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Redefinition of the Role of Asia-Pacific Region in the Global Economy

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## TAIWAN'S POSITION IN ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AFTER THE ECFA

**Abstract:** Two current focal points for regional economic relations in Asia-Pacific area are the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) led by the United States and an ASEAN-centred Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Taiwan as an economy highly interconnected with mainland China surely would avoid being left out of regional economic relations in Asia-Pacific region. However, its unfavourable diplomatic relations with China are still one of the main issues which prevent Taiwan from joining the major regional blocs successfully. Thus, because of such a changing regional environment where most Taiwan's major trading partners are TPP or/and RECP parties, the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how Taiwan tries to leverage on the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) as a gateway to maintain its advantageous status and to have opportunities for accession to the TPP or the RCEP.

Keywords: TPP, RCEP, China, Taiwan, ECFA.

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#### 1. Introduction

Over the past 10 years, the liberalization of regional trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region has grown rapidly and is creating a complex web of intersecting bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. Two current focal points for regional economic relations in Asia-Pacific area are the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) led by the United States and the ASEAN-centred Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Plus the tripartite FTA between China, Japan and Korea (CJK FTA), all members from these three trade negotiations in the Asia-Pacific region together account for around 56% in the world GDP share and share approximately 40% in the world exports and imports of goods and services. The implementation of any one of these three regional pacts, if successful, will have significant implications for regional and international trading environments.

Moreover, one noticeable transformation seen this past decade is that China is moving from being the world factory to being the world market. In the increasing tendency of the world economic centre moving from Atlantic to Pacific, the Chinese market has an increased attractiveness as an investment destination for foreign companies. However, despite China's growing regional dominance in both economic and security issues, the Chinese government still has a lot of influence in managing the investment into China by foreign investors, including policies regarding which areas of investments are permitted and to what extent foreigners can invest in companies of various selection of key sectors.

Taiwan as an economy highly interconnected with mainland China surely would avoid being left out of regional economic relations in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, after the signing of Taiwan and China's Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010, the Agreement between New Zealand and Taiwan on Economic Cooperation (ANZTEC) was signed and entered into force in December 2013, while the Agreement between Singapore and Taiwan on Economic Partnership (ASTEP) was signed in November 2013 and entered into force in April this year. At the same time, in June 2013, the Taiwanese government signed with China a Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Service, which is one of the follow-up agreements under the ECFA.

However, its unfavourable diplomatic relations with China are still one of the main issues which have forced Taiwan not to join the major regional blocs successfully. Thus, in such a changing regional environment where most of Taiwan's major trading partners are TPP or/and RECP parties, the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how Taiwan tries to leverage on the ECFA as a gateway to maintain its advantageous status and to have opportunities for accession to the TPP or the RCEP.

## 2. An overview of CJK FTA, TPP and RCEP in Asia-Pacific region

The Asia-Pacific region is a relative latecomer to regional trade agreements; but over the past decade, the number of FTAs has increased dramatically. The large number of participating economies and population involved, the economic diversity and scale, the sharp difference of interests between developed and developing economies, and the complex and numerous integration mechanisms are the main features of economic cooperation in this region. As an essential part of economic globalization, economic integration activities in the Asia-Pacific region have attracted worldwide attention since 2012 with the launch of new CJK FTA and RCEP negotiations, and with several countries added to the TPP negotiations. And it is expected that these talks may reach agreements around 2015.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> G.Q. Tang, Z.Y. Wang, *Pathways to Asia Pacific Regional Economic Integration: China-US Focus*, China-United States Exchange Foundation, 2014, March 7, http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/pathways-to-asia-pacific-regional-economic-integration/ (retrieved: 13.04.2014).

