reminds us of, and this statement immediately implies the necessity of uncritical assimilation of the views proclaimed by the representatives of the movement.

The above summary results in further directions of research. First, the issue of the understanding of theology through RO should be addressed, within which the relation of theology to philosophy and other sciences would also be discussed more comprehensively. It would be worthwhile to ask how the authors associated under the banner of RO conduct a dialogue with the present day could not be a hint for Catholic theologians on how to take up the call of Pope Francis expressed in the Apostolic Constitution on ecclesiastical universities and faculties. In *Veritatis Gaudium*, the Holy Father expressed the expectation that ecclesial studies should become a kind of cultural laboratory, in which the interpretation of reality in accordance with the “evangelical hermeneutics” would be combined with the development of new narratives and cultural paradigms in dialogue with culture and science.¹⁰⁴ Then we should ask ourselves whether and how the approach of RO can provide a positive impulse for Catholic theology, especially post-conciliar one, which has indeed given too

¹⁰² Cf. „Jakby spadła na mnie szafa z książkami”. Z Sebastianem Dudą rozmawiają Michał Bardel i Janusz Poniewierski (“It’s like a book closet fell on me.” Michał Bardel and Janusz Poniewierski talk to Sebastian Duda), “Znak” 7–8 (2010), pp. 93–94. A Catholic theologian associated with RO directly referred to the Chalcedonian formula in the description of the relationship between faith and reason when he was commenting on the unannounced speech of Benedict XVI at the University of La Sapienza – cf. P.M. Candler jr, *Logika chrześcijańskiego humanizmu* (Logic of Christian humanism), op. cit., p. 59: “The relationship between faith and reason should therefore be properly considered in the likeness of a hypostatic union: faith and reason are united in Christ, without confusion or separation.”

¹⁰³ Cf. D.G. Eadie, *Chalcedon revisited*, “Journal of Ecumenical Studies” 1 (1973), no. 1, p. 143.

¹⁰⁴ Franciszek, *Konstytucja Apostolska “Veritatis gaudium” o uniwersytetach i wydziałach kościelnych* (Apostolic Constitution “Veritatis gaudium” on universities and ecclesiastical faculties), 3–5.

much space to the autonomy of earthly realities, thereby, perhaps, contributing to the progressive secularization.

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The Beginnings of the Church Career of Tomasz I, the Bishop of Wrocław, until Taking Over the Office (1232)

Początki kościelnej kariery wrocławskiego biskupa Tomasza I
do czasu objęcia biskupstwa (1232 r.)

ABSTRACT: Tomasz I descended from Jelenie-Jeleńczycy family line. His father Przybysław was a castellan in Sądowel and a lord in Powidzk. His uncle Piotr (died in 1240) was a provost of a cathedral chapter. Tomasz I did not complete his education at the level of a local cathedral school but started further studies at foreign universities, undoubtedly in Italy, accomplished by winning a doctorate. Owing to his uncle's patronage, he became a member of a cathedral chapter. He also acted as a chancellor of Henryk Brodaty. The Bishop Tomasz I belongs to a group of those Polish bishops from the beginning of the 13th century who are known to had possessed holy orders at the moment of taking up the position of a diocesan bishop, which that time was not a common practice. He was elected the Bishop of Wrocław in 1232. It can be stated with the substantial degree of probability that Tomasz was a candidate of the Silesian ruler – it is proved by the fact that immediately before consecration he had held an office of the chancellor of prince.

KEYWORDS: Silesia, Church, Tomasz I, Jeleńczycy, *sacri ordines*, doctor of canon law

ABSTRAKT: Tomasz I pochodził z rodu Jeleni/Jeleńczyków. Jego ojciec Przybysław był kasztelanem w Sądowelu i panem na Powidzku. Jego wuj Piotr (zm. 1240) był prepozytem kapituły katedralnej. Tomasz I na pewno nie zakończył swojej edukacji na poziomie miejscowej szkoły katedralnej, lecz podjął dalszą naukę na zagranicznych uczelniach, zapewne we Włoszech, i to najprawdopodobniej zwieńczoną zdobyciem doktoratu. Dzięki protekcji wuja wszedł do kapituły katedralnej. Pełnił także funkcję kanclerza Henryka Brodatego. Biskup Tomasz I należy do grona tych polskich biskupów z początku XIII wieku, o których wiemy, że w chwili obejmowania urzędu ordynariusza diecezji posiadali święcenia kapłańskie, co na ówczesne czasy nie było często spotykaną praktyką. W 1232 roku został wybrany na biskupa wrocławskiego.

Z wielkim prawdopodobieństwem można powiedzieć – jeśli wziąć pod uwagę fakt, że bezpośrednio przed przyjęciem sakry biskupiej sprawował urząd kanclerza książęcego – iż był kandydatem śląskiego władcy.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: Śląsk, Kościół, Tomasz I, Jeleńczycy, *sacri ordines*, doktor dekretów

In the history of the bishopric of Wrocław, the 13th century deserves the name of a new and weighty epoch. There are numerous reasons for this assessment. Primarily, the Episcopal See of Wrocław at that time was seated by only powerful individualities who fought with enormous fortitude for freedom with prince's power. The struggle, with unprecedented obstinacy, frequently associated with a humiliation of the bishop's dignity, as it was in the case of Bishop Tomasz II, ended with the total victory of the Church. Possessed talent, persistence and understanding of an established program and its effective implementation led to a significant transformation in the law, functioning of the Church and society as well as in an existence of each Christian resident. Full of a creative energy and conscious in applying rough and dramatic measures in a case of resistance, the bishops brought the Silesian Church province to a strong development in many fields. Owing to their vigilance, the Silesian Church would always form a unified body, led by a single bishop. Such a success would not have been achieved if Wrocław bishops had not bridged their policy with the Holy See and Gniezno metropolis. The list of the bishops devoted with all their soul to the Church starts with Wawrzyniec (1207–1232), next Tomasz I (1232–1268) and ends with Tomasz II (1270–1292). The first one was thoroughly researched by a historian N. Jerzak. Desiring to complement the above-mentioned research, I undertook an attempt to study the path of Tomasz I to rule the Church of Wrocław.

Background and family environment

The future Bishop of Wrocław, Tomasz I descended from a wealthy, noble and the most influential family in the 13th century – Jelenie/Jeleńczycy. According to the majority of historians, most likely the Archbishop of Gniezno Wincenty from Niałko¹ came from this family line. However, the archbishop was included

¹ J. Umiński, *Arcybiskup Wincenty z Niałka, następcą Henryka zw. Kietliczem* (Archbishop Wincenty from Niałko, the Successor of Henryk, Called Kietlicz), [in:] *Księga pamiątkowa*

to the family of Łodzie² by J. Bieniak³ and A.M., Wyrwa. This belief was opposed by J. Maciejewski who stated that firstly the sons of Wincenty; Bogusław and Mirosław could have been related to a voivode Przedpełek on the distaff, secondly, a papal bulla describes Wincenty as a man *generis et morum nobilitate preclarum*⁴ and the criteria was met in 1220 by Jeleńczycy.⁵ T. Jurek, who recently dealt with the family of Tomasz I, recognized Bieniuk's and Umiński's proposals as equally likely and stated that in an existing situation there is no need to modify the opinions⁶ expressed by them. Simultaneously, a thesis of Tomasz's descent from the Rawicz⁷ family suggested by F. von Heydebrand or T. Silnicki⁸ was steadfastly rejected by Jurek.

The Comes Przybysław was the father of the bishop, whereas a sister of a Wrocław Provost, Piotr described as an uncle⁹ of the bishop, was his mother. Przybysław occurred in the sources in 1202¹⁰ and the following year, on 28th June, witnessed the Henryk Brodady document as a Master of the Horse.¹¹ In 1223

ku czci W. Abraham (Memorial Book Dedicated to W. Abraham), Lviv 1931, vol. 2, pp. 146–149.

² A.M. Wyrwa, *Procesy fundacyjne wielkopolskich klasztorów cysterskich linii altenberskiej: Łęknio-Łąd-Obra* (Foundation Processes of Wielkopolska Cistercian Monasteries of the Altenberg Line: Łęknio-Łąd-Obra), Poznań 1995, pp. 139–140.

³ J. Bieniak, *Rozmaitość kryteriów badawczych w polskiej genealogii średniowiecznej* (Diversity of Research Criteria in Polish Medieval Genealogy), [in:] *Genealogia – problemy metodyczne w badaniach nad polskim społeczeństwem średniowiecznym na tle porównawczym* (Genealogy – Methodical Problems in Research on the Polish Medieval Society on Comparative Basis), J. Hertel (ed.), Toruń 1982, pp. 145–146.

⁴ *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Wielkopolski* (Diplomatic Code of Wielkopolska) (further: KDW), I. Zakrzewski, F. Piekosiński (eds.), Poznań 1877–1908, vol. 1, no. 109.

⁵ J. Maciejewski, *Episkopat polski doby dzielnicowej 1180–1320* (Polish Episcopate During the Feudal Fragmentation 1180–1320), Kraków–Bydgoszcz 2003, p. 72.

⁶ T. Jurek, *Slesie stirps nobilissima. Jeleńczycy – ród biskupa wrocławskiego Tomasza I* (*Slesie stirps nobilissima. Jeleńczycy – the House of The Bishop of Wrocław, Tomasz I*), "Roczniki Historyczne" (Historical Annals) 58 (1992), p. 34 ff.

⁷ Ibidem.

⁸ F. von Heydebrand und der Lasa, *Die Herkunft der Breslauer Bischöfe Thomas I und Thomas II*, "Zeitschrift des Vereins für Geschichte Schlesiens" (further: ZVGS) 51 (1917), p. 134; T. Silnicki, *Dzieje i ustrój Kościoła katolickiego na Śląsku do końca w. XIV* (History and System of the Catholic Church in Silesia until the End of the 14th Century), Warsaw 1953, p. 155.

⁹ *Księga henrykowska* (The Book of Henryków), R. Grodecki (ed.), Poznań–Wrocław 1949, p. 374.

¹⁰ For the first time occurs in a document of the Bishop of Wrocław, Cyprian in 1202; *Schlesisches Urkundenbuch* (further: SUB), vol. 1, von H. Appelt (ed.), Graz–Wien–Köln 1971, no. 82.

¹¹ SUB, vol. 1, no. 83.

he served as the Sądowel Chatelaine¹² and the Lubuska Castellany held by him from 1236 until death¹³ was a culmination of his official career. In a document from 1223 he was proved to be a possessor of Powidzk near Milicz,¹⁴ which the Bishop initially presented to the Bishopric of Wrocław¹⁵ and afterwards in 1268 to the Wrocław Cathedral¹⁶ as his *patrimonium*. He died certainly in 1244.¹⁷

A certain Gosław¹⁸ was the grandfather of the bishop. He had two sons – aforementioned Przybysław and Dzierżak.¹⁹ The latter one occurred during the Prussian crusade in 1222 with a title of the Voivode of Wrocław (a palatine).²⁰ It

¹² In a document from 2 August 1223 occurred as the Castellan of Sadowel; see: SUB, vol. 1, no. 227.

¹³ As the Castellan of Lubusz; see: SUB, von W. Irgang (ed.), Graz–Wien–Köln 1977, no. 112, 234.

¹⁴ *Regesten zur schlesischen Geschichte. Zweiter Theil. Bis zum Jahre 1280* (further: Regesten), C. von Grünhagen (ed.), Breslau 1875, no. 270; F. von Heydebrand, *Die Herkunft...*, op. cit., p. 134; M. Kogut, *Dzieje Kościoła w kasztelanii milickiej do połowy XVII w.* (History of the Church in Milicz Castelany until the Mid-Seventeenth Century), Kluczbork 1997, pp. 57–58.

¹⁵ W. Schulte, *Quellen zur Geschichte der Besitzverhältnisse des Bistums Breslau*, “Darstellungen und Quellen zur schlesischen Geschichte” 3 (1907), pp. 185, 45.

¹⁶ SUB, vol. 1, no. 228; Regesten, no. 1289; C. Grünhagen, *Über das angebliche Testament des Bischofs Thomas I*, ZVGS 5 (1863), p. 380.

¹⁷ SUB, vol. 2, no. 270.

¹⁸ Obituaries of Wrocław Obiń and Wielopolska Lubiń define a few Gosław or Gościśław. One of them could be the grandfather of the bishop, Gosław. *Nekrologi opactwa św. Wincentego we Wrocławiu* (Obituaries of St. Wincenty Abbey in Wrocław), [in:] *Monumenta Poloniae Historica* (further: MPH), *Series nova*, vol. 9/1, Warsaw 1971, pp. 5, 51; *Nekrolog opactwa Panny Marii w Lubiniu* (Obituary of the Virgin Mary Abbey in Lubiń), MPH, *Series nova*, vol. 9/2, Warsaw 1976, pp. 11, 23.

¹⁹ *Księga henrykowska*, op. cit., p. 256; see: M. Cetwiński, *Rycerstwo śląskie do końca XIII w. Pochodzenie – gospodarka – polityka* (Silesian Knighthood until the End of the 13th Century: Origin – Economy – Politics), Wrocław 1980, p. 30.

²⁰ SUB, vol. 2, no. 216. Albert, ‘called With Beard’ married the daughter of Dzierżak. The German from Lusatia, after the father from Czurbanie family line and Walloon (nicknamed Łyka) after the mother indicating his bourgeois origin made a staggering career in Silesia. It was not until 1209 when he was a judge of the Court of Henryk Brodaty, to be a starost since 1226. More on him see: H. Neuling, *Die schlesische Kastellaneien bis zum Jahre 1250*, ZVGS 10 (1870), p. 98; F. Schilling, *Ursprung und Frühzeit des Deutschtums in Schlesien und im Land Eebus*, Leipzig 1938, pp. 101, 224; K. Eistert, *Der Liegnitzer Archidiakon Heinrich von Steine (1303) d. Rittergeschlecht d. Suevi und ihre Familienkirche in Odersteine Kr. Ohlau*, [in:] *Archiv für schlesischen Geschichte*, vol. 3, Breslau 1938, p. 68; J. Mularczyk, *Dobór i rola świadków w dokumentach śląskich do końca XIII wieku* (Selection and Role of Witnesses in Silesian Documents until the End of the 13th Century), Wrocław 1977, pp. 24, 31, 124; K. Wutke, *Zur Geschichte des Geschlechts der Gallici (Walch) und ihres Grundbesitzes in Schlesien im 13/16 Jahrhundert*, ZVGS 61 (1927), p. 290; L. Białkowski,

comes from false documents containing reliable personal data from 1230 and 1232 that he could hold a position of the Castellan of Bardo.²¹ He appears together with his wife Elżbieta²² in the Lubiąż's obituary. Five children of Dzierżak are known. A daughter of an unidentified name married Albert z Brodą. She did not enjoy the marriage for long, as *The book of Hendrków* informs she died during a delivery before 1229.²³ A son bearing the father's name – Dzierżak occurred in sources not until 1264.²⁴ Unquestionably, Przybysław, authenticated as *filius Dersconis*,²⁵ was the son of Dzierżak. He commenced his official career in the court of Henryk Brodaty where he filled an office of the Governor²⁶ (1237–1238) as well as witnessed a document of Henryk Pobożny in Chobienia on 12th March 1238.²⁷ During the reign of Henryk III he was the Castellan of Uraz (1250).²⁸ In 1250 he repeatedly witnessed documents signed by Henryk III Biały.²⁹ However, the office was not held by him for the extensive period of time as he moved to the court of Bolesław Rogatka where he was a pantler³⁰ (1261–1263). His appearance in documents of Bolesław Rogatka was frequently noticed, for example on 16th October 1243.³¹ In 1245 at Słęża, Bolesław Rogatka witnessed an exchange of a village between Przybysław and Tomasz I, which as comes from a document, Przybysław previously received from a prince.³² His witness can be also noted in a document of Bolesław Rogatka signed in Górka on 1st October 1247.³³

Ród Czamborów-Rogalów w dawnych wiekach (The Czambor-Rogal Family in the Past Centuries), "Roczniki Heraldyczne" (Heraldic Annuals) 6 (1925), p. 80 ff.; S. Kozierowski, *Obce rycerstwo w Wielkopolsce w XIII–XIV w.* (Foreign Knighthood in Wielkopolska in the 13th – 14th Centuries), Poznań 1929, pp. 26–27; M. Cetwiński, *Rycerstwo śląskie...*, op. cit., p. 22; B. Zientara, *Henryk Brodaty i jego czasy* (Henry the Bearded and His Times), Warsaw 1975, pp. 173, 253.

²¹ SUB, vol. 1, no. 226, 314, 372, 373.

²² *Monumenta Lubensia*, W. von Wattenbach (ed.), Breslau 1861, p. 49.

²³ *Księga henrykowska*, op. cit., pp. 256, 297 ff.

²⁴ SUB, vol. 3, no. 468. In this document, Dierżak, the son of Dzierżak, witnessed the Prince Henryk III's confirmation of the exchange of properties between the Bishop Tomasz I and Bogusław from Strzelin.

²⁵ SUB, vol. 2, no. 146, 252, 299.

²⁶ Ibidem, no. 137, 145.

²⁷ Ibidem, no. 146.

²⁸ Ibidem, no. 410.

²⁹ Ibidem, no. 391, 409, 413.

³⁰ SUB, vol. 3, W. Irgang (ed.), Köln–Wien 1984, no. 382, 437.

³¹ SUB, vol. 2, no. 252.

³² Ibidem, no. 299.

³³ Ibidem, no. 329.

Piotr and Kunczko who entered the priesthood were also the sons of Dzierżak. As can be assumed, they owned careers to a favoritism of their uncle, Tomasz I, the Bishop of Wrocław.³⁴ It was not until 1257 that Piotr took an office of the Canon of Wrocław.³⁵ In 1258 he became to occur in documents with a title of bishop's chancellor. This office was occupied by him by almost 40 years. He is to be placed among the most trusted advisors of Tomasz II. He fulfilled significant and secret missions during a dispute between Tomasz II and the Prince Henryk IV. Until death, he provided advice and shared experience with Bishop Jan Romka. He died at old age in 1296.³⁶

His brother Kunczko vel Konrad commenced an official career in 1248 as a notary of the Prince Henryk III Biały. Since 1251 he sat in the Chapter of Wrocław³⁷ and since 1253 he held there a function of the Cantor.³⁸ Before 1262 he became the Provost of the Gniezno Chapter³⁹ owing to that Tomasz I was able to use him to represent his interests at the court of the Wielkopolska Province. The conjunction of both prelatures was approved by the Pope in January 1264.⁴⁰ The election to the Gniezno Archbishop⁴¹ office, most likely after 26th August 1271, was the most significant achievement of Konrad. After the death of the Archbishop Janusz, a part of the Gniezno Chapter selected him as a successor. Nevertheless, he had never took the office due to lack of papal approval.

The above-mentioned election divided the Chapter of Gniezno into two hasty and reluctant to compromise factions. The first, who were called 'bigger and healthier'⁴² group by the Pope's document voted for the Provost Konrad, the latter group chose Jan, the Canon of the Chapter – nicknamed Rydlica,⁴³

³⁴ See: T. Jurek, *Slesie stirps nobilissima...*, op. cit., p. 27.

³⁵ SUB, vol. 3, no. 252.

³⁶ R. Samulski, *Untersuchungen über die persönliche Zusammensetzung des Breslauer Domkapitels im Mittelalter bis zum Tode des Bischofs Nanker (1341)*, Weimar 1940, pp. 41, 152; R. Żerelik, *Kancelaria biskupów wrocławskich do 1301 roku* (The office of Wrocław Bishops till 1301), Wrocław 1991, pp. 180, 235 ff., 267.

³⁷ SUB, vol. 3, no. 8, 9; R. Samulski, *Untersuchungen...*, op. cit., p. 151.

³⁸ SUB, vol. 3, no. 60.

³⁹ KDW, no. 405.

⁴⁰ SUB, vol. 3, no. 469.

⁴¹ Historians do not agree on the date of the Archbishop's death. It could happen at the beginning of the following year. Certainly it was before 1st March 1272 due to the fact that on this date Konrad was in Wrocław where he witnessed at the first place in a document of the Castellan of Wrocław, Dzierżykij. The Dean of Wrocław, Mikołaj testified, among others the diploma together with him. SUB, vol. 4, Köln 1988, no. 166.

⁴² *...maior et sanior pars Capituli*. KDW, no. 463, 456; *Vetera Monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, Romae 1860, vol. 1, pp. 157, 158.

⁴³ KDW, no. 456, 463; *Vetera Monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, op. cit., pp. 157–158.

for the Archbishop. Both parties had to lodge a complaint to Rome as the Pope Grzegorz X ordered to investigate the case by the Cardinal Provost of Saint Marcin *ad montes*.⁴⁴ Both elects started seizing Archbishop's possessions and incomes triggered either by a desire of an interim profit or by an expectation that owing to a *fait accompli* method they would maintain the position. Obviously, both elects ladled out the Archbishop's possessions generously distributing it between their voters and relatives. In order to prevent further wasteful economy and to protect the Archbishop's possessions and incomes until confirmation of one of the elects, on 17th January 1274, the Pope Grzegorz X assigned the Kujawy Bishop, Wolimir as the administrator the Bishop's estates.⁴⁵ As for Konrad, the dispute ended in 1275 with his death.⁴⁶

The Bishop Tomasz I had three brothers: Marcin, Zbylut, Przybimyl and a sister of the unknown name. She married Bogusław Starszy from Strzelin, the father of the Bishop Tomasz II, a member of a very influential family at the court of Wrocław, which used a sobriquet – Drzemlik.⁴⁷ Since 1232 Bogusław was the Castellan of Ryczyn and then between 1246–1248 – Niemcza.⁴⁸ In a document from 1264 Bogusław Starszy is called *amicus*⁴⁹ by Tomasz I. Fedor von Heydebrand und der Lasa translated this term as a 'brother in law'.⁵⁰ It was confirmed by the fact that the Bishop of Wrocław Tomasz II called his predecessor, Tomasz I an uncle *aunculus*⁵¹ in the last will. Therefore, he was the uncle of his successor and namesake.⁵²

The brother Zbylut, the son of Przybysław⁵³ played a significant role at the court of Wrocław for a certain amount of time. In 1244 he witnessed documents

⁴⁴ Ibidem.

⁴⁵ S. Zachorowski, *Rozwój i ustrój kapituł polskich w wiekach średnich* (Development and the Structure of Polish Chapters in the Middle Ages), Krakow 1912, p. 229; W. Karasiewicz, *Jakób II Świnka: arcybiskup gnieźnieński* (Jakub II Świnka; the Archbishop of Gniezno), Poznań 1948, p. 4.

⁴⁶ Ibidem, pp. 456, 463; W. Karasiewicz, *Jakób II Świnka...*, op. cit., p. 3; T. Silnicki, K. Gołąb, *Arcybiskup Jakub Świnka i jego epoka* (Archbishop Jakub Świnka and his Epoc), Warsaw 1956, p. 19 ff.

⁴⁷ T. Jurek, *Slesie stirps nobilissima...*, op. cit., p. 29.

⁴⁸ M. Cetwiński, *Rycerstwo śląskie...*, op. cit., p. 155.

⁴⁹ SUB, vol. 3, no. 482.

⁵⁰ Fedor von Heydebrand, *Die Herkunft...*, op. cit., p. 138.

⁵¹ W. Semkowicz, *Nieznany testament Tomasza II biskupa wrocławskiego* (Unknown Testament of The Bishop of Wrocław), "Collectanea Theologica" 17 (1936), p. 272.

⁵² It is confirmed by a number of sources: see: SUB, vol. 3, no. 52; ibidem, vol. 4, no. 157; J. Pfitzner, *Zur Abstammung und Verwandtschaft der Bischöfe Thomas I. und Thomas II. von Breslau*, "Schlesische Geschichtsblätter" 1 (1925), p. 19.

⁵³ First time as the son of Przybysław; see: SUB, vol. 2, no. 270.

of Bolesław Rogatka as the Castellan of Sądowel.⁵⁴ He belonged to key inspirers of a movement against Bolesław Rogatka. Osiński assumes that the absence of Zbylut at the prince's circle after 1244 can indicate his participation in an assassination on Bolesław Rogatka. As a result, he was barred from wielding the power and only the partition of Silesia conducted by the brothers in 1248 enabled him to retake one of the highest offices⁵⁵ – that time by the Prince of Wrocław, Henryk III Biały side – not as the Castellan but a court judge (1250–1256).⁵⁶ A similar function was held by him at the Court of Głogów (1259–1260).⁵⁷ Zbylut married Waclawa, the daughter of Peregryn from Wezenborg.⁵⁸ After 1260 he occasionally occurred in the sources. It is assumed that he fell into disgrace. Undoubtedly, he still lived in 1273.⁵⁹ As can be read in *The Annual of Trask* in 1285 he could be murdered by the order of the young Prince Henryk IV.⁶⁰ Długosz wrote directly that the knights mentioned in *The Annual* were murdered by Henryk Probus.⁶¹

Further Bishop's brother, Marcin, apparently as a result of Tomasz I favoritism devoted himself to a church career⁶² not playing any political role. Firstly, by the favor of his brother, he became the Chancellor of Bishop (1233)⁶³ and then the Canon of Wrocław (1239–1259).⁶⁴

Przybimił, the brother of the Bishop has never appeared in the sources as a living person.⁶⁵ Later sources provide knowledge about him. A document from 1273 reads that he married Wisława Jaktorówna from Wielkopolska. At the time of the marriage she was already a widow of Comes Przybek, the son of

⁵⁴ Certification as the Castellan of Sadowel; see: *ibidem*, no. 272, 273.

⁵⁵ J. Osiński, *Bolesław Rogatka. Książę legnicki, dziedzic monarchii Henryków Śląskich (1220/1225–1278)* (Bolesław Rogatka, Prince of Legnica, Heir to the Monarchy of Silesian Henryks [1220/1225–1278]), Krakow 2012, pp. 125–127.

⁵⁶ SUB, vol. 2, no. 413; SUB, vol. 3, no. 19, 45, 60, 61, 137, 189.

⁵⁷ SUB, vol. 3, no. 304, 324.

⁵⁸ J. Menzel, *Die schlesischen Lokationsurkunden des 13. Jahrhunderts*, Würzburg 1977, no. 8, 22; see: M. Cetwiński, *Rycerstwo śląskie...*, *op. cit.*, p. 155; F. von Heydebrand, *Die Herkunft...*, *op. cit.*, p. 134 ff.

⁵⁹ SUB, vol. 4, no. 215.

⁶⁰ *Rocznik Traski* (Annual of Trask), MPH, vol. 2, Lviv 1872, p. 850: *Wratislaviensis dux, Johannes Menchicz cum Petro et Sbilutone occiduntur.*

⁶¹ *Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae*, lib. 7, Warsaw 1975, p. 237.

⁶² T. Jurek, *Slesie stirps nobilissima...*, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁶³ SUB, vol. 2, no. 32.

⁶⁴ SUB, vol. 2, no. 159; see: R. Samulski, *Untersuchungen...*, *op. cit.*, p. 150; R. Żerelik, *Kancelaria...*, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 30.

the Lubuski Castellan, Przybysław. Their daughter Jarosława married Gunter Biberstain Młodszy, bringing two villages⁶⁶ as a dowry.

Both Tomasz I and Tomasz II were linked with the Ordinary of Lubuskie, Wilhelm from Nysa by family relations. In the case of Tomasz II the cognateness occurred in III/IV levels of canonical counting and a great-great-grandfather of Wilhelm and a grandfather of Tomasz were the common ancestors. As for Tomasz I, the same level of the affinity with the Lubuskie Ordinary can be found due to the fact that the mother of Tomasz II was the sister of Tomasz I. However, Wilhelm was linked with the latter by the bonds of different nature. The family of the Bishop of Lubuskie, whose property completely contrasted from the positions of both Tomasz I and Tomasz II, faithfully served the Bishopric of Wrocław, at least in second generation.⁶⁷ M. Cetwiński assumed that the Bishop of Wrocław, Wawrzyniec coming from the Wilczyce⁶⁸ family, was related to his successor Tomasz I. It would result from a document⁶⁹ in which certain Henryk was named the brother of the Bishop Wawrzyniec and relative (*consanguineous*) of Tomasz I.⁷⁰

Presbyterate

The Bishop Tomasz I belongs to a group of those Polish bishops from the beginning of the 13th century who are known to have possessed holy orders at the moment of taking up the position of a diocesan bishop, which that time was not a common practice. It was of a significant importance as elects possessing presbyterate could count on quick receiving of the episcopal consecration. It was a frequent situation when a candidate for a bishop possessed Holy Orders required by the law, that allowed for his legal election but he was not a priest which resulted in staying an elect for a longer time and his consecration had to be delayed. Bishops could consecrate higher Holy Orders (*sacri ordines*)

⁶⁶ KDW, no. 451; Regesten, no. 1428; L. Białkowski, *Ród Bibersteinów. Studium nad średnio-wiecznym rodem rycerskim* (The Biberstain family. Study of the Medieval Knight Family), Krakow 1908, p. 8; T. Jurek, *Silesie stirps nobilissima...*, op. cit., p. 30.

⁶⁷ See: J. Maciejewski, *Pochodzenie i kariera biskupa lubuskiego Wilhelma I z Nysy* (Origin and Career of the Bishop of Lubuskie, Wilhelm I from Nysa), "Roczniki Historyczne" (Historical Annals) 68 (2002), pp. 85–90.

⁶⁸ M. Cetwiński, *Rycerstwo śląskie...*, op. cit., p. 31.

⁶⁹ Regesten, no. 362.

⁷⁰ Ibidem, no. 543a.

only six times per year in terms ordered by canon law.⁷¹ It was only possible to consecrate once in a given term.⁷² Confirmation of possessing a *prezbyterate* by Tomasz can be read in a document which survived to present times. Its content indicates that in 1230 the Chancellor of Henryk Brodady, Master Tomasz, and the Canon of Wrocław was simultaneously the parson of the St. Jan Ewangelista Parish Church in Oleśnica.⁷³ Moreover, Tomasz baptized three sons of Henryk Pobożny: Bolesław II, Konrad and Władysław.⁷⁴ Bolesław II and Konrad had been born before taking the office of bishop⁷⁵ by Tomasz therefore, this proves that he was already the priest. All of them called Tomasz by using the word *compater* which means *a godfather*⁷⁶ in Latin. Obviously, this term is to be more understood as a kind of spiritual relation and Tomasz's role as a minister of sacraments.⁷⁷

Education

The Bishop Tomasz I certainly did not finish his education on a level of a local cathedral school but he commenced further foreign studies most likely accomplished by gaining a doctorate. There is one existing source credit line which

⁷¹ On Saturday before Passion Sunday, on Holy Saturday and four times per year in the so-called 'Fry Days' and here, as the rule, only Saturday was involved; *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, p. 2: *Decretalium Collectiones*, E. Friedberg (ed.), Graz 1959 (further: DC), col. 118; A. Gąsiorowski, *Święcenia w diecezji kujawskiej na przelomie XV i XVI wieku* (Consecrations in Kujawy Diocese at the Turn of the 15th and 16th Centuries), "Roczniki Historyczne" (Historical Annals) 67 (2001), pp. 84–86. About adhering to this regulation during the period under question see: *Das Formelbuch des Domherrn Arnold von Protzan*, Breslau 1862, no. 1–2, p. 143; Significant number of examples of consecrations on Dry Saturdays in the 15th century was provided by K. Stopka, *Szkoły katedralne metropolii gnieźnieńskiej w średniowieczu. Studia nad kształceniem kleru* (Cathedral Schools of the Gniezno Metropolis in the Middle Ages. Study on the Education of the Clergy), Krakow 1994.

⁷² DC, col. 121–122.

⁷³ SUB, vol. 1, no. 317, The word *parrochianus* was used in this document undoubtedly in a sense of a parson, a parish priest of a village church.

⁷⁴ SUB, vol. 3, no. 103, 138, 278, 338, 467, 554. It is doubtful that Tomasz was their godfather. Definitely more likely he baptized them; see: J. Maciejewski, *Episkopat polski...*, op. cit., pp. 24–25.

⁷⁵ K. Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów śląskich* (Origin of Silesian Piasts), vol. 1, Wrocław 1973, pp. 110 and 122.

⁷⁶ A. Jougan, *Słownik kościelny łacińsko-polski* (Latin-Polish Church Dictionary), Poznań–Warsaw–Lublin 1958, p. 128.

⁷⁷ For the clarification of the meaning of the word *compater* see: [in:] C. Cange, *Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae latinitatis*, vol. 1, Graz 1953, p. 463.

confirms this fact, mainly from a document of the Ordinary of Kujawskie, Michał from 1232 issued on the Polish Bishops Summit on 18th May 1232 on the occasion on the consecration of the Archbishop Pełka.⁷⁸ The ceremony was attended by the Bishop of Wrocław, Wawrzyniec and Tomasz, the doctor of canon law, who hanged a seal⁷⁹ to the document issued on the given occasion.

Publishers of *Diplomatic Code of Poland* associated Tomasz with the subsequent Ordinary of Wrocław.⁸⁰ Admittedly, we possess only this single document of a problematic similarity of names, not allowing for straightforward identification in relation to other sources,⁸¹ however, written remarks regarding the Bishop provide assurance that Tomasz not only had a master's but definitely a doctor's degree⁸² as well. Tomasz I accomplished his education at a university level and possibly in the then popular Bologna. In documents prepared in his bishopric office he did not use master's degree title.⁸³ In turn, Papal mandates from May and June of the following year were sent, among others, to Master Tomasz.⁸⁴

The analysis of those documents indicates one additional and relatively interesting fact. Both Papal documents listed only two bishopric offices to which they were addressed to and the only one called by the name, was Tomasz. Connections? Deals? Or rather a visible evidence of recognition by the Pope and personnel of Rome Curia his significant knowledge, imaginativeness and fame? It allows to assume that Tomasz was a noted person in the Rome circle. Apparently he proven himself when he came to Rome in connection with a completion of the studies.

Undoubtedly, Tomasz was the man of a deep, firm intellectual formation and outstanding mentality. All the more, Tomasz I engraved in the minds of the then people as the man belonging to the intellectual elite in Silesia. An author of *The Book of Hendryków* set out the views regarding his high intelligence in such a way: *Hic idem magister Thomas erat huius provincie ex stirpe nobilissima*

⁷⁸ *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Polski* (Diplomatic Code of Poland), vol. 1, L. Rzyszczewski, A. Muczkowski, I. Bartoszewicz (eds.), Warsaw 1847–1858, no. 21; R. Samulski, *Untersuchungen...*, op. cit., p. 90; T. Silnicki, *Dzieje i ustrój Kościoła...*, op. cit., p. 155; *Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas. Schlesien*, N. von Conrads (ed.), Berlin 1994, p. 128.

⁷⁹ It was the seal with the inscription '*Thome doctoris decret.*'

⁸⁰ *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Polski*, op. cit.

⁸¹ Editor of SUB (vol. 2, no. 18) found identification uncertain.

⁸² In the light of the recent research by J. Maciejewski regarding the use of the term *magister* in the 13th century this thesis can be accepted as very likely; idem, *Episkopat polski...*, op. cit., p. 37.