China-Japan-Korea FTA. China, Japan and South Korea are the world's top 10 trading countries and the total economic output of the three countries account for one fifth of the total global output. At the same time, they are important trading and investment partners and have close cooperation in the division of global industrial chains. According to the joint study in regard to the trilateral FTA from 2003 to 2009 and from 2010 to 2012, three countries announced the launch of the FTA negotiations during the 5<sup>th</sup> Trilateral Summit Meeting on 13<sup>th</sup> May 2012.<sup>2</sup>

Although four rounds of FTA negotiations have been completed and three countries decided that the fifth round of talks will be held around July this year, there are still some contradictions among three countries due to territorial disputes that have created diplomatic and military tensions. China and Japan are in dispute over territorial sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and the maritime boundaries around them in the East China Sea, while the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands is a territorial dispute between Japan and Korea. The political discord among the three countries over the territorial disputes could adversely affect the negotiations.

Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The RCEP is an ASEAN-centred proposal for a regional FTA among the 10 members of ASEAN (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) and the six dialogue partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand) with which ASEAN has signed FTAs. The 16 participating countries account for almost half of the world's population, 29% of global GDP and 30% of world exports.

The RECP history reaches back to 1997, starting as a study proposal for establishing an ASEAN + 3 East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA). This was complemented from 2007 with another parallel joint research for an ASEAN + 6 Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) proposed by Japan. Both joint researches were reported almost around the same time at the ASEAN + 3 economy ministers' meeting in 2009. Later, at the Fourth East Asia Summit in 2009, officials were tasked to consider the recommendations of both the East Asia Free Trade Area and Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia studies due to the conflict among the participating countries, especially Japan that prefers CEPEA and China that prefers EAFTA. Therefore, in order to end the debate ASEAN proposed its own model for an ASEAN-centred regional FTA – the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Later, at the 19th ASEAN Summit in 2011 ASEAN leaders endorsed a framework doe RCEP, and at the 20th Summit in 2012 it was officially announced that the RCEP negotiations would be initiated in early 2013 and completed by the end of 2015.<sup>3</sup>

Based on the Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the RCEP, it states that the agreement will have a deeper and broader engagement with improvements

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Ministry of Commerce, PRC, *China's Free Trade Agreements under Consideration: China-Japan-Korea Joint Study*, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/chinarh.shtml (retrieved: 15.04.2014).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, *Background to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Initiative*, 2012, December, https://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/rcep/downloads/rcep-background-paper-background.pdf (retrieved: 17.04.2014).

over all existing ASEAN + 1 FTAs and will not retreat on any provision for integration which already exists. Taking into consideration the different levels of development of the participating countries, the agreement will include forms of flexibility for special and differential treatment to the least-developed member states. In addition, the RCEP agreement has an open accession clause to enable the participation of any ASEAN FTA partner which did not participate in the negotiations and any other external economic partners after the completion of the RCEP negotiations.<sup>4</sup>

*Trans-Pacific Partnership.* The Trans-Pacific Partnership led by the United States is an FTA currently being negotiated by 12 countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam. The total GDP of the current TPP 12 parties comprises approximately 40% of the world GDP and 26% of the world trade.

The TPP originated from the 2005 Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPSEP), a FTA among four Pacific governments of Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. The TPSEP was renamed the Trans-Pacific Partnership following the United States' expression in joining the talks in 2008. After President Obama took office in 2009, he announced the United States' intention to work with the TPP countries to form an ambitious and comprehensive agreement of the 21st century, with the objective of shaping abroad membership and the highest standards regional pact. Since TPP negotiations began in 2010, 19 rounds of talks have been conducted as of August 2013.<sup>5</sup>

The TPP aims to be a high quality preferential trade agreement with few exemptions and a more demanding set of regulations in areas such as labour standards, intellectual property rights, state-owned enterprises and government procurement policies. Unlike the RCEP's open accession clause, the TPP is open to all APEC economies, with the aim of becoming a FTA of the Asia-Pacific region (FTAAP), and countries not involved in the networks of bilateral FTAs among members can also join the initiative during the course of the negotiations. However, the entire process surrounding the negotiations is shrouded in secrecy.