⁸³ SUB, vol. 1, no. 308, 317.

⁸⁴ SUB, vol. 2, no. 4, 6 (*magistro Thome canonico*).

*natus, litteratura et honestate morum tam decenter ornatus, ut eius virtutum fama in curia Romana et multis aliis in locis diebus suis apud magnificos viros lucidissime fulgeret.*⁸⁵ It was also clearly addressed by an author of *Chronicle of Polish Princes* by a statement that Tomasz: *litterarum sapientia et virtutibus morum claruit, ut eius fama celebris esset in Romana curia et apud nobiles et magnates.*⁸⁶ The scholarliness of Tomasz was also noticed in *Catalogue of Bishops of Wrocław*.⁸⁷ *The Annual of Poznań* calls him: *vir prudens et doctus, ymmo speculum totius cleri Poloniae illius temporis* and an author of *Life of St. Jadwiga* commenting a divorce verdict issued by him – *vir utique litteratus et prudens.*⁸⁸

Undoubtedly, I do not intent to undermine the above-cited terms but this elevated tone results from the fact that Tomasz skillfully used his knowledge and fame, which was to reach circles of official of the Rome Curia, in practical struggle for Church freedoms but ton for scientific interests.

Being well-educated, he placed emphasis on his relatives to gain education. It is believed that his nephew, Tomasz II used the patronage of his uncle, similarly as his *nepos*, the Canon of Wrocław, Tobiasz who studied in Bologna between 1267–1269.⁸⁹ Tomasz I also affiliated education of young, talented boys.⁹⁰ It is plausible that the Bishop of Wrocław was a patron of studies of his successor, Jan Romka. The Romka family was not among the wealthiest at that time thus, they would not afford such a significant financial contribution for the son. Having decided to finance the studies of Jan Romka, Tomasz I discerned an academically able young man – worth investing. In the future Tomasz experienced a great gratitude from his side. Jan Romka, as his chaplain, demonstrated his solidarity in the most difficult period for the Bishopric of Wrocław, mainly during the fierce conflict with the Prince of Legnica, Bolesław Rogatka in 1256–1261.

⁸⁵ See: *Księga henrykowska*, op. cit., p. 273.

⁸⁶ *Kronika książąt polskich* (Chronicle of Polish Princes), Z. Węglewski (ed.), MPH, vol. 3, Lviv 1878, pp. 547–548.

⁸⁷ *Księga henrykowska*, op. cit., p. 373.

⁸⁸ *Rocznik kapituły poznańskiej* (Annual of Poznań Chapter), p. 41; *Vita sanctae Hedvigis*, A. Semkowicz (ed.), [in:] MPH, vol. 4, p. 616.

⁸⁹ *Chartularium Studii Bononiensis*, Bologna 1927–1936, vol. 7, no. 2159; vol. 8, no. 3229; vol. 11, no. 4866.

⁹⁰ See: M. Maciejowski, *Orientacje polityczne biskupów metropolii gnieźnieńskiej 1283–1320* (Political Orientations of Bishops of Gniezno Metropolis), Krakow 2007, p. 65.

Election for Bishop of Wrocław

Solid education and extraordinary mentality of Tomasz were noticed by the Bishop Wawrzyniec. At the beginning of his career, Tomasz was employed in a bishop's office and before 1230 he was tasked to take over the office of Chancellor after Idzi. Soon after, he became a member of the Chapter of Wrocław.⁹¹ A new stage of his career began after the death of the Ordinary of Wrocław on 7th June 1232.⁹² Unquestionably, the Bishop Tomasz I was canonically selected by the Chapter on 31st October⁹³ as that year he occurred as the elect of Wrocław. The selection by the Chapter *per viam scrutinii* is to be treated as a certain historical fact, however, the date of election, accompanying circumstances and its course are unknown.

It can be assumed that Tomasz owed his election to his uncle Piotr, the then Provost of the Chapter of Wrocław, the outstanding individual in all respect and canons among which were his relatives who possessed stalls in the Chapter of Wrocław.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, the reconciliation of the future Bishop with the Prince seems to be necessary due to his power and significance of the episcopal office for the state.⁹⁵ In a given case, it can be stated with the substantial degree of probability that Tomasz was a candidate of the Silesian Ruler – it is proved by the fact that directly before consecration he had hold the office of the Chancellor of Prince.⁹⁶ None of his two consecutive successors

⁹¹ R. Samulski, *Untersuchungen...*, op. cit., p. 35.

⁹² Regesten, no. 188, according to Lubiąż, Kamieniec and Henryków catalogues.

⁹³ He occurs as *Wratislaviensis electus* in Skaryszów by the side of the Prince Henryk see: Regesten, no. 396; SUB, vol. 2, no. 24.

⁹⁴ R. Samulski, *Untersuchungen...*, op. cit., p. 55; T. Jurek, *Slesie stirps nobilissima...*, op. cit., p. 27.

⁹⁵ SUB, vol. 2, no. 24; cf. W. Irgang, *Die schlesische Kirche im 13. Jahrhundert – Orientierung am westlichen Muster*, [in:] *Christianity in East Central Europe Late Middle Ages*, J. Kłoczowski, P. Kras, W. Polak (eds.), Lublin 1999, pp. 100–101. This researcher calls into questions respecting by the Prince Henry the Bearded the principle of canonical election of the bishop. Maciejewski had no such doubts; cf. idem, *Episkopat polski...*, op. cit., p. 52. Whereas Z. Lisiewicz, *Obsadzenie stolic biskupich w Polsce* (Filling Episcopal Capitols in Poland), Lviv 1892, p. 108, states that the first episcopal selections were formally elections but in fact the strong influence of the ducal authority was visible. However, he is not justified in claiming that it is not known whether the Henry the Bearded respected the principle of the canonical election of the Bishop.

⁹⁶ Confirmed in 1230 (SUB, vol. 1, no. 308, 317), he was probably the Chancellor till 1232. See: F. von Heydebrand, *Die Herkunft...*, op. cit., pp. 134–137; B. Zientara, *Henryk Brodaty...*, op. cit., p. 294; R. Żerelik, *Personalne związki katedry wrocławskiej i lubuskiej oraz kolegiat śląskich z kancelariami książęcymi (do 1350 r.)* (Personal Connections between Wrocław and Lubuskie Cathedrals and Silesian Collegiate Churches with Offices of Princes [till 1350]),

(Jan Romka and Henryk from Wierzbno) were directly linked with the office or the Court of the Prince and their career paths were clearly associated with ecclesiastical activities.

It is worth underlining that the times of election of Tomasz I for the Wrocław See constituted a significant turning point in systematic delimiting the secular power during elections conducted by chapters in Silesia. The ongoing process of the political disintegration of this land can serve as the main limiting factor which resulted in weakening of the ducal power. The second factor is the mutual competition of Silesian rules for the influence on Church policy either in diocesan or general spheres. The ability to conduct an effective diplomatic dialogue accompanying this process led to either solutions based on own intention or to political defeat. The end result of the excessive dispute between the Prince Henryk IV and Tomasz II, especially granting the great privilege to the Church of Wrocław in 1290, highlights this to the best extent.

This was experienced by the Prince of Żagań and simultaneously the Cathedral Provost, Konrad who lost a battle for the episcopal throne with a representative of a modest knight family, a long-time collaborator of Tomasz I and Tomasz II, Jan Romka. This episode was described by Długosz⁹⁷ in a relatively reliable manner. The Prince Konrad could count on help in this case only from his brother, the Henryk of Głogów due to the fact that the support from all Silesian rulers⁹⁸ is hard to believe.

Won conflicts of the bishops of Wrocław led to the full independence of the Silesian Church from local secular rules who when defeated, frequently granted new privileges to the bishopric.

[in:] *Ludzie Kościoła katolickiego na ziemi śląskiej* (The People of the Catholic Church in Silesia), Wrocław 1994, p. 10. The close relationship with the Court of the Prince Henry is also evidenced by the fact that Tomasz baptized his sons before he had become the bishop.

⁹⁷ *Joannis Dlugossii Annales...*, op. cit., pp. 272–273.

⁹⁸ T. Silnicki, *Dzieje i ustrój Kościoła...*, op. cit., p. 193; T. Jurek, *Dziedzic Królestwa Polskiego. Książę głogowski Henryk (1274–1309)* (Heir to the Kingdom of Poland. Henryk, the Prince of Głogów [1274–1309]), Poznań 1993, pp. 25–26.

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Communication in the Face of Death: the Meaning of Funeral Sermons in the Old Polish Epoch

Komunikacja w obliczu śmierci, czyli znaczenie kazań pogrzebowych
w epoce staropolskiej – reformackie kazania funeralne

ABSTRACT: This article is an analysis of four funeral sermons. Their authors are the Franciscans of Primitive Observance: Józef Drohojowski (the sermon for Stanisław Skarbek Ankwic's funeral); Karol Kwinta (the sermon for Stanisław Dłużewski's funeral); Benedykt Roszkowski (the sermon for Wojciech Opaliński's funeral); Franciszek Parażyński (the sermon for Józef Grodzicki's funeral). From the analysis of the funeral sermons, two closely related messages emerge: the vision of death, and the necessity of a good life, which conditions salvation. The recipient of the funeral sermon undoubtedly had to pay attention to these two issues because they were the most important in evangelistic considerations. Everyone who heard the priest's words at the funeral knew that one should virtuously imitate the deceased to achieve the desired salvation. This pedagogy of dying in the Old Polish epoch was an extremely important element from the point of view of the eschatological future. A good, happy death guaranteed good dying and salvation and, as Drohojowski emphasises, residing in the realm of the living. Communication in the face of death was one of compositional elements of the Old Polish epoch *artis bene moriendi*, that is, the art of a good death.

KEY WORDS: Franciscans of Primitive Observance, funeral sermon, communication, death, life after death, old polish epoch

ABSTRAKT: Artykuł jest analizą czterech kazań pogrzebowych. Ich autorami są franciszkanie reformacji: Józef Drohojowski – kazanie na pogrzeb Stanisława Skarbka Ankwicza, Karol Kwinta – kazanie na pogrzeb Stanisława Dłużewskiego, Benedykt Roszkowski – kazanie na pogrzeb Wojciecha Opalińskiego, Franciszek Parażyński – kazanie na pogrzeb Józefa Grodzickiego. Z analizy kazań pogrzebowych wyłaniają się dwa ściśle ze sobą powiązane przesłania, to jest wizja śmierci oraz konieczność dobrego życia, która warunkuje zbawienie. Odbiorca kazania pogrzebowego bez wątpienia na

te dwie kwestie musiał zwrócić uwagę, bo to one były w kaznodziejskich rozważaniach najważniejsze. Każdy słuchający na pogrzebie słów duchownego wiedział, że należy naśladować cnotliwe życie zmarłego, by osiągnąć upragnione zbawienie. Ta pedagogika umiarama w okresie staropolskim była elementem niezwykle istotnym z punktu widzenia przyszłości eschatologicznej. Dobra, szczęśliwa śmierć gwarantowała dobre umieranie i zbawienie, jak to podkreśla Drohojowski – „przebywanie w ziemi żyjących”. Komunikacja w obliczu śmierci stanowiła jeden ze składowych komponentów staropolskiego *artis bene moriendi*, czyli sztuki dobrego umierania.

SŁOWA KLUCZE: franciszkanie reformaci, kazanie pogrzebowe, komunikacja, śmierć, życie po śmierci, epoka staropolska

Introduction: Communication in the Old-Poland epoch and the meaning of funeral sermons

Without doubt, communication covers several fields of human existence. We communicate in many different ways, using various codes. Throughout history, we encounter diverse ways to exchange thought, opinion, and emotion. While penetrating the distant worlds of human experience, we notice the multiplicity and diversity of communication schemes, which demonstrates the validity of the need to examine that reality. The Old-Poland era had a few forms of communication that penetrated the receivers' consciousness in appropriate circumstances. Among them, we can mention sermons.

As highlighted by Filip Wolański, 'sermons in the reality of Old Poland culture functioned on two levels: as a unique, unrepeatable, oratory act of a sermoniser, and simultaneously, as a text, available in print or in manuscript.'¹ The sermons transmitted religious content, thus constituting a source of information about God, Jesus, Mary the Mother of God, and the Saints. They served as guideposts to moral questions, and they were doubtless the kerygmatic foundation of the Church in those days.² A special kind of sermon is the funeral sermon, which has panegyric features characteristic of the Baroque era. This epoch was a golden age for the funeral sermon, both in quantity and

¹ F. Wolański, *Kaznodziejstwo bernardyńskie w staropolskim systemie komunikacji społecznej u schyłku epoki saskiej. Studium kształtowania wyobrażeń i postaw*, Toruń 2012, p. 63.

² See also: K. Panuś, *Zarys historii kaznodziejstwa w Kościele Katolickim*, part. 2: *Kaznodziejstwo w Polsce od średniowiecza do baroku*, Kraków 2001; J.A. Drob, *Trzy zegary. Obraz czasu i przestrzeni w polskich kazaniach barokowych*, Lublin 1998; R. Kościelny, *Kazanie barokowe jako źródło do badań nad mechanizmami kształtowania postaw mieszkańców Rzeczypospolitej*, "Nasza Przeszłość" 97 (2002), pp. 89–124.

in quality, while ceasing to be authentic personal testimony of the speaker on the rostrum.³ As the funeral sermon by definition is of panegyric character, it represented an epideictic type of preaching, englobing enunciation regarding contemporary times. The death of the protagonist of the sermon was, however, from the standpoint of the living, his entrance to the 'world of memory.'⁴

Panegyrics were already known in ancient Greece, for the creator of the genre is considered Gorgias. The Christian variant of the literary genre was formed from the praise of martyrdom. Later, praise of martyrs adopted a special form and entered the canon of ecclesiastic speech. Among the creators of the most beautiful panegyrics are Saints Ambrose and Basil. The Baroque writers took a particular liking to this form because it allowed room for free play with imagination and fantasy. Handbooks teaching how to write panegyrics were written in that time, both for ecclesiastic and laic needs.⁵

It is worthwhile to draw our attention to the communicative role of the panegyric in Old Poland culture. It was not solely, as Kazimierz Maliszewski noted, a bond between the laudator and the addressee or the hero of the praise but also it gained the dimension of a mass phenomenon, becoming an important element of social practice, exchange of values, a permanent element of the public life and one of the forms of sociotechnical and persuasive acts. The panegyric, as part of the verbal communication system, turned out to be a part of a multi-systemic pan-semiotic performance that used all available means of human communication, including gesture, motion, and occasionally architecture within the funeral ceremony. Thus, it was not only an expression of the literary culture but also a general culture of the society of states, with its acceptance of hierarchy, respect for laws, exchange of moral norms, and principles of ethics.⁶ What is more, these elements were also present in funeral sermons, whose construction is described by Bogdan Rok:

³ W. Pazera, *Kaznodziejstwo w Polsce. Od początku do końca epoki baroku*, Częstochowa 1999, p. 36.

⁴ W. Pawlak, *Karmelitańskie kazania pogrzebowe*, "Barok–Historia–Literatura–Sztuka" 16 (2009), no. 1(31), p. 159.

⁵ M. Brzozowski, *Teoria kaznodziejstwa*, [in:] *Dzieje teologii katolickiej w Polsce*, vol. 2: *Od Odrodzenia do Oświecenia*, part. 1: *Teologia humanistyczna*, M. Rechowicz (ed.), Lublin 1975, pp. 408–409.

⁶ K. Malczewski, *Z dziejów staropolskiej kultury i cywilizacji*, Lublin 2010, p. 79.

typical sermons were based on a three-part epicedium pattern: they contained a part praising the deceased, followed by mourning, and concluded by consolation of the remaining relatives. Additionally, Catholic clergymen also preached the faithful, participants of the funeral service, about the necessity to reflect on the problem of the four last issues, above all, the subject of death.⁷

There was then rich literature around the theme of the death. One of its expressions were manuals called *artis bene moriendi* or occasional mourning texts. Rok divides them into four categories: condolences, descriptions of funerals, funeral sermons, and funeral speeches.⁸ Because the funeral ceremonies could have been extremely complex, many funerals had few circumstantial sermons. More often than not, preachers' orations were published in print right after the funeral. In the 17th and 18th centuries, most probably a few hundred of them were published.

This article is an attempt to analyse the content of four funeral sermons. Their authors are Minor Friars: Józef Drohojowski, Karol Kwinta, Benedykt Roszkowski, and Franciszek Parażyński.

The righteous life of Count Stanisław Ankwicz in the sermon by J. Drohojowski

Father Józef lived from 1739 to 1811. Apart from his work as a sermoniser in the province of Małopolska, he also worked on the territory of the Custody of the Holy Land, where he fulfilled the function of a definator.⁹ Drohojowski's sermon analysed in the article is the *Sermon during the funeral of the Honourable Stanisław Skarbek Ankwicz*¹⁰ Count from Postawice, former Sandecki Castellan, Knight of Polish orders, in the Church of XX Krakow Franciscans of Primitive Observance (...) on the day of the 10th of March 1785. The work is divided into three

⁷ B. Rok, *Człowiek wobec śmierci w kulturze staropolskiej*, Wrocław 1995, pp. 21–22.

⁸ F. Wolański, *Radziwiłłowskie uroczystości funeralne w XVIII w. na tle zwyczajów pogrzebowych w Rzeczypospolitej*, <http://etalpykla.lituanistikadb.lt/fedora/objects/> [access: 1.01.2019]; B. Rok, *Druki żałobne w dawnej Polsce XVI–XVIII w.*, [in:] *Wesela, chrzciny, pogrzeby w XVI–XVIII w. Kultura życia i śmierci*, H. Suchojad (ed.), Warsaw 2001, pp. 187–201; B. Rok, *Człowiek wobec śmierci...*, op. cit., pp. 15–18.

⁹ A. Szteinke, *Polscy bracia mniejsi w służbie Ziemi Świętej 1342–1995*, Poznań 1999, pp. 70–71; H. Wyczawski, *Słownik polskich teologów katolickich*, vol. 1, Warsaw 1981, pp. 422–423.

¹⁰ Stanisław Walenty Ankwicz z Posławic herbu Habdank (b. 1720, d. 1784). *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, vol. 1, W. Konopczyński (ed.), Krakow 1935, p. 117.

parts and is provided with introduction and conclusion. In the introduction (dedication missing), we read that there are two burial sites: in the grave and in human memory.¹¹ 'What were his merits for when the cruel earth infects his corpse, people of friendship will keep his spirit in their memory, where he may rest for eternity.'¹² This memory also keeps the souvenir of the entire noble lineage of Ankwicz, to whom the virtuous Stanisław joined by his death:

has left the world One of the most Significant men in the Nation, and he's among the living no more. You're asking about Him in grief, you're looking for Him in detriment, you seek Him in loss, that He's not here, only the regret of the loss remains, and the memory of His virtue (...). Stanisław Ankwicz, Count from Postawice, died as faithful, buried as a nobleman, remains in the memory of the living as a friend of everyone. The first circumstance recommends him in front of God. The second gives him honour in the row of his Family. The third gains him respect among the living.¹³

In the first part of the sermon, the Franciscan highlights that the death concludes human life, but the one who is righteous and virtuous has no need to fear the future beyond the border of life, as 'God's favours' await him there.¹⁴ While describing the figure of the deceased, the speaker underlines that superstition disgusted him, as he was a man of earnest faith who did good to others, and 'all of his trust was placed in God (...), his prudence was courageous, his continence judicious, his prowess watchful, his justice practiced (...) and humble heart faithfully accomplished religious duties.'¹⁵

In the second part, we can read the following characteristic of the Count: 'he was among the most worthy in the Nation, this worthiness was not only taken after his Ancestors but he also multiplied it by his particular merits as an Emulator of the virtue and glory of his Ancestors.'¹⁶ Drohojowski searches for the beginning of the noble family in 999, and he mentions their numerous honours and merits: 'Few were the chairs the Ankwicz did not possess.'¹⁷ He

¹¹ J. Drohojowski, *Kazanie podczas pogrzebu Jaśnie Wielmożnego Stanisława hrabi z Postawic Skarbka Ankwicza bywszego Kasztelana Sandeckiego polskich orderów kawalera w kościele Krakowskiem XX Reformatów dnia 10 marca 1785*, Krakow 1785, p. 9, 12.

¹² Ibidem, p. 35.

¹³ Ibidem, pp. 10–11.

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 13.

¹⁵ Ibidem, pp. 16–19.

¹⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 21.

also pays attention to the various monasteries and churches created due to the generosity of the bounteous founders.¹⁸ No sooner than after the general introduction and relaying the characteristics of the Ankwicz family, does the author describe more in detail the figure of the very Stanisław, mentioning, for example, that he served August the III: ‘delegated to set Convents at the luckiest Election of our Highness Stanisław August, today, the King.’¹⁹

Apart from the information regarding the involvement in political and social life,²⁰ the sermoniser evokes the deceased’s spouses: Salomea and Tekla, as well as his children, Tadeusz, Józef, Kunegunda, Anna, Elżbieta. He also quotes, by name, the large group of grandchildren who can’t find consolation in their grief after the dearest granddad, and who will never forget his cuddles and blessings.²¹ The suffering family would be ready to give up their health and life to enjoy more time with their ‘inestimable Father.’²²

In the third part, the perspicacious sermoniser points at the Ankwicz’s features of character and his disposition:

unobserved were in him weirdness nor wildness, the flaws that make one unbearable for the others. In His innate mildness, he didn’t provoke others’ grunting. His lordly humour attracted friendly hearts for whom he did not wish to be a slave of stinginess. He simply knew how to estimate people according to their degree and office, so he would be always reciprocally estimated by them.²³

This part is then also a praise, a laudation on the theme of a noble deceased whose traits of character are given as an example to follow.

What seems only natural and obvious in this type of texts, the Franciscan strongly accentuates the inevitability of death. Apart from the panegyric features, the funeral sermons also contained elements of the didactics of death. It

¹⁸ I.e. S. Zydek, *Rola magnatów w kształtowaniu kultury prowincjonalnej w ośrodkach kultu reformatów w Rzeczypospolitej w XVIII w.*, [in:] *Fundator i mecenas. Magnateria Rzeczypospolitej w XVI–XVIII*, E. Dubas-Urwanowicz, J. Urwanowicz (eds.), Białystok 2011.

¹⁹ J. Drohojowski, *Kazanie podczas pogrzebu Jaśnie Wielmożnego Stanisława hrabi z Poławic Skarbka Ankwicza bywszego Kasztelana Sandeckiego polskich orderów kawalera w kościele Krakowskim XX Reformatów dnia 10 marca 1785*, Krakow 1785, p. 30.

²⁰ ‘Having fulfilled the duties of a tender citizen when still alive, he recommended himself to the citizens, once in the public interests, and a second time in private life,’ *ibidem*, p. 33. An active social attitude, considered to be desired and noble, is visible here quite clearly.

²¹ J. Drohojowski, *Kazanie podczas pogrzebu Jaśnie Wielmożnego Stanisława...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 38–39.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 37.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 35.

would be hard to imagine a sermoniser speaking to the crowd gathered around the deceased's coffin without touching on this fundamental thread. It is also important to note that in the 18th century, death was perceived differently than today. Every Catholic's task was to rightfully prepare to pass through the gate of life. The preachers of the day perceived death in two ways. It could have been a blessed, happy, and good experience on the condition that a man was properly prepared for its encounter. If a man died without the right disposition, without the Sacraments, in a state of sin, he could only count on condemnation and an eternal stay in Hell. That was the knowledge of the eschatological future that was spread from the rostrum of the church in the Old-Poland era.²⁴ And the funeral ceremony, in its arrangement, also through the sermon, was an extremely important factor in the preparation; it was a channel of communication about the absoluteness of death. 'Who happened to be born, will inevitably have to die.'²⁵ In the conclusion of his sermon, Drohojowski speaks in a very decisive manner, as if he was in possession of certain information as to the posthumous destiny of the Count Stanisław: '(...) he has already appeared in front of the face of the King of Ages, and it's from this frontier he pays his respects at Your Highness' Throne.'²⁶ He also evokes the figure of Primate Michał Poniatowski, Bishop Potkański, the Senate of the Polish Kingdom, and for a second time, the man's wife Tekla and their children.²⁷ He concludes his sermon with these words:

The Christian faithfulness brought here by bonds of family, friendship and love for the sake of help of the soul of our lord (...). Let's take this lesson: such life, such death (...). Dear God, count this man, full of merits for his fatherland, among those who surround your throne in the land of the living.²⁸

As for the language the sermon was written in, we must notice that the Franciscan applied a clear, communicative code, limiting the use of Latin. When using Latin, he places an explanation in a footnote, thus keeping the perception of a text undisturbed.²⁹

²⁴ The preachers devoted much attention in their sermons to the theme of death, the last things, eschatological visions. This reality was depicted very vividly and almost sensually.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 40 (reference to the Letter to Hebrew).

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 41.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 42–45.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 45.

²⁹ See also: *ibidem*, p. 18.

‘Sweet memory of him was awakened across the country’: Funeral sermon by K. Kwinta dedicated to Stanisław Dłużewski

Father Karol, the author of the second sermon, lived in 1716 to 1783. He joined the order of Franciscan of Primitive Observance in Małopolska Province, but since 1746, after Russ Custody was formed, he belonged to the latter. He worked in several cloisters, as sermoniser or novice magister. He was also a member of the province board as a secretary, definitor, custodian or vice provincial and provincial. He died in the L'viv cloister.³⁰ He authored a very short funeral sermon: *Immortal glory in death fall rightly due the paid debt triumph of the death (...) of the mighty Sir Stanisław in Dłużew Dłużewski, Chief Warrant Officer of Chelski Land (...) offered to the hands of mighty Lady Teodora née Cieszkowska Dłużewska.*³¹

Kwinta, just as Drohojowski, refers to ‘life’ in the human memory that should be the deceased’s share as: ‘sweet memory of him was awaken across the country (...) and the constant thought of him allows him to live anew in the memory.’³² The author also recalls the noble acts of the dead while evoking his respectful family,³³ ‘who served the fatherland faithfully and supported the Franciscan order (...) and granted many honours to the Sarmatian world.’³⁴ The dead himself, evidently deserved the praise and recognition as ‘various qualities and excellent virtues (...). Providence enclosed [in him], which everybody sees and recognises.’³⁵ The sermon praises Stanisław Dłużewski, but is clearly dedicated to the widowed wife to give her solace in her mourning:

To you then, Lady of noble qualities and high virtues, I write this work and deposit it in your charitable Hands, though it’s a meagre gift for You, as the dignity of both Families found shape in you, however the tiniest services of our Convent you used to respect in the Seraphic, and your father’s, benevolence.³⁶

³⁰ H. Wyczawski, *Słownik polskich teologów katolickich*, vol. 2, Warszwa 1982, p. 489.

³¹ K. Kwinta, *Sława nieśmiertelna w śmiertelnym upadku powinna należytość przy wypłaconym długu tryumf śmierci (...) wielmożnego Jegomości Pana Stanisława na dłużenie Dłużewskiego Ziemi Chelskiej Chorążego (...) wielmożnej Jejmości Pani Teodory z Cieszkowskiej Dłużewskiej Ziemi Chelskiej Chorążyny w Dobroczyenne Jey Ręce podana*, Lwów 1749.

³² Ibidem (the printed sermon is paginated).

³³ See also: S. Baczewski, *Obraz śmierci w XVII-wiecznych kazaniach pogrzebowych*, “Roczniki Humanistyczne” 1 (2002), vol. 1.

³⁴ K. Kwinta, *Sława nieśmiertelna w śmiertelnym upadku...*, op.cit.

³⁵ Ibidem.

³⁶ Ibidem.

Kwinta, just as his confreres, describes the deceased as a column of a house that has been destroyed and falls into ruin because of death, as it 'fell struck by death's fatal impetus.'³⁷

The conclusion of the sermon seems to deviate slightly from the adopted code of funeral communication, as it refers to people who remain on earth and who gravitate more towards temporality than heaven. It is not, however, an isolated case, as dedicating sermon collections to the convents' benefactors was a widespread practice. Franciscans wishing to remain the beneficiaries of Dłużewski's family material assistance, 'used' in a manner of speaking the Castellan's death, thanked for his generosity while asking for further support. Thus, the situation, as it turns out, opened yet another possible communication sphere that may be called 'communication of gratitude and request,' as it's visible already in the dedication of the sermon. Pauper Franciscans couldn't express their devotion in any other way than through prayer or a testimony of faithfulness expressed in the words of the sermon. A generous benefactor departed to receive the well-merited price, but his family remained, and at the occasion of his death and funeral it could be humbly presented with a request of support similar to the assistance offered by the deceased.³⁸ Then, the ceremony at the catafalque became, apart from a farewell, also a manifesto of fidelity of the grateful Franciscans.

The language used by Kwinta contains numerous Latin references and interjections. The text remains clear, but in its linguistic layer, is akin to the language used by Parażyński.

The noble life and dignified death of Count Wojciech Opaliński in the sermon by B. Roszkowski

Another author is Father Benedykt Roszkowski (1735–1791). He joined the order in 1750 in Osieczna and worked in the Wielkopolska Province as a town guard in Miejska Górka, Woźniki near Grodzisk, Kalisz, and Pakość. For more than 21 years, he was a sermoniser in Kalisz, Lutomiersk, Brzeziny near Łódź, and in the cathedral in Poznań. Few of his sermons were published in print.

³⁷ Ibidem.

³⁸ See also: S. Zydek, *Rola magnatów w kształtowaniu kultury prowincjonalnej w ośrodkach kultu reformatów w Rzeczypospolitej w XVIII w.*, [in:] *Fundator i mecenas. Magnateria Rzeczypospolitej w XVI–XVIII*, op. cit.

Among the ones that were, though, is a funeral sermon dedicated to (title page not preserved): *Her Excellency Mrs Teresa the Countess, née Potocka Opaleńska, Voievode of Sieradz, Matron of Bolesławiec, Lady, Benefactrice* (Poznań 1775).

In the sermon's introduction, the author praises the sharp mind of the virtuous noblewoman,³⁹ to whom he dedicates his preaching effort. Then, alike Drohojowski and Kwinta, Roszkowski notes that a man as noble as Wojciech Opaliński, having reached the end of his days, may count on the memory of him, kept in the hearts of his close ones.

In the narration of the sermon, a very interesting image of the deceased is sketched:

Nobility inherent to His mind avoided anything that could be called wickedness (...). This Lord, through (...) Christian exercises of the soul, comprehended and recognised two most notorious affairs of the essential happiness, that were always desired by his heart's intention in time and in eternity; what he desired in time was merit, and what he desired in eternity was reward.⁴⁰

Thereafter, the Franciscan draws our attention to the fact that what truly mattered in Opaliński's life was not merits, wealth nor honours, but only what he owed grace, as it was the only thing that he boasted in. He was a good senator, citizen, and Catholic. A virtuous man,⁴¹ humble, accepting God's will: 'His kind-hearted life for eternal memory and public example is set, not only to the youth, but to the Nation.'⁴²

The death of Count Opaliński, despite being certainly a blessed event, cast a shadow over the life of his widowed wife Teresa: 'In the mighty Wojciech, the count from Bnin, Opaliński, a voivode of Sieradz, falls down the last pillar of yours (...). This unfortunate bullet, is an injury to your dignified life, may it last the longest age, your Highness...'⁴³

Roszkowski does not recall any children in his sermon, which so willingly did Drohojowski and Parażyński, as Opaliński did not bear offspring. This is the reason why the preacher so poetically described the deceased as 'the last pillar' and last representative of the Opaliński family, with its coat of arms of

³⁹ B. Roszkowski, *Jaśniewielmożnej Pani Imci Teressie Hrabinie z Domu Potockich Opaleńskich Woiewodzinie Sieradzkiej, Starościnie Bolesławskiej, Pani, Pani Dobrodzice*, Poznań 1775, p. 2.

⁴⁰ Ibidem, p. 4.

⁴¹ S. Zydek, *Radość człowieka cnotliwego, czyli o przyczynach radości w dobie saskiej*, "Logos i ethos" 40 (2016), pp. 93–103.

⁴² B. Roszkowski, *Jaśniewielmożnej Pani Imci Teressie...*, op.cit., p. 12.

⁴³ Ibidem, pp. 18–19.

Łódzia.⁴⁴ Instead, he mentions the Castellan Rafał Gajewski, who becomes the deceased's successor. In this situation, the wife may feel double pain and grief as she realises that from now on, she's on her own and dependent on help and the compassion of strangers. Roszkowski, like his confrere Kwinta, evokes facts of voivode life, vividly inscribed in Franciscans' memory and still awakening their gratitude as they give impulse to continuously and humbly request and obtain support ('and dare to keep the convent in the founder's protection'⁴⁵).

This Franciscan's rather short sermon is free from too much praise or panegyric form. The figure of the voivode is presented as good and noble, but devoid of excessive exaggeration that could evoke a near fairytale and unreal elements in the depicted image of the dead. Although, the author doesn't hesitate to compare the departed to the biblical David who searched for happiness in God only. Even in this motif, however, a certain distance towards the figure of the mourned man and moderation in the creation of his posthumous image appear to be observed. The language of the sermon is also very communicative, with not many Latin interjections.

The death of the 'man of three virtues,' or the funeral sermon by F. Parażyński dedicated to Józef Grodzicki

Different in its expression and, in particular, in the linguistic layer, is the message of Father Franciszek Parażyński. We know little about the author of the sermon, other than the fact that he was an oratory preacher in the Poznań cathedral and worked in the Wielkopolska Province.⁴⁶

The Franciscan penned the sermon: *Acting on the public Tract, to the glory of the Name of the Ancestors, on the land of Christian piety to the expeditious Gryfe of the Coats of arms of his Excellence Sir Józef Grodzicki, by his deadly remains (...) with this funeral sermon offered to the knowledge of the copious and distinguished Auditory (...) on the day of the 20th of January of 1755 in the Church of Reformers in Poznań.*⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Wojciech Opaliński was the last representative of this coat of arms in the Opaliński family lineage.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, p. 26.

⁴⁶ K. Estreicher, *Bibliografia polska*, part. 3, vol. 24, Warsaw 1977, p. 94.

⁴⁷ F. Parażyński, *Zabieg na publicznym Trakcie gornolotnemu sławę Imienia z Antenatów szybko biegnącemu cnot chrześcijańskich pobożności terenu Herbowemu Gryfowi w wielmożnym Imc Panu Józefowi Grodzickiemu przy śmiertelnych jego zwłokach nieodwłocznie pogrzebowym*

In his dedication, we can read a Latin formula praising the 'noble and honourable Sir Tomasz Grodzicki, the best of protectors,'⁴⁸ that is, the son of the deceased Józef. The texts we studied above contained dedications addressed to the wives of the departed noblemen, but here we observe the dedication of the sermon to the son.

Analysing the sermon, we discover that addressing it to the son was a type of manifesto: on one hand, the author addresses the world of the living and wealthy successors of the deceased man, and on the other, he touches on the eschatological and mythical, thus transferring the attention and emotions of the funeral's participants to the afterlife.

Parażyński, like Roszkowski or Drohojowski, in his attempts to create an image of the mourned ancestor, he describes the dead man as a fallen pillar of the great house of Grodzicki. In his sermon vision, he also becomes 'the Hector of Troy,'⁴⁹ or a nobleman devoted to his fatherland, immaculate hero, a perfect human. While depicting the deceased, Father Franciszek doesn't hesitate to reach out for other mythological figures, and so he compares Józef to Apollo. Similarly, there is no shortage of biblical references: 'the shine of the heroic acts as holiness of the ancient actions exploding from the fatherland's Nest like from the Moses's Burning Bush will terrify with brightness and sound.'⁵⁰ He also recalls the seven seals of the Apocalypse:

You sank not seven swords of pain in the loving hearts, not seven unfortunate cases of the just Joseph in one deadly fall did you betray, not seven from the dark shackles of grief on the great magnificence of the honourable house of the Grodzicki from the fatal and punishing hand.⁵¹

We don't find here as colourful visions as in the previously analysed sermons. The common element though is, evoked in every speech, the memory of the deceased that will last for eternity: 'God, who in His mercy crowns the deeds of mortal people, He makes no trouble in surrounding by the glory on earth, the one that will be granted eternity in heaven.'⁵²

kazaniem liczno dystyngowanemu Audytowi do wiadomości podany roku którego Bóg zabieg, zabieg zbawieniem ludzkim dn. 20 stycznia 1755 w Kościele ww oo. Ref. Poznańskich.

⁴⁸ Dedication of the sermon.

⁴⁹ Ibidem, p. 9.

⁵⁰ Ibidem, p. 16.

⁵¹ Ibidem, pp. 11–12.

⁵² Ibidem, p. 14.

Hereinafter, he grieves Józef's death, he deplores the loss of 'the repository of dear talents, the treasure of inestimable qualities.'⁵³ Commemorated and mourned and lamented defunct was also, according to the preacher's words 'a man of thee virtues': faith, hope and charity. They shaped his character and accompanied his daily living, guiding him towards the true ideal of a Christian life. Particularly important was faith, which Grodzicki confessed fervently and sincerely. In further words, the Franciscan evokes the orphaned wife, Zofia: 'and here you've lost half your soul, half of your unconstrained life, mighty Zofia Grodzicka, née Tomicka,⁵⁴ and other members of the family: 'this house, that is, the Throne of Glory, Majesty of fortune and tabernacle of justice.'⁵⁵

Much attention in the sermon is paid to the Grodzickis, a respectful family. Father Franciszek searches for its roots in the history of the first Piast dynasty, or even in the figures of Leszek and Popiel.⁵⁶ Like Father Parażyński who legitimised the family of Ankwicz, he describes the story in vivid colours and in details:

The wing of the Gryfe in the coats of arms of Grodzicki in the treaties between the Ottoman Empire and Polish Kingdom, after the tempestuous clouds of pagan onrush was prettily shining in the Rainbow of alliance, as it was publicly confessed in the Senate during already the Bolesław Chrobry's times.⁵⁷

Thus, the noble ancestors of the deceased had been all righteous people of values and devoted to their country, which evidently became a model to follow for him. Such it was as well for the deplored Józef Grodzicki.

The language used by the Franciscan is saturated with Baroque mannerisms. It contains a plethora of Latin interjections while its panegyric form is very developed. As for the linguistic layer, the text is quite challenging to comprehend and read easily. There is an apparent difference between the last sermon and the analysed texts penned by Roszkowski or Drohojowski. Those sermons were written later. Father Józef published his in 1785, so it features already certain tendencies typical of the Enlightenment. The sermon by Father Benedykt, only slightly older, created in 1775, is also written in a style that differs from the sermons from 1755 (Parażyński) or from 1749 (Kwinta).

⁵³ Ibidem, p. 10.

⁵⁴ Ibidem, p. 12.

⁵⁵ Ibidem, p. 16.

⁵⁶ Ibidem, p. 18.

⁵⁷ Ibidem, p. 22.

Despite those differences in the linguistic layer, the above-analysed sermons contain elements in common that may be considered constitutive of the literary genre, and no doubt, one of these elements is their panegyric character with very detailed and colourful descriptions, the presence of the figures of the dead, or dedications, present in three out of the four sermons (two addressed to the wives and one to the son). All the texts are also rich in a certain type of expression or sentences, present regardless of the time of writing, which demonstrates the universal character of the funeral sermon as a form with specific functions to play in society.

The sermons that comprise the data sources for this paper, contain one more similarity in the sense that they all concern laic men, which entails the presence of certain common elements, such as references to inheritors or descriptions of family coats of arms. Consequently, a contribution to this field of research would be to extend it to the study of sermons delivered at the funerals of women or clergy.

Conclusion

From the analysis of the sermons, two tightly connected messages are revealed: a vision of death and the necessity of a good life, which conditions salvation. The addressee of the funeral sermon must have doubtlessly paid attention to these two aspects as they were the core of the preacher's considerations. Drohojowski, Kwinta, Roszkowski, and Parażyński, like many other funeral sermonisers, satisfied the demands of panegyric form, most and foremost praised the life of the nobleman and set him as an example. Everyone listening to the preacher's words at the funeral knew that the virtuous life of the deceased must be imitated to obtain the desired salvation. This pedagogy of dying in the Old-Poland era was an extremely important element from the point of view of the eschatological future. A good, blissful life guaranteed a good death and salvation,⁵⁸ as highlighted by Drohojowski: 'dwelling in the land of the living.' This communication in the face of death was one of the components of the Old-Poland *bene moriendi*, or the previously mentioned, art of dying. As stated earlier, a Catholic taking part in the funeral of a family member or a friend, found himself or herself in a situation in which he or she had to ask a question about his or her own death, had to have a thought about his or her

⁵⁸ See also: S. Zydek, *Strach i poczucie bezpieczeństwa jako elementy budujące polską mentalność w XVIII wieku w świetle kaznodziejstwa Antoniego Węgrzynowicza (1658–1721)*, Toruń 2018.

own life and, if necessary, revise it in order to deserve the laurel of honour and a panegyric laudation, consequently, to become an example to follow for his relatives. The principal value of this kind of communication was the reference to the receiver of this complex reality.

For the assumption is, as Filip Wolański highlights, that the preaching message should put the world image in order and integrate the community of the faithful around this vision. The symbolical character of the preacher's message, with its multidimensional communication, influences the auditory in a complex manner.⁵⁹

That was the case for the four analysed sermons; the transmitted message was supposed to influence the way of thinking, change the attitude. Still, quoting Filip Wolański, it is worthwhile to remember the Harold Lasswell communication model that he analyses. According to the model, there are five important elements in the process of communication: transmitter, content, channel, receiver, and effect. These elements are derived from a simple and universal communication relation: who is speaking, to whom, and with what effect.⁶⁰ Lasswell's approach corresponds to the question of communication when faced with death as analysed in this article. Thus, the elements mentioned above are important: the message channel and the effect. The channel for the message here is the funeral sermon and its effect was a change of thinking, a change in mindset or the hierarchy of values, and the final preparation for death that is to be preceded by a good life. The figure of the preacher is not irrelevant either: he held the theological knowledge and experience in ministry, and therefore he could be sure of his authority among the listeners for whom his words were crucial for the reason of their eschatological destiny. Perceived in this way, the communication in the funeral situation was understandable by the receivers of the time and is also understandable by today's researcher.

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⁵⁹ F. Wolański, *Kaznodziejstwo bernardyńskie...*, op.cit., p. 73.

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The Church Institution's Purchase of the Foreign License for Publication of a Literary Creation in Poland¹

Nabycie przez instytucję kościelną zagranicznej licencji
na wydanie w Polsce utworu piśmienniczego

ABSTRACT: Canonical law does not contain detailed regulations referring to the area of contracts concluded by church institutions in domestic and international trade. The church legislator refers to the norms of the current state law in this matter. This reception also includes copyright agreements, the subject of which is a foreign entity granting a license for publishing a literary creation in Poland. This study is an attempt to present the most important issues related to this. First, the notion of the literary work on the basis of Polish and international law was approximated. Next, the need to examine the possible termination of the author's economic rights in the country of the work's origins was pointed out. In such a situation, the work is widely available and there is no need to conclude a license agreement. In the following part, the issue of license in the canonical order was discussed and it was shown that it comes into the area of interest in the broadly understood Church property law. The normative bases, which give the possibility to choose Polish law as the law applicable to the performance of the license agreement, were given in the article. Afterwards, the connection between the payment of royalties to a foreign entity and the collection of a flat-rate corporate, as well as withholding income tax (i.e. withheld in Poland) is made. The article ends with an analysis of the translator contract key provisions.

KEY WORDS: canonical law, church property law, copyright, work, book, license agreement, withholding tax, translation, publishing house, publication

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ABSTRAKT: Prawo kanoniczne nie zawiera szczegółowych regulacji odnoszących się do sfery umów zawieranych przez instytucje kościelne w obrocie krajowym i międzynarodowym. Prawodawca kościelny odsyła do obowiązujących w tej materii norm prawa państwowego. Ta recepcja obejmuje również umowy prawnoautorskie, których przedmiotem jest udzielenie przez podmiot zagraniczny licencji na wydanie w Polsce utworu piśmienniczego. Niniejsze opracowanie stanowi próbę przedstawienia najistotniejszych zagadnień z tym związanych. Po przybliżeniu pojęcia utworu piśmienniczego na gruncie prawa polskiego i prawa międzynarodowego wskazano na potrzebę zbadania najpierw ewentualnego wygaśnięcia autorskich praw majątkowych w kraju pochodzenia dzieła. W takiej sytuacji utwór jest powszechnie dostępny i nie ma potrzeby zawierania umowy licencyjnej. W dalszej części, po omówieniu licencji w porządku kanonicznym i wykazaniu, że problematyka ta wchodzi w obszar zainteresowania szeroko rozumianego prawa majątkowego Kościoła, podane zostały podstawy normatywne, dające możliwość wyboru prawa polskiego jako prawa właściwego dla wykonywania umowy licencyjnej. Następnie ukazany został związek, jaki ma miejsce między zapłatą należności licencyjnych podmiotowi zagranicznemu a poborem zryczałtowanego podatku dochodowego od osób prawnych „u źródła”, czyli w Polsce. Artykuł kończy analiza kluczowych postanowień umowy z tłumaczem.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: prawo kanoniczne, kościelne prawo majątkowe, prawo autorskie, utwór, książka, umowa licencyjna, podatek „u źródła”, tłumaczenie, wydawnictwo, publikacja

Introduction

Church institutions, especially church publishers and universities, purchase licenses authorizing them to issue Polish translations of foreign written works concerning theology, philosophy and canon law, as well as religious works of fiction or hagiographic literature. Foreign licensors (ecclesiastical and non-ecclesial entities) may originate from various countries. The diversity of entities in international relations create far-reaching ramifications for the concluded license contracts. In order to fully comply with the requirements of the church property law and the provisions of Polish copyright law,² the law applicable to the work's country of origin and the international law, especially including the Bern Convention, should be considered when concluding such contracts.³

² Copyright and Neighboring Rights Act of 4 February 1994, i.e. Journal of Laws of 2018, item 1191, as amended (hereinafter: CNRA).

³ Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 9 September 1886, revised in Berlin on 13 November 1908 and in Rome on 2 June 1928, Journal of Laws of 1935, no. 84, item 515, as amended, with the wording adopted by the Paris Act relating to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, drawn up in Paris on 24 July 1971, Journal of Laws of 1990, no. 82, item 474, with appendix.

Written work

There are no normative grounds for defining the term “literary work” in Polish and international law. In art. 1 sec. 2 point 1 of the CNRA, the State legislator provides an approximate indication of the types of works expressed in words or characters, describing them as: “literary, journalistic, scientific, cartographic.” A slightly more extensive catalogue is contained in art. 2 sec. 1 of the Berne Convention, specifying that the term “literary and artistic works” shall include every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression, such as books, pamphlets and other written works; lectures, addresses, sermons and other works of the same nature.

In this situation, a synthesized definition of a work as an object of copyright protection (art. 1 sec 1 of the CNRA), according to which a work is “any manifestation of creative activity of individual nature,⁴ established in any form, irrespective of its value, purpose or form of expression,” becomes crucial. The use of the phrase “creative activity” means that a written work resulting (being a manifestation of) from such an activity should at least marginally differ from other results of the same activity, and, therefore, possess a new quality, the degree of which is insignificant, as indicated, among other things, by the use of the word “any.” Copyright protection is granted regardless of the purpose or function of the work⁵ or the author’s performance, effort, workload, education or qualifications.⁶

The subject literature notes that the creativity and individual nature of a work are vague concepts, the boundaries of which are not easy to define.⁷ It also points to the fact that “the concept of a work has become difficult to grasp and comprehend not only for the usual transaction parties, but also for the specialists.”⁸ In addition, it is indicated that:

⁴ See: judgment of the Poznan Court of Appeal, 31 December 2014, I ACa 989/14, *Legalis*.

⁵ Cf. judgment of the Supreme Court of 30 June 2005, IV CK 763/04, OSNC 2006, no. 5, item 92.

⁶ Cf. M. Poźniak-Niedzielska, *Przedmiot prawa autorskiego* (Subject of Copyright Law), [in:] *System prawa prywatnego* (Private Law System), t. 13: *Prawo autorskie* (Copyright Law), J. Barta (ed.), Warsaw 2017, pp. 10–11.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

⁸ W. Machała, *Utwór. Przedmiot prawa autorskiego* (A Work: The Subject of Copyright Law), Warsaw 2012, p. 158.

the current tendency to seek and demand copyright protection for every manifestation of human intellectual activity leads not only to a large number of disputes, but is also the primary cause of the “distortion” of the principles of copyright protection (...)⁹

Expiry of economic rights to a foreign work

When considering publication of a foreign written work in Poland, church institutions should first make sure that the author’s economic rights in the country of origin of the work have not expired. Their duration term may vary, even within the European Union.¹⁰ Expiration means that the work has entered public domain and is not protected by copyright. In such a case, it is not necessary to purchase a foreign license to publish a work in Polish.

The verification of the applicability of economic rights to a foreign work in its country of origin should be preceded by an analysis of the prerequisites for the application of Polish law.¹¹ As stated in art. 5 of the CNRA, the provisions of the Act shall apply to works:

- a) whose author or co-author is a Polish citizen or whose author is a citizen of a EU member state or member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) – parties to European Economic Area agreement, or

⁹ J. Kępiński, *Critical Gloss to the Supreme Court judgment of 6 March 2014*, V CSK 202/13, “Acta Iuris Stetinensis” 2/18 (2017), pp. 135–136.

¹⁰ In France, as a special provision, the standard copyrights protection term (70 years after the author’s death) has been extended by 30 years for authors who fought and died for France in combat: *les droits mentionnés à l’article précédent sont prorogés, en outre, d’une durée de trente ans lorsque l’auteur, le compositeur ou l’artiste est mort pour la France, ainsi qu’il résulte de l’acte de décès* (art. L. 123-10. Le Droit D’auteur).

¹¹ In accordance with art. 36 of the CNRA, in Poland, economic rights protection period expires, as a rule, after 70 years. It was introduced through the Act of 9 June 2000 amending the Copyright and Neighboring Rights Act (Journal of Laws no. 53, item 637), already before Poland’s accession to the European Union, as an implementation of Council Directive 93/98/EEC concerning the harmonization of copyright protection term and certain neighboring rights (Official Journal L, 24 November 1993, p. 9.), subsequently repealed by Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the term of copyright protection and certain neighboring rights (Official Journal L 372, 27 December 2006, p. 12; Directive 2006/116/EC is a consolidated version of the original Directive 93/98/EEC). It is, therefore longer, than the global standard term of economic rights protection, which, under the Berne Convention, expires 50 years after the author’s death.

- b) which were published for the first time on the territory of the Republic of Poland or simultaneously on that territory and abroad, or
- c) which were published in Polish for the first time; or
- d) which are protected under international agreements, to the extent to which their protection results from those agreements.

It thus seems that the aforementioned provision should be applied in conjunction with art. 46 sec. 1 of the Act of 4 February 2011 on Private International Law¹² (hereinafter referred to as “PIL”), which states that “the creation, content and termination of an intellectual property right shall be subject to the law of the country in which the right is exercised.” Although the publication of a foreign work in Poland involves utilizing the original work, it cannot be concluded with certainty that Polish law, rather than the law of the work’s country of origin, should apply. Private International Law can only be applied if the expiration of economic rights is not regulated by an international convention binding a given country. Given the universality of the Berne Convention, to which 167 States¹³ are signatories, this will only apply to rather isolated cases. The issues addressed in the current paper require a thorough analysis of the factual and legal circumstances, considering not only the law of the work’s country of origin, but also the provisions of international law.

Licensing in Canon Law

In the Code of Canon Law of 1983, there are¹⁴ no provisions directly referring to intellectual property law. The Code of Canons of the Eastern¹⁵ Churches refers to this area of law, stating in canon 666 § 1, that: “The fruit of an author’s intellectual efforts is under the protection of the law whether as the expression

¹² *Notice of the Speaker of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of 13 October 2015 on the publication of the consolidated text of the Act – Private International Law*, Journal of Laws no. 1792, item 1792.

¹³ The list of Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works parties can be found at http://ippanorama.uprp.pl/05/down/05_Lista_stron_konwencji_bernenskiej.pdf [access: 13.04.2019].

¹⁴ *Codex Iuris Canonici auctoritate Ioannis Pauli PP. II promulgatus* (25 January 1983), AAS 75 (1983), pars II; text in Polish [in:] *Code of Canon Law*, Polish translation approved by the Episcopal Conference, bilingual text, E. Sztafrowski (translation) and scientific commission edited by K. Dynarski, Poznań 2008 (hereinafter referred to as CCL/83).

¹⁵ *Codex Canonum Ecclesiarum Orientalium auctoritate Joannis Pauli PP. II promulgatus* (18 October 1990), AAS 82 (1990); polish translation by L. Adamowicz, M. Dyjakowska, Lublin 2002 (hereinafter: KKKW).

of the author's personality or as the source of patrimonial rights." The ecclesiastical legislator supplemented this, rather general, standard by adding § 3 to the aforementioned canon, which states: "More detailed norms about this matter may be issued in the particular law of each Church *sui iuris*,¹⁶ in accordance with the civil laws concerning the rights of authors."

Undoubtedly, it should be assumed that the provisions mentioned above have a normative meaning in the Latin Church as well, because the principles of law interpretation refer to the entire legislation of the Church.¹⁷ Thus, the reception of the provisions of intellectual property law to the canon law is possible on this basis.¹⁸ The reception should consider the ultimate goal of the Church's property right, namely, the human person, their integral promotion, and the upholding and safeguarding of their dignity.¹⁹ This is confirmed by the canon 22 CCL/83, which provides the general principle that "Civil laws [*leges civiles*²⁰] to which the law of the Church yields are to be observed in canon law with the same effects, insofar as they are not contrary to divine law and unless canon law provides otherwise." The Church's reception of civil law is not static but dynamic.²¹ This means that it is essential to observe the amendments to legislation, as well as to consider the judicial decisions of courts and the perspective of doctrine.

Church institutions are obliged to comply with the norms of civil law and they cannot excuse themselves by being unaware of them. This principle has been reflected in particular in canon 1290 CCL/83 that states that:

¹⁶ The term indicates the relative autonomy of churches (taking into account the highest authority of the Pope). Cf. M. Kuryłowicz, A. Wiliński, *Rzymskie prawo prywatne* (Roman Private Law), Warsaw 2008, pp. 96–97.

¹⁷ See: J. Mantecon, [in:] A. Marzoa, J. Miras, R. Rodriguez-Ocaña (eds.), *Comentario Exegético al Código de Derecho Canónico*, Pamplona 1997, t. 4/1, pp. 151–153.

¹⁸ Canon law as a complexus legum, a certain legal system, is better described as canon order (*ordinamento canonico*) than a system. Cf. E. Baura, *Parte generale del diritto canonico. Diritto e sistema normativo*, Roma 2013, p. 159.

¹⁹ W. Wójcik, *Dobra doczesne Kościoła* (Temporal Goods of the Church), [in:] W. Wójcik, J. Krukowski, F. Lempa, *Komentarz do Kodeksu Prawa Kanonicznego* (Commentary on the Code of Canon Law), t. 4, Lublin 1987, pp. 44–45.

²⁰ "*Leges civiles* are not civil law in the contemporary understanding of one area of law, but secular law, i.e. all objective legal norms (including customary norms, international law) in force in the territory of a given state." Cf. R. Sobański, [in:] J. Krukowski, R. Sobański, *Komentarz do Kodeksu Prawa Kanonicznego. Księga I, Normy ogólne* (Commentary on the Code of Canon Law. Book I, General Standards), t. 1, Poznań 2003, p. 77. Idem, *Prawo kanoniczne a krajowy porządek prawny* (Canon Law and the Domestic Legal System), "Państwo i Prawo" (State and Law) 6 (1999), p. 10.

²¹ Cf. R. Sobański, [in:] J. Krukowski, R. Sobański, *Komentarz do Kodeksu...*, op. cit., p. 77.

The general and particular provisions which the civil law [the code term *ius civile* is used to refer to generally applicable law²²] in a territory has established for contracts and their disposition are to be observed with the same effects in canon law insofar as the matters are subject to the power of governance of the Church unless the provisions are contrary to divine law or canon law provides otherwise (...).

On this basis, one might assume that the legal provisions governing contractual relations relating to intellectual property essentially constitute auxiliary sources of law in canon order. This leads to the following conclusion: all legal regulations related to contracts for the acquisition of a foreign license to publish a written work fall within the scope of interest of the broadly understood property law of the Church.

Choice of law clause in the license contract

Generally speaking, the acquisition of a foreign license means that the licensee obtains a legal title to use the work (or, in fact, the rights to the work in general, not the work as a “copy”) in the fields of exploitation specified in the contract, in a specified time and in a specified territory. In other words, under a license contract, the foreign licensor authorizes the Polish licensee to use their economic rights.

When purchasing the rights to use a foreign work, a church institution may, in agreement with the licensor, indicate in the provisions of the license contract the applicable law (Polish, or that of a given country) for resolving disputes related to the performance of the contract. This issue is regulated by the Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (the so-called Rome I Regulation).²³ Its preamble (note 11) emphasizes that: “The parties’ freedom to choose the applicable law should be one of the cornerstones of the system of conflict-of-law rules in matters of contractual obligations.” This principle is normatively provided in art. 3 sec 1 of the Rome I regulation, which states: “Where all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are located in a country other than the country whose law has

²² See: art. 87 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, Journal of Laws of 1997 no. 78, item 483, as amended.

²³ Official Journal L 177, 4 July 2008, p. 6.

been chosen, the choice of the parties shall not prejudice the application of provisions of the law of that other country which cannot be derogated from by agreement.” The above regulations are worth mentioning because, with the entry into force of the Rome Convention, its provisions took precedence over the national norms of Private International Law.²⁴

Considering the necessity to ensure legal security, the church entity should strive to include an explicit provision in the license contract concerning the choice of the Polish law as the competent law for resolving any disputes related to the performance of the contract.²⁵ This is especially important when the foreign licensor has prepared a model contract and the Polish licensee has limited possibilities to identify the meaning of the contract and influence its content. It cannot be ruled out that the licensor country’s copyright law regulates important contractual issues in a different manner (for instance, it differs with respect to the permissible degree of general indication of the fields of exploitation²⁶). Indicating the Polish law in the contract also creates the possibility to refer to art. 67 sec. 4 of the CNRA, according to which: “Unless otherwise stated in the contract, the holder of the exclusive license²⁷ may make claims for infringement of copyright in the scope of the license contract. According to Polish law, only one exclusive license for the use of a given work in a specific field of exploitation may exist. A foreign licensor may not grant a subsequent license to a different entity in the same scope. If they did, such a license would be legally defective. The church institution may then request to prohibit the use of the work, remedy the effects of the infringement and claim damages and compensation, provided that the contract does not prevent that.”²⁸

²⁴ This is explicitly stated in art. 28 sec. 1 of PIL, referring directly to the provisions of the Rome I Regulation.

²⁵ See: K. Grzybczyk, *Prawo właściwe dla autorskoprawnej umowy licencyjnej* (Law Applicable to Copyright License Contracts), Warsaw 2010, p. 132 ff.

²⁶ J. Barta, R. Markiewicz, *Obowiązek wymienienia pól eksploatacji w umowie licencyjnej* (Obligatory Listing of Fields of Exploitation in License Agreements), “Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego: Prace z Wynalazczości i Ochrony Własności Intelektualnej” (Scientific Papers of the Jagiellonian University. Dissertations on Intellectual Property Law) 100 (2007), p. 21 ff.

²⁷ It should be assumed that if the contract reserves the exclusive right to use the work in a manner consisting in the publication of the original work in the Polish language, it is, therefore, an exclusive license.

²⁸ Cf. J. Barta, R. Markiewicz, *Prawo autorskie* (Copyright Law), [in:] J. Barta, M. Czajkowska-Dąbrowska, Z. Cwiągalski, R. Markiewicz, E. Traple, *Prawo autorskie i prawa pokrewne. Komentarz* (Copyright and Neighboring Rights: a Commentary), Krakow 2005, p. 521.

It is also advisable to ensure that the Polish translation of the license agreement is given the attribute of authenticity. This can be done by including a provision stating that the two versions of the agreement (licensor country's and Polish) are equivalent. This may be significant in case of a dispute over interpretation of the contract between the parties, but also in the course of administrative or judicial proceedings, since the Polish version of the contract may then be regarded as evidence in the court.

License fees and public-law liabilities of a church institution

Acquisition of a foreign license to publish a written work by a church entity in Poland may occur with or without remuneration. Under the Polish Copyright and Neighboring Rights Act, the obligation to remunerate the licensor is not absolute. As stated in art. 43 sec. 1 of the CNRA: "If the contract does not state that the transfer of economic rights or the licensing was made free of charge, the author²⁹ shall be entitled to remuneration." As a general rule, the licensor is, therefore, entitled to remuneration, provided that it is not otherwise stated in the contract. The acquisition of a license free of charge is not merely a removal of the obligations towards the foreign licensor. If a foreign entity does not receive license fees, there are no tax obligations resulting from the lump-sum corporate income tax in the place (country, namely, in Poland) from which the license fees are transferred, hence the name "withholding tax."

The transfer of license fees by a church legal entity to a foreign entity may go beyond the scope of a bilateral contract with a foreign licensor. Such an event results in a tax liability under the Corporate Income Tax Act of 15 February 1992.³⁰ A foreign licensor is treated as a taxpayer who is subject to the income tax on income generated on the territory of the Republic of Poland (art. 3 sec. 2 of the CIT Act). This provision contains the principle of limited

²⁹ The term "author" should be understood as any entity entitled by virtue of economic rights. It also includes the legal successors of the author. After: M. Bukowski, D. Flisak, Z. Okoń, P. Podrecki, J. Raglewski, S. Stanisławska-Kloc, T. Targosz, *Prawo autorskie i prawa pokrewne. Komentarz*, op. cit. See also: J. Barta, R. Markiewicz, *Prawo autorskie* (Copyright Law), Warsaw 2016, p. 206.

³⁰ *Notice of the Speaker of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of 10 May 2018 on the publication of the consolidated text of the Corporate Income Tax Act*, Journal of Laws no. 1036, item 1036, as amended (hereinafter: CIT Act).

tax liability, according to which the country in whose territory the source of income is located (in this case – Poland), has the sovereign right to tax entities which are not its tax residents (who do not have their registered office or management board in Poland) with regard to income obtained from such a source. This will be the case even if the provisions of the contract state that the law of the licensor's country apply to license fees.³¹

A foreign licensor who agreed to the translation and paid edition of a written work in Polish becomes a taxpayer of withholding tax upon receiving the license fees, and the Polish publisher (licensee)³² acts as a remitter. This means that the economic burden of paying the tax can be placed on the church legal entity if it conducts a business activity.³³ This interpretation results directly from art. 26 sec. 1 of the CIT Act, according to which legal persons-entrepreneurs, who pay the amounts due resulting from art. 21 sec. 1, and consequently from the copyrights³⁴ mentioned in point 1 therein, are obliged as payers to collect lump-sum income tax on those payments on the day of payment in the amount of 20% of income, with consideration of double taxation treaties, to which the Republic of Poland is a party (art. 21 sec. 2).³⁵ If there are no capital ties between the church entity and the foreign licensor referred to in art. 21 sec. 3 of the CIT Act, and, therefore, there is no basis for the application of the exemption from withholding tax set forth in this provision, the receivables transferred to the

³¹ J. Sekita, *Rozliczanie podatku u źródła* (Withholding Tax Settlement), Warsaw 2017, p. 210.

³² Pursuant to art. 8 of the Tax Ordinance Act, i.e. Journal of Laws 2018, item 800 as amended, the remitter is a natural person, a legal person or an organizational unit without legal personality, obliged under the tax law to calculate and collect tax from the taxpayer and transfer it in due time to the tax authority. Pursuant to art. 30 § 1 and 3 of the Tax Ordinance Act, a remitter who has not fulfilled the obligations set out in art 8 shall be liable for uncollected and collected but unpaid taxes with all of their assets.

³³ As stated in art. 3 point 9 of the Tax Ordinance Act, business activity is understood as “any gainful activity within the meaning of the Act of 6 March 2018 – Entrepreneurial Law (Journal of Laws no. 646), including the pursuit of a liberal profession, as well as any other gainful activity in one's own name and on one's own account or on the account of others, even if other acts do not consider this activity as business activity, or a person performing such activity – as an entrepreneur.”

³⁴ “The application of art. 21 sec. 1 of the CIT Act in legal practice is simplified. It is based on the assumption of equivalence of Polish and foreign copyright regulations – which allows for the assessment of a contract's subject on the basis of Polish law. The statement above results from the interpretative clause, contained in international conventions, which refers to the significance of legal concepts in the source State.” Cf. J. Sekita, *Rozliczanie...*, op. cit., p. 210.

³⁵ See: R. Mastalski, *Prawo podatkowe* (Tax Law), Warsaw 2014, p. 144 ff.

beneficial owner³⁶ are subject to taxation in Poland at the rates specified in the double taxation treaties, provided that the place of residence of the taxpayer for tax purposes is documented with a certificate of residence obtained from them.³⁷ For example, under the double taxation treaties concluded by Poland with Germany,³⁸ Italy³⁹ and the USA,⁴⁰ the tax is calculated in the following way:

- a) 5% of the gross amount of license fees paid to the German counterparty,
- b) 10% to Italian or US counterparties.

It should be noted that Poland has not signed double taxation treaties with all countries. For church entities, the absence of such a treaty with the Vatican City State may prove to be important. For a licensor with residence in the Vatican, the provisions of the aforementioned agreement with Italy do not apply. Therefore, receivables transferred to a recipient located in the Vatican City State will be taxed in Poland at the rate of 20%. Then, there is no obligation to have a certificate of (tax) residence because the statutory tax rate applies.

³⁶ In accordance with art. 4a point 29 of the CIT Act, the term “beneficial owner” describes an entity which meets all of the following conditions: a) receives the receivable for its own benefit, which includes determining its intended use and bears the economic risk associated with the loss of the receivable or of part of it, b) is not an intermediary, agent, trustee or other entity legally or factually obliged to transfer all or part of a receivable to another entity, and c) conducts real economic activity in the country of tax residence if the receivables are obtained in connection with the economic activity conducted.

³⁷ Certificate of (tax) residence is a declaration of the place of residence of a taxpayer for tax purposes issued by the competent tax administration of the taxpayer’s country of residence. (art. 4a point 12 of the CIT Act).

³⁸ Treaty on the avoidance of double taxation in respect of taxes on income and wealth, concluded between the Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed in Berlin on 14 May 2003, Journal of Laws of 2005 no. 12, item 90.

³⁹ Treaty on the avoidance of double taxation in respect of taxes on income and the prevention of tax evasion between the Government of the Polish People’s Republic and the Government of the Italian Republic, concluded in Rome on 21 June 1985, Journal of Laws of 1989 no. 62, item 374

⁴⁰ Treaty on the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of tax evasion with respect to taxes on income between the Government of the Polish People’s Republic and the Government of the United States of America, signed in Washington on 8 October 1974, Journal of Laws of 1976 no. 31, item 178.

Translation as a derivative work

In accordance with art. 2 sec 1 of the CIT Act, the translation of a written work has the status of a transposition⁴¹ that, as an independent work, is also subject to legal protection.⁴² It is assumed that, for idiomatic reasons, translation to another language is always creative, even if the translated texts were devoid of individuality.⁴³ However, the actual replacement of a human being by a machine, for example, using translation software to translate a text, will not result in the creation of a work, since the final result in the form of translation will not be a result of the human intellect. Rather, it will be a computer-generated work.⁴⁴

The translation itself does not require the permission of the original work's author. However, in order to be able to distribute⁴⁵ and use a translation, a church entity must obtain permission from the author or another authorized foreign entity (e.g. an inheritor, a publishing house), provided that, as already stated, the copyright to the original work has expired (art. 2 sec. 2 of the CNRA).

In view of the requirement laid down in art. 53 of the CNRA, the contract with the translator should be concluded in written form. The church publisher (the ordering party) should list the fields of exploitation in the contract (art. 50 of the CNRA), i.e. the ways of using the work (translation).⁴⁶ It is also crucial to clearly specify that the ordering party will be the holder of copyrights to the translation. In the absence of such a provision, it will be reasonable to presume that the translator has granted a non-exclusive license and may continue to dispose of the translation (art. 65 and 67 sec 2 of the CNRA). In general, contracts for the publication of translations specify a lump-sum remuneration,

⁴¹ The essence of transposing someone else's work is the fact that "its creation is to some extent based on a work previously made by another author." Cf. E. Ferenc-Szydelko, [in:] *Ustawa o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych, Komentarz*, E. Ferenc-Szydelko (ed.), Warszawa 2016, p. 78.

⁴² See: judgment of the Supreme Court of 24 July 2009, II CSK 66/2009.

⁴³ M. Czajkowska-Dąbrowska, Z. Cwiąkałski, K. Felchner, E. Traple, *Ustawa o prawie autorskim. Komentarz* (Copyright Act. A commentary), J. Barta, R. Markiewicz (eds.), Lex 2011, commentary to art. 2.

⁴⁴ M. Bukowski, D. Flisak, Z. Okoń, P. Podrecki, J. Raglewski, S. Stanisławska-Kloc, T. Targosz, *Prawo autorskie i prawa pokrewne. Komentarz*, op. cit.

⁴⁵ A distributed work is a work that, with the permission of the author, has been made available to the public in any way (art. 5 sec. 1 point 3 of the CNRA).

⁴⁶ For translation, the fields of exploitation can be defined in the following way: preservation of a work using any technique, reproduction (multiplication) of the work in print and distribution of reproductions of the work.

which is based on the assumption that the success of a work depends not only on the quality of the translation but, above all, on the success of the original.⁴⁷ With regard to art. 44 of the CNRA, which provides that in the event of a glaring discrepancy between the remuneration and the benefits to the assignee of the economic rights or the licensee, the author may request a corresponding increase in remuneration from the court, the publisher may predetermine further remuneration for the translator if the sale of copies exceeds a certain level.⁴⁸

Even if the translator has transferred all his economic rights to the publisher, they will be entitled to unlimited in duration and non-transferable moral rights to the translation (art. 16 of the CNRA). However, nothing prevents the contract from specifying a person (preferably connected with the publisher) who will be authorized to dispose of the translation, i.e. to exercise moral rights on behalf of the translator.⁴⁹ If such a clause is not introduced, the translator's consent to further disposal of the translation will always be required.