There is some concern that TPP and RCEP proposals could also be associated with patterns of major power competition, especially between the U.S. and China, to shape the economic cooperation and cement their economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Since the Obama Administration announced its pivot of U.S. interests towards Asia, through the completion of a high-standard TPP the U.S.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> ASEAN, Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, 2012, http://www.asean.org/images/2012/documents/Guiding%20Principles%20 and%20Objectives%20for%20Negotiating%20the%20Regional%20Comprehensive%20Economic%20Partnership.pdf (retrieved: 20.04.2014).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Organization of American State's Foreign Trade Information System, *Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement – Background and Negotiations*, http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/TPP/TPP\_e.ASP (retrieved: 22.04.2014).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> B.D. Sanchita, RCEP and TPP: Comparisons and concerns, *ISEAS Perspective* 2013, no. 2, p. 7, http://www.iseas.edu.sg/documents/publication/ISEAS%20Perspective%202013\_2.pdf (retrieved: 22.04.2014).

wants to implement the rebalance and remain a major force in the region. While the U.S. is actively advocating the TPP as a way of countering China's economic rise, the Chinese government is also stepping up its own efforts on pushing forward building new free trade pacts, including CJK FTA, ASEAN + 3 and RCEP, to help gain initiatives in Asia-Pacific region. It can be easily seen that the China-supported RCEP does not involve the United States and US-led TPP negotiations do not include China at the moment.

Despite the major power competition between the U.S. and China, the U.S. stated that China and other countries will be welcome to join the TPP in the future, so long as they meet the necessary standards for admission, which presently make China less likely to join. Therefore, recently the Chinese government declared its interest in early participation in the TPP negotiations in order not to leave out of setting global regulations.

### 3. Taiwan's dilemma in the Asia-Pacific economic integration

There are currently 12 parties negotiating the TPP, six of which are among Taiwan's top 20 trading partners (Japan, United States, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and Vietnam), while 11 out of Taiwan's top 20 trading partners (China, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia, Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand and India) are participating in RCEP negotiations (Table 1).

Due to the shortage of natural resources and a relatively small domestic market, foreign trade has been the engine of Taiwan's rapid growth since the 1960s with the government actively implementing export-oriented policies. As a result, there is a highly dependent relation between foreign trade and economic growth. Any fluctuations in world demand could easily change Taiwan's economy, including the trade diversion effect from its trading partners, especially those countries in CJK FTA, RCEP and TPP negotiations which accounted for 37.17, 56 and 32.79% of total trade in 2013 (Table 1).

In the "Global Enabling Trade Index 2014" by the World Economic Forum, Taiwan ranked 24<sup>th</sup> out of 138 economies, rising five notches from its last listing in 2012. However, among the seven pillars of enabling trade index, Taiwan had poor performance in the foreign market access? (137<sup>th</sup>), which burdens its performance in the market access subindex (121<sup>st</sup>) and constitutes the main competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis its trading partners. Such unpleasant outcomes could be explained as the result of the low percentage of Taiwanese exports covered by free trade agreements, indicating that the coverage rate for Taiwan is 9.69%. In fact, due to its unfavourable

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Foreign market access assesses tariff barriers faced by a country's exporters in destination markets. It includes the average tariffs faced by the country as well as the margin of preference in destination markets negotiated through bilateral or regional trade agreements or granted in the form of trade preferences. Source from: World Economic Forum, *The Global Enabling Trade Report 2014*, Geneva 2014, p. 4.

Table 1. Total trade with Taiwan's trading partners participating in TPP and RCEP, 2013