Conclusion

The acquisition, carried out abroad, by a church institution of a license to publish a written work in Poland is finalized by the provisions of the license contract. Its conclusion should be preceded by a thorough and comprehensive analysis of issues that, due to their complexity, were merely outlined in the current article. Among them, the need to align the rights and obligations of the contracting parties with the level of statutory liabilities connected with obligatory collection of withholding tax on license fees becomes a priority. It is important to stress once again that the financial consequences of legal unawareness in this respect will be borne primarily by the Polish licensee as an income tax remitter. For this reason, a church entity should consider this issue at the initial stage of negotiating the amount of license fees.

⁴⁷ E. Traple, *Umowy o eksploatacje utworów w prawie polskim* (Exploitation Contracts Under Polish Law), Warsaw 2010, p. 223.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁹ Cf. P. Białecki, *Nadużycie praw podmiotowych w związku z wykonywaniem praw autorskich* (Abuse of Subjective Rights in Connection with the Exercise of Copyrights), "Monitor Prawniczy" (Legal Magazine) 17 (2005), p. 833.

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Phenomenology and Christian Philosophy: Edith Stein's Three Turns

Fenomenologia a filozofia chrześcijańska.
Trzy przemiany Edith Stein

ABSTRACT: This essay examines Edith Stein's three phases of religious development in the context of the debate during the 1920s and 30s over the relationship between religion and philosophy. This debate focused on the question of whether a Christian philosophy was an oxymoron. Stein, after her conversion to Roman Catholicism in 1922, identified herself as a Christian Philosopher. She thought that Christianity and Philosophy were reciprocal partners, not antagonists, in the search for fundamental truths of life and death. Stein's three turns, which this essay explores historically and biographically, feature her decision to apply phenomenological philosophical methods and insights to the realm of religion, her move to a Christian perspective and finally her choice of Catholicism as her belief system.

KEYWORDS: Carmelites, Catholic, Christian philosophy, empathy, Husserl, Ingarden, phenomenology, Scheler, Stein, theology

ABSTRAKT: Niniejszy esej analizuje trzy fazy rozwoju religijnego Edith Stein w kontekście debaty toczonej w latach 20. i 30. XX wieku na temat relacji pomiędzy religią a filozofią. Debata ta koncentrowała się na kwestii, czy filozofię chrześcijańską należy uznać za oksymoron. Stein, po przejściu na rzymski katolicyzm w 1922 roku, określiła się jako filozofka chrześcijańska. Uważała, że chrześcijaństwo i filozofia nie są dla siebie wzajemnie antagonistami, a partnerami w poszukiwaniu podstawowych prawd o życiu i śmierci. Trzy przemiany duchowe Stein, które esej ten bada pod względem historycznym i biograficznym, odnoszą się do jej decyzji o zastosowaniu fenomenologicznych metod i spostrzeżeń filozoficznych do sfery religii, przeniesienia zainteresowania filozofki na perspektywę chrześcijańską i wreszcie wyboru katolicyzmu jako systemu wiary.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: karmelicy, katolicy, filozofia chrześcijańska, empatia, Husserl, Ingarden, fenomenologia, Scheler, Stein, teologia

On September 12, 1932, the Thomist Society of France held a conference in Juvisy, Seine-et-Oise, a southern suburb of Paris. Only a year before entering the Carmelite convent in Cologne on October 15, 1933, Edith Stein attended and actively participated in this conference. As you can glean from the published proceedings of this Conference, printed in French and German, 35 philosophers participated, mostly from France, six from Germany, while a very few came from Italy and Austria.¹ The conference contributed to a fierce debate that had become official a few years before in meetings and in publications on the question of Christian philosophy, whether the very term *Christian philosophy* is an oxymoron. Of course, the debate of the proper relationship between reason and faith can be traced back to antiquity and the Middle Ages, but only in the 1920s and especially in France during the 1930s, did the debate become a central preoccupation as a result of early twentieth-century developments in both philosophy and theology. At times, the debate was dubbed the French Debate, but, in fact, the debate was European-wide. This particular conference at Juvisy focused on the feasibility of Christian Phenomenology, i.e. whether the relatively new philosophy of phenomenology, defined and founded by Edmund Husserl in the early decades of the twentieth century, and by the 1930s, widely esteemed and adopted by European philosophers, was compatible with Christian theology. The dominant Christian theology of the early thirties drew upon the dramatic revival and translations in the 1920s of the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, and the proliferation of Thomist societies and academic studies. Hence, at Juvisy, a Catholic theology prevailed, though Protestant theologians invoked Aquinas' arguments as well.²

Is there an historical and inherent character to phenomenology that inclines it to Christian philosophy? This debate continues to attract the attention of philosophers. Gregory Sadler, in his study of the 1930s conferences, writes, "In the present day... the possibility and the nature of Christian philosophy still remains an open, complex, and alluring question."³ A vivid example of

¹ Société thomiste, *Proceedings of the Juvisy Conference: Journées d'Etudes de la Société Thomiste 1, Juvisy, 12 September 1932*, Juvisy, 1932. Excerpts translated into English by Gregory B. Sadler, *Reason Fulfilled by Revelations: the 1930s Christian Philosophy Debates in France*, Washington DC 2012. For an example of Edith Stein's discussion of the Juvisy Conference, see: E. Stein, *Finite and Eternal Being*, [in:] *Collected Works of Edith Stein*, vol. 9, transl. K. Reinhardt, Washington DC 2002, 12, and end notes, nos. 18 and 32, 547, 550. Stein mentions the Juvisy conference in a letter, November 11, 1932, to Roman Ingarden: *Letters to Roman Ingarden*, [in:] *Collected Works of Edith Stein*, vol. 12, transl. H. Candler Hunt, Washington DC 2014.

² B. Sadler, *Reason Fulfilled...*, op. cit., pp. 20, 26–27.

³ Ibidem, p. 36, cf. 45.

this was the international conference, “New Frontiers: Phenomenology and Religion,” at the University of Söderstörn in Sweden in 2008. One outcome of this conference was the volume *Phenomenology and Religion: New Frontiers*, edited by Jonna Bornemark and Hans Ruin, published in 2010, which includes an essay on Stein.⁴ This conference arose for two reasons: one, a response to a volume published in 2000 of essays in which the late Dominique Janicaud termed phenomenologists’ application of philosophical methods to religious questions, a “theological turn” about which Janicaud was critical,⁵ and, two, a concern that religious fundamentalism had hijacked critical thinking about religion and inhibited a serious study of the borders between secular and non-secular, religious and non-religious, rational and irrational thinking.⁶

The Debate consists of responses to five critical questions: 1. Is a Christian philosophy possible? 2. What would be its nature? 3. Has there been any genuinely Christian philosophy? 4. If so, is there now any genuinely Christian philosophy? 5. What is the relationship between past and present Christian philosophies? Quite evident was a lack of consensus over definitions of philosophy and of Christian, identities both deeply controversial then and now. Both terms, of course, have a complex, tangled history. What is clear is that various efforts to reconcile faith and revelation with science or natural reason flounder over the matter of which takes priority.

The conflict among the Juvisy participants, mostly but not all Catholics, mostly but not all Thomists, mostly but not all phenomenologists, is divided as follows: those like Heidegger (he did not attend the conference, but influenced the thinking of many there), who rejected the notion of Christian philosophy as “wooden iron,”⁷ and a rejection echoed at Juvisy by such Neo-Scholastic theologians as Mandonnet and Noël. Another in this ideological camp, Bréhier, declared “one can no more speak of Christian philosophy than of Christian mathematics or a Christian physics.”⁸ The problem of the concept of Christian philosophy for various of the philosophers and theologians is that

⁴ J. Bornemark, *Max Scheler and Edith Stein as Precursors of the Turn to Religion within Phenomenology*, [in:] *Phenomenology and Religion: New Frontiers*, J. Bornemark, H. Ruin (eds.), Söderstörn 2010, pp. 45–65.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 45.

⁶ J. Bornemark, H. Ruin, *Introduction*, [in:] *Phenomenology and Religion...*, op. cit., p. 9.

⁷ B. Sadler, *Reason Fulfilled...*, op. cit., p. 37, citing Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, end note p. 66.

⁸ B. Sadler, *Reason Fulfilled...*, op. cit., p. 36, citing Emile Bréhier, [in:] *Proceedings* 36. See: E. Bréhier, *Y-a-t’il une philosophie chrétienne?*, “Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale” 38 (1931), no. 4.

for Christians, faith is the ultimate authority for truth, whereas, for philosophers, reason and logic are the ultimate arbiters of truth. For example, Stein and others cite Thomas' belief that both Aristotelian and Arabic philosophy offer enough evidence to show that pure natural reason, unaided by revealed truth, can lead a thinker to a belief in God and ultimately to a Christian philosophy.⁹ But, in the final analysis, faith and revelation can trump natural reason if a conflict between the two arises. For that reason, some of those at Juvisy insisted that philosophy is independent from religion and cannot be merged into the concept of Christian philosophy. They will grant that Christians are often philosophers, e.g. Descartes and Heidegger, but their philosophies are not Christian in nature.

In the other ideological camp that holds Christian philosophy to be a legitimate concept are Maritain, Gilson, Marcel, Stein and Blondel, and others. They pointed out that the Church fathers adopted Christianity as a philosophy because they viewed it as fulfilling the goals of Greek philosophers and because Christian doctrine made use of philosophic concepts.¹⁰ Edith Stein regarded her own work as Christian philosophy.¹¹ Stein, who had immersed herself in Aquinas' thought as she translated from 1925–1929 Aquinas' *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, her translation published in 1931, conformed to the major tenets of those who had no problem with the term. She, following Aquinas along with other medieval theologians, argued that philosophy is essential to the pursuit of wisdom; indeed, Aquinas designated philosophy to be the perfect work of reason. At one point, Stein states:

the term *Christian philosophy* designates not only the mental attitude of the Christian philosopher, not merely the actual doctrinal system of Christian thinkers but, above and beyond these, the idea of a *perfectum opus rationis*. A Christian philosophy in this sense must aspire to a unity and synthesis of all the knowledge which we have gained by the exercise of our natural reason and by revelation.¹²

In this sense, Stein views revelation and faith as indispensable assistants to reason. Faith can stimulate questions and offer ideas about the realm of reality beyond the reaches of reason. Faith enters because those who reason discover

⁹ E. Stein, *Finite and Eternal Being*, op. cit., p. 13.

¹⁰ B. Sadler, *Reason Fulfilled...*, op. cit., p. 73.

¹¹ B. Stein, *Finite and Eternal Being*, p. 25. See: End Note 18 for Stein's extended discussion of how Christian philosophy differs from theology, 548, and in End Note 32, Stein, citing P. Daniel Feuling, sets forth a definition of philosophy.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 13.

the path of reason insufficient. But she is clear that human beings lack the capacity to grasp any truth confidently. She writes:

Even finite reality can never be exhaustively understood by means of conceptual knowledge, and much less the infinite reality of God... even theology is not a closed nor an absolutely conclusive structural whole. It evolves historically... it must be emphasized that the contents of revelation do not comprise the infinite plenitude of divine truth.¹³

And Stein does not look blindly at theological arrogance. She states, "Grace does not exempt Christian scholars from the need for a solid scientific and philosophic erudition" and adds without such more training, they "fall far behind the achievements of thorough and conscientious non-Christian scholars."¹⁴

In this essay, I dip into aspects of this debate as it appears in Edith Stein's personal and public writings. Among her personal writings, today I will enlist key letters from her correspondence with Poland's eminent philosopher, Roman Ingarden. Since most of my published essays on Edith Stein treat her life decisions, her complex sense of identity, her analysis of the nature of empathy, her distinctive secular and Christian feminism, and her approach to biographical and autobiographical writing, my attention herein addresses the biographical and historical dimensions of her involvement with this question of the legitimacy of a Christian philosophy based upon scientific phenomenological methods and insights. Please note: I am neither a philosopher nor a theologian; I am an historian of ideas and a biographer. I welcome your questions and thoughts following my presentation, some of which you may, among yourselves, better clarify and expand than I can.

Back to Juvisy: By the time that Stein went to Juvisy, she, among philosophers present, was widely honored as a path-breaking phenomenologist. For mostly sexist and possibly antisemitic reasons, scholars, until the past few decades, have marginalized her writings, though she is every bit as original and probing a philosopher as her more famous peer, Heidegger. In fact, Stein was instrumental in the development of Edmund Husserl's thought. She was not just Husserl's brilliant protégé, not just one of his most remarkable doctoral students, not just his hired assistant in deciphering and rewriting his nearly illegible notes on

¹³ Ibidem, p. 26.

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 551, end note p. 35. See also: E. Stein, *Letters to Roman Ingarden*, op. cit. pp. 241, 259–260.

disorganized scraps of paper, but also his collaborator, as Philosopher Antonio Calcagno has established in his various essays and books.¹⁵

Stein's thought on the validity and nature of a Christian philosophy had already begun take form by 1933. In 1929, Stein had contributed an essay to the *Journal of Philosophical and Phenomenological Research's* special issue, a *Festschrift* in honor of Husserl's 70th birthday. Two versions of this essay are extant. In both, she compares the philosophies of Aquinas and Husserl, though in one she imagines the comparison as a dialogue between the two men. Stein's theatrical imagination comes to the fore, as she has Husserl invite Aquinas to sit on the old leather sofa that Husserl prizes, saying "it's quite comfortable and I doubt I'll ever part with it."¹⁶ Then ensues a dialogue, highlighting many important commonalities between the two men and also pointing to insuperable differences. This work is singular in bringing medieval scholarship into dialogue with the Christian philosophy of her time. Erich Przywara, the brilliant and beloved Jesuit theologian and mentor of Edith Stein, evaluated Stein's dialogue as an "astonishing confrontation between Husserl and Aquinas."¹⁷ He prefers the dramatic dialogue version to the one Heidegger permitted to be published that appears in third person and is less captivating. Stein's remarks at Juvisy sustain and expand the ideas that appear in this 1929 essay. Similarly, Stein's remarks at Juvisy anticipate Stein's Christian philosophy as it appears in her *magnum opus*, *Finite and Eternal Being*, begun in 1931, before Juvisy and completed in 1936 during her years as a Carmelite nun in Cologne, Germany.

Similarly, Stein's dialogue reflected at least a decade of her theological turn, if we apply Janicaud's term to the many phenomenologists attracted to theological matters well before the 1930s. In Husserl's oft-quoted letter in 1919 to Rudolf Otto, the author of *The Idea of the Holy*, Husserl wonders about the impact of his phenomenological philosophy on his students. It makes, he says "Protestants out of Catholics and Catholics out of Protestants."¹⁸ His remark should extend

¹⁵ A. Calcagno, *Assistant and/or Collaborator? Edith Stein's Relationship to Edmund Husserl's Ideen II*, [in:] *Contemplating Edith Stein*, J.A. Berkman (ed.), Notre Dame 2006, pp. 243–270. See also: E. Stein, *Letters to Roman Ingarden*, op. cit., February 1918, pp. 85–90.

¹⁶ E. Stein, *Knowledge and Faith*, transl. W. Redmond, Washington DC 2000, p. 3.

¹⁷ T.F. O'Meara, *Erich Przywara SJ: His Theology and His World*, Notre Dame 2002, p. 123.

¹⁸ H. Kleuting, *Edith Stein and John of the Cross: An Intellectual and Spiritual Relation from Husserl's Lecture in 1918 to the Gas Chamber of Auschwitz in 1941*, [in:] *Intersubjectivity, Humanity, Being: Edith Stein's Phenomenology and Christian Philosophy*, M. Lebeck, J.H. Gurmin (eds.), Oxford, 2015, p. 472. Kleuting cites Husserl's 1919 letter to Rudolf Otto, published in *Das Mass des Verborgenen, Heinrich Ochsner (1891–1970) zum Gedächtnis*, C. Ochswald and E. Tecklenborg (eds.), Hannover 1981, p. 159. See: J. Bornemark, H. Ruin, *Introduction*, op. cit., p. 7.

to his Jewish students, such as Stein and Scheler among others. Though some of the phenomenologists remained skeptics, both Stein and Scheler became Catholics, and Husserl, a Jew himself, was a convert to Protestantism. Too easily scholars dismiss the rash of conversions of intellectuals over the decades as opportunistic, a means to secure and advance their careers or to spare their families from prejudice and discrimination.

Yet, inherent in the phenomenological method are elements that predispose its followers to consider theological issues. Most studies of Stein's theological turn emphasize her life experiences rather than her philosophical work. I do not want to diminish their importance, and I will review these briefly, but I do not think scholars have given adequate weight to her intellectual fervor and depth. Any perspective Stein adopted needed to satisfy her passion for rational truth, even after she converted and upheld the truths of faith and revelation. My argument is that Stein, in presenting her Christian philosophy (and she called it that), reveals the crucial role phenomenology exerted in sustaining her commitment to the criteria of rational logic, objectivity and fairness.¹⁹ The phenomenological method encourages a self-critical and reflective analysis of how and what we think, be it of natural or supernatural experiences. Husserl directed Stein and his other students to focus on "‘things’ themselves. Perception... appeared as reception, deriving its laws from objects."²⁰ Objects encompassed everything from emotional events and acts of consciousness, to a tree. If all encompassing, then, obviously religious experience falls under the endless breadth of the phenomenological umbrella.

Stein and her peers quarreled over the meaning and implications of phenomenology and increasingly saw its limitations. A philosopher whom Stein often cites and was influential in her thinking and that of her phenomenological peers was Henri Bergson. Although his father was a Polish Jew, Bergson was attracted to Catholicism and scathing in his attacks on rationalist intellectualism in French philosophy.²¹

¹⁹ E. Stein, *Knowledge and Faith*, op. cit., p. 9. Stein frequently rebuts those who claim her philosophical and religious views reflect her feelings and fantasies. She agrees with Aquinas and Husserl who assert that philosophy "is a matter of the serious, sober inquiry of reason," and, so too, her turn to religion.

²⁰ E. Stein, *Life in a Jewish Family, 1891–1916: An Autobiography*, [in:] *Collected Works of Edith Stein*, vol. 1, L. Gelber, R. Leuven OCD (eds.), transl. J. Koeppel OCD, Washington DC 1986, p. 250.

²¹ E. Sadler, *Reason Fulfilled...*, op. cit., p. 27. As one example, see: Edith Stein letter to Roman Ingarden, January 5, 1917 (*Letters to Roman Ingarden*, op. cit., pp. 25–26).

As a phenomenologist, Stein asks: “What is philosophy?”²² Can the means of knowledge themselves be fully known? In effect, phenomenology as a set of philosophical principles and a philosophical method itself deserves critical analysis. And when she and others subjected phenomenology to critical scrutiny, she realized the limits of phenomenology, especially as it relates to non-apparent reality. She wrote to Ingarden who was struggling with religious questions that “It seems that first, using the intellect, you have to approach the limits of reason and then come to the door of mystery.”²³

In a provocative paragraph that ends the first chapter of *Finite and Eternal Being*, Stein sums up one of the challenges posed by the French Debate in this way:

Unbelievers have no good reason to distrust the findings of Christian philosophy on the grounds that it uses as a standard of measurement, not only the ultimate truths of reason, but also the truths of faith. No one prevents them from applying the criterion of reason in full stringency and from rejecting everything that does not measure up to it. They may also freely decide whether they want to go further and take account of those findings which have been gained with the aid of revelation. In this case they will accept the truths of faith not as “theses” (as do believers) but only as “hypotheses.” But as to whether or not the conclusions at which both arrive are in accord with the truths of reason, there prevails again a standard of measurement which both sides have in common... And unbelievers must judge for themselves whether by accepting this additional knowledge, they may perhaps gain a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of that which is. They will at any rate not shrink back from such an attempt if they are really as unbiased as, according to their own conviction, genuine philosophers ought to be.²⁴

Stein and her peers were determined to be unbiased and objective. Karl Schudt writes that the purpose of a Christian philosopher is not to deliver faith, but “to remove obstacles for the unbeliever.”²⁵

²² E. Stein, *Finite and Eternal Being*, op. cit., p. 28.

²³ Edith Stein to Roman Ingarden, November 8, 1927 (*Letters to Roman Ingarden*, op. cit., p. 259).

²⁴ E. Stein, *Finite and Eternal Being*, op. cit., p. 28.

²⁵ K. Schudt, *Edith Stein’s Proof for the Existence of God from Consciousness*, “American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly” 82 (Winter 2008), no. 1, p. 124.

Before examining the decisive role of phenomenology in influencing Stein's theological turn, let us review the no less decisive contribution of her life experiences.

Stein chronicles in her autobiography, periods of acute anxiety and even suicidal depression.²⁶ Before World War One, these arose from academic frustrations, a fear of failing in her academic projects and ambitions and family matters. It may be that her turn away as a young adolescent from the Judaism of her family contributed, but evidence for that hypothesis is lacking, especially since even after Stein's conversion, Queen Esther of the Jewish Bible, as well as her own mother, whom Stein deems upon her death an angel with intercessory powers, acted as paramount inspirations to godly devotion.²⁷ Edith Stein's iron will, remarkable intelligence, passion for learning, and feminist values certainly did not mesh well with the synagogue segregation of the sexes and women's exclusion from important religious rites and clerical positions.

World War One, however, brought a host of experiences that rocked the foundations of Stein's well being. During the war, Stein served for a time as a Red Cross nurse in a lazaretto on Germany's eastern front. There she treated men in acute suffering, many dying. Compounding these experiences, she lost her Göttingen University philosophical community of treasured friends. They scattered or still more shattering, many of her male friends and male relatives of her teachers and friends were injured and/or were killed. One particular death struck her particularly hard. When Stein learned of the death in 1917 of her deeply admired teacher and friend, Husserl's right hand man, Adolf Reinach, she was undone. She writes Ingarden, "...recently I have experienced difficult days – and there are more ahead – that have left me incapable of happiness."²⁸ Throughout Europe, countless individuals were searching for a shred of cosmic meaning in the relentless physical pain and the wholesale slaughter of millions. Soon, however, Stein encountered Reinach's wife Anne's calm, courage and positive approach to the death of her husband, which Anne had attributed to her Christian religious grounding. Anne's faith in the immortality of the soul,

²⁶ E. Stein, *Life...*, op. cit., p. 277.

²⁷ Edith Stein to Sr. Callista Kopf, October 4, 1936 [in:] E. Stein, *Self-Portrait in Letters, 1916–1942*, [in:] *Collected Works of Edith Stein*, vol. 5, transl. J. Koeppl OCD, Washington DC 1993, p. 238. See also: my discussion of Stein's elevation of her mother in Joyce Avrech Berkman, Esther and Mary: *The Uneasy Jewish/Catholic Dynamic in the Work and Life of Edith Stein*, "Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion" 32 (Spring 2016), no. 1, p. 60.

²⁸ Edith Stein to Roman Ingarden, December 24, 1917 (*Letters to Roman Ingarden*, op. cit., p. 81).

symbolized through Jesus on the cross, propelled Stein to consider Christian belief more seriously.²⁹

Stein occasionally cited the powerful influence of coming to know people who were inspiring models of another kind of living. In *On Empathy* she observes, “By empathy with differently composed personal structures, we become clear on what we are not, what we are more or less than others.”³⁰ Applying this sentiment to her wartime female friends, Stein reflects in her autobiography:

Frau [Erika] Gothe was a very devout Protestant; and the warmth radiating from her goodness reached us... [my] friendship with Pauline [Adolf Reinach's, sister] and Erika had more depth and beauty than my former student friendships. For the first time, I was not the one to lead or to be sought after; but rather I saw in the others something better and higher than myself.³¹

Erika Gothe also provided an example of Stein's analysis of empathizing with another's joy. Gothe had let Stein know that Husserl was seeking an assistant and suggested to Husserl the possibility of Stein holding such a position. When Gothe learned of the actual arrangement taking place, Stein writes, “Her deep-set, dark eyes were alight with intense joy. That night when we went to bed she said, ‘Good night. Lady Assistant!’”³² This attitude of the pivotal role of empathic encounters with others correlates to Stein's immense indebtedness to St. Theresa's influence through Stein's empathizing with Theresa when she read Theresa's autobiography. In a telling letter to Ingarden, she explains that her intellectual work was essential to her journey to religion, but that her life experiences, along with concrete images of Christianity in the words of witnesses, such as Augustine, Francis and Teresa, were “decisive for me.”³³

Soon after the war, Stein's relationship with Husserl as his assistant unbraided. I will not take the time now to describe what happened. She eventually resigned from her assistantship, though she and Husserl sustained a sturdy and mutually admiring friendship. At the same time this was happening, Stein, the second woman in Germany to receive a doctorate in philosophy, met

²⁹ T.R. Posselt OCD, *Edith Stein: The Life of a Philosopher and Carmelite*, S.M. Batzdorff, J. Koepfel, J. Sullivan (eds.), Washington DC 2005, pp. 59–60, and End Note pp. 12, 246.

³⁰ E. Stein, *On The Problem of Empathy*, [in:] *Collected Works of Edith Stein*, vol. 3, transl. W. Stein, Washington DC 1989, p. 89.

³¹ E. Stein, *Life...*, op. cit., p. 308.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 411.

³³ Edith Stein to Roman Ingarden, November 8, 1927 (*Letters to Roman Ingarden*, op. cit., p. 259).

rejection over and over again in her efforts to land a professorship, and, if you will, to land a life partner, and in her effort to get the Weimar government to remove discrimination against appointment of women in the civil service. Other scholars have written at length about these experiences. Less studied is her intense disillusionment with, first, Germany's defeat in World War One and then with the failure of her vision of liberal democracy to take root. She had limited psychological resources to cope with all of these setbacks, which is why many scholars have attributed her turn to religion as a desperate source of comfort, rather than also a logical extension of her intellectual activity as a phenomenologist.

Certainly religion did offer her the strength she urgently needed. The significance of her anxieties to her theological turn is evident in her letter to Roman Ingarden in October 1918 when she informs him of her turn to Christianity as having "freed me of all that [her anxieties and depression] suppressed me and at the same time has given me the strength to see life anew and, thankfully, to start living again. Thus, I can speak of 'rebirth' in the deepest sense of the term."³⁴

No less vital, as Stein extended rational reflection to all phenomena, she discovered reason's limits or insufficiency. Mystery and mysteries of being are fundamental to all philosophies of religion. In my country, native American communities tell myriad stories, just as the Jewish and Christian Bibles tell numerous stories. One of the glories of our human imagination is our ability to express existential mystery through stories, and all stories reflect the truth of our contingent being, the non-given, as well as the given. For many native American peoples, the divinity is all pervasive, their religions pantheistic. For example, before hunting and killing a deer, the meat vital to survival, the hunter must engage in self-sacrificial rituals.

Stein knew that what is given to our natural reason is not all there is. That reality exceeds what is given, that truth is more than what natural rational and scientific thought discloses. In addition to fostering awareness of the limits of rational knowledge, phenomenology presented other concepts compatible with the theological turn. For Husserl, all experience, all that we think, intend, feel, all of our inner and outer life constitute phenomena for study. But how does that breadth of objects of study include what is not apparent, what our rational faculties cannot analyze?³⁵

³⁴ Edith Stein to Roman Ingarden, October 10, 1918 (*Letters to Roman Ingarden*, op. cit., p. 140).

³⁵ Edith Stein to Fritz Kaufmann, September 16, 1919, "I do not believe I have cut the knot concerning the problem of the free will. I have only emphasized the negative... what seems to me to be certain – that the spontaneity of the will cannot be deduced from the individual

Husserl's writings on inner time-consciousness and the concept of horizon and of intersubjectivity invoke the non-apparent. For Husserl, the given and non-given arise simultaneously and appear via human inner time consciousness, which he viewed as the living stream of our subjectivity.³⁶

The phenomenological method undergirds Stein's approach to being, whether the being or object is given, co-given with the non-given or of the simply non-given. The phenomenological method, as you who are here know, involves a process of reduction, *epoché*, as Husserl sets it forth in his *Ideen* (1913). It features a peeling away of all graspable attributes of an object and a bracketing as well of all our prejudices and assumptions to describe the abstract essence of an inner or outer object. But this abstract essence defies rational description of its origin and its dynamic. By the way, Stein sees in St. John of the Cross, her final study, an ascent to God, as based on peeling away to the divine co-given, that requires faith and revelation as well as reason for understanding.³⁷

Husserl also introduced the key concept of intention. We select objects to consider every moment of our day. These acts of consciousness reveal our intentions, consciously or unconsciously. Stein, like Scheler and St. John of the Cross, and many others (see Mayayana Buddhism),³⁸ interpret that intention as driven by desire or love or by hate or any other series of emotions. Scheler certainly influenced Stein in her conviction that the intention of perceiving the unknowable is driven by love.³⁹

Husserl proposed three ways to deduce knowledge:

1. The light of understanding
2. The forms, shapes, categories through which understanding grasps being
3. The objects through which we experience ourselves and other objects, including other consciousnesses.⁴⁰

Through his method, he argues that we climb or dive (you can choose your metaphor) to the essences of inner and outer objects.

strengths and natural tendencies. Then, I have opened the door to the philosophy of religion in whose domain further investigations must take place" (E. Stein, *Self-Portrait in Letters...*, op. cit., p. 33).

³⁶ J. Bornemark, *Max Scheler and Edith Stein...*, op. cit., pp. 46, 58.

³⁷ Ibidem, pp. 62–63. Bornemark cites Herbert Hecker, *Phänomenologie des Christlichen bei Edith Stein*, Wuerzburg 1993, p. 379, and Rolf Kuehn, *Leben aus dem Sein*, [in:] *Denken im Dialog: Zur Philosophie Edith Steins*, W. Herbstrich (ed.), Tuebingen 1991, pp. 118–132. Bornemark quotes heavily from Edith Stein, *Kreuzeswissenschaft, Studie über Johannes a Cruce* (Edith Stein Werke Bd. 1) (Louvain, E. Nauwelaerts, 1954).

³⁸ Ibidem, p. 65.

³⁹ Ibidem.

⁴⁰ E. Stein, *Knowledge and Faith*, op. cit., p. 55.

Husserl's essence of the being of our self is the *Pure I*, or *Transcendent Ego*, because it is an abstraction or category for all human beings or selves. That *Pure I* readily becomes identified as the soul by Stein and other phenomenologists. The soul is the fount of our specific ego and of our individual spirit and personality. Phenomenologists, however, argue over whether the transcendent self is manifested in transcendent forms or types that shape our particular individuality.

A dilemma for Husserl's students, including Stein, concerns the independence of the objects outside our consciousness.⁴¹ What, for example, is the relationship between our counting to 5 and the number 5 itself. What is the relationship between the act, the naming, and the number?

Stein also reasons through the image of cherry trees in our garden. She notes that we see that they are in bloom. As a realist she reasons that these objects pre-exist our consciousness and language, but our grasp and understanding of the blooming cherries depend upon structures of our consciousness, our language, linguistic categories and modes of thinking; otherwise the pure form 'cherry' cannot have content for us.⁴² Jonna Bornemark labels Stein's approach to religion as "mystical realism."⁴³ Kathleen Haney dubs it "transcendental realism."⁴⁴

Those phenomenologists called "transcendental idealists,"⁴⁵ representing the direction of Husserl's thought, subsequently bracketed the existence of objects outside our consciousness. Students were, therefore, to set aside the idea of the reality of objects pre-existing our conscious attention. Therein, the evidence and logic they held were insufficient to argue for their objective existence outside our consciousness and it is the structures of our consciousness that should absorb our attention. These abstract essences, the essence of the object 'cherry,' intuited through phenomenological reduction, transcend time and place and are universal.

Stein's position is not altogether consistent and clear. Recently, Antonio Calcagno, having translated Stein's *Introduction to Philosophy*, concludes that she tried to combine both the idealist and realist positions. This leads to the theory of the co-giveness of objects, an outlook highly compatible with the thinking of Aquinas and others.⁴⁶

⁴¹ Ibidem, p. 33.

⁴² E. Stein, *Finite and Eternal Being*, op. cit., p. 16.

⁴³ J. Bornemark and H. Ruin, *Introduction*, op. cit., p. 11.

⁴⁴ K. Haney, *Inviting Edith Stein into the French Debate*, [in:] *Intersubjectivity, Humanity, Being...*, op. cit., p. 441.

⁴⁵ T.F. O'Meara, *Erich Przywara...*, op. cit., p. 125.

⁴⁶ A. Calcagno, *The Philosophy of Edith Stein*, Pittsburg 2007, Chapter 7: *Die Fuelle oder das Nichts? Martin Heidegger and Edith Stein on the Question of Being*.

Stein, however, was not uncritical of Thomas. The Christian philosophy that she developed differed from Thomas on the rational path to knowledge of God. Where Thomas starts with beings in general, Stein starts, somewhat like Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*, with the I, the self, the ego, and the contingency of all things finite, and adds a special element, the question of the origins and nature of our sense of security in our own being.⁴⁷ After all the peeling away, we are left with the peeling actor, the psycho-physical self, our most intimate and immediate knowledge. But whereas Descartes' I is disembodied, Stein's is embodied and this embodiment in the intersubjective act of empathy constitutes the self and the other.

Stein goes beyond Husserl's *Pure I* and asks what is the being of which I am conscious; what is the self which is conscious of itself, and what is that which is both conscious of itself and its motion. She proceeds to explore human contingency. She observes that we live in time, in the moment, which is the meeting point of past and future. We are no longer and not yet. We can recover the past to some extent through memory, but the future is indeterminate. We are always making choices over certain possibilities, e.g. to learn to swim. Aware of our temporality and our finitude, we imagine and we desire, she claims, God is a being that is not temporal but eternal, not finite but infinite, not limited but all encompassing, a pure act, as in *Exodus*, where God is who is. We, on the other hand, are never in full possession of our being, we're always becoming. And Stein asks, what secures this ever mutating being who we are? This is a question that goes beyond First Cause argument to something more personal. As long as we are alive, our fluctuating self is sustained, she concludes, by an infinite being.⁴⁸

Stein presents contradictory perspectives in her writings. She argues that God self-discloses in all created objects (co-giveness) and human reason can reveal that, but at other times she insists that the created can be known fully only through faith and revelation. For Stein, however, the non-given is not transparent and cannot be logically described. Faith became the key. Reason alone needs faith to fathom the objects of mystery. She proclaims that "Reason would turn into unreason if it would stubbornly content itself with what it is able to discover with its own light, barring out everything which is made visible to it by a brighter and more sublime light."⁴⁹ Stein takes a leap into faith that

⁴⁷ E. Stein, *Finite and Eternal Being*, op. cit., p. 58. See also: K. Schudt, *Edith Stein's Proof...*, op. cit., pp. 122–123.

⁴⁸ E. Stein, *Finite and Eternal Being*, op. cit., p. 58.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 22.

Husserl does not. Although Husserl left open the possibility of seeing visions as a source of religious experience, he regarded faith as not relevant to philosophy. Regarding this leap of faith, Stein cites the words in Aesop's Fables, #209: "hic Rhodus, hic salta" ("here is Rhodes, jump here").⁵⁰

Stein's personal theological turn involves three turns: 1. Turn to religion, 2. Turn to Christianity, 3. Turn to Catholic theology.

The geographical and socio-historical context of Stein's intellectual and spiritual development is essential to understanding the character of her theological turn to Christianity, rather than Buddhism or revisionist forms of Judaism. In the Germany of the time when Stein entered the university, phenomenology had won the hearts and minds of many philosophically minded students. Stein made the difficult choice in of leaving her family and friends in Breslau to follow Husserl, the Master, as he was dubbed, of phenomenology to the University of Göttingen. Eventually she followed him to Freiburg to complete and defend her doctoral thesis and receive her doctoral degree on August 3, 1916.

Turn to Religion

We must ask with regard to Stein, as she moved into the realm of non-given, what method for understanding was part of the tool kit of her time? The most influential options were impersonal deism or theism in its various types, varieties of Judaism and varieties of Christianity. We do not know whether Stein ever studied Eastern religions, though various German philosophers and writers did. Stein never encountered Jewish theology or philosophy, apart from Spinoza. For example, I see no reference in her writing to Neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen or phenomenologist Emmanuel Levinas or intersubjective analysts such as Martin Buber. Stein, however, did admire Spinoza highly, and in 1926 requested from the General Vicariat of Speyer permission, which was granted, to keep in her possession Spinoza's complete works along with three books by Bergson, and one apiece from Hume, Kant and Locke, to assist in her study of the relationship between modern philosophers and Aquinas.⁵¹ She, however, never cites Spinoza's

⁵⁰ Edith Stein to Sr. Adelgundis Jaegerschmid, February 16, 1930 (E. Stein, *Self-Portrait in Letters...*, op. cit., p. 60). See also: her analogy of the "leap into the abyss... The believer leaps across lightly, the unbeliever stops this side of the precipice," [in:] *Finite and Eternal Being*, op. cit., p. 110, and to the wager (reminiscent of Pascal's wager) in her letter to Roman Ingarden, November 20, 1927 (*Letters to Roman Ingarden*, op. cit., p. 263).

⁵¹ Edith Stein to the General Vicariate, Speyer on the Rhine, February 21, 1926 (*Self-Portrait in Letters...*, op. cit., pp. 49–50).

understanding of his core concept of infinitude in her religious development. Nowhere does she write of outstanding rabbis in the synagogues she attended with her mother before and after her conversion. Among her phenomenological circle of associates and friends were a remarkable number of Jews, and, as much as I can glean, other Jews among her Jewish teachers and friends, with few exceptions, either suspended their beliefs or converted to some denomination of Christianity. Henri Bergson's writings certainly influenced Stein's philosophical thinking - but not her religious orientation.

When Stein abandoned Judaism in her early teens, she became an unbeliever in a broad sense – i.e. she did not become an atheist, but rather an agnostic and indifferent to questions of religion. For her, phenomenology served as her religion. But let me be clear; Stein never abandoned her ethnic pride. She delighted in the fact that she was connected with Jesus physically, as she told her Jesuit confessor, Father Hirschmann, “You don't know what it means to me to be a daughter of the chosen people – to belong to Christ, not only spiritually, but according to the flesh.”⁵² And, further, she never tried to convert any believing Jew to Christianity. Her foremost concern became unbelieving Jews and Christians.⁵³

In tracking Stein's turn toward religious experience, we find that as early as 1913 and '14, Stein no longer ruled out religious experiences as phenomena to investigate. The phenomenologist philosopher Max Scheler, about whom I will speak again in connection with Stein's learning about Catholicism, was responsible. Stein writes that he was a genius, and his study *Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values...* probably affected the entire intellectual world of recent decades even more than Husserl's *Ideas*. The young phenomenologists were greatly influenced by Scheler; some ...depended more on him than on Husserl. Stein found stirring, Scheler's insistence on “radical intellectual honesty.”⁵⁴ When Stein met him, he was working out his theory of sympathy, a focus on emotional objects corresponding to Stein's focus on empathy as an object. During her first two years at Göttingen, Scheler rivaled Husserl in attracting philosophy students. In Scheler's remarks on religion, Stein writes, Scheler opened for her:

⁵² Posselt quotes Stein's words to Daniel Feuling [in:] *Edith Stein: The Life...*, op. cit., p. 109. His recollection of this incident appears in his *Short Biographical Sketch of Edith Stein*, [in:] *Never Forget: Christian and Jewish Perspectives on Edith Stein*, W. Herbstrith (ed.), transl. S. Bartzdorff, Washington DC, 1998, pp. 260–263.

⁵³ G. Stein, *My Experience with my Aunt Edith Stein*, [in:] *Never Forget...*, op. cit., p. 55.

⁵⁴ E. Stein, *Life...*, op. cit., pp. 258–259.

a region of phenomena which I could then no longer bypass blindly. With good reason, we were repeatedly enjoined to observe all things without prejudice, to discard all possible "blindness." The barriers of rationalistic prejudices... fell, and the world of faith unfolded before me.⁵⁵

When Stein was working on her dissertation in 1915 and 1916, she had not yet examined the field of faith, but religion surfaces a few times in her dissertation. The final section of her dissertation is titled *Empathy as the understanding of Spiritual Persons*. This is a curious section. Stein's use of spirit (*Geist*) should not be confused with a spiritual or religious person, but, rather, is a term for the aspect of the individual's consciousness that is separate from natural and physical forms. In the early 1920s, Stein further fleshes out the dynamic interplay between our physical and psychological attributes and experiences and our distinct mental and spiritual aspects. Stein rejected psychological determinism and insisted on the human capacity for free will. She viewed that freedom emanated from one's spirit. She understands that spirit is a facet of the *Pure I* that Husserl expounds. Still, it is in this section of her dissertation when she considers the possibility of an individual empathizing with a personality type very different from their own that she invokes the religious person. She writes:

I can be skeptical myself and still understand that another sacrifices all his earthly goods to his faith. I see him behave in this way and empathize a value experiencing as the motive for his conduct... I empathically gain the type of *homo religiosus* by nature foreign to me, and I understand it even though what newly confronts me here will always remain unfulfilled.⁵⁶

She goes on to insist on our making an effort of transcending our self-structure, lest "we take the self as the standard [and] lock ourselves into the prison of our individuality. Others become riddles for us, or still worse, we remodel them into our image and so falsify historical truth." This quotation shows the vital openness of Stein's phenomenology and personality. It relates to her value for objectivity, but reveals more – her recognition that personal growth demands openness to others unlike ourselves, no matter how different from ourselves, a philosophy that I wish prevailed in our world today.

In this same section of *On Empathy*, Stein speculates on religious personalities:

⁵⁵ Ibidem, p. 260.

⁵⁶ E. Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, op. cit., p. 115.

There have been people who thought that in a sudden change of their person they experienced the effect of the grace of God, others who felt themselves to be guided in their conduct by a protective spirit...Who can say whether there is genuine experience present here or whether there is that unclarity about our motives which we found in considering the 'idols of self knowledge'?

Then Stein asks:

is the essential possibility of genuine experience in this area already given with the delusions of such experience?... the study of religious consciousness seems to me to be the most appropriate means of answering our question... However, I leave the answering of this question to further investigation and satisfy myself here with a 'non liquet,' It is not clear.⁵⁷

A year later, by 1917, if not before, Stein found herself searching for clarity phenomenologically. She immersed herself in questions of religion. She has begun writing about metaphysics. She remarks to Roman Ingarden:

I find that many people will cut all corners (to totally avoid the religious experience) though it is impossible to conclude a teaching on person without going into the God question, and it is impossible to understand history. Of course, I am still not at all clear about this... It is THE question that interests me. When you return, perhaps we can read Augustine together.⁵⁸

At the same time, though devastated by Adolf Reinach's death, she and his widow Anne prepared his literary remains for publication. Among these was a paper on the philosophy of religion written while in the battlefield. Reinach stressed the idea of security that God gave finite individuals. This security, for her, appears in her image of being cradled in God's arms as a child in her parents' arms,⁵⁹ an image that kindles her thinking phenomenologically about the possibility of a divine being in new ways, as I will explain shortly.

⁵⁷ Ibidem, p. 118.

⁵⁸ Edith Stein to Roman Ingarden, February 20, 1917 (*Letters to Roman Ingarden*, op. cit., pp. 49–50).

⁵⁹ E. Stein, *Finite and Eternal Being*, op. cit., p. 58.

Turn to Christianity

By 1918, four years before her conversion, Stein, evident in her correspondence with Roman Ingarden, is already discussing the philosophy of religion with Husserl and Heidegger and anticipating her “the great decision” ahead.⁶⁰ She has delved into a number of major Protestant and Catholic religious writings: *The Gospel of Luke*, Schleiermacher’s *Sermons*, writings by Heinrich Scholz (Protestant Theologian and University of Breslau Professor of Religion), Selma Lagerlöf’s *Christuslegenden*, a collection of German religious poems in the *Bücher der Rose*, Josef Kreitmaier’s essay on Expressionism and Dostoyevsky’s *The Brothers Karamazov*. She informs Ingarden that she was impressed by Möhler’s *Symbolik* and later Scheebben’s *Mysterien des Christentums*: “a book I very much love and value. It is the first work, or one of the first, that after the great flood of rationalism, placed itself again quite decisively in support of the supernatural and became fundamental for the entirely new dogmatics.”⁶¹ Stein is also engaged in conversations with Gerda Walther about mysticism and parapsychology, the latter a field of interest to Henri Bergson and William James and other philosophers.⁶² By October 10th, 1918, Stein writes to Ingarden: “I have overcome all the obstacles and increasingly have a thoroughly positive view of Christianity.”⁶³

During her summer with her closest friend, philosopher Hedwig Conrad Martius, and before Stein read *The Life of Saint Teresa by Herself*, she was actively discussing religious questions. She describes Hedwig’s work *Metaphysical Conversations*, which investigates the soul and ontology in general, as “indescribably wonderful.” In the same letter to Roman Ingarden, not mentioned in Stein scholarship, Stein began a treatise on the philosophy of religion at the same time! She also predicts that “Presumably, in the future, I will work only in this area.”⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Edith Stein to Roman Ingarden, October 12, 1918 (*Letters to Roman Ingarden*, op. cit., p. 41).

⁶¹ Edith Stein to Roman Ingarden, September 24, 1918 (ibidem, p. 131) and October 12, 1918 (ibidem, p. 141), and November 8, 1927 (ibidem, p. 259).

⁶² Edith Stein to Roman Ingarden, August 7, 1917 (ibidem, p. 77).

⁶³ Edith Stein to Roman Ingarden, October 10, 1918 (ibidem, p. 139).

⁶⁴ Edith Stein to Roman Ingarden, August 30, 1921 (ibidem, p. 188).

Turn to Catholicism

Why did she become Catholic rather than Protestant? Stein wrote that she searched a long time before she found the religious answers she needed. These, she found in St. Teresa's autobiography, which she spent a night reading during her 1921 summer stay with the Theodor Conrad and Hedwig Conrad-Martius, both Jewish converts to Protestantism. Stein's reverence for Theresa is all the more interesting because Hedwig was at that time her closest and dearest friend. Still, it was this book that set the seal on her choice of which form of Christianity.⁶⁵

Despite Stein's words, Przywara (1889–1972), the distinguished Jesuit theologian and insightful mentor of Stein, and who was, as well, a prolific writer and fervent anti-Nazi, challenges Stein's claim to Hedwig of Teresa's autobiography's catalytic role. Przywara reported a different turning point: We were walking along the bank of the Rhein in Speyer when she told me that while still an atheist she found in the bookstore she frequented, a copy of [Ignatius Loyola's] *Spiritual Exercises*. It interested her first only as a study of psychology, but she quickly realized that it was not something to read but to do. So as an atheist, she made, along with the little book, the long retreat and finished the thirty days with the decision to convert.⁶⁶ What troubles me about Przywara's alternate account is that Stein was not an atheist at any point in her life. She was an agnostic or skeptic. Also, as I've suggested already, Stein had already moved toward Christianity, even if she had not identified which form of Christianity.

Assuming that Stein's own words matter and Teresa's autobiography acted as a catalyst to her decision to convert to Catholicism, then how did it? Should her experience with this book fall under the category of life experiences or a consequence of her phenomenology? Both, I argue, come to play.

I can readily appreciate Stein's attraction to Teresa's autobiography. Teresa also experienced deep depression and psychological exhaustion and wrestled with suffering and death. She too was a woman of power and leadership.

⁶⁵ Ibidem, fn. 4, p. 189, includes a substantial discussion of Stein's reading of Teresa of Avila's autobiography and its relation to Stein's conversion. It makes special reference to Stein's explanation to Johannes Hirschmann of the autobiography's pivotal impact. According to Posselt, *Edith Stein: The Life...*, op. cit., Stein told her and Hedwig Conrad-Martius of the autobiography's influence. Nowhere, however, did Stein leave a written account of her experience. See: Posselt's *Edith Stein: The Life...*, editors' extensive discussion in footnote 3 of Ch. 7, 246 and in their "gleanings 4," pp. 292–293. See also: Edith Stein to Roman Ingarden, January 1, 1928 (*Letters to Roman Ingarden*, op. cit., p. 266).

⁶⁶ T.F. O'Meara, *Erich Przywara...*, op. cit., p. 121. Przywara cites his "Die Frage Edith Stein," *In und Gegen*, Nuremberg 1955, p. 72.

Teresa's entrepreneurial and risk taking radical reform and transformation of the Carmelite order in the face of considerable resistance and the terror of the Inquisition no doubt thrilled Stein. Further, Teresa was dedicated to a contemplative life; she combined intellectual passions with a deep emotional and mystical relationship with God. A reading of Teresa's account reveals a vigorously thinking woman, for example in her careful, complex delineation of the nature of prayer.

We can consider other factors in Stein's turn to Catholicism, such as her pleasure in Catholic churches being open to worshippers beyond set services, her visits to Catholic monasteries with the Protestant Conrads and her relish in reading Latin texts. Stein's mastery of Latin surely shaped Professor Gertrud Koebner's conclusion after a conversation with Stein, "It was because the Lutheran Church had none of this that she could never be a Lutheran."⁶⁷ Possibly, Stein's anti-nationalism and universalistic outlook along with her identification with the minority and persecuted state of Catholicism historically in Prussia were further elements.⁶⁸

Phenomenology again appears as an influence when we examine Stein's regard for Max Scheler, whom I earlier discussed. Stein underscores his Catholicism:

I do not know in which year Scheler returned to the Catholic Church... he was full of Catholic ideas at the time and employed all the brilliance of his spirit and his eloquence to plead them. This was my first encounter with this hitherto totally unknown world.⁶⁹

I suspect Stein's emphasis upon the body as central to the empathic act, as well as the constitution of the person inclined her toward Catholicism more than Lutheranism. While all Christian denominations pose a tension, if not a dualism, between the mind and body, or soul and body, the antinomy is more muted in Catholicism. Stein may have found in many Catholic texts a fuller acceptance of the body as God's creation than in most Protestant texts. For example, the very idea that one has intimacy with God's body in the experience of transubstantiation of wine and bread is utterly alien to the dominant Protestant view of the sacrament as essentially a spiritual or cerebral intimacy or simply a symbolic event. Similarly, Catholic iconography of Jesus as baby and

⁶⁷ Waltraud Herbstrith quotes the recollection of Professor Gertrude Koebner, *Edith Stein: A Biography*, transl. B. Bonowitz, OCSO, San Francisco 1992, p. 71.

⁶⁸ E. Stein, *Life...*, pp. 168–169, 190.

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 260.

as adult on the cross highlights his humanness and physical reality. Indeed, this is closer to Stein's Jewish upbringing in which God becomes immanent and physical in the burning bush.

I offer two conclusions: (1), the combined influence and affirmation of Stein's life experiences, her devotion to Thomas and other theologians, along with her devotion to Husserl and the philosophy of phenomenology typifies all aspects of Stein's thought. Throughout all of Stein's published writings, whether on empathy, on being and personhood, on the state, on community, on women, on education, and in her correspondence, we can see her drive to integrate, reconcile, combine, a kind of irenic, peace-loving impulse. Thomas offered a model, but her striving carried into all matters. Przywara underscored how the Carmelites served as a hybrid site for reconciling her past, present and desired future.⁷⁰ Carmel spirituality rested on the life and words of the prophet Elijah. Carmel and Israel came together in the order. Stein had not abandoned her Jewish ethnic identity nor major elements of Jewish belief and worship, as these are evident in Carmel's six pointed star of David in their sacred art and their worship beginning with the Jewish declaration of monotheistic faith, *Schma Israel*.⁷¹ Carmel also prized prayer and intellectual endeavor, and Stein found a haven for her research and writing. She could remain faithful to Husserl and Aquinas, other medieval thinkers, as well as classical Greek and Latin thinkers. An essay of mine, published in the *Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion* treats Stein's ability to join together her worship of both Queen Esther and Jesus' mother, Mary. Relatedly, she integrates both secular feminist views on women based upon a phenomenological analysis with Christian texts, to pioneer a Christian Feminism - which some would claim is debatable just as is the concept of Christian philosophy.⁷²

My second conclusion is (2) Stein scholars are very familiar and often daunted by her response to queries about her conversion when she uttered *secretum meum mihi*. These were the words which Protestant Hedwig Conrad-Martius reported were Stein's response when Hedwig asked her about her attraction to Christianity and to Catholicism. She simply did not want to share with others her reasons for her theological turn. Harm Kleuting, Professor of Church history and theology and a priest in the Archdiocese of Cologne claims, however, that *secretum*, which scholars hold is taken from the Jewish Bible, does

⁷⁰ T.F. O'Meara, *Erich Przywara...*, op. cit., p. 126.

⁷¹ E. Stein, *The Prayer of the Church*, [in:] *The Hidden Life: Hagiographic Essays, Meditations, Spiritual Texts*, [in:] *Collected Works of Edith Stein*, vol. 4, L. Gelber and M. Linssen (eds.), transl. W. Stein, Washington DC 1992, p. 7.

⁷² J. Berkman, *Esther and Mary...*, op. cit., pp. 55-74.

not mean secret in all versions of the Jewish Bible. And contrary to the views of other scholars, he argues that Stein was not quoting the Bible, but St. John of the Cross, who voiced these words when he was imprisoned in 1578 Toledo. Therein, John was citing both the Jewish Bible and Corinthians 12:4. Kleuting speculates that Stein may have come across St. John's words in 1918, when Husserl gave a lecture on Otto's earlier mentioned book *The Idea of the Holy*, in which St. John is quoted.⁷³

In sum, Stein did not keep her religious evolution a secret. She has directly and indirectly left many clues to her spiritual development. An understanding of her three intellectual and spiritual turns reveal the nature of the evolution of Stein's philosophy and theology. They also invite us to reflect on the relationships between our experience and our intellectual and spiritual development within our historical context.

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⁷³ H. Kleuting, *Edith Stein and John of the Cross...*, op. cit., pp. 470–471.

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Plutarch of Chaeronea – the Concept of Principles

Plutarch z Cheronei – koncepcja zasad

ABSTRACT: This article attempts to reconstruct the concept of the principles of the world in Plutarch of Chaeronea. For this purpose, four of his works were analysed: *On the E at Delphi*, *Isis and Osiris*, *The Obsolescence of Oracles*, and *On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus*. It was attempted to point out that it is hard to find consistency in the Middle Platonist's theological and cosmological views. One time, following Plato, he writes about the highest efficient cause – transcendent God, whom he calls good, the reason, father and creator of the whole of reality. Another time, he refers to the views of the “Old Academy,” i.e. the concept of the One (*Hen*) and the indefinite Dyad (*aoristos Dyas*) as the highest principles. Moreover, citing Plato, Plutarch mentions the eternal cause responsible for the evil in the created world. However, a characteristic feature of Plutarch's thought is the concept of the transcendent cause of reality as a whole. Not only will that idea and the one of an immanent reason – Logos affect the later Platonists, but it will also inspire the first representatives of Christian philosophy.

KEY WORDS: God, Middle Platonists, theology, transcendence, Plutarch of Chaeronea

ABSTRAKT: W artykule podjęto próbę rekonstrukcji koncepcji zasad Plutarcha z Cheronei. W tym celu przeanalizowano cztery jego dzieła: *O E delfickim*, *O Izydzie i Ozyryście*, *O zamilknięciu wyroczni* i *O powstaniu duszy w Timajosie*. Starano się wskazać, że trudno jest znaleźć spójność w teologiczno-kosmologicznych poglądach medioplatonika. Raz za Platonem pisze on bowiem o jedynej, najwyższej przyczynie świata – transcendentnym Bogu, którego nazywa dobrym, ojcem i twórcą całokształtu rzeczywistości. Innym razem natomiast odwołuje się do poglądów Starej Akademii, tzn. nauki o Jedni (*Hen*) i nieokreślonej Diadzie (*aoristos Dyas*) jako najwyższych zasadach. Ponadto, powołując się na Platona, Plutarch wzmiankuje o przyczynie odpowiadającej za zło w utworzonym świecie. Jednakże cechą charakterystyczną dla myśli Plutarcha jest nauka o transcendentnej przyczynie całokształtu rzeczywistości. Pogląd ten oraz koncepcja o immanentnym w świecie rozumie – Logosie wpłyną nie

tylko na późniejszych platoników, ale zainspirują również pierwszych przedstawicieli filozofii chrześcijańskiej.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: Bóg, medioplantonizm, teologia, transcendencja, Plutarch z Cheroni

In *Delta of Metaphysics*, Aristotle presents the definition of the principle of the beginning (ἀρχή). In a brief summary, he concludes that: “The characteristic feature of all the principles – beginnings is that they are the source from which existence, creation or cognition originates. However, some of the principles are internal (ἐνυπαρχουσαι), others external (ἐκτός).”¹ As Stagirit points out, the idea (ἀρχή) is a source – a cause that enables the creation and learning of things. According to him, the *first science* (ἡ πρώτη), which he called theology (θεολογική), deals with the first principles – causes of the whole reality.² In this article, I would like to address this very science and reconstruct the concept of the first principles, which we can find in the writings of Middle Platonist Plutarch of Chaeronea, who lived at the turn of the 1st and 2nd centuries.³ In my work, I will attempt to show the validity of the thesis that the Plutarch’s writings that survived until our times contain no single coherent science regarding the first principles.⁴ Moreover, I would like to emphasise that Middle Platonism is not a uniform trend since we can find different decisions concerning theological and cosmological issues in its representatives’ works.

Many of Plutarch’s works have been preserved to this day. The Lamprias catalogue lists 227 titles of his writings.⁵ Eighty-three of these are considered authentic, nonetheless, as the Dobrochna Dembińska-Siury emphasises, this

¹ Aristotle, *Metafizyka* (Metaphysics), *Księga Delta* (Book of Delta) (V), 1013a, transl. K. Leśniak, Warsaw 2013.

² Cf. ibidem, *Księga Epsilon* (Book of Epsilon) (VI), 1025b–126a.

³ Through referring to Aristotle terminology, I would like to stress that the concepts of principle and theology were not unknown to the then thinkers and were used by Plutarch himself in this sense; cf. Plutarch, *Iris and Osiris* (Περὶ Ἰσίδος καὶ Ὀσιριδος), 382C, transl. A. Pawlaczek, Poznań 2003; cf. also: A. Baron, *Neoplatoniska idea Boga a ewangelizacja* (Neo-Platonic Idea of God and Evangelisation), Krakow 2005, pp. 87–89. *Plato’s Lecture on the Sciences* (Διδασκαλικὸς τῶν Πλάτωνος δογματῶν) originated in Platonic environments of the 2nd century AD (several years after Plutarch died) by Alcinous, who uses the Aristotelian meaning of the concepts of principle (cause) and theology also confirms the vitality of these concepts in the philosophical discourse of those times; cf. Alcinous, *Wykład nauk Platona* (*Didaskalikos*), III 153–154; VIII 162, transl. K. Pawłowski, Krakow 2008.

⁴ Thereby I will engage in a polemic with G. Karamanolis, who claims that Plato, based on Plato’s thought, has created a coherent philosophical system, cf. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/plutarch/> [access: 8.05.2019].

⁵ Cf. M. Treu, *Der sogenante Lampriaskatalog der plutarchischen Schriften*, Waldenburg 1873.

number is not complete, since 18 works attributed to Plutarch today are not included in this catalogue, as are 15 others not preserved, but mentioned by indirect sources.⁶

Plutarch's writings address religious, historical and political issues, but above all moral ones. Among his works, we can also find ones, which raise theological and cosmological matters. It is this analysis that I would like to limit myself to in this article. This group includes *On the E at Delphi*, *Isis and Osiris*, *The Obsolescence of Oracles*, and *On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus*. I will discuss those writings in the order as mentioned above. I will not follow the chronology of the creation since there is a great difficulty in determining it.⁷ Moreover, I believe that their analysis of such an order will make the Plutarch's idea of the first principles more accessible, thus facilitating its better understanding.

In this article, I will bring closer the common points as well as the differences present in the afore-mentioned Plutarch's texts (the first thesis). I will also refer to the thoughts of the philosopher of Chaeronea that had been rejected by later Middle Platonist philosophers such as Apuleius of Madaura and Alcinous. The above is to allow showing some change in the Middle Platonic thought itself, and thus emphasise that there is no unanimity in the Platonic environment of the 1st and 2nd centuries.⁸

The theological thought of Plutarch as one of the leading representatives of Middle Platonism is crucial since it makes it possible not only to understand this philosophical trend but also observe the form in which Platonism was present in the Roman Empire, and how it influenced the next generations of pagan philosophers and the first representatives of Christian thought.

⁶ Cf. D. Dembińska-Siury, *Literatura filozoficzna za cesarstwa* (Philosophical Literature Under the Empire), [in:] *Literatura Grecji starożytnej* (Literature of Ancient Greece), vol. 2, H. Podbielski (ed.), Lublin 2005, p. 849.

⁷ Cf. *ibidem*.

⁸ When discussing the medieval thought, Italian researcher G. Reale tries to compare the main problems and solutions proposed by this trend in a uniform and synthetic way; cf. G. Reale, *Historia filozofii starożytnej* (History of Ancient Philosophy), vol. 4, transl. E.I. Zieliński, Lublin 1999, pp. 325–437. On the other hand, as I have mentioned before, I intend to show the differences and changes in the views of Middle Platonists, thus avoiding any unauthorised generalization.

On the E at Delphi

In accordance with the above order, I will begin with an analysis of the work titled *On the E at Delphi* (Περὶ τοῦ ΕΙ τοῦ τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς). Plutarch addressed this letter to his friend Sarapion and described in it the discussion that had taken place a few years earlier about the letter *E* placed on the fronton of the temple in Delphi.⁹ The discussants wanted to answer the question of why that letter had been placed there. As Plutarch points out: “Certainly not by chance, nor as if by drawing, the only one among the letters has found itself in an honourable place with God and gained the character of a holly votive meant to be watched.”¹⁰ His teacher, Ammonius, spoke after long debates. His speech ended the dialogue, which suggests that it was the most appropriate one. Plutarch, therefore, acts like Plato, who not alone, but through his teacher or another person, presents his views.

Well, I don’t think – says Plutarch with Ammonius’ mouth – that this letter means a number or a place in order, or a coherence or any other of the dependent parts of speech. It is a self-sufficient phrase and statement to God, introducing at the same time the one who speaks into the consciousness of the essence of God.¹¹

As he further stresses, on the temple in Delphi, there is the inscription “get to know yourself” (γνώθι σεαυτὸν), which is interpreted as a greeting from God. When responding *EI*, or “you are,” we emphasize His nature – existence (τὸ εἶναι).¹² “For we – he continues – actually have no part in life, but every mortal being between birth and death represents only a spectre and a blurred and unstable appearance of itself.”¹³

In the further part of the dialogue, Plutarch shows us a variable reality in which everything becomes and nothing is the same, as well as the Divine Reality – constant and unchangeable. In the variable reality in which we live, the leading senses mislead us as we take what appears to us as truly existing.¹⁴ In the second one, however, there is no change, movement or time, due to which

⁹ The discussion recalled by Plutarch probably took place in 67 A.D., when Nero was visiting Delphi; cf. Plutarch, *O E delfickim* (On the E at Delphi), 385 B, [in:] *Moralia II* (Morals II), transl. Z. Abramowiczówna, Warsaw 1988.

¹⁰ Plutarch, *O E delfickim* (On the E at Delphi), op. cit., 385A.

¹¹ Ibidem, 391F–392A.

¹² Cf. ibidem, 392A. In Greek, *EI* is a form of the verb ‘to be’ and means ‘you are.’

¹³ Ibidem, 392A–B.

¹⁴ Cf. ibidem, 392E–F.

we define something as past or future. As Plutarch points out, what exists belongs to the other reality:

God exists (if it must be stated) and does not exist at any time, but in immovable, timeless eternity not knowing deviations, where there is nothing first or later, nothing future or past, nothing older or younger. God, being the only one, fills the only present with an eternal existence. And only this is truly what is like Him: what neither has happened nor will happen; what neither has begun nor will end.¹⁵

Through the mouth of his teacher Ammonius, Plutarch also points out that the invariability of God indicates His unity, so that He cannot be a multiplicity, that is, unlike people He cannot have any parts: “For the deity is not a multiplicity, just as each of us, who are made up of thousands of components resulting from the changes, and we are a collection of various elements mixed disorderly.”¹⁶ Only God, as an absolute unity, is entitled to a true existence.

We can conclude from the above findings that God cannot be subject to sensory perception, because He is not material or composed of parts. Therefore, referring to Stoic thought, Plutarch states:

However, this is not even worth listening to about His [God’s – author’s note] changes and transformations, when He would burn with the whole universe, as they say, or thicken and descend again, turning into earth, sea, winds, living beings and experience the hard turns of fate of animals and plants.¹⁷

The philosopher from Chaeronea also points out that God does not annihilate the world, but is the principle that makes it last. The following words confirm that: “On the contrary, God brings together everything that the universe can contain within itself and protects the weakness of the matter that seeks to annihilate.”¹⁸ At the end of the argument, Plutarch returns once again to the words “get to know yourself” (*γνώθι σεαυτὸν*) and “you are” (*ΕΙ*), thus stressing the difference between God and man:

Although the phrases “you are” and “get to know yourself” seem to contradict each other to some extent, to a certain extent, they agree. The first one, with

¹⁵ Ibidem, 393A–B.

¹⁶ Ibidem, 393B.

¹⁷ Ibidem, 393D–E.

¹⁸ Ibidem, 394A.

fear and reverence, proclaims God as eternally existing, while the second one is to remind mortals of their nature and their weakness.¹⁹

In conclusion, it should be noted that in the last part of *On the E at Delphi* Plutarch divides the whole reality into a variable (sensual) one in which man lives, and a genuinely existing one – constant, unchangeable, belonging to and defining God. The indicated difference between these two dimensions reveals Plutarch's belief that beyond the emotional sphere, there is also such one in which time, change and materiality do not occur. God belongs to this second one, as an absolute way, an immaterial and perfect oneness without any parts, and a principle of order and harmony in the sensual world.

Isis and Osiris

The issues addressed in *On the E at Delphi* are developed in the work *Isis and Osiris* (*Περί Ισιδος και Οσιριδος*). In this letter, when explaining to his friend, priestess Cleo,²⁰ the Egyptian myth about the god Osiris and the goddess Isis, Plutarch states: “we should – provided it is in human power – study the doctrine of the gods”²¹ since “the pursuit of truth, especially about gods, is a manifestation of the pursuit of the divine, for it includes, as it were, acquisition of knowledge about the Causes of Saints in its study and search.”²² The philosopher of Chaeronea wants to achieve this goal through the cognitive recognition, because only in this way can the nature of the gods be properly represented and properly worshipped: “The follower of Isis is someone who seeks by reason and reflects upon the truth contained in what is shown and fulfilled in the rites of worship of these gods.”²³

Plutarch indicates that the Egyptian myths contain the truth about these sacred issues. And whatever it is, it does not change the fact that the theology

¹⁹ Ibidem, 394C.

²⁰ Cf. Plutarch, *Isis and Osiris*, 364D-E, transl. A. Pawlaczyk, Poznań 2003. The Middle Platonist also dedicates a treatise entitled *On the Virtues of Women* to Cleo. That work was translated by J. Szymańska-Doroszewska into Polish and published in “*Studia Antyczne i Mediewistyczne*” 5/40 (2007), pp. 26–64.

²¹ Plutarch, *O Izydzie i Ozyrysie* (*Isis and Osiris*), op. cit., 351.

²² Ibidem, 352E.

²³ Ibidem, 352C.

of the Egyptians contains wisdom.²⁴ Therefore, when instructing Cleo, the Middle Platonist adds:

So, when you hear what myths the Egyptians tell about the gods, their changes, wanderings, tears and many such cruel events, remember what was said before and do not think that what they describe happened or was done accurately as presented.²⁵

After these preliminary explanations, Plutarch invokes the myth of Osiris and Isis, and their struggles with God Typhon.²⁶ Presenting numerous conflicts and intrigues of the gods, he states:

For if such horrible things are said and acknowledged about the blessed and indestructible nature of the deity, as we understand it to be, according to Aeschylus's words, "it is necessary to spit and cleanse the mouth," I need not remind you of that, Cleo. You yourself do not respect those who have such perverse and barbaric views of the gods.²⁷

By emphasizing the sense of his statement, the philosopher compares a myth to a rainbow which, being a colourful reflection of sunlight and broken in a cloud, returns to the eye. Thus, a myth is only a reflection of truth; it refers our mind to something else, as behind its robe there is a more profound – philosophical – meaning, showing us the principles (causes) of the whole reality.²⁸

Before explaining the Egyptian myth, Plutarch also points out that as per the Persian and Greek religions and Chaldeans' beliefs, there is a cause of good and evil in the world.²⁹ The same is true of the Egyptian beliefs, therefore the

²⁴ Cf. *ibidem*, 354C.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, 355B.

²⁶ Cf. *ibidem*, 355D–358E.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, 358E.

²⁸ Cf. *ibidem*, 358F–359A. It is worth noting that the philosopher from Chaeronea uses the allegoretic method in his search for the truth of myth. More information about this method used in antiquity, cf. J. Zieliński, *Jerozolima, Ateny, Aleksandria. Greckie źródła pierwszych nurtów filozofii chrześcijańskiej* (Jerusalem, Athens, Alexandria: Greek Sources of the First Movements of Christian Philosophy), Wrocław 2000, pp. 94–126; M. Szram, *Duchowy sens liczby w allegorycznej exegizie Aleksandryjskiej (II–V) w.* (The Spiritual Meaning of Numbers in Allegorical Alexandria Exegesis [II–V century]), Lublin 2001; M. Domaradzki, *Filozofia antyczna wobec problemu interpretacji: rozwój alegorezy od przedsokratyków do Aristotelesa* (Philosophy Antique to the Problem of Interpretation: Development of Allegoresis from Pre-Socrats to Aristotle), Poznań 2013.