Country Name	Total Trade				Total Trade				
	Ranking	Amount	Share (%)	Tariffs faced*	Country Name	Ranking	Amount	Share (%)	Tariffs faced*
China <sup>a), b)</sup>	1	119,608,262,975	21.473	5.4	India <sup>b)</sup>	19	6,101,861,314	1.095	5.4
Japan <sup>a), b), c)</sup>	2	60,100,490,678	10.79	6.0	Canada <sup>c)</sup>	25	3,847,060,432	0.691	5.5
United States <sup>c)</sup>	3	56,504,625,198	10.144	5.9	Mexico <sup>c)</sup>	29	2,535,674,597	0.455	5.1
Korea <sup>a), b)</sup>	5	27,360,394,044	4.912	5.3	Chile <sup>c)</sup>	32	2,066,935,249	0.371	3.5
Singapore b), c)	6	27,112,105,863	4.867	4.2	New Zealandb), c)	38	1,300,647,608	0.234	4.9
Malaysia <sup>b), c)</sup>	8	16,095,882,178	2.89	4.5	Cambodia <sup>b)</sup>	51	700,313,856	0.126	3.7
Indonesia <sup>b)</sup>	10	12,167,300,279	2.184	4.4	Peru <sup>c)</sup>	58	464,645,107	0.083	4.6
Australia <sup>b), c)</sup>	11	11,616,271,133	2.085	5.8	Myanmar <sup>b)</sup>	69	278,256,362	0.05	4.2
Vietnam <sup>b), c)</sup>	12	11,189,343,536	2.009	4.5	Brunei <sup>b), c)</sup>	99	91,495,137	0.016	N/A
Philippines <sup>b)</sup>	13	10,597,561,480	1.903	4.4	Laos <sup>b)</sup>	133	16,711,608	0.003	3.8
Thailand <sup>b)</sup>	14	9,922,341,477	1.781	4.3	Total	_	557,018,864,945	100	

Note: <sup>a)</sup> Member State of CJK FTA; <sup>b)</sup> Member State of RCEP; <sup>c)</sup> Member State of TPP.; \* trade-weighted average tariff faced in destination markets (%) (2013 or most recent year available).

Source compiled from Bureau of Foreign Trade, MOEA, R.O.C. and Global Enabling Trade Report 2014.

diplomatic relations with China, the Taiwanese government had only signed six FTAs with seven countries and one early announcement with China since its accession to the WTO in 2002. In addition, Taiwan's trade-weight average tariff faced in destination markets is 6%, while its main competitors, South Korea and mainland China, impose an average 5.3 and 5.4%, respectively (Table 1).

As the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared that "the TPP is turning the Pacific Ocean into an inland sea and a huge economic zone," more and more countries thus have expressed interest in joining the RCEP and TPP talks, including Taiwan. The Taiwanese government has reiterated its desire many times to participate in both groupings, if the opportunity arises in any case. Although the RCEP accounts for a higher percentage of Taiwan's total trade than the TPP, the RCEP will only enable new members to participate after the completion of the RCEP negotiations among the initial 16 countries, which is not scheduled to occur before the end of 2015. At the same time, the possible entry of any new country into the TPP pact would be expected to occur after the negotiations among the current members concluded in April or July this year. Moreover, recently U.S. officials have made positive statements that the U.S. welcomed Taiwan's interest in joining the TPP. But they also suggested that Taiwan should raise its interest in membership with all of the other parties in the TPP negotiations, since the TPP is a consensus-type membership.

## 4. What can Taiwan do to raise its interest in membership with all of the other parties?

Taiwan's position in Asian supply chains and its economy's reliance on international trade has made market access for its exports and stable trading relations a priority. On the other hand, as a result of its rapid economic growth and its energetic participation in the regional economic integration, China's attitude and position has become a crucial factor in the decision making process in economic affairs in the Asia-Pacific region. But somehow the accession of Taiwan into the WTO provided it with space to manage its international trade relations and thereby more or less alleviated the pressure from the Chinese government on Taiwan to negotiate FTAs with its main trading partners.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> M. Barker, Taiwan aims for participation in two regional economic groupings, *Taiwan Panorama* 2014, March 12, http://www.taiwan-panorama.com/en/show\_issue.php?id=201430303038E. TXT&table=3&distype=text&year=2014&month=3 (retrieved: 27.04.2014).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> J. Chen, *U.S. official welcome Taiwan's interest in TPP membership*, Central News Agency, 2014, March 15, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201403150003.aspx (retrieved: 27.04.2014).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Because of China's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, Taiwan became the WTO's 144<sup>th</sup> member on 1<sup>st</sup> January 2012 after China's WTO accession on 11<sup>th</sup> December 2011. In addition, based on the "One China Policy", Taiwan joined the WTO under the names "Chinese Taipei" and "The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu" in order to avoid any implication that Taiwan had joined the WTO as a state.