²⁹ Cf. Plutarch, *O Izydzie i Ozyrysie* (Isis and Osiris), *op. cit.*, 369E–370D.

Middle Platonist, to confirm the validity of the thesis, recalls the testimony of Plato, who in his late work *The Laws* mentions the existence of a good and a bad soul in the world.³⁰ Based on the beliefs of other religions and the authority of Plato and his words, Plutarch moves to explain the myth of Isis and Osiris.

For Plutarch, the Egyptian Osiris is the same as the Logos,³¹ which is the eternal, unchanging good, and after Plato³² is called the mental element, idea, model, and father of the world as well.³³ That shows that the Middle Platonist considers the Egyptian Osiris as the first principle (ἀρχή) that contributes to the existence of the whole reality. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that this concept of efficient cause does not contradict the findings on God from *On the E at Delphi*, where the philosopher from Chaeronea pointed to the absolute existence, permanence and unity of God. This thought is developed in Isis and Osiris by adding that God is good, has world-forming power and, as a perfectly rational being, is the idea, or model, according to which the whole of reality was created. The natural consequence of showing such nature of God is to highlight His total otherness, that is, transcendence in respect to the world. To explain this, Plutarch writes: “In fact, he is [Osiris – author’s note] extremely distant from the earth, remaining unrecognizable and unseen, unblemished by any creature subjected to destruction and death.”³⁴

Plutarch accepts Isis as the second principle of the world. Being a goddess, is an eternal female element in nature, possessing the ability to take forms – ideas, thus making it possible for things to exist in the world.³⁵ It is identical with matter (ύλη), which, as Plutarch indicates, Plato calls “mother, host, seat and place of birth.”³⁶ The Middle Platonist also points out that this very principle is not bad, as:

although for both elements it is soil and matter, it always turns spontaneously towards a better being, allowing it to be born from it, and to fill its womb with outflows and images that make it rejoice in being pregnant and full (of

³⁰ Cf. *ibidem*, 370F; Platon, *Prawa* (The Laws), 896D, transl. M. Maykowska, Warsaw 1997.

³¹ Cf. Plutarch, *O Izydzie i Ozyrysie* (Isis and Osiris), op. cit., 373B.

³² Cf. *ibidem*, 372E, 373A.

³³ Cf. *ibidem*, 373E (τὸ μὲν νοητὸν καὶ ιδέαν καὶ παράδειγμα καὶ πατέρα); cf. Platon, *Timajos* (Timaeus), 50C–D, transl. P. Siwek, Warsaw, 1986.

³⁴ Plutarch, *O Izydzie i Ozyrysie* (Isis and Osiris), op. cit., 382E–F.

³⁵ Cf. *ibidem*, 372E.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, 373E (μητέρα καὶ τιθήνην ἔδραν τε καὶ χώραν γενέσεως); cf. Platon, *Timajo* (Timaeus), 50C–D.

expectations) of the birth. For the origin in the matter is a picture of being, and what is being created is an imitation of being itself.³⁷

The Supreme God – Logos, being an idea, uses this model and influences the matter, thus forming the world – the cosmos (κόσμος) called Horus by Plutarch: “Better and more divine nature consists of three elements: the mental element, the matter and their combination, which the Greeks call the cosmos. (...) Similarly, Osiris can be considered as the first principle, Isis as the receiving (matter) and Horus as the perfect fulfilment.”³⁸

However, for Plutarch, the first principle – God (Osiris) – is not connected with the world. To be precise, the philosopher from Chaeronea mentions Hermes, whom he also calls the Mind (Logos).³⁹ He describes it as a good force in the cosmos, which introduces order into it:

The Mind has brought order to the universe, combined inconsistent and contradictory parts into a coherent whole, and not destroyed the power of destruction, but only weakened it. The power of evil – as Plutarch continues – has become weak and powerless, and has therefore been combined with elements subject to sensations and transformations, becoming the driving force behind quakes and shuddering of the earth, drought and violent currents of air, as well as lightning bolts and thunders.⁴⁰

To explain why Plutarch calls both Osiris and Hermes Logos, two of its aspects should be distinguished. The first one – immanent – is the Logos located in the world and provides it with the order. The second one – transcendent – is the mind of the Supreme God, who, incorporating ideas – world patterns – is the proper model cause in relation to the material cause – the matter – and the one who, through his plan (ideas) enables the immanent Logos – the mental element (Hermes) – to introduce order into the world, thus ‘fighting’ against the cause of disorder, chaos, evil.⁴¹ Arkadiusz Baron also believes that Logos (Hermes) is an ‘emanation’ (ἀπορροή) from the first principle (Osiris). Therefore, we can speak of ‘emanating’ Logos (Hermes) from the Supreme God to

³⁷ Plutarch, *O Izydzie i Ozyrysie* (Isis and Osiris), op. cit., 372F–373A.

³⁸ Ibidem, 374A.

³⁹ Cf. ibidem, 373B.

⁴⁰ Ibidem, 373D.

⁴¹ Cf. J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, Ithaca–New York 1996, pp. 200–202.

‘curb’ the cause of evil.⁴² According to Plutarch, this principle of evil in the world is God Typhon, whose nature makes him an eternal evil soul causing the disorder. The Middle Platonist describes him as the cause of “death, sickness and confusion, as manifested in the wrong seasons and temperatures, as well as solar eclipses and moonlighting.”⁴³

Therefore, the cosmos/world appears as a place where two forces are always fighting each other, responsible for good and evil. However, Plutarch points out that Hermes/Logos has more power than Typhon, so that the world can last. Nonetheless, this advantage does not imply that the weaker power can be annihilated because then the existence of evil in the world could not be explained:

The origin and nature of the cosmos are confused and composed of two opposing forces of unequal power, but the dominion belongs to the better one. Evil is impossible to be damaged. There is a lot of dark power in the flesh and soul of every creature, and evil continually fights against good.⁴⁴

Later Middle Platonist thinkers, like Plutarch, emphasized the eternity, goodness, reasonableness and transcendence of God⁴⁵ and, more clearly than the philosopher from Chaeronea, stressed that ideas – patterns of the world are His thoughts. Alcinous presented the above most emphatically: “The idea of God is His thought.”⁴⁶ Neither in the writings of Alcinous nor of Apuleius can we find the concept of an evil soul that causes and explains evil in the world. Apuleius of Madaura mentions only the heavenly soul (*caelestem animam*), while Alcinous – the world soul (ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου), which both fulfil the function of the laws of the world, realizing the idea of the Supreme God.⁴⁷ The name of the chaotic and disordered principle, which at the same time makes this world unstable and changeable, was attributed to the first matter.

⁴² Cf. A. Baron, *Bóg w ujęciu medio-platoników* (God from the point of view of Middle Platonists), [in:] A. Baron, *Neoplatońska idea...*, op. cit., p. 90, footnote 80.

⁴³ Plutarch, *O Izydzie i Ozyrysie*, op. cit., 371B.

⁴⁴ Ibidem, 371A.

⁴⁵ Cf. Alkinous, *Wykład nauk Platona (Didaskalikos)*, transl. K. Pawłowski, Krakow 2008, X 164–166; cf. Apuleius of Madaura, *O Platonie i jego nauce* (About Plato and His Teachings), transl. by K. Pawłowski, Warsaw 2002, vol. 1, V 190, X 201–203, XI 204.

⁴⁶ Alcinous, *Wykład nauk Platona (Didaskalikos)*, op. cit., IX 163.

⁴⁷ Cf. ibidem, X 165, XIV 169; cf. Apuleius of Madaura, *O Platonie i jego nauce*, op. cit., vol. 1, IX 199–200.

According to them, it is a disorder without any shapes and qualities, which is susceptible to the formation.⁴⁸

The Obsolescence of Oracles

The next Plutarch's letter dealing with theological issues is the dialogue *The Obsolescence of Oracles* (*Περὶ τῶν ἐκλελοιπότηων χρηστηρίων*). It is addressed to Terentius Priscus, and the action takes place in Delphi.⁴⁹ The oracles, or more precisely their fall – silence, are under discussion, since “the Boeotia, once resounding with oracle's voices, has now been completely abandoned like dry streams, and great sterility in respect of divination has prevailed in this land.”⁵⁰ It is not Plutarch that speaks in the dialogue in the first person but his brother Lamprias, who also appears in *On the E at Delphi* mentioned earlier. However, as Zofia Abramowicz notes:

Plutarch reveals that the brother is his porte-parole when he says “we” when speaking of Delphic priests in § 49 [437a – author's note]. The translator adds that it was him, not Lamprias, who was Apollon's priest. Since the latter speaks the most in the dialogue and the last word belongs to him, we can assume that what we read are Plutarch's views.⁵¹

However, the discussion about the oracle's silence does not have an ultimate settlement, and Lamprias's final words sound: “These are the things – said – I advise you to consider frequently, and I want to do so myself, because they have many difficulties and contradictory assumptions, and the present moment does not allow us to enter all of them. So, for the time being, let us put them aside for later.”⁵² In the dialogue, one can find information about the number of worlds and, more importantly, the concepts of the highest principles of the whole reality, which are essential for theological considerations. Presenting these thoughts with Lamprias's mouth, Plutarch claims that: “I cannot say anything

⁴⁸ Cf. *ibidem*, VIII 162–163; cf. Apuleius, *O Platonie i jego nauce* (About Plato and His Teachings), *op. cit.*, vol. I, V 191–192.

⁴⁹ Cf. Plutarch, *O zamilknięciu wyroczni* (The Obsolescence of Oracles), § 1, 409 e–f, [in:] *Moralia. Wybór pism filozoficzno-moralnych* (Morals. Selection of Philosophical and Moral Writings), transl. Z. Abramowiczówna, Wrocław 1954.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, § 5, 411 e–f.

⁵¹ Z. Abramowiczówna, *Moralia...*, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

⁵² Plutarch, *O zamilknięciu wyroczni*, *op. cit.*, § 52, 438d–e.

more likely at least now (...), but perhaps it is better to show own views than those of others.”⁵³

Plutarch presents the concept of the two highest principles: the One (*ἕν*) and the indefinite Dyad (*ἀόριστος δυάς*). Noting that unchangeable nature, being unity, cannot alone introduce multitude we are observing into the world, and the Middle Platonist also decided to accept the existence of a principle that causes multiplicity, calling it the indefinite Dyad. He characterises both principles as follows:

As far as the two highest principles (the One and the undetermined Dyad) are concerned, the latter, being the element of all disorder and infinite formlessness, is called infinity. While, through defining and embracing the indefinite and immeasurable vacuum of infinity, the nature of the One gives it a shape and a certain ability to accept and adapt to the terms accompanying our judgments on sensual things.⁵⁴

Things in the world can be variously depicted, but as Plutarch points out, the most basic way of describing them is through numbers, and it is in these that he sees the first beings to order and define sensual things: “Then, each of the multiplicities, defined by oneness, becomes a number; and if oneness is removed, the indefinite duality mixes everything once again and introduces disorder, infinity, and immeasurability.”⁵⁵ Plutarch treats numbers as patterns – ideas to identify things in the world. Thus, through the interaction of the One and the Dyad, the creation of the first even and odd numbers is the primary distinction: “The indefinite principle creates an even number, while the more perfect one – an odd number. Among even numbers, there is two first, and from odd numbers, there is three first. Hence five is formed, which has common components with both of them, but by the quantity it is odd.”⁵⁶

The multiplicity appearing in the whole reality must, therefore, have its cause (principle), which, according to Plutarch, is the indefinite Dyad. Things, however, are made up of plurality, but they also have their unity, definition, and form, without being wholly disintegrated into multitudes. The reason for this is the One (*Hen*) that gives the shape and order to the Multiplicity (Dyad). The adoption of these two mutually interacting principles explains

⁵³ Ibidem, § 34, 428b.

⁵⁴ Ibidem, § 35, 428f–429a.

⁵⁵ Ibidem, 429a.

⁵⁶ Ibidem, 429b.

the origin of numbers, and then of mathematical subjects, and, according to Plutarch, solves the problem of the unity and multiplicity in the world. There cannot be only the principle of the unity – invariability as it being something one, inseparable cannot cause multitude, which appears to us in the sensual perception. Therefore: “If there were only pure and uninhibited oneness, nature would know no dispersion at all.”⁵⁷

Plutarch’s concept of two principles (the One and the indefinite Dyad) and the first models of the world of ideals – numbers resembles the views of Plato’s successors: Speusip of Athens and Xenocrates of Chalcedon, thus indicating that their continued unwritten study of Plato (*ἀγραφα δόγματα*) was not unknown to the Middle Platonist.⁵⁸

Not only does the philosopher from Chaeronea present the concept of the highest principles but also his interpretation of Plato’s views on the number of worlds. He claims that the above has reference to five original elements shown in *Timaeus*.⁵⁹ Moreover, believing that they correspond to these individual elements, Plutarch refers to the five highest genera of *Sophist*.⁶⁰ Thus, the earth (cube) belongs to rest because it is characterised by stability and hardness; the moving – fire (regular tetrahedron) as being characterized by mobility; the being – ether (dodecahedron) covering everything else; the difference – water (icosahedron) taking on different properties by mixing with other things; and the identity – air (octahedron) covering and permeating every being.⁶¹ To sum up, the Middle Platonist states: “If nature demands equality in everything, there may be no more or fewer worlds than those patterns, so that each of them will have the position and supreme power in each world as they have in the creation of bodies.”⁶²

In his work, Plutarch also repeatedly mentions the matter, which appears as an eternal principle of the world. Being “shaken” by the five primordial elements it contains, it is ordered by God using numbers, that is, by measure and proportion, created, as mentioned above, through the interaction of the One and the Multiplicity. For he says:

⁵⁷ Ibidem, 429d.

⁵⁸ Cf. J. Dillon, *The Heirs of Plato*, Oxford 2003, pp. 30–155; B. Dembiński, *Późny Platon i stara Akademia* (Late Plato and the Old Academy), Kęty 2010, pp. 109–170.

⁵⁹ Cf. Platon, *Timajos* (Timaeus), op. cit., 55C–D.

⁶⁰ Cf. Platon, *Sofista* (Sophist), 254B–256D, transl. W. Witwicki, Warsaw 1956.

⁶¹ Cf. Plutarch, *O zamilknieniu wyroczeni*, op. cit., § 34, 428c–428d.

⁶² Ibidem, 428c.

For it was not God who separated and dissociated the matter, but it was the matter that split itself and was wandering in a significant disorder into separate particles. However, he took it, ordered it according to measure and proportion, and then placed a rational principle in each particle, as if it were the head and guard, and created as many worlds as there were kinds of primitive bodies.⁶³

As can be seen from the quotation above, God, as stated by Plutarch, is also the guardian of the worlds, assigning to everyone the rational principle that puts them in order.

Bearing in mind the concepts of God and the One presented above, it seems that these two principles need to be identified. For God, like the One, brings clarity and harmony to what still does not have it. In Plutarch's text, however, we do not find clear arguments in favour of this thesis. Thereby, a different interpretation may be considered. Perhaps the Middle Platonist, apart from the principle of multiplicity, one, and the first principle, also assumes another eternal cause – God, who, using the results of the interaction of the One and the Dyad, introduces order into the primordial, disordered material – the matter.

In the light of the analyses conducted so far, the following question should be asked: Are the principles of the One and the Multiplicity presented by Plutarch immanent or transcendent towards the world? It seems that one should not identify the matter with the Dyad, because the Middle Platonist characterises them variously. The matter with an immanent movement caused by the primary elements is ordered by God who, with the help of mathematical objects generated by the interaction of the principles of the One (*Hen*) and Multiplicity (*Dyad*) creates five worlds. Moreover, bearing in mind the sensual world we live in, it must be said that we do not observe beings that are only oneness and only multiplicity in it, because everything, as mentioned above, includes a certain unity and multitude. Therefore, from these quotations and arguments, it is likely that both the One and the indefinite Dyad do not exist in the world but are transcendent to it.

In *The Obsolescence of Oracles*, Plutarch, therefore, presents us with a concept of two transcendent principles: the One (*Hen*) and indefinite Dyad, causing and explaining unity (definiteness) and at the same time multiplicity (disparateness) in the world. This thought does not appear in the previously analysed writings of the Middle Platonist. On the other hand, the concept of the five

⁶³ Ibidem § 37, 430e–f. It should be noted that the created worlds must be connected to each other in some way since, as it follows from the above considerations, Plutarch does not accept the existence of a vacuum.

worlds contradicts the reasoning contained *Isis and Osiris* – the idea of one world (Horus). Similarly, we do not find the concept of the One and Dyad as well as the plurality of worlds in the views of later Middle Platonists.⁶⁴ According to them, the influence of the unchangeable God on the chaotic matter created he multiplicity in the world. However, how can a constant, invariable, being affect anything? Alcinous addressed this issue when he tried to explain by analogy how the untouched God moves everything else. For he wrote: “He moves, while standing still himself, like the sun in relation to the eyesight, when he looks at it, and how the object of desire causes desire, even though it remains unmoved.”⁶⁵

On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus

On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus (Περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ ψυχογονίας) is the last of Plutarch’s works that I would like to analyse in terms of the principles of the world. It is not a dialogue, but a lecture, namely an exegesis of Plato’s text, addressed to his sons, Autobul and Plutarch.⁶⁶ The work aims to explain the concept of the soul shown on the pages of *Timaeus*. However, during his lecture, the philosopher from Chaeronea also refers to other writings of the Athenian, showing the consistency of his views: “For how could a drunken sophist, let alone Plato, be accused of so much disorder and inconsistency in what occupies him most?”⁶⁷

He begins his lecture with the presentation of his position on the issue of the soul and the origins of the world, and then supports it with Plato’s authority.

First, therefore, writes Plutarch, I will present the view I have on these matters, trusting in its similarity and explaining, as far as possible, the uniqueness and paradoxes of the lecture. Then I will join an explanation and proof to the words, reconciling them with each other.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Both Alcinous and Apuleius address the existence of one world; cf. Alcinous, *Wykład nauk Platona*, op. cit., XIV 170 – XV 171; cf. Apuleius, *O Platonie i jego nauce*, op. cit., vol. 1, VIII 197–198.

⁶⁵ Alcinous, *Wykład nauk Platona*, op. cit., X 164.

⁶⁶ Plutarch, *O powstaniu duszy w Timajosie* (On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus), 1012b, transl. J. Komorowska, [in:] Plutarch of Chaeronea, *Pisma egzegetyczne* (Exegetical Writings), Krakow 2012.

⁶⁷ Ibidem, 1016a.

⁶⁸ Ibidem, 1014a.

As a preliminary remark, the Middle Platonist recalls the characteristic thesis of Greek philosophy that nothing can come into being from nothing⁶⁹. Thereby, the first principles must be accepted: “For [there is] creation not from non-existence but from which is neither beautiful nor appropriate just as the case with a house, robe or statue.”⁷⁰ Plutarch, after Plato, writes about the first three principles: the God, substance and matter:

Thus, it is better to believe Plato and say that God created the world and to sing that it is the most beautiful thing of all born and that its builder is the most perfect of all causes. While the substance/matter from which it originated is not the resultant, but eternally subsistent, and gave itself to the demiurge to be arranged and ordered as well as conformed as much as possible to it.⁷¹

The philosopher from Chaeronea, therefore, indicates that there was a disorder (*ἀκοσμία*)⁷² before the world was born. It consisted of the first matter, which the Middle Platonist, following Plato, calls the mother (*μήτηρ*) and feeder (*τιθήνη*). It was susceptible to the formation and taking on shapes.⁷³ As he further points out, it was carnal, but without a specific quality and form, so he states:

This all-encompassing material [element] had size, space and size, yet it lacked beauty, shape and measurability of shapes. It received them, after it had been ordered, to give birth to all lands, seas, heavens, stars, bodies and organs of plants and animals.⁷⁴

However, as Plutarch emphasizes, the original disorder (*ἀκοσμία*) also had some chaotic, disordered movement: “the disorder is not without is a body, movement and soul, but it includes a shapeless corporality and a contentless unreasonable and changeable mobility.”⁷⁵ By referring to Plato’s *Phaedrus*, Plutarch considered the eternal soul (*ψυχή*), which was incomprehensible and

⁶⁹ This thesis finds its expression in the philosophy of Anaxagoras of Klazomenaj, cf. Aristotle, *Fizyka* (Physics), transl. K. Leśniak, [in:] Aristotle, *Dzieła Wszystkie* (The Complete Works), vol. 2, Warsaw 1990, vol. 1, 187a.

⁷⁰ Ibidem, 1014b.

⁷¹ Ibidem, 1014a–b; cf. Platon, *Timajos*, op. cit., 29A.

⁷² Cf. ibidem, 1014b.

⁷³ Cf. ibidem, 1015a–e; cf. Platon, *Timajos*, op. cit., 50D–51A.

⁷⁴ Ibidem, 1014c.

⁷⁵ Ibidem, 1014b–c.

indefinite,⁷⁶ as a source of movement. Moreover, with reference to *The Laws*, the Middle Platonist saw the cause of evil in it: “In *The Laws*, he [Plato – author’s note] called it [eternal soul] a necessity, and he said that it was a disordered soul and a perpetrator of evil.”⁷⁷ In summing up, he distinguishes the matter and a disordered soul in the original disorder, and states as follows:

After all, Plato calls the matter a mother and feeder, while the cause of evil is the motion that moves it [i.e. the matter] that arises to a body, and is disorderly and incomprehensible but not heartless. As has already been said, in *The Laws*, it is referred to as the opposite soul and contrary to doing good.⁷⁸

Having presented the matter and a rotten soul, Plutarch turns to discuss the principle of introducing order into the primeval chaos. The reason for this is God, whom he calls the creator (δημιουργός), good (ἀγαθός), father (πατήρ) and mental being (ὄν δὲ δὲ τὸ νοητόν).⁷⁹ As has already been pointed out, God, being good, wanted everything to be conformed to Him as much as possible. For this purpose, he used eternal and unchangeable ideas-models.⁸⁰ The philosopher from Chaeronea characterises the process of shaping the matter as follows:

God, therefore, did not arouse the wretched matter but stabilized the one shaken by an unreasonable cause. Furthermore, he did not provide nature with the principle of change and experience; however, when it remained in various experiences and changes, he took away much of its ambiguity and falsehood using harmony, analogy/proportion and number as tools. Their task is not to provide things with experiences of otherness and difference through movement and change, but rather to make them stable, reliable and similar to what is always the same.⁸¹

It can be seen from the afore-mentioned fragment that Plutarch understands ideas as unchangeable and eternally existing mathematical entities, i.e. numbers and proportions, which introduce determinacy and formality into the chaotic

⁷⁶ Cf. *ibidem*, 1015e; cf. Platon, *Fajdros* (Phadros), 245C–246, transl. W. Witwicki, Warsaw 1958.

⁷⁷ *Ibidem*, 1014e; cf. Platon, *Prawa* (The Laws), 896D.

⁷⁸ *Ibidem*, 1015d–e.

⁷⁹ Cf. *ibidem*, 1015b, 1017a, 1024c.

⁸⁰ Cf. *ibidem*, 1022e–1023d. The Middle Platonist does not situate ideas ‘beyond’ God; he probably assumes that they are his thoughts, because the causal cause, as rational, should have a plan for the creation of the world in its mind.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*, 1015e.

matter. Thereby, he emphasizes that the world is a structure arranged according to a mathematical formula, which makes it possible to describe it with the language of mathematics.⁸²

While discussing the shape of the primordial soul, the Middle Platonist invokes the idea of the Same (τὰυτόν) and the Other (θατερόν), believing that the principle of the former is the One (ἓν) and the latter is the Dyad (δύαξ): “For each is based on a different principle – the Same according to the One, the Other according to the Dyad.”⁸³ In the soul, the Same and the Other are mixed with appropriate mathematical proportions, and through mutual interaction, they “cause” identity and order (the Same) and difference and multiplicity (the Other). Therefore, we find both differences – multiplicity and identity – unity in the movement of the world:

Also here, in relation to the soul, for the first time they are confused, bound by numbers, proportions and harmonious intervals. And having found itself [there / in it], the Other introduces a difference in the Same, while the Same in the Other order, as it can be seen in the first powers of the soul, that is, in the moving and decisive ones. Simple way in the movement in the sky shows there are visible differences in the identity in the circulation of fixed stars, while the identity in the variation in the planetary alignment⁸⁴. (...) The Same is the idea of what is always the same, while the Other of what is always unlike. And the task of the latter [i.e. the Other] is to separate, change, and make a multiplicity of whatever it touches, while the former – to collect and set together, when for the sake of similarity, they [the affected] take on one of many forms and powers.⁸⁵

Plutarch, therefore, most probably following Plato’s *Sophist*, shows that the five highest genera probably refer to the evil soul (movement), the idea (rest), God (being), the Same (identity) and the Other (difference). How to reconcile the concept of three original causes of the world previously indicated by Plutarch with the science of the One and the Dyad appearing in subsequent parts of *On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus*? It seems that to specify this, we should put forward a hypothesis that only one of the first causes mentioned above could have caused the existence of the One and the Dyad. This reason, of course, is the mental being – God. Provided that the above is correct, it must

⁸² Cf. *ibidem*, 1017e–1022c.

⁸³ *Ibidem*, 1024d.

⁸⁴ *Ibidem*, 1024d–1024e.

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*, 1025c.

be stated that the principles of the Same and the Other, i.e. the One and the Dyad, are hypostases emanating from the supreme God, and Plutarch describes to us the mental process of the divine creator to explain unity (identity) and multiplicity (difference) in the movement of the soul. Such a hypothesis indicates that he considers certain levels of existence: God (mind) – the One and the Dyad – the Same and the Other resulting in the identities and differences in the original principle of movement – the evil soul. The primordial soul formed by God became the soul of the world (κόσμου ψυχή), i.e. the mind ruling over the merged cosmos.⁸⁶ Summing up the process of ordering the soul, Plutarch states:

In this way, he repeatedly reveals to us that not God creates the entire soul, but that it has an inborn portion of evil within itself, which He [God] organized when with the help of the one He limited the multiplicity so that a substance emerged which contributed the boundary. Moreover, with the help of the Same and the Other, he added the order, change, difference and similarity, and using all of them he created, as far as possible, a mutual community and friendship through numbers and harmony.⁸⁷

The concept of the highest principles presented in *On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus* coincides with some of the views expressed in *Isis and Osiris*. The supreme transcendent God (father, creator of the world) is equivalent to Osiris, the matter (mother) to Isis, and the cause of evil in the emerging world (primordial soul) to the Typhon.

As already mentioned, in the writings of Alcinous and Apuleius neither do we find the doctrine of the evil soul (the cause of evil), nor thoughts of the One and the Dyad, as the reasons for multiplicity and unity in the world. Besides, it should be emphasised that in *On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus* we speak of one created world, not five as in *The Obsolescence of Oracles*.

Conclusion

As I tried to demonstrate, there is no consistency in the theological-cosmological thought of Plutarch. Sometimes he refers to the science of the One and the Dyad, and another time he writes about one cause of order in the primordial matter. Sometimes he speaks of the creation of five worlds; at other times he

⁸⁶ Cf. *ibidem*, 1014e, 1026c.

⁸⁷ *Ibidem*, 1027a.

mentions only one world. Nevertheless, what is worth emphasising is that his views are characterised by the thought of the transcendent principle that determines the creation of the world(s). He does not only see the cosmos as an immanent cause but also refers to a principle that is different from everything else in the world.

When the world for the Greeks “opened up” to the East, previously unknown religions influenced the views of the then people, who tried to understand and explain what was new. Under the influence of those impulses, Plutarch tried to rationalise religious beliefs through referring to the Greek philosophy of the transcendent principle of the world, Plato’s philosophy, forgotten in the Hellenistic era. Looking into the past, he wished to better understand and explain the present. However, Middle Platonism, the movement he represented, was not uniform. Its later representatives, such as Alcinous and Apuleius, did not write like Plutarch about the eternal cause of evil in the world (the evil soul, Typhon), nor did they continue the doctrine of the One and the indefinite Dyad.⁸⁸ However, the return to the transcendental cause of the world and the thought of immanent understanding (Logos, the soul of the world) in the created cosmos, initiated by the philosopher from Chaeronea, were continued by them, thus influencing the minds of the next generations.

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⁸⁸ It should be noted that the issues of the One and the Dyad, which were not discussed by later Middle Platonists, can be found in the thought of Plotinus living in the third century; cf. A. Woszczyk, *Problem hen i aoristos dyas w Enneadach Plotyna* (The Problem of Hen and Aoristos Dyas in the Enneads by Plotinus), Katowice 2007.

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REVIEWS

Wrocławski PRZEGLĄD Teologiczny
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Wrocław Theological REVIEW

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Review: Bishop Andrzej F. Dziuba *Służyć życiu* (Serving Life), Franciscan Fathers' Publishing House, Niepokalanów 2012, pp. 344

The issue of man, both concrete and at the same individual human being, will always draw attention to the fundamental issue of personal life, regardless many specific problems relating to people or different societies and communities. It, in turn, brings with it an extraordinary wealth of positive and negative traits, especially of the alternative: for or against life. Therefore, they will be like bright rays of light on the paths of human pilgrimage, but on the other hand, they will also be the shadows of negation, to put it mildly. Nevertheless, it must be added that today this reality sometimes even adopts brutal methods.

There is no doubt that this subject matter is particularly close to Catholic teaching, which is aware that man is ultimately the way of the Church, as St. John Paul II so strongly reminded us. This evangelical responsibility even imposes an interest in the man whom God wanted for themselves, and not as someone abstract, distant, or unknown but a concrete human person. Therefore, the anthropological reflection, both philosophical and theological, present in the Church is the complete opportunity for responsible answers to human questions about the man. That is the most appropriate environment for this reflection and creative reflection.

The author of the presented study is the Bishop of Łowicz and Full Professor at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, where he chairs the Department of the History of Moral Theology. In the Polish Episcopal Conference, he is, among others, the chairman of the Scientific Council. He was also appointed by the Holy See to the Church Concordat Committee. He is the author of many books and scientific articles on moral theology and Catholic social science. He has also published a dozen or so articles on bioethics. It is

worth noting that the presented paper is published as the third volume of an interesting series “Bioethics and Human Ecology.”

The book opens with a schematic introduction (pp. 5–6). The whole study is divided into 23 chapters, which in turn were divided into smaller paragraphs. It seems that it is enough to recall the titles of particular chapters to schematically introduce the content. Detailed issues specify the research analyses undertaken. The first of them *Kim jest człowiek?* (Who is man?) (pp. 7–44) is a kind of a clarification of the foreground of research anthropological and bioethical issues, with a relatively abundant reference to the Holy Scriptures.

The next chapters have the titles as follows: *Ciało – widzialne dzieło Boga* (Body – visible work of God) (pp. 45–53); *Drogi życia* (Ways of life) (pp. 55–64); *Zagrożenie szacunku dla życia i ciała człowieka* (Threat to respect for human life and body) (pp. 65–77); *Rodzina a dziecko nienarodzone* (Family and unborn child) (pp. 79–88); *Należy im się miłość. Służba zdrowia wobec nienarodzonych* (They deserve love. Health care for the unborn) (pp. 89–98); *Doświadczenie cierpienia i bólu* (Experience of suffering and pain) (pp. 99–110); *Misterium choroby* (Mystery of illness) (pp. 111–122); *Mysli o cierpieniu i bólu* (Thoughts about suffering and pain) (pp. 123–137); *Granica między życiem a śmiercią* (The border between life and death) (pp. 139–151); *Ludzkie drogi ku śmierci* (Human paths to death) (pp. 153–163).

The subsequent chapters focus on the matters such as *Przeszczepy* (Transplants) (pp. 165–176); *Wyzwanie eutanazji* (The Challenge of Euthanasia) (pp. 177–187); *Eutanazja* (Euthanasia) (pp. 189–200); *Dramat narkomanii* (Drama of Drug Addiction) (pp. 201–213); *AIDS i odpowiedzialność* (AIDS and Responsibility) (pp. 215–231); *Wobec AIDS. O współpracy chorego i lekarza* (Towards AIDS on cooperation between the sick and the doctor) (pp. 233–241); *Egoizm – ubóstwo – bieda* (Selfishness – poverty) (pp. 243–254); *Drogi przemocy* (Ways of violence) (pp. 255–265); *Terrorizm – droga negacji życia* (Terrorism – the way of life negation) (pp. 267–277); *Pokój z całym stworzeniem – ekologia* (Peace with all creation – ecology) (pp. 279–291); *Świat jako dar Boga i zadania człowieka* (World as a gift from God and a task for man) (pp. 293–299); *Czyniąc pokój* (Making peace) (pp. 301–312).

As far as the content is concerned, the book closes with a short ending (p. 313). The list of abbreviations (p. 315), the relatively extensive bibliography (pp. 317–337), and the detailed table of contents (pp. 339–344) are included. It is a good introduction, especially in the given subsections, to the detailed issues raised by the author.

A cursory reading of the Bishop Andrzej F. Dziuba’s book indicates that it is an opportunity to meet with an excellent both philosophical and theological outline of anthropology. It touches upon the basic premises of every responsible

reflection on man. It resounds in man in the vast richness of the truth of creation and redemption, as well as eschatological leaning. As such, he is desired by God. It is a concrete person in the physical, mental and spiritual traits, living at the same time *hic et nunc*. Such is the man since he will always make pilgrimages in the earthly realities of his fulfilment and, therefore, improvement, at least in God's intentions. This improvement is concurrently discovering oneself, and one's leaning towards others.

In this context, the author's comment is fully justified:

The sketches contained in the book are, in a sense, separate entities, but on the other hand, their common theme is man perceived as a person in many relations with God, other people, himself, and the world. It is touching our perhaps already lived experiences, or perhaps those we will have to face in the vast field of service for life (p. 6).

This relativity is a particular man's dynamism that emerges creatively from the pages of this anthropological study. These multiple personal references constitute a unique perspective and at the same time, a chance for fulfilment. Besides, this is also the desire to develop oneself with others and in relation to others.

It turns out that the richness of such general topics, as the titles of individual chapters of the presented book show schematically, hides many specific issues. The author does not avoid referring to them, although they still do not have more detailed proposals in ecclesiastical teaching. This courage and readiness to take up every subject indicates the author's competence and broadly understood the responsibility for a specific person. The Church must continuously give answers to ethical problems, which is even forced by the ordinary course of events. It is not infrequent that the world far from religion is also interested in Christian anthropological proposals and the system of values. In the long term, it is a concrete person who carries the need for such decisions, since, in particular, ethical choices require that.

As for the source base of the work of the Warsaw theologian, it is worth quoting once again his words from the introduction:

In the course of the emerging thoughts, there are only, whilst not always, references to the Holy Scriptures and both Covenants. On the other hand, the footnotes indicate the teaching of the Church, especially taking the preaching of the popes, particularly Blessed John Paul II and Benedict XVI, into account for obvious reasons. These indications are to allow for meeting with concern for a living faith and the resulting attitudes to life. Let these living signs of teaching be the lights on the paths of mind and heart around the problems of life (p. 6).