Thanks to the Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) many countries which previously kept a wait-and-see approach, now have a greater willingness to invest in Taiwan and develop closer economic relations with the nation. However, as it happened when China decided to press for WTO membership after Taiwan expressed strong interest in joining the international trade body, there is uncertainty whether China might impede Taiwan's interest for having FTAs with members both from TPP and RCEP if those members do not have a trade agreement with China before signing with Taiwan. For example, China did not hinder Taiwan's FTAs with New Zealand and Singapore because New Zealand and China concluded a bilateral agreement before New Zealand came to an agreement with Taiwan, and Singapore first had an agreement with China through its membership in ASEAN.<sup>11</sup>

Despite China's growing regional dominance in both economic and security issues, the Chinese government still has a lot of influence in managing the investment into China by foreign investors, including policies regarding which areas of investments are permitted and to what extent foreigners can invest in companies of various selection of key sectors. Hence, before the TPP, RCEP and CJK FTA reaches a consensus, what can Taiwan do to raise its interest in membership with all of the other parties, especially for those with which China does not have free trade agreements?

Firstly, together with the implementation of the "Three Direct Links" in postal services, trade and air, and shipping transportation in 2008 and the implementation of the agreements on enhancing financial cooperation, jointly cracking down on crimes and offering mutual judicial assistance in 2009, the singing of the ECFA symbolized the rapid improvement in Cross-Strait relations in decades. Therefore, many countries view Taiwan as a platform to expand their business with China and a gateway exporting to China. By sharing historical, linguistic, and cultural ties, the implementation of those agreements allows Taiwan's business to enter China's market without any cultural nor language barriers. This provides a favourable position to grasp opportunities in China's markets before its trade competitors, and utilizes China's economic resources to boost Taiwan's economic development compete.

Secondly, the business etiquette in China differs from that practiced in Western societies. Finding a trading partner for Chinese markets in a more developed area such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore will be easier and faster for foreign investors when it comes to understanding the "ins and outs" of doing business in China. Compared to Hong Kong, the advantageous geography of the Asia-Pacific region, easy access to China's production resources, world-leading manufacturing and hi-tech industries, comprehensive supply chains and industrial clusters, and active

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> H. Stephens, D. Goold, *Should Canada Support Taiwan's Entry into the Trans-Pacific Partner-ship?*, Canada-Asia Agenda, 2014, https://www.asiapacific.ca/canada-asia-agenda/should-canada-support-taiwans-entry-trans-pacific (retrieved: 29.04.2014).

in R&D and product innovation enable Taiwan to become a priority cooperation partner for multinational enterprises to utilize Taiwan's advantage as an entry-point to China.

Thirdly, in 2011 the present government of the ROC unveiled its "Golden Decade, National Visions" plans in order to achieve a robust economy for the nation's development over the coming ten years. Within the plan, the government has announced several policy objectives for innovating technologies, encouraging scientific research, adjusting the economic structure, improving employment, and stabilizing prices and modernizing agriculture in order to transform and enhance Taiwan's business and investment conditions in the international community. <sup>12</sup> In addition, the government is carrying out a plan to set up Free Economic Pilot zones (FEPZs)<sup>13</sup> connecting to the industrial clusters in their neighbourhood. The purpose of creating FEPZs is to combine the functions of seaports and airports with meeting all the needs for supply-chain management, and to create a friendly tax environment for transnational business operations by relaxing restrictions to the flow of goods, personnel, and technology.