This procedure is intriguing and worthy of recognition as it is a proper form of promoting ecclesiastical teaching in the field of research.

The author skilfully searched for various texts and assigned them to the analysed topics and content, as well as more specific matters. It is as if he had given the essential foundation for the proposals, conclusions or remarks made. This mosaic of proposed texts resonates with touching the subtlest questions relating to man, concerning his personal, social and even communion traits. How rich the bioethical teaching of the Council, as well as synodal, papal, and ecclesiastical (including the Vatican dicastery and the Catechism of the Catholic Church) is. How this teaching breathes with the love of every human being from conception to natural death. It is a peculiar ability to enjoy man and teach it to others because many people need and even expect it.

Bishop Andrzej F. Dziuba leans over people with extraordinary respect and responsibility. It is great subtlety and even the love for the being that has been created in God's image and God's likeness. Not only is it an exceptional gift, but also an enormous task. He always sees in it the dignity of the perfect creature of God, wanted for himself, but at the same time inscribed in the earthly realism of life, which, however, is not its ultimate end. For this eschatological leaning, whose prospective appears already in the responsibility of earthly pilgrimage, will remain. Regardless of the complexity of the ways of life, especially those caused by sin, every human being is always worthy to serve life, as the author points out in the title of his study. The cry for the service for life, where a place for everyone exists breathes from the whole book.

The thoroughness of the content of the presented study allows for yet another direct experiencing human beauty, but simultaneously also his sinfulness and evil, even wickedness because this truth fits into human existence. That is why Bishop A.F. Dziuba so sincerely, with a prophetic spirit, draws attention to terrorism or violence, killing the unborn, and euthanasia. It is also an experience of pain, illness and suffering, poverty, and drug addiction. It is the image of the struggle of good against evil in man and the world throughout a fully conscious and responsible life. However, in no way, it affects the commitment to serve the life of every person, which is a specific motto already expressed in the title of the book.

Reading the study releases enormous gratitude for the teaching of the Catholic Church that is addressed to the faithful but also people of goodwill. How much concern for man, his dignity and life it includes. What would the world be like today if there were no such evangelical message? It is good that it resonates so legibly and clearly, and at the same time in a very communicative language. Perhaps this book will make a creative contribution to the service for life, and then its purpose would become a servant fact.

One can get the impression that the presented reflection appears to be a mature fruit of many years of studies and thoughts of the author. It is a part of developments in the field of bioethics, both philosophical and theological, which arouses broad interest. What is more, the Warsaw researcher capably builds his narration, so that the presented content is highly attractive. However, not only the form itself or other formal elements, but the content, its seriousness, and anthropological and existential meaning have always been crucial for Bishop Andrzej F. Dziuba.

Here is another study of human issues, especially with bioethical elements. It is appropriate for the author that he looks so broadly because ultimately, this is the realism of a real human being's life. Indeed, one could also expect many other issues here, such as in vitro, paedophilia, incest, pornography, the Internet, and prostitution. The service for life will, therefore, remain an ongoing personal and social obligation for man and humanity. Everyone should find their place here, so that in this way while serving life itself, they can see their own value.

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Review: Jörg-Dieter Brandes *Korsarze Chrystusa. Joannici – władcy Morza Śródziemnego* (Corsairs of Christ. Johannites: Masters of the Mediterranean Sea), translated by M. Dobija, Wydawnictwo M., Krakow 2010, pp. 254

The issue of military orders, primarily established in the Middle Ages, frequently in the Middle East, remains both an enormously interesting research and purely information question. This is a compelling apparition, an extraordinary phenomenon – not only religious, especially if data are presented in a communicative form and language. This is met by an interest in the Sovereign Military Order of Malta with origins in Holy Land and its official founder, Blessed Gerard.

A German publicist dealing for many years with the issue of the Middle East is an author of the paper under discussion. As a former general and a staff officer of the Bundeswehr he worked in an intelligence service and as a military attaché accredited in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Therefore, he exhaustively knows this environment – so important for the perception of the Knights of St. John. He is an author of, among others: *Die Mameluken. Aufstieg und Fall einer Sklavendespotie* (Sigmaringen 1996) and various minor studies and drafts.

As for its content, the book commences with introduction to the Polish edition by Fr. Prof. Dr. hab. Jan Kraciak from the Pontifical University of John Paul II in Kraków (pp. 5–7). After the introduction by the author (pp. 8–10), several thematic blocks were included. In order to familiarize the content of the work, titles of the blocks rather are worth citing than discussing: *Zakon jako potęga lądowa w Palestynie i Syrii* (Order as Land Power in Palestine and

Syria) (pp. 11–23); *Przeistoczenie się w potęgę morską: Cypr* (Transformation into Maritime Power: Cyprus) (pp. 24–27); *Potęga morską: Rodos* (Maritime Power: Rhodes) (pp. 28–46); *Atak islamu* (Attack of Islam) (pp. 47–54); *Bastion chrześcijaństwa* (Bastion of Christianity) (pp. 55–63); *Przed szturmem* (Before Assault) (pp. 64–74); *Odwrót ze wschodnich rejonów Morza Śródziemnego* (Retreat from Eastern Regions of Mediterranean Sea) (pp. 75–89); *W poszukiwaniu nowej ojczyzny – na wygnaniu we Włoszech* (In Search of New Homeland – In Exile in Italy) (pp. 90–100); *Malta – centrum polowania na piratów* (Malta – Pirate Hunting Center) (pp. 101–114); *Dragut* (Dragut) (pp. 115–132). The further thematic blocks were titled: *Zwiastun nawałnicy* (Portent of Storm) (pp. 133–150); *Natarcie Turków* (Assault of Turks) (pp. 151–156); *Wielkie oblężenie – St. Elmo* (Huge Siege of St. Elmo) (pp. 157–167); *Wielkie oblężenie – port galer* (Huge Siege – Port of Galleys) (pp. 168–181); *Bitwa morską pod Lepanto* (Sea Battle of Lepanto) (pp. 182–193); *Skok w nowożytność* (Leap into Modern Era) (pp. 194–200); *Służba policyjna* (Police Service) (pp. 201–209); *Wojna na Peloponezie* (War in Peloponnese) (pp. 210–218); *Kryzys tożsamości zakonu* (Crisis of Order Identity) (219–223) and *Bonaparte* (Bonaparte) (pp. 224–233).

The entire content of the work is summarized by the conclusion (pp. 234–237). Moreover, an interesting supplement was added (pp. 238–245). It consists of the following parts: *Mistrzowie i wielcy mistrzowie zakonu* (Masters and Grand Masters of Order) (pp. 238–240); *Wielcy baliwowie języka niemieckiego, jednocześnie wielcy baliwowie zakonni, tj. osoby odpowiedzialne za fortyfikacje zakonne* (Great Bailiffs of German Language, Simultaneously Great Bailiffs of Order, i.e. individuals responsible for Order's Fortifications) (pp. 240–242); *Języki zakonu w konwencie, urzędy (wielkich) baliwów poszczególnych języków* (Languages of Order in Convent, Offices of Great Bailiffs of Particular Languages) (pp. 242–243); *Dynastia Osmanów do końca panowania zakonu na Malcie* (Ottoman Dynasty till the End of Ruling of Order in Malta) (pp. 243–244) and *Chrześcijańskie zakony rycerskie w średniowieczu* (Christian Knight Orders in the Middle Ages) (pp. 244–245). The list of literature (pp. 246–247) and the index of people were also added. The whole is compiled by the table of contents (pp. 253–254). Occasionally, supplementary titles of minor repertoires were incorporated (pp. 20, 32).

As noticed by the author of the introduction to the Polish edition:

The work by Brandes is the book not only for historians, which facilitates supplementing significant areas of their knowledge. This is the publication which may be of interest to enthusiasts of marine literature, reading novels about former raiders or more modern battles fought from ships. It turns out

once again that a real story, accurately reproduced and interestingly presented, constitutes more valuable reading than an imaginary one. Life has always been creating better scenarios than imagination of writers has been able to (p. 6).

So tumultuous is the century-old history of the Order of Malta. Certainly, a maritime theme is particularly interesting, especially when it comes to battles.

In turn, as stated by the author:

The book deals primarily with those activities of the Order which explain its presence in Mediterranean basin – combating piracy and preventing an invasion of Turks and Islam into an essential Mediterranean region. The book begins at the time of the fall of the Order as a land power after losing the battle of Hattin on Lake Tiberias (1187) and ends with the destruction of the religious state in Malta by Napoleon (1798). It is worth adding that the book describes aspects of Europeanization of this international Order, which could be learnt by all European countries. The book only briefly refers to the earlier history of the Order as a Palestinian-Syrian land power and its later role of a humanitarian organization is completely omitted. According to the author, none of those periods of activity – without diminishing charitable activities – is relevant to general history (pp. 9–10).

These are valuable introductory remarks providing vital indications regarding expectations towards the contents of the presented study.

Thus, the pages of the current work illustrate the turbulent history of the Order of Malta with the entire diversity of facts and events as well as their actors – people. It appears, however, that the title *Corsairs of Christ* is clearly a journalistic trick. It results from the fact that it is difficult to objectively define the broad activity of the Order by such a term. Therefore, it seems reasonable giving the work a closer subtitle interpretation, two-piece in the German original – *Johanniter & Malteser. Die Herren des Mittelmeers*.

The study under discussion presents a broad spectrum of various historical threads of the then Europe which is also affected by unusual challenges. The book by a German journalist, a passionate about history and an expert on Middle East countries, devoted to a military-naval stage of the history of armed hospitallers addresses a poorly known in Poland, thread of the European past (p. 6). However, it is to be admitted that in many parties the mentioned passion comes to the fore, which is not a good advisor when it comes to the objectivity of the presented opinions.

The rich historical narrative provides the book hallmarks of attractiveness and creative communicativeness. A variety of addressed facts, dates or names is however, complicated to cognitively comprehend without prior knowledge of even general history of the Order. What is more, a multitude of tensions around various interests, authorities, persons and religious motives, mainly political ones, creates a very condensed phenomenon.

Nevertheless, the Maltese spirituality inscribed in it resounds relatively weak and not particularly clear in its characteristic, and it was a significant advantage of the Order's dynamic throughout its entire history. It cannot be reduced to a purely secular structure although, occasionally some manifestations of a given activity seem to possess such features. This is completely inaccurate understanding; what is more, it constitutes an example of succumbing to certain tendencies that aim at deprecating the Order itself and its activities.

Most of the book presents century-old history at the crossroads of Christianity and Islam. It is a phenomenon that for centuries was visibly existing on a multithreaded level in the Mediterranean basin and at the same time shaped its political, cultural and ideological elements.

The problem of encountering those two phenomena demonstrates an extraordinary tension in which constitutive civilization elements of humanity can be heard, not only of this region – more and more visible nowadays. In the presented study, a military theme of these tensions echoes more meaningfully, although it is clearly unified and even oriented towards the Order of Malta and its broad involvement. Certainly, this constitutes an interesting element of history but it requires to be seen through the context of the entire wealth of the Order, particularly its multilevel activity.

It seems that the book is not only a fascinating journalistic account of a certain definitively closed past of the Order of Malta. It is rather, in a concrete example, the dynamics of events with ongoing effects; how dramatic they are even today. To what extent multitude of participants, problems and feelings is moving. All this creates a certain whole, relatively compact and legible. It is connected by spiritual dynamics which the Order tries to be faithful to preserve its identity.

In various parts of the book, one can also notice multiple attempts to assess and value people and facts. Perhaps sometimes the journalistic language facilitates the message itself, as it is relatively communicative, but unfortunately at the same time it often demonstrates a significant simplification, on occasion even a peculiar interpretation, to say the least.

The bibliography seems to be interesting. It is even a standard in the issue under consideration.

In his work, the author based on subject literature and personal experience. For many years he served as a military attaché in the Middle East and sought materials in Cyprus, Turkey, Italy and the island of Rhodes and Malta (p. 10).

This is a valuable addition by the author himself. However, what is striking is failure to indicate the famous and extremely valuable work of H.J.A. Sire *Kawalerowie maltańscy* (The Knights of Malta) (Warszawa 2000), which today is one of the fundamental studies for the entire history of the Order.

The index of names constitutes a curious and supportive appendix to the book. Nevertheless, it contains spelling inconsistencies, a peculiar alphabetical ordering and it omits certain characters. A valuable comparison of dates and numbers was included in the text (pp. 202, 206, 216). An overview listing nationality of slaves freed from Turkish galleys in 1652, 1656 and 1661 is worth mentioning. It turns out that the most numerous nations after the Russians (56%) and Venetians (10.9%) were Poles (8.1%) (p. 206). Poland is mentioned by the author in the context of the history of the Order after 1792 (pp. 222–223).

A chronological correlation of the most important events in the presented period of the Order's history is expected for broad reading of the book. This would provide a beneficial reference in the proper placement of individual content or people. Such a statement would be a chronological key to address the richness of the events presented. The list of masters and grand masters of the Order is certainly worth noticing (pp. 238–240). It is unfortunate that a description of a reproduction of the painting on the cover page was not indicated. It would also be appreciated to include at least a minor set of illustrations related to the history of the Order. It is also a shame that the book does not contain footnotes, but its popular science character seems to justify this fact. However, the richness of the content proposed justifies this expectation.

The presented study constitutes an attention-grabbing proposition introducing another thread from the history of the Order of Malta. Delineating of maritime history is an important component of the history of the Knights of St. John, especially in its early history. With this publication, the service of the sword is more widely understood, i.e. a classical knightly fight for faith, but always inscribed in the famous *tuitio fidei et obsequium pauperum*, the Order's motto and call. Therefore, a complementary view should always recognize and creatively combine these two trends, which should be de facto considered as one.

It must be remembered that this Order's commitment has not lost its relevance even today, and in fact, remains the main message of the contemporary extremely fruitful activity of the Knights of St. John. Naturally, it acquires significance in a divert sense, but ultimately it should come from the same

evangelical spirit. Contemporarily, it is manifested by a dynamic commitment to new evangelization coming from the instructions of John Paul II. In this work of proclaiming the Gospel, there is a place for every Christian, according to the baptismal vocation given and fulfilled, also the universal one, especially for a lady and a knight of Saint John.

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Review: Father Czesław Parzyszek SAC *Znaczenie nowej ewangelizacji dla odnowy współczesnego świata* (Importance of New Evangelization for the Renewal of the Modern World), Apostolicum, Ząbki 2012, pp. 381

The evangelical teaching of the Church is a work undertaken in response to the indication of Jesus Christ Himself before the Ascension: “Go out and teach, then, all nations” (Mt 28:19). “Make disciples to yourselves,” Jesus of Nazareth asked. The proclamation of the Gospel message fulfils the fundamental duty of evangelization, both for yourselves, others, and the world. Indeed, the same Gospel fits within it, but it is continuously addressed to new listeners, under new circumstances, and often in new places, using new tools, techniques and methods. These characteristics seem to exhaust the concept of the new evangelization.

The issue of the new evangelization is particularly relevant in the contemporary teaching of the Church, especially since the time of John Paul II. Pope Benedict XVI even established the Pontifical Council for the Promotion of New Evangelization, separating it as a body completely independent from other Vatican dicasteries. Pope Francis upheld these changes. Together with the ministry of all three Popes, it became more clearly interested in substantive issues and took on a form of seeking practical solutions. It is also more widely present in the official teaching of the Church. The presented study is part of this trend and constitutes yet another reflection on the new evangelization, its signs and pastoral message.

The author of the presented book is a professor at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw and the Higher Seminary in Ołtarzew. He is a Pallottine and an outstanding expert on the issues of the new evangelization and the theology of apostolate. He is the author of many articles, sketches and elaborations, as well as several books. These include, among others *Nowa*

ewangelizacja – drogą Kościoła do nadziei. Refleksje w oparciu o nauczanie Jana Pawła II (New Evangelization – the way of the Church to hope. Reflections based on the teaching of John Paul II) (Ząbki 2010), *Życie konsekrowane w posoborowym nauczaniu Kościoła* (Consecrated Life in the Post-Council teaching of the Church) (Ząbki 2007), *The New Evangelization as a Remedy for Dechristianization* (Warsaw 2012), *Nauka Wincentego Pallottiego o apostołstwie świeckich w świetle konstytucji Soboru Watykańskiego Drugiego “Lumen Gentium” i dekretu “Apostolicam Actuositatem”* (The Doctrine of Vincent Pallotti on the Apostolate of the Laity in the light of the Constitution of the Second Vatican Council “Lumen Gentium” and the decree “Apostolicam Actuositatem”) (Lublin 1970). It is worth noting that the presented book was published as the 14th volume in the well-known series “Biblioteka Instytutu Teologii Apostolatu” (Library of the Institute of Apostolate Theology) (Warsaw–Ołtarzew).

The book opens with the table of contents (pp. 5–7) and the list of abbreviations (pp. 9–12). In turn, the whole is divided into eight chapters, and these into two or three subsections.

The first chapter is entitled *Przemiany we współczesnym świecie* (Transformations in the Modern World) (pp. 23–61). It presents a complex picture of the contemporary world and the urgent need for its renewal. The essential elements of the new evangelization are the subject of the next chapter of Fr. Parzyszek’s study (pp. 62–95). First, this is a question about the path towards the concept of the new evangelization, which also has theological foundations. Finally, the questions concern the goal of the new evangelization.

The next chapter focuses on *Możliwości urzeczywistnienia nowej ewangelizacji* (Possibility to realise the new evangelization) (pp. 96–130). The author rightly asks about the subject of the new evangelization to indicate how its works can be accomplished. It is obvious that the conditions and means of this realization are also crucial. Fr. Parzyszek addresses *Kierunki nowej ewangelizacji dla odnowy świata* (Directions of the new evangelization for the renewal of the world) in the next part of his study (pp. 131–169). It is the fundamental truth of the new man in Christ that is essential. Only after having learned about it can we speak about a new society. The author also points to the building of a civilization of love.

The fifth chapter, as the title indicates, presents *Podstawowe “areopagi” nowej ewangelizacji* (Basic “areopagi” of the new evangelization) (pp. 170–259). Family, youth, education, professional work, culture, media, Internet, social and political life, ecumenism, migration, religious movements and communities, schools of the new evangelization, and parish are – in the order proposed by the author – the primary places for the realization of the new evangelization.

Maryja – Gwiazda nowej ewangelizacji (Mary – Star of the New Evangelization) is another chapter of the study by the Pallottine researcher (pp. 260–280). The author points first to the relationship between Mary and the Word of God, and then with the Holy Spirit. *Maryja a wspólnota Kościoła* (Mary and the community of the Church) are another Mariological issue.

The seventh chapter is quite specific, and to some extent, it reflects its title: *Lineamenta – dokument przygotowawczy Synodu Biskupów ds. nowej ewangelizacji* (Lineamenta – the preparatory document of the Synod of Bishops on the New Evangelization) (pp. 281–300). Following this document, Fr. Parzyszek proposes to indicate the following detailed issues:

- the fundamental goal of the Synod;
- *Times of the New Evangelization*;
- *Preach the Gospel of Jesus Christ*;
- *Introduction to the Christian experience*.

The last chapter of the study is entitled: *Nowe dokumenty dotyczące dzieła nowej ewangelizacji* (New documents concerning the work of the new evangelization) (pp. 301–317). The author recalls *Porta Fidei – podwoje wiary* (Porta Fidei – the door of faith) by Benedict XVI and the Note of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith with pastoral guidelines for the Year of Faith.

The book closes with the conclusion (pp. 318–327). Apart from the Scriptures, the bibliography is divided into the following parts: documents of the universal Church, papal teaching, documents of the Holy See, and literature on the subject (pp. 328–366). In alphabetical order, Papal teaching includes Benedict XVI, John XXIII, John Paul II, and Paul VI. A summary in English (pp. 367–369), Italian (pp. 370–372), German (pp. 373–375), French (pp. 376–378), and Russian (pp. 379–381) has also been added to the publication. Each of them contains a short introduction and a table of contents previously provided in Polish. This right procedure is becoming increasingly popular in Polish publications, thus allowing for a schematic presentation of the work in question.

The presented work may be a significant contribution to the correct understanding of the new evangelization and the need for its realization to authentically renew the modern world and the community of the God's People of the New Covenant. It seems that this issue still entails numerous insinuations or even ambiguities. The articulated expectations appear even more clearly in the context of the then upcoming XIII Ordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops, which was held on the theme of "New Evangelization for the Transmission of the Christian Faith." An additional advantage was probably also the Year of Faith announced by Benedict XVI on October 11, 2012.

In this context, the author rightly emphasizes that:

The major issue (...) of the dissertation will be the significance of the new evangelization for the renewal of the secularized contemporary world. Its author has been interested in this subject for many years; therefore he decided that there was an urgent need to reach the most profound contents of the new evangelization – strongly emphasized by Blessed John Paul II, and especially Benedict XVI (p. 20).

John Paul II, today a saint, spoke a lot about it almost from the beginning of his pontificate. However, it is Benedict XVI who introduced it into the reality of life and various ministries of the Church. The Holy Father Francis also points to other elements, which are even more intriguing because of their Latin American inspiration. In the presented book, this richness of the popes' prophecy resounds relatively interesting.

It seems that the author has correctly read the essence of the message of the new evangelization and its primary and at the same time, practical orientation. What is essential, he also skillfully systematized its manifestations. Moreover, not only does the proposed content discern the signs of the times, but also it is open to culture and constitutes the correct discernment of the future. The entire cultural thread is vital here, as it is not possible to abstract from the whole environment, a kind of *Sitz im Leben*.

In all his research analyses, the Rev. Prof. Parzyszek aptly and creatively indicates

how the new evangelization fits in with the renewal of the modern world and what efforts must be made to bring this rather desacralized world, which has been given to Christians, closer to Christ so that they may acknowledge Jesus as the Saviour – the only source of hope (p. 22).

It seems that the content and methods of the new evangelization can be particularly useful here. What is only required here is more exceptional creative courage and at the same time openness to the breath of the Holy Spirit.

The attempt at systematizing the “areopagi” of the new evangelization appears interesting. There are many of them, and they are highly diverse. Unfortunately, they are often overlooked or underestimated. It is good that the family, the prime ecclesial and human community, came first. In fact, it can become an instrument of the new evangelization that goes towards other “areopagi” indicated by the Rev. Prof. Parzyszek. Through the family, as a special *communio personarum*, the renewal of the contemporary world can take place.

It is a family that has a creative influence on almost all other spheres of human life, both in the personal and community dimensions.

It is particularly important that the author analyses three essential and at the same time the latest Church documents: *Lineamenta na XIII Zwyczajne Zgromadzenie Ogólne Synodu Biskupów* (Lineamenta for the XIII Ordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops), the apostolic letter *Porta Fidei* proclaiming the Year of Faith and *Nota Kongregacji Nauki Wiary* (Note of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith) connected with the aforementioned Year. At the time of editing the book, those were the most recent and leading documents in the presented subject matter. It can be seen, therefore, that Fr. Czesław Parzyszek follows the teaching of the universal Church on an ongoing basis and tries to scientifically analyse, discuss, and effectively bring it closer to a broad audience. The latter mission is worthy of special emphasis and recognition.

Introductions and summaries of individual chapters are a right procedure. That makes it much easier to read individual fragments of the book. Also, the general introduction recalls in an academic form the essential introductory elements, such as the description of the research method or the source database and the dissertation scheme, which deserve a positive assessment.

The rich list of abbreviations may trigger the question of why the Polish abbreviations of the documents of the Second Vatican Council have been abandoned. Unfortunately, bibliography raises much more questions. Reference is made to some items several times (pp. 329, 330, 338, 339). The documents of the Holy See should be systematized according to the precedence of the Congregation and other Vatican offices (pp. 345–346). The Vatican observes the above even with pedantic precision.

What is more, questions are raised by the inclusion of, among others, *Apostolorum successors...*, the document of the Congregation for Bishops (p. 346), *Rapporto finale...* (p. 360), the text *II Polski Synod Plenarny...* (The Second Polish Plenary Synod) (p. 352) or *Pielgrzymka Apostolska...* (Apostolic Pilgrimage) in the literature on the subject (p. 358). As is sometimes the case, the three dictionaries should instead appear in footnotes as sources of terms (p. 362). The abbreviation “KolCom” is described in various ways (pp. 348–349, 357). In many places, no pages were given (p. 347). The alphabetical layout is strange (p. 352). There are also relatively few letter errors (pp. 12, 342, 346, 362).

The footnotes are valuable bibliographical references, but in many places also additions and expanding details. That is a proper methodological and formal procedure. It is a good thing that the author loyally and often points out that his reflection clearly refers to earlier publications or thoughts of other

authors. However, it makes the book a reprint in some parts. Unfortunately, the footnotes also contain inaccuracies or omissions (pp. 61, 213, 274).

Reflection on the renewal of the modern world cannot first omit the renewal of the Church itself, the pilgrim people of God's New Covenant, and the Divine-human community. Unquestionably, it means the consciousness of sinfulness, especially of the people of the Church, both clerics and laypeople, but one cannot solely focus on it. It appears that this thread does not resonate clearly enough. Although the theme of the book seems to be limited to the renewal of the world, at the same time the whole work of the new evangelization in its source touches upon the truth of religious faith, as Benedict XVI indicated even if only by announcing the Year of Faith. Thus, the category of living faith with its traits of trust is becoming a specific key to the whole problem or at least its numerous aspects.

The richness of reflection that Fr. Prof. Dr. hab. Czesław Parzyszek SAC proposed in this study is a continuation of his earlier extensive dissertation *Nowa ewangelizacja – drogą Kościoła do nadziei. Refleksje w oparciu o nauczanie Jana Pawła II* (New Evangelization – the way of the Church to hope. The reflections based on the teaching of John Paul II). Not only does the author capably use its content but he also takes up several new topics, and significantly deepens the existing ones, primarily through a relatively abundant reference to the teaching of the Holy Father Benedict XVI. That is a crucial asset of the presented study.

Reading the book gives the impression that the contemporary offer of the new evangelization is oriented primarily towards Latin culture. Its reference to other continents is poorly visible, while it is where a wide variety of differentiation, including cultural and moral, exists, and other value systems and religions, as well as numerous struggles of faith, mainly personal, individual, apply. In fact, Church's offer still addresses this wide field quite marginally, especially if one were to look for concrete proposals. Sometimes one gets the impression that it lacks the necessary ecclesial courage. The then expected Roman Synod might give new impulses and hopes here. The meeting of the new evangelization with the evangelizing missionary service will be interesting – and it already is.

This publication could have been a good introduction in the Polish religious community to the expected deliberations of the then announced Synod of Bishops in Rome on the new evangelization. It is undoubtedly an interesting material, especially when confronted with the proposed *Lineamenta*. Moreover, the confrontation between the of Fr. Prof. Parzyszek's study and a later synodal *instrumentum laboris*, next a document, probably a post-synodal exhortation that Benedict XVI is likely to publish, is noteworthy. In the reflection on the new evangelization, the presented study is an important and beneficial tool that sets out significant perspectives.

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Review: Chantal Delsol *Kamienie węgielne. Na czym nam zależy?* (Cornerstones: What do we care about?) translated by Małgorzata Kowalska, Znak, Krakow 2018, pp. 320

Cornerstones. *What do we care about?* is another book by Chantal Delsol translated into Polish. Chantal Delsol (born in 1947 in Paris) specializes in political philosophy, history of ideas and philosophical anthropology. She wrote over a dozen philosophical books and several novels, some of which have been translated into Polish: *Essay on the man of late modernity* (Znak, Krakow 2003), *What is man? The anthropology course for the uninitiated* (Znak, Krakow 2011), *Hatred of the world. Totalitarianisms and post-modernity* (PAX, Warsaw 2017) and *Cornertones* discussed in this article. As a columnist, Delsol cooperates with Le Figaro and the magazine Valeurs actuelles. She is a member of the French Academy, a professor at the University of Marne-le-Vallée and the founder of the Hannah Arendt Institut. She is also considered to be the heiress to this thinker. Among the Western European authors, she is distinguished by her sensitivity to the situation of the Central and Eastern Europe, her knowledge of its history and her attempt to use the tragic experiences of this region (especially the Soviet regime) as a warning to the rest of the Old Continent.

The book entitled *Cornerstones. What do we care about?* analyses the European culture and its growing similarity to the 20th-century totalitarianisms, which the author observes in an attempt to indicate the direction of repair. Delsol traces those elements of the Old Continent's culture without which Europe will no longer be itself, and then puts them to the cohesion test because, as she writes, "all cultures are respectable and in all cultures people can live happily, but none can survive without a minimum of cohesion" (p. 9). Each chapter of the book

explains the different cornerstones of the European culture: understanding of the human being as a person and the values associated with it, such as freedom of conscience and the imperfect character of the person; the joy of following values; the promise that brings hope; the primacy of truth.

In the first chapter, entitled *Choosing a person*, Delsol focuses on describing the human being as a person. It is the starting point and the basis of the author's entire worldview. Describing the human being as a person is a matter of faith, or choice, claims the French philosopher. In other cultures, a different choice has been made, something has been lost and something gained at the same time. Delsol points out that European culture traditionally treats the human being as a person. However, that kind of treatment has been degenerated these days. The anthropology of post-modern culture is falling into schizophrenia, writes Delsol, because, on the one hand, it sees the human being as something sacred (never again the Holocaust), and on the other hand, in the light of discoveries in neuroscience and biology, treats him as a higher level animal. Therefore, in order to speak of the human being as a person, it is necessary today, first and foremost, to firmly embed the person's inviolable dignity, and secondly, to review and adjust the status of the person.

Human dignity, in order to be inviolable, cannot be attributed to the human being from the outside. This is the case in cultures that lack the notion of the human being as a person, where society or some of its elements have the primary role. For example, in ancient Greece or ancient Rome, eugenics was a normal thing. Children with developmental delays or those considered unnecessary for the society were killed and no one considered it unethical. Similarly, for the Nazis, human dignity was given from the outside by ideology: it was granted only to the Germans, while the Jews or Poles were regarded as sub-human. Delsol emphasizes that today's liberal individualism, which also decides who is human and who is not (for example as regards abortion), fits into the logic of the 20th-century totalitarianisms. At the same time, it tries to avoid returning to those criminal systems, constantly fuelling the outrageous atmosphere by reminding about the crimes of the Holocaust in schools or television programmes. According to the French philosopher, that is not enough. In such a case, human dignity is granted to him from the outside by creating a certain mood, and the mood can change at any time, whereas dignity must be an internal human category, independent of current social moods, and must therefore be based on the dogmatic faith derived from Christianity. For any dignity that is not based on transcendence is not unconditional.

Besides, for human dignity to be unconditional, it must be without definition, according to Delsol. This is because it stems from a mystery. We human are mysterious beings and no science can describe us in a comprehensive manner.

If we assume that science can determine what a human being is, we could reduce him to neurons or to biology or chemistry, and then he will cease to be a respectable being. In order for unconditionality to appear, it is necessary to acknowledge spirituality. For spirituality introduces the fear of violating something divine and mysterious in a human being. Only such an attitude can make him inviolable.

Having clarified the foundations of unconditional human dignity, Delsol shows how to review and adjust the status of a person. According to the French philosopher, the subject has been degenerated and must be distinguished from the notion of a person. In fact, the Enlightenment has led to a distortion of humanism, since the rule of human-king over the world, present in Judeo-Christian culture, has been transformed into an unlimited power of human-god. The human being began to be treated as an independent subject. This independence, in turn, meant power without responsibility and brought tragic consequences for the world entrusted to him. For he ruled the world without taking into account its rights. In response to this approach, "anti-humanism" was born. Freud, for example, argued that the man in the Bible granted himself an immortal soul and divine origin, and lost the sense of solidarity with the animal world. A further consequence of such an attitude was the blurring of the boundaries between the animal world and the human world. The values ceased to be the source of the creature's this ability, and were replaced by the ability to feel. Since animals also had this ability, they deserved the same respect as humans. This is how the morality of compassion based on emotions, which is still valid today, was born. Emotions, however, are not permanent and it is impossible to build unconditional human dignity on them.

In Western European culture, according to Delsol, the criticism of an entirely independent subject has been expressed in ecological trends. The French philosopher perceives them as a source of hope, as they indicate the existence of some external laws that are independent of the subject – the laws of Nature. Ecologists point out that the humans have violated the sacred order and they have to re-establish respect for it, if they wish to save themselves and take care of their children's future. Such thinking may be the beginning of the path towards restoring the notion of a person. For as a person, the human being is not the creator of the world, but a creature chosen and loved by God, who has entrusted the world to him, and he has to take care of that world. He must, therefore, respect the rights vested in him by the Creator, whereas the Renaissance and the Enlightenment have fictitiously separated God and creation, faith and reason, which has led to a distortion of the subject's autonomy.

Delsol notes that the philosophy of the person assumes both internal dignity and the subject's autonomy. These two values are difficult to reconcile, since an autonomous subject will seek to absolutise its independence, and internal dignity requires respect and imposes restraints. This clash generates tension that is complex and tiring. Freedom is tiring, stresses the French philosopher. This has largely contributed to the emergence of totalitarianism in the 20th century. They took away the burden of freedom and responsibility from the individual. A similar phenomenon occurs in today's Western European countries, which are becoming welfare states. Citizens are increasingly being treated as children who do not themselves know how to use their freedom and take responsibility for their own choices, but instead they must be cared for.

However, according to Delsol, man as a person must be treated as an adult, which in turn leads to granting him freedom of conscience and the resulting *personal* responsibility for his own actions. In Christianity, responsibility is personal and not collective; not because the individual is not bound by the group, but because he can shape his own fate. It is, therefore, not a question of getting rid of an autonomous subject, but of shaping a responsible person. To be responsible is to be dependent – to assume that you are not a master, but a debtor, and that you are subject to what you are responsible for. Delsol writes that to call a man a person is to burden him with a debt that cannot be repaid. Man as a person is born into a certain order that he did not choose, but still he perceives it as a debt, not a fate. This means he is not subject to such order, but he accepts it with full responsibility – yet, he has to recognize it first.

Following a certain order gives rise to responsibility that gives man an identity without which his life is empty. This means that responsible being is the fullest of all – for example, a man is fully realised when he protects his wife and takes care of children as a father and husband, or as a patriot when he is concerned about the welfare, security and development of his country. According to Delsol, the proposal of postmodern culture to liberate man from all affiliations, such as nationality, skin colour, being a man or woman, or family ties, creates an individual without a name, that is, an empty person. Hence, the French philosopher advocates the restoration of the concept of a world that is an atmosphere which an individual breathes and without which he would be nothing, and not just a theatre decoration which he could do without.

On the other hand, the human being should not just imitate a group identity, because then he would dissolve in society. Nowadays, in Delsol's opinion, this is apparent in political correctness, where one repeats without any reflection anything that is received well by others. In this way, however, an extraordinary phenomenon of Christian culture is lost, the one contained in the notion of

a person, which distinguishes a person from the others – education that prepares to take initiatives. Such education is reflected, for example, in the idea of a university, which is characteristic of Europe, where education means not only having some knowledge, but also being prepared to approach it in a creative manner and criticise it. Universities cannot be compared to Muslim madrasas or Jewish rabbinical schools that prepare students exclusively to assimilate a certain amount of knowledge and cultivate tradition. For Christians, knowledge is less important than a student who, in his freedom, can go beyond it and undermine it.

The proper status of a person, therefore, means that a balance must be struck between the subject's autonomy and the blurring of the boundaries between an individual and the world. According to Delsol, such a balance is possible only under the protection of transcendence. God's recognition saves the human being from two extremes: the arbitrary use of his freedom and perceiving the world as sacred (once the Creator's idea is accepted, the world is not sacred itself, but is as God's creation). Only Christianity maintains this balance. On the one hand, man does not blend in with Nature, which allows him to be the subject; on the other hand, he does not rule over the Nature, as he is not its owner (God is), but rather a leaseholder – a gardener cultivating the garden entrusted to him.

In the second chapter, entitled *Happiness or joy*, Delsol discusses the basic fruit that can be enjoyed by the human being who exists in the world as a person – joy. Joy comes from the realisation of specific values and ideals in life. It is not an end in itself. This is why the French philosopher distinguishes between joy and happiness. This last she defines as a feeling of peace and comfort (lack of suffering). Man as a person values joy more than happiness. Happiness, according to the French philosopher, is the product of the Enlightenment. The concept of happiness stems from three factors: materialism, individualism and equality. The 17th century Europe, tired of numerous conflicts and the pursuit of demanding, fanatical ideas, develops trade and industry, and comfort becomes available to many. The search for ideals is thus replaced by the search for prosperity. This in turn leads to individualism. Previously, the individual, feeling he is a part of a larger whole, devoted himself to big things. Now, nothing is worth more of his energy than taking care of himself. Health takes the place of salvation. The 17th century was also a time when the bourgeoisie became more prominent and the differences between social groups were reduced. This gave rise to the idea of social equality and the categories of compassion and gentleness associated with it, which resulted in the attitude of tolerance.

Delsol asks a question: what is the price of happiness understood in this way? And she answers that it is mediocrity. For man, by his very nature, is insatiable. Its insatiability is intensified by philosophy and religion, posing existential

questions. This insatiability breeds anxiety and the need of searching, which is an obstacle to the Enlightenment's ideal of happiness. That is why contemporary European culture, in which this model is still valid, tries to get rid of religion and philosophy and to introduce the Pascal's ideal of entertainment: to forget about evil, as we cannot do anything about it, and to place our desires where they can be satisfied. A similar approach, according to Delsol, is recommended by the Eastern wisdom, which has been gaining an increase in popularity among today's Europeans. It imposes curbing one's desires. Unfortunately, the comfort achieved by limiting or eradicating great ideas kills joy. Man, having no reference to the reality that transcends him, loses the awareness of finiteness and creaturehood and is no longer able to experience the world and everyday life as a gift from the Creator.

In the third chapter, entitled *Hope as the principle of the world*, Delsol focuses on the next cornerstone which is hope, resulting from the promise and combined with mystery. The author emphasizes that hope is not limited to this reality, but directs man towards transcendence. That is what distinguishes hope from progress. To characterise the Judeo-Christian hope, the French philosopher compares two journeys made by Ulysses and Abraham. Ulysses sets out on a journey that involves returning to a home that he had to leave because of the Trojan War. Therefore, Ulysses has his place on Earth. Abraham's journey, on the other hand, involves breaking away from the land to which he has become accustomed, not in the hope that he will return to it, but knowing that it is not his land. His journey focuses on entering the unknown. Abraham has been in a foreign land since the day he set out. The Promised Land, to which he is heading, is a symbol of the spiritual home of man, the one located beyond this world. The hope of man as a person is Abraham's hope – the longing for the unknown land.

This approach to the world is also different from rational thinking, which suggests that man should be satisfied only with what he has. Nevertheless, in Delsol's opinion, there is a fallacy in the calmness and sense of completeness of a wise man, since man cannot be satisfied with himself. At most, he forces himself to avoid suffering. Hope, in this sense, is the opposite of wisdom, as it is humility: it involves acknowledging that one does not have everything. This lack of self-sufficiency is life-giving, because it shows reality and the future as open to novelty and otherness. This corresponds to the natural condition of human beings who find the greatest joy in overcoming their own nature (for example, in the sacrifices of love). Thus, hope concretises the ontological deficit in an individual and the fact that he is oriented towards transcendence.

In today's world, man is afraid of hope because it is connected with waiting for the unknown, with uncertainty. Contemporary man chooses knowledge that is proven. Such an attitude, however, paralyses him in making life decisions (e.g. about getting married). Today, everyone wants to have knowledge instead of trust and hope. But in this way, we deprive ourselves of the joy that is born in an open and uncertain world. Delsol quotes the words of Søren Kierkegaard, who said that the measure for cows is set by a shepherd, while man grows when his measure becomes infinite God.

In chapter four, entitled *How truth guarantees freedom*, Delsol presents the last of the European tradition cornerstones, that is building on truth. Contemporary man, according to the French philosopher, believes that without the idea of truth he will be free and tolerant. Meanwhile, it is the truth that makes him free. The reservation being that this is not about some particular truth, but about the conviction that truth exists. The discovery of the idea of truth in the Judaeo-Christian culture leads to the belief that things exist and can be expressed. Man can speak out about the world and distinguish between what is true and what is false in it. This in turn gives rise to the idea of scientific objectivity.

This category, which is extremely valued by Europeans, stems from believing in the idea of a created world in which there is a universal order. In such a system, the laws of Nature reflect universal laws. Therefore, there must be a heavenly legislator for the laws of Nature to exist. In addition, there must be a belief that the truth exists and that it is possible to get closer to it. Only then can there be a healthy scientific cognition. It is theology that enables such cognition and sets its limits. Only through theology does one not fall into the extremes of modernity and postmodernity: The Enlightenment worshipped science and usurped the ability to grasp the whole and achieve the omniscience; while postmodernity, disappointed by the failures of modernity, began to negate its own ideas. However, one should always remember that truth is an uncertain reality – it is searching. Our finite intelligence cannot fully penetrate the Creator's knowledge. In this way, truth is associated with hope and mystery. You should seek the truth, just as theology seeks and explores God, knowing that He will always transcend it. The search for truth is consent to the unknown – to human finiteness, to the fact that man will never know and never possess the whole truth.

Moreover, the search for truth must be an end in itself. Man seeks the truth because it brings him closer to the Creator. Thus, the love of truth has a theological foundation. Philosophy and theology reach the truth, they do not invent it. The Greek word *theorein* means contemplation – truth comes

from transcendence, it imposes itself, overwhelms man and transforms him. Whoever recognises the truth is not the master of the world, but adjusts to the truth and recognises his finiteness. On the other hand, truth is not just a mechanical acceptance of a proven knowledge, but it teaches us to look at the world and interpret it. A man can be free for he has been raised to seek the truth. His development does not consist in adopting norms imposed on him, but in being prepared for an independent searching of a life path.

Universality of truth is a condition necessary for the existence of truth itself. The truth is either universal or non-existent. If two plus two is four, it's always true. There can only be one truth. The fact that cognition is always put in a situational context does not mean that there is no truth at all. The truth exists, although it is not fully reachable. Such a view, however, is based on the concept of the Creator, and requires humility and recognising the finiteness of man.

Chapter Five, entitled *The abyss exists*, is a summary of the current situation in the Western Europe, which has lost – as has been mentioned above – the concept of the Creator and the reference to transcendence. Delsol compares the Western Europe to an orphan whose illegitimate mother died in childbirth and took the secret of her origin to her grave. This is where we should seek it. This is where hope is, at least that there is a mysterious source that gives a completely new beginning. According to the author, European culture can confirm its right to exist only through discovering its roots, i.e. the concept of the Divine Creator.

To sum up, Chantal Delsol's book is an insightful and interesting analysis of the Western Europe's situation. The philosophical analysis of the Old Continent's culture has been illustrated by numerous examples and comparisons to other cultures of the world, showing the author's erudition and leaving the reader with food for thought. The book is written in a lightweight style, which makes reading pleasant and the content more accessible. As for the disadvantages of this publication, it seems that the arguments have been presented in a slightly chaotic manner, so that they need to be reorganised after reading. In each chapter, the author focuses on one of the values (a cornerstone), but then she interferes with numerous digressions and shows connections with other values to be discuss only later. Nevertheless, the book is worth recommending. For lecturers, it can be a source of valid examples and gives a lot of interesting insights, which may allow to diversify and to enrich the classes. In summary, it can be treated as a kind of apologetics of Christianity. For anyone who is interested in culture, theology or philosophy, the book will broaden the horizons and be a material for reflection on the situation of today's Europe.

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Review: J.C. Lennox *Czy nauka pogrzebała Boga? Zderzenie światopoglądów (God's Undertaker: Has Science Buried God?)* translated by A. Gomola and G. Gomola, W drodze, Poznań 2018, pp. 448

I had known John C. Lennox earlier from conferences and debates available on YouTube. Thus, I accepted two positions of the mathematician and the philosopher of science published by the publishing house W drodze¹ with great joy. The practically untranslatable English title (*God's Undertaker. Has Science Buried God?*)² had to be changed in the Polish edition – the subtitle became the title and the subtitle indicated the basic idea of the book, very aptly identified by the Poznań publisher: *Czy nauka pogrzebała Boga? Zderzenie światopoglądów*. Indeed, the University of Oxford professor, both in the analysed publication and in his speeches, emphasizes that the real conflict exists not between science and religion, but “between two radically different world views: naturalism and theism. The inevitable collision occurs between them” (p. 53). He devotes a large part of the book to the justification of this key thesis. However, he does not stop at this observation, but asks: “Which worldview does science support: naturalism or theism?” (p. 56).

In the introduction Lennox raises problems in a slightly journalistic way, for example, when he recalls that the great figures of modern science (Bacon, Galileo, Kepler, Newton and Maxwell) believed in the rational Creator, and

¹ In addition to the item reviewed – see: *Bóg i Stephen Hawking. Czyj to w końcu projekt? (God and Stephen Hawking: Whose Design is it Anyway?)*, transl. A. Gomola, G. Gomola, Poznań 2017, p. 132.

² The publication in English was published already in 2009.

today laymen are told that science “pushed God to the corner, killed him and then buried, as it can explain everything to us nowadays” (p. 9). He immediately places the problem on the appropriate level, asking whether the naturalistic interpretation of reality dominant today is a philosophical belief arising from science or introduced to it on the principle of “faith similar to religious faith” (p. 11). Instead of answering the question of which position – theistic or atheistic – can be considered scientific, the author recommends checking “which worldview best corresponds to the results of scientific research” (p. 22).

In the first chapter, titled *Wojna światopoglądów* (War of worldviews), the reader receives a sort of evolving introduction with its basic thesis. The very attitude of believers towards non-believers among scientists contradicts the thesis that God would die and be buried by science. Even today, both are found among scientific figures, including Nobel prize winners. Naturalists argue that science has eliminated God, while theists say that it confirms their faith. The philosopher of science enters between both and recalls that “claims of scientists are not necessarily claims of science” (p. 32). Lennox offers a closer look at the forgotten roots of science based on faith in the rational Creator of the world, and then the alleged conflict between science and faith. He discusses the latter using two paradigmatic events: the case of Galileo and the debate between Thomas Huxley and Samuel Wilberforce (concerning the book titled *On the Origin of Species* by Charles Darwin). They have become a breeding ground for the still lingering myth of war between science and religion, which “has been heated up and shamelessly used as a weapon in another battle – the real one, between naturalism and theism” (p. 52).

The second chapter is an attempt to explain the not so easy, as it turns out, issue contained in the title: *Zakres i granice nauki* (Scope and limits of science). Science cannot be strictly defined, and its results do not have the degree of certainty that some people still expect from it. The ideal of an impartial, unconditioned and “Enlightened” scientist should be put to rest. If “for many people science is practically inextricably linked to the advancement of agnosticism or atheism on the basis of metaphysics,” “it is at best a symptom of a very serious prejudice, and at worst a categorical error” (pp. 65–66). In the case of numerous scientists, it turns out that the adopted a priori philosophical stance determines the essence of what they consider to be science. If “for extensive areas of science, philosophical positions of researchers have no meaning,” then it does not encompass “all science – and therein lies the problem” (p. 76). Granting science the exclusive right to truth is not “a scientific theorem, but a theorem about science, and therefore a meta-scientific assertion” (p. 85).

The third chapter titled *Redukcja, redukcja, redukcja...* (Reduction, reduction, reduction...) could be described as a warning against reductionism. The methodological reductionism adopted in science consists in seeking an explanation based on the process of reduction to simpler elements. However, finding the “theory of everything” – the final mathematical compression linking the basic influences of nature – proves impossible. The Austrian mathematician Kurt Gödel has proven that the desire to close the whole of mathematics in several theorems (the so-called Hilbert’s programme) is doomed to failure, and the inconsistency of mathematics cannot be proven without recourse to axioms of a higher order. At the same time, it shows the limits of epistemological reductionism – the whole will always be something larger than the sum of analysed parts, and thus phenomena of a higher level cannot be explained by descriptions of processes taking place at a lower level (and vice versa: laws of a higher order cannot be derived from a lower one). Unfortunately, scientists often make ontological reductions: by accepting a lower-order explanation, they limit the whole reality to this measure.

The answer to the question posed in the title of Chapter Four is very interesting: *Wszechświat zaprojektowany?* (Designed universe?) First of all, the very conviction about the intelligibility of the universe that can be read by human reason draws attention. It has “such a key significance for all our thinking that we are not able to question its validity without simultaneously assuming it,” and only theism, says Lennox, “can justify this faith in a coherent and rational manner, while naturalism is not capable of doing so” (p. 118). The Christian apologist argues here with Stephen Hawking, according to whom the law of nature could have brought the universe into existence. The law, as a way of acting, assumes the existence of a causal entity that acts in accordance with the order of law. In the history of thought, there have appeared conflicting concepts of the eternal world on the one hand and of creation with time on the other, but today science itself suggests some kind of beginning of the universe (the so-called standard model of the Big Bang). The reluctance towards the idea of the beginning turns out to be again a result of the adopted worldview. “The more we know about our Universe, the more credible” – the author argues – “becomes the hypothesis that there exists a creator deity who has designed the Universe for some purpose” (p. 139). Above all, the complex tuning of the fundamental interactions in the universe, without which it would be impossible to sustain life (the so-called anthropic principle), is astonishing. Richard Dawkins’ view that the anthropic principle and God are two competitive solutions to the mystery of the universe is of no use; on the contrary, this principle, Lennox retorts, “is not an explanation of the origin of life, but merely the result of

observations from which the need for such an explanation arises” (p. 149). Even the “multiverse” hypothesis, which Lennox describes as an “extreme violation of Occam’s razor,” does not seem rationally justified, and the existence of the multiverse would also not exclude God the Creator.

Lennox then moves on to the field of biology in the next chapter titled *Zaprojektowana biosfera?* (Designed biosphere?), which, according to many influential thinkers, would present the biggest number of arguments in favour of science burying God. The author advises to abandon the word “project” associated with Newton’s mechanistic universe: “In order to avoid potential misleading associations, it is better to talk about arguments indicating an intelligent origin of life than to discuss arguments suggesting a project” (pp. 176–177). As a result of the “either God or evolution” assumption, there is “a common feeling that the theory of evolution has wiped out God as something unnecessary and irrelevant, or even embarrassing” (p. 179). For this proposal to be true, two assumptions would have to be made at the same time: “the biological evolution cannot be linked with the existence of a Creator” and “the biological evolution explains the existence of the entire complexity of life” (p. 182). God and evolution, however, do not belong to the same category of explanations, and evolutionary algorithms are hardly thought to work without a plan. “Darwin’s Dangerous Idea” (Daniel Dennett’s term) can be reconciled with theism, given that biological evolution requires a tuned universe in order to occur at all. The most uncomfortable question turns out to be: “Can the mechanism of evolution carry all the burden imposed on it?” in other words: “Is Dawkins’ claim that natural selection explains not only all forms of life, but also its existence true?” (p. 195). Again, the philosopher of science points to the connection between the theory of evolution and a priori assumptions: “It is so closely related to naturalistic philosophy that it can be deduced from it directly and without the need to refer to other evidence” (p. 203).

Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish evolution from evolutionism, as Clive Staples Lewis, quoted by the author, has already pointed out. A look at the nature and scope of evolution is the content of Chapter Six titled *Natura i zakres ewolucji* (Nature and scope of evolution). Lennox first differentiates between disparate meanings of the term “evolution”: from common or used to describe artificial breeding selection through microevolution (modifications within species) to large-scale macro-evolutionary changes (formation of new species) or Neo-Darwinian molecular evolution (including the formation of a living cell from non-living material). The key problem posed by the scientist is the question of the boundaries of evolution. Extrapolation of microevolution observation results to macroevolution is risky. Mathematicians have added their

valuable contributions here: some calculations show that possible accumulations of micro-mutations, which would supposedly result in macro-evolutionary changes, would require longer time than evolutionary processes could have had at their disposal. Similarly, the fossil record, which was expected to be a crucial proof of evolution, turns out to be, according to the palaeontologist David Raup – “surprisingly uneven and intermittent, and ironically, we have even fewer examples of evolutionary changes today than we did in Darwin’s day” (p. 237). Molecular biology reveals the world of living organisms with their unimaginable complexity and regulatory abilities that bear the marks of a deliberately acting intelligence.

In the seventh chapter titled *Pochodzenie życia* (Origin of life), Lennox emphasizes the very existence of life, without which one would not be able to question evolution at all. The author considers biogenesis to be an even more dangerous challenge for naturalism than the question of evolution raised earlier. Before a researcher of the micro-world of cells, a miniature molecular factory is revealed, characterized by the so-called irreducible complexity, i.e. such a degree of cooperation of individual elements of the system that a deduction of any of them would prevent the functioning of the whole. The “machinery” constructed in this way could not, as it seems, be created in an evolutionary way; to some, it is a direct proof of planning by some intelligence. Lennox then refers to various theories about the origin of life, showing their improbability in the light of the latest research. The first of them traces the “bricks of life” in amino acids, which make up proteins that are the building blocks of molecular machines. If the very formation of amino acids suggests a certain “tuning” of the conditions allowing their creation, the formation of the protein structure characterized by a high degree of specialization seems even more problematic – its construction “requires the intelligence of an architect and the skill of a builder” (p. 269). Here again, mathematical calculations make it impossible to accept an accidental origin on the basis of random probability alone. “Blind luck is not enough, and there is a fairly common conviction among scientists, whether they are naturalists or not” (p. 271).

Kod genetyczny i jego pochodzenie (Genetic code and its origin) is the title of Chapter Eight. In search of solving the mystery of life, Lennox leads the reader to an even deeper level – to a DNA molecule in the nucleus, which stores the instructions necessary to build proteins: “Just like a computer hard drive, DNA contains a database of information and a program to create a specific product. Each of the 10 to 100 trillion cells of the human body contains a database larger than *Encyclopaedia Britannica*” (p. 282). The cell itself is a kind of information processing machine. The author gives quite a complicated account of what

“deoxyribonucleic acid” is and how DNA gives rise to proteins, which would not be possible if a series of proteins had not existed before; this means that DNA and protein cannot be confused with the first representatives of life – rather, DNA is dependent on already existing life. The mystery again escapes comprehension (what was first: an egg or a hen?). Then comes the time to deal with a few myths: one claiming that everything is written in genes, and another which draws conclusions about human nature from the resemblance of human and chimpanzee genes. It turns out that “a small difference in the number of genes may be responsible for very large disparities in phenotype (a set of observable traits) of an organism” (p. 294). Perhaps what strikes evolution the hardest is the discovery that cells protect themselves against accidental genetic change through certain systems of checking and repairing, and that the genetic code itself has not changed in the last two billion years; the same “genetic dictionary” exists from bacteria to humans.

Attempts to reduce the puzzle to Darwin’s solution do not seem convincing, also from the point of view of mathematics. The author devotes his attention to this issue in Chapter Nine titled *Materia informacji* (Matter of information). According to the algorithmic information theory, compression of a sequence of symbols to a shorter form of the algorithm generating such a sequence is possible, but not in the situation of random sequences, inevitably complex; in turn, we deal with such a sequence in the case of information contained in the human genome. As it turns out, neither coincidence nor necessity as a result of known laws of nature cause the genome. Thus, Lennox asks “if there is any other possibility,” and answers: “It is provision of information” (p. 327). He assumes here that if a mathematician is unable to prove that something is possible, he or she may try the opposite way – proving that something is impossible. For example: it can be proven that the construction of *perpetuum mobile* is not feasible when one begins from the principle of energy conservation. Analogously, in regard to the origin of genetic information, it should be demonstrated that “all explanations of biogenesis that do not take into account the supply of information from some external and intelligent source are unfounded” (p. 331). To formulate the problem in a slightly different way: it would be necessary to prove a kind of “right of information preservation.” If information, similarly to energy, has to be preserved, then “in order to start a life, it is necessary to introduce information from the outside” (p. 338).

From this perspective, in the chapter called *Matpia maszyna* (Monkey machine) Lennox analyses one of the attempts to simulate the genesis of oriented DNA complexity, allegedly obtained only through untargeted processes of nature. This concerns the famous analogy quoted less and less frequently:

If monkeys hit the typing keys completely accidentally and did it long enough, equipped with unlimited amount of paper and never got tired, they would eventually type on the machine, only by chance, one of Shakespeare's sonnets, or maybe even one of his dramas as a whole (p. 340).

From the point of view of mathematics, it is obvious that even the age of the universe itself accepted today (not to mention the space needed to accommodate monkeys, typewriters or rubbish bins!) would be too short for such an undertaking. Therefore, the majority of researchers is convinced that "processes based only on chance cannot explain the origin of complex information-filled systems" (p. 342). Even for the leading evolutionary scholar Dawkins, it became clear that Darwinism could not work as a chance theory. Therefore, the author of *The Blind Watchmaker* proposed something similar to the law of nature: only effects corresponding to the expected outcome would pass to the next stage of the evolutionary process. Returning to the monkeys: a randomly hit letter would be compared (by whom?!) with the target sentence and kept if it corresponded to the target phrase.

Dawkins tells us that evolution is unreasonable. So how should we then understand his introduction of two mechanisms, each of which is a clear proof of the influence of some rational mind: a mechanism comparing every attempt with the target sentence and a mechanism preserving a successful attempt? (pp. 348–349).

There is a vicious circle here: the information that evolutionary mechanisms were to produce would have already needed to be hidden in the body in order to stimulate the process. It turns out that all simulations of evolution prove it difficult to recognize any progress in evolution without "embedding" the expected solution in it.

In the penultimate chapter titled *Pochodzenie informacji* (Origin of information), considering that DNA has characteristics which indicate man-made texts or computer languages, the author postulates to take "into account the fundamental role of information and intelligence in the existence of the Universe and life – they are not the end products of unguided natural processes initiated by energy and matter, but have been present in these processes from the very beginning" (p. 369). The apologist argues with Dawkins' argument that God himself, capable of designing a complex world, would need to be even more complex, and therefore would also have to be explained (in other words: he does not explain the world, as he is even more improbable than what he would

need to explain). At the root of this view is the assumption that the only kind of explanation goes along the line from simple to more complex. This is contradictory to common sense (the author of *The God Delusion* is more complex than the book which he wrote) and science, the theories of which are usually more complicated than events explained by it; what had been thought to be simple (e.g. atoms) turned out to be extremely complicated. A theory characterized not so much by simplicity as by explanatory power would be legitimate.

If we claim that God created the universe, we must ask who created God – this is a variation of Dawkins' earlier argument. It does not prevent the retired professor from accepting the eternal existence of matter and energy, as the Greeks did. The Hebrew tradition, older than the Ionian philosophy of nature, shows the beginning of the universe created by the eternal God. If the ultimate fact for an atheist is the world, for a theist it would then be God. However, the philosopher of science does not allow us to stop at such a statement; following Socrates' advice, he orders us to follow the evidence: "In which direction does science point? Towards the existence of matter before mind or Mind before matter?" (p. 389). It is not about resorting to "God of the gaps" patching the holes in knowledge, because this gap results precisely from the scientific knowledge! The knowledge about the nature of biological information

combined with the knowledge that the only recognized sources of information are those characterized by intelligence, as well as the fact that chance and necessity are not capable of generating this kind of complex and oriented information with which we deal in biology. All these taken together indicate the project as the best explanation for the existence of information-rich DNA (pp. 394–395).

The need for information and creative power corresponds with the Christian faith in the Logos: "in the beginning was the Word" and "through him all things were made" (J 1, 1:3).

Czy cuda są pogwałceniem praw przyrody? Dziedzictwo Hume'a (Are miracles a violation of the laws of nature? Hume's legacy) is the title of the last of the twelve chapters of the book. Lennox focuses on David Hume's famous accusation that possible miracles would be a violation of the laws of nature. If, in Hume's opinion, the very uniformity of the laws of nature and human experience speak against miraculous events, then the Scottish philosopher's stance can be seen as intrinsically contradictory. On the one hand, it contradicts the possibility of proving the uniformity of the laws of nature and the existence of the necessary causality; on the other, it invokes the invariability of nature in order to reject miracles. On the one hand, he recognizes that a miracle is something we have never experienced

before (otherwise it would not be a miracle), on the other hand, he does not have access to all experiences in order to state it: “The uniformity of experience is one thing, the absolute uniformity is something completely different” (p. 409). He also perceives all reports of miracles as false because he assumed in advance that “no testimony is sufficient to prove the authenticity of a miracle unless it is of the kind whose falsity would be a greater miracle than the fact to be proven on its basis” (p. 423). Since for him the proof of what is regularly repeated weighs more than the evidence of what is unique, “he has already delivered a verdict as a judge against miracles and has not even begun the trial!” (p. 424). The philosopher “simply assumes what he desires to prove, namely that nature is homogenous and that no miracles have ever taken place. There is a vicious circle in his reasoning” (p. 422).

In fact, belief in miracles and in the laws of nature are not mutually exclusive possibilities, as “new atheists” would like. Modern scientists easily reject the miracles of the New Testament, treating them as an expression of faith inherent in primitive pre-scientific culture. However, also for inspired authors, to recognize something as a miraculous event, it was necessary to know the common regularity, from which the miracle was an exception. For instance, Zachariah, although not an atheist, “politely but firmly expressed his doubt” in the angelic news because “the birth of a descendant in their time would contradict everything they knew about the laws of nature” (p. 416). Furthermore, the first voices of opposition to the Resurrection news did not come from non-believers, but from high priests. The second argument raised by the scientific community is the conviction that learning about the laws of nature makes it impossible to believe in miracles. In turn, a theist, recognizing the natural laws, allows for supernatural interventions of God that do not break these laws at all. As a matter of fact, “there are no scientific, fundamental objections against the existence of miracles” (p. 429). Here, Lennox invokes Lewis’ position:

If God annihilates, creates or alters a fragment of matter, he shapes a new situation. All nature immediately embraces this new situation, accepts it and adapts all other events to it. The situation adapts to all laws. If God miraculously creates a sperm in a virgin’s body, he does not destroy any laws as a consequence! They start working at once. Nature is ready – pregnancy with all its natural consequences follows and nine months later a child is born (pp. 419–420).

Finally, we return to the worldview: the real problem with miracles “is that they threaten the foundations of the naturalistic view of the world.” Nature is everything, and this “axiom is a conviction, not a consequence of scientific research” (p. 428).

The professor concludes in the epilogue: “Science has not buried God at all; on the contrary, the results of scientific research not only point to God, but also science itself is possible and credible only through His existence” (pp. 436–437). One has to choose: “Either human intelligence ultimately owes its origin to mindless matter, or there is a Creator” (p. 437). Although science directs towards a Mind through which it can be cultivated, it does not respond to the purpose of human existence. “Real science does not feel at all embarrassed by the impossibility of defining this goal and simply admits that it goes beyond its competence,” and therefore “it would be a serious methodological error to look only at the components of the Universe – matter, structures and processes – in order to establish its objective and answer the question why we are here” (pp. 432–433). The final answer must come from outside the universe. The theological explanation of the world’s intelligence points to the Divine Logos underlying it. Christians believe that He is a Person, and thus can communicate with man not only scientifically but directly. This opens up a new space “beyond the boundaries of science, but not beyond the boundaries of reason” (epilogue title).

* * *

At the end, the reader receives a rich index of names. These eight two-column pages written in a small font reflect the style of Lennox, whose publication is full of quotes and references. The majority of chapters start from a juxtaposition of two-three mottos presenting a “clash of worldviews.” Then, a surname follows a surname, an authority stands against another authority, and Nobel Prize winners are divided into theists and atheists. At the same time, the Christian apologist is extremely honest in quoting and tries to invoke longer fragments rather than treat polemicists selectively. The book gains a lot from all of this, although its volume dangerously expands. It seems that it was originally intended to be a much shorter position. This opinion is prompted by relatively numerous popularization interludes and illustrations intended to make it easier for a less proficient reader to get an idea of the subject. Anecdotes about the Ford manufacturer (cf. e.g. pp. 88, 94, 101) or aunt Matilda’s baked goods (cf. e.g. pp. 80–81, 84, 86, 128) get lost somewhere in the expanding content. It looks as if the author could not slow down and had to report literally everything he had read himself. He did not, however, manage to avoid certain repetitions.

To sum up Lennox’s style, one would need to label this book as popular science. There are fragments that diverge into the scientific nomenclature, so that they become incomprehensible without prior knowledge. However, he includes many “real life” illustrations or metaphors “for mortals” (cf. e.g. pp. 130–131,

142, 249–250, 270), journalistic insertions and colloquialisms (cf. e.g. pp. 23, 128, 161, 196), apologetic “trips,” and even military nomenclature (cf. e.g. p. 167). The whole is complemented by elegant malice, characteristic of debates between religious critics and defenders of faith (cf. e.g. pp. 24, 122, 382), and a pinch of humour, which the reader would not expect from a mathematician (cf. pp. 198, 258, 338). Questions that author had to ask himself also arise: how to pass elite knowledge to the group of “uninitiated” and avoid its trivialization? How to practice apologia in the era of ping-pong debates?

The most serious shortcomings of the publication include the lack of bibliography. This sin of negligence committed by the publisher will be hard to forgive! It is a pity because Lennox’s book can replace a scientific query – only that the recipient will now have to browse the footnotes in search of a good starting point for further in-depth research.

It is not an exaggeration to state that both the reader who is just beginning his or her adventure in the subject of the science-faith relationship and the more oriented one will benefit from this position. The popularizing style did not come at the expense of content. For fundamental theologians and everyone interested in the philosophy or theology of science, Lennox’s work becomes mandatory reading.

Spis treści

SŁAWOMIR STASIAK

- “Primarily, the proclamation of the Gospel”
„Przed wszystkim głoszenie Ewangelii” 5

A VOICE FROM THE VATICAN

GERHARD LUDWIG MÜLLER

- Theology as a Science
Teologia jako nauka 7

ANGELO VINCENZO ZANI

- Theology in the World of Science
Teologia w świecie nauki 19

BIBLICAL THEOLOGY AND BIBLICAL STUDIES

KRZYSZTOF BARDSKI

- Medieval Glossary of Biblical Symbols – Pseudo-Garnier’s of Langres *Allegoriae in universam Sacram Scripturam*
Średniowieczny glosariusz symboli biblijnych *Allegoriae in universam Sacram Scripturam* Pseudo-Garniera z Langres 33

JAN KLINKOWSKI

- The Significance of Suffering in Biblical Anthropology – Based on Cultures of the Middle East: *Res sacra miser* – a Suffering Man is sacrosanct
Znaczenie cierpienia w antropologii biblijnej na tle kultur Bliskiego Wschodu.
Res sacra miser – człowiek cierpiący rzeczą świętą 43

DARIUSZ SAMBORA

- The Second and Third Jesus’ Passion and Resurrection Announcements according to St Luke
Druga i trzecia zapowiedź Męki i Zmartwychwstania Jezusa w ujęciu Łukaszowym 73

FUNDAMENTAL AND DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

PRZEMYSŁAW ARTEMIUK

God in the World of 'Liquid Modernity': Zygmunt Bauman on Religion.

Presentation and Criticism

Bóg w świecie „płynnej nowoczesności”. Zygmunt Bauman wobec religii.

Prezentacja i krytyka 95

TRACEY ROWLAND

Reflections from Romano Guardini on Being “Lost in Chaos”

Refleksje Romano Guardiniego o byciu „zagubionym w chaosie” 113

SŁAWOMIR ZATWARDNICKI

Radical Orthodoxy as *Suspended Middle*

Radykalna ortodoksja jako *suspended middle* 121

CHURCH HISTORY, PASTORAL THEOLOGY AND CANON LAW

MIECZYŚLAW KOGUT

The Beginnings of the Church Career of Tomasz I, the Bishop of Wrocław,
until Taking Over the Office (1232)

Początki kościelnej kariery wrocławskiego biskupa Tomasza I

do czasu objęcia biskupstwa (1232 r.) 149

SYLWIA ZYDEK

Communication in the Face of Death: the Meaning of Funeral Sermons
in the Old Polish Epoch

Komunikacja w obliczu śmierci, czyli znaczenie kazań pogrzebowych w epoce staropolskiej – reformackie kazania funeralne 167

MICHAŁ SKWIERCZYŃSKI

The Church Institution's Purchase of the Foreign License for Publication
of a Literary Creation in Poland

Nabycie przez instytucję kościelną zagranicznej licencji

na wydanie w Polsce utworu piśmienniczego 185

PHILOSOPHY

JOYCE AVRECH BERKMAN

Phenomenology and Christian Philosophy: Edith Stein's Three Turns

Fenomenologia a filozofia chrześcijańska: trzy przemiany Edith Stein 201

MATEUSZ BIERNACZYK

Plutarch of Chaeronea – the Concept of Principles

Plutarch z Cheronei – koncepcja zasad 225

REVIEWS

REGIS NORBERT BARWIG

- Review: Bishop Andrzej F. Dziuba, *Służyć życiu* (Serving Life),
Franciscan Fathers' Publishing House, Niepokalanów 2012, pp. 344 247

ANDRZEJ FRANCISZEK DZIUBA

- Review: Jörg-Dieter Brandes, *Korsarze Chrystusa. Joannici – władcy Morza Śródziemnego* (Corsairs of Christ. Johannites: Masters of the Mediterranean Sea),
Wydawnictwo M., Krakow 2010, pp. 254 253

ANDRZEJ FRANCISZEK DZIUBA

- Review: Father Czesław Parzyszek SAC, *Znaczenie nowej ewangelizacji dla odnowy współczesnego świata* (Importance of New Evangelization for the Renewal of the Modern World), Apostolicum, Ząbki 2012, pp. 381 259

MACIEJ RACZYŃSKI-ROŻEK

- Review: Chantal Delsol, *Kamienie węgielne. Na czym nam zależy?*
(Cornerstones: What do we care about?), Znak, Krakow 2018, pp. 320 265

SŁAWOMIR ZATWARDNICKI

- Review: J.C. Lennox, *Czy nauka pogrzebała Boga? Zderzenie światopoglądów*
(*God's Undertaker: Has Science Buried God?*), W drodze, Poznań 2018, pp. 448 273

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