In the fourth place, service trade has become an important driver of economic growth and is increasingly important to Asia-Pacific economic integrations. Therefore, the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) 23 parties, including Taiwan, have recently agreed on a framework for the negotiation of the high-quality and comprehensive services-only trade agreement in order to promote free trade in services by guaranteeing open markets for all. For this reason, the Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Service, which is one of the follow-up agreements under the ECFA, was signed between Taiwan and China in June 2013. The pact promises a higher degree of liberalization than through the WTO and provides great business opportunities for the financial and e-commerce sectors in the Chinese market. The government hopes that foreign companies might take advantage of the agreement and seek strategic partners in Taiwan to access the market. However, the agreement currently is ungratified by Taiwanese legislature because of the Sunflower Student Movement in March 2014. They argue that the pact was negotiated through

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> P.K. Fang, Taiwan's strategy of integrating into the global and the regional economy, [in:] J. Rymarczyk (ed.), *Handel i inwestycje w semiglobalnym otoczeniu*, t. 1, Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, no. 267, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2012, p. 197.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Free Economic Pilot zones (FEPZs) are teat beds of economic liberalization and market opening, advancing from WTO to FTA/TOO for foreign investors and from ECFA to WTO for Chinese investors in the zones. In Phase I, 13 administrative regulations have been revised in 2013 and 6 seaports in Keelung, Suao, Kaosiung, Taichung, Taipei and Anping; 1 Airport in Taoyuan; and 1 agri-biotech park in Pingtung are approved as FEPZs. The Phase II will begin right after the proclamation of the Special Act for FEPZs. Source from: National Development Council, *Free Economic Pilot Zones: Time Line*, http://www.fepz.org.tw/en/m1.aspx?sNo=0020108 (retrieved: 3.05.2014).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> US wants to expand trade and investment under TISA, *Taipei Times* 2013, November 2, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/11/02/2003575967 (retrieved: 4.05.2014).

undemocratic processes and will allow China to gain greater political control over the island. Therefore, the opponents stand for the establishment of a monitoring mechanism and demand for an article-by-article review of the agreement before restarting negotiations with China.

#### 5. Conclusions

Joining TPP and RCEP is a must for Taiwan to compete with Singapore, Hong Kong, as well as other countries and areas. But if the nation is to win the trust of the members of these two free trade blocs and their support for Taiwan's entry, China's attitude and position is still a crucial factor. Although Taiwan will have no problem with passing a similar pact with a country other than China, the uncertainty over the Cross-Strait Agreement in Service would serve as an indication to the international community that Taiwan lacks capacity to effectively engage in fulfilling an already signed trade agreement and the risks involved for other countries in signing a FTA with Taiwan may be more important than the potential benefits. However, no one can guarantee as Taiwanese government mentioned that once the two sides sign the agreement in service, Taiwan will be able to join the TPP or RCEP. One can be sure while the Taiwanese government tries to leverage on the ECFA to gain support for TPP and RCEP membership, Taiwan not only needs to be more careful to deal with the option of further economic integration with China, which has become a threat to Taiwan's autonomy and democracy; but also needs to find a way of locating itself strategically among those major powers.

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### POZYCJA TAJWANU W INTEGRACJI EKONOMICZNEJ REGIONU AZJI-PACYFIKU PO ECFA

Streszczenie: Dwa obecne punkty centralne dla regionalnych relacji ekonomicznych w regionie Azji-Pacyfiku stanowią Partnerstwo Transpacyficzne (TPP) przewodzone przez Stany Zjednoczone oraz Regionalne Kompleksowe Partnerstwo Gospodarcze (RCEP) pod przewodnictwem ASEAN. Tajwan jako gospodarka wysoce połączona z Chinami na pewno uniknęłaby pominięcia w regionalnych relacjach ekonomicznych Azji-Pacyfiku. Jednak jej niesprzyjające relacje dyplomatyczne z Chinami są wciąż jednym z głównych czynników powstrzymujących Tajwan przed dołączeniem do głównych bloków regionalnych. W związku z tym w tak zmieniającym się środowisku regionalnym, w którym głównymi partnerami handlowymi Tajwanu są strony TPP lub/i RECP, celem tej pracy jest ukazanie, jak Tajwan próbuje wpłynąć na Porozumienie o Współpracy Ekonomicznej (ECFA) jako drogę do utrzymania jego korzystnego statusu oraz posiadania możliwości wejścia do TPP lub RCEP.

Słowa kluczowe: TPP, RCEP, China, Tajwan, ECFA